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Fitments Of Project 15A DDG INS Kolkata D-63

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Official press-briefings of the type given by the Indian Navy (IN) on August 13 regarding the INS Kolkata D-63—the first of three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG) on order for the IN—are always important for two reasons: for what is disclosed, and for what is not. For instance, while the IN stated that INS Kolkata is 90% indigenous by cost, it never went beyond that (thereby repeating history, for, on April 29, 2010, the IN had claimed that the total indigenous effort accounted for 60% of the cost of producing each Project 17 guided-missile frigate (FFG). My personal estimation is that in terms of hardware, INS Kolkata can boast of less than 50% indigenous content. And each Project 15A DDG’s acquisition cost is almost US$950 million (Rs.38 billion), while that of each Project 17 FFG is US$650 million (Rs.26 billion). The cost escalation in these two shipbuilding projects has been about 225% for Project 15A, about 260% for Project 17, with the main reasons contributing towards cost escalations being: delay in supply of warship-building D-40S steel by Russia, escalation due to increases in expenditure of the services rendered by Russian specialists on account of inflation during the build-period, impact of wage revisions due from October 2003, and finalisation of cost of weapons and sensors. 
INS Kolkata, whose keel was laid down on September 23, 2003, was launched on March 30, 2006. Therefore, detailed design of this class of DDG (using TRIBON CAD software) by a joint team comprising the IN’s in-house Directorate of Naval Design (DND)—which celebrates its 50 years of existence this year—and the MoD-owned shipbuilder Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), should have been concluded by mid-2002. But this was not to be, since the weapon-and-sensor fitments were yet to be selected at that time. It was only on January 27, 2006 that India’s MoD-owned Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inked the Barak-2 LR-SAM’s joint five-year joint R & D contract—valued at US$556 million—following 17 months of exhaustive negotiations. And the follow-on US$1.1 billion procurement contract for Barak-2 LR-SAMs and the three EL/M-2248 S-band multi-function search-and-target acquisition radars (MF-STAR)—the first naval active phased-array radars to become operational with a navy of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—was inked in April 2009. As a result, it can be safely inferred that the DND had finalised only about 70% of the DDG’s design by 2003. 
What cannot be denied, however, is that the IN’s DND and its captive centre of excellence—the Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE)—along with MDL, have succeeded in fabricating and delivering an engineering marvel, despite several institutional handicaps. For instance, designing and building the main mast housing the EL/M-2248 was no small achievement. This APAR comprises four 3 x 3-metre fixed-array faces (each weighing 1,500kg) based on a modular tile-array architecture providing full 360-degree coverage. Liquid cooling is used to dissipate heat at the arrays. The EL/M-2248’s on-board processors and power-suppliers together weigh 900kg and are housed within six cabinets--two for the processors and four for the power-supply hardware. The entire MF-STAR suite thus weighs 6,900kg.In addition to 3-D long-range airspace volume search, the EL/M-2248 simultaneously provides ASCM approach warning; target classification; maritime surface surveillance; active and semi-active SAM support; fire-control for the OTOBreda 76/62 SRGM; and multiple targets engagement capabilities. It can detect a combat aircraft flying at high altitude at ranges of up to 250km, while an incoming ASCM can be detected at ranges of up to 25km.
The INS Kolkata’s CMS-15A combat management system (CMS), developed by the WESEE, includes the IAI-developed  Weapon Control System (WCS), which performs threat evaluation and resource allocation functions, thereby optimising the capabilities of the CMS. The WCS thus provides simultaneous long-range volume search, threat alert, target verification/acquisition, target classification, track-while-search, and dedicated track, multi-long-range intercept support, and kill assessment capabilities. It is also characterised by:

* Wide intercept envelopes against a wide variety of targets.

* Quick reaction, short response time and minimum intercept range, these being crucial in scenarios of late target detection, high-speed attacking weapons, and restrained response policy.

* Long-range area defence.

* Effective against targets from low-altitude to their maximum operational flight altitude.

* Simultaneous multi-target engagement capability and multi-missile co-existence capability for ensuring effectiveness against saturation attacks. 

* De-confliction and coordination capabilities in dense and complex scenarios.

* Advanced ECCM features.

* Built-in threat evaluation, resources allocation and engagement coordination with other on-board defence systems.

* 2-way data-link with LR-SAMs (housed within eight 8-cell modules each weighing 1,700kg) increases mission success and target selectivity by providing the missile with real-time in-flight targetting updates, and providing real-time kill assessment to support shoot-look-shoot operations.

* Multi-system interoperability (task force-level as well as carrier battle group-level operations), under which each system may operate either as a standalone unit, supported by own sensors for engagement and guidance; or integrated in a multi-warship task force. Joint task force-level operation enables coordinated engagement of threats, mission optimisation (engaging each target with the optimal interceptor, in the optimal time) and resource sharing.

* Advanced Net-of-Nets architecture to ensure interoperability with other air-defence assets, such as remote/airborne radars mounted on aerostats) and external command-and-control centres).

* The Barak-8 LR-SAM’s flexible dual-pulse motor propulsion system provides high manoeuvrability at target interception range throughout its wide envelope.

* High-performance missile warhead specially designed for catering to a wide variety of airborne targets, and which guarantees robust target destruction.

* Built-in fratricide avoidance for undertaking safe air-defence operations near friendly air-traffic.

* Gunnery support capability, including combined missiles/gun engagement.
Expected To Go On-Board In Future
 Or
Though it was way back in late 2007 that the IN was introduced to the concept of operating remote-controlled RHIBs equipped with dunking sonars, it was only in late 2011 that the IN decided to acquire such systems since, unlike active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar, the dunking sonar-on-a-RHIB can be operated in both shallow and deep waters (up to an operational depth of 300 metres or 985 feet), are easily and quickly deployed, are much cheaper and impose no restrictions whatsoever on warship manoeuvrability, especially in situations when a warship is being engaged by wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes. It is for all these reasons that the IN in early 2012 refused to order either the NAGAN active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar that was being developed by the DRDO’s Naval Physical & Oceanographic Labs (NPOL) or the ATLAS Elektronik-developed ATAS, which had earlier been selected after competitive bidding for the three Project 15 DDGs and three Project 1135.6 Batch-1 FFGs. The IN now plans to acquire a few ROVs from Textron Systems and equip them with the NPOL-developed LFDS, with all structural and systems integration work being done by a joint team of personnel hailing from NPOL and WESEE.
But what accounts for the long delays in commissioning INS Kolkata? Obviously, MDL cannot be blamed since it is the IN’s DND that was unable to freeze the Project 15A DDG’s design concept well before the commencement of hull construction. Another reason for the delay has been the WESEE’s inability to build either a dedicated shore-based facility for undertaking weapons-and-systems integration R & D, or to acquire a test vessel for on-board tests-and-trials of various sensors, weapon systems and propulsion sub-systems. Contrast this with what China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) has done for undertaking similar activities: at the PLAN’s Wuhan Naval Research Facility at Huangjia Lake southeast of Wuhan, a giant full-scale replica of the top-deck, island and citadel of the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier (Liaoning 16) was built, and a similar effort is now underway there to build a full-scale mock-up of the citadel and integrated mast of the PLAN’s futuristic Type 055 DDG.  
In addition, since March 1997, the PLAN has acquired at least three test vessels, with the first of these being the 6,000-tonne Dahua-class vessel (Shiyan 891) that was built by Shanghai-based Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard and became operational in January 1998. The second such vessel—Hua Luogeng 892—was commissioned in August 2005. The third vessel—893—was commissioned in November 2011. It features a raised-bow breakwater to reduce water over the bow and a never-before-seen 30-feet-tall, 3-feet-diameter SATCOMS antenna on the forecastle. The ship has an enclosed foremast instead of the latticework mast structures found on 891 and 892. The foremast’s three yardarms feature new paired round flat-faced ESM antennae, plus radomes housing weapons targetting Ku-band and UHF-band data-link antenna. 

Heading In The Right Direction.....At Last!

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Matters have now progressed just as I had predicted (http://trishul-trident.blogspot.in/2014/08/blindly-muddling-through-with-eyes-wide.html). At last, the AgustaWestland AW-101 VVIP transportation helicopter procurement process is back on track! The terms, which have been cleared by the Attorney General, state that:
* All ongoing contracts will continue unhindered.
* All contracts related to spares will continue.
* Contracts with Russian manufacturers, where Finmeccanica is involved in the back-end, will continue.
* Finmeccanica will be allowed to participate in all tenders but if there are multiple options, Finmeccanica will not be considered regardless of the competitiveness of the offer.
* However, where Finmeccanica is the single vendor with no other firm providing options, the Govt of India is empowered to go ahead with the deal.
Looks like logical reasoning, sanity and common-sense are all staging a gradual comeback into India and the process of redeeming national honour and self-resilience has begun at long-last. My hearty congratulations to IAF HQ for doggedly persisting in trying to convince the Govt of India to objectively and dispassionately arrive at conclusions based on the merits of the case. For the past two years I too have been on a similar lonely crusade  and I was perhaps the sole voice that took on the task of systematically exposing the sheer ignorance of those ‘desi’ journalists who were propounding all kinds of conceivable (and now-discredited) conspiracy theories about financial impropriety related to the AW-101 procurement process. Needless to say, I will doggedly continue with my efforts to expose the convulated illogical mumbo-jumbo of such ‘desi’ journalists who most definitely are not India’s wellwishers. 
Spotlight On INS Kamorta
(Project 28) ASW Corvette
All four Project 28 ASW corvettes will have on board the RAFAEL-suppliedC-Pearl EW system and ELTA’s ELK-7038 DF system—the same as those on board the Indian Navy’s six105-metre NOPVs now in delivery. The Lynx-U2 NGFS is licence-assembled by BEL and has been supplied by Oerlikon Contraves, which is now a part of Germany’s Rheinmetall.
Build-Qualities Of Submarines

New Force Accretions Are Welcome, But There's More On The Waiting List-1

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Before getting into the nitty-gritty of various procurement contracts that were green lighted since last December, it is necessary to clear the mis-conceptions created solely by the ‘desi’ journalists regarding the roles and functions of the Indian Defence Ministry’s (MoD) Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by the Defence Minister/Raksha Mantri, and the Defence Procurement Board (DPB). The DAC’sfunctions include (i) in-principle approval of the 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) for the three armed services (ii) accord of Acceptance of Necessity to acquisition proposals that are prioritised by the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS); (iii)categorisation of the acquisition proposals relating to ‘Buy’, ‘Buy & Make’ and ‘Make’; (iv) issues relating to single-vendor clearance; (v)decision regarding direct/indirect industrial ‘offsets’ provisions in respect of acquisition proposals above Rs.300 crores; (vi) decisions regarding transfer of technology (ToT) under the ‘Buy & Make’ category of acquisition proposals; and (vii) authorisation and facilitation of field-trial evaluations either on a competitive basis or sole-source basis. It is ONLY AFTER the DAC authorises a procurement process to begin that each armed service HQ begins the process of preparing and then issuing global or restricted Requests for Proposals (RFP).
The DPB, on the other hand, is the body that oversees all activities related to procurement on capital account in the MoD’s Department of Defence flowing out of the ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy & Make’ decisions of the DAC. It functions mainly as a coordinating, supervising and monitoring body for the procurement process undertaken by the Acquisitions Wing of the Department of Defence for the ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy & Make’ categories. In this process, it has the responsibility of approving the Annual Acquisitions Plans for the three armed services. It essentially accords approvals to all major projects which are beyond the powers of the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) and require the approval of the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) or the Union Ministry of Finance. The Defence Secretary is the Chairman of the DPB and its members include representatives from the various Departments in the MoD, the three armed services, and the Chief of IDS. The Member Secretary is the Financial Adviser in the Acquisition Wing of the Department of Defence. 
Let’s now proceed to the various approvals accorded for procurement. It was on December 23, 2013 that the DPB cleared procurement proposals worth Rs.16,000 crore (US$2.75 billion) that included 1) re-lifing of some 400 Israel Aerospace Industries-supplied Barak-1 missiles that were acquired for the Indian Navy (IN) between the years 2000 and 2005 (on October 23, 1999the 268.63 million/Rs.5.8 billion contract for procuring seven Barak-1 point-defence missile systems or or PDMS, including 224 missile rounds worth $69.13 million and 14 EL/M-2221 STGR combined fire-control radars/optronic fire directors was inked  and these were subsequently installed on the aircraft carrier INS Viraat, three Project 15 DDGs and three Project 16A FFGs Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa. By late 2003 the MoD inked a $100 million contract to acquire another four Barak-1 PDMS to be installed on three Project 17 FFGs and on INS Ran Vijay, a Project 61ME/Kashin 2-class DDG.); 2) procurement of seven new-build Barak-1 PMDS suites for the three Barch-2 Project 1135.6 FFGs and the four Project 28 ASW corvettes; 3) opening of competitive bids for supplying two deep-submergence rescue vessels (DSRV) worth Rs.1,500 crore ($258.62 million); and 4) placing orders for two Goa Shipyard Ltd-designed 75-metre naval offshore patrol vessels (NOPV), which are to be delivered to the Sri Lanka Navy as part of a financial assistance package from India to Sri Lanka. Barring the DSRV contract, all of the above-mentioned contracts have since been inked and orders placed.
This was followed in January 2014 by the DPB’s approval for inking a contract worth $300 million Rs.1,740 crores for procuring 98 Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei-built Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes for for the IN’s six Scorpene SSKs that are due for delivery between September 2016 and late 2019. This contract, however, has yet to be inked. After orders are placed, the first 20 Black Sharks will be delivered directly by WASS, while the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd will licence-assemble the rest from WASS-supplied completely knocked-down kits.
On August 30, 2014, the DPB cleared for contract signature (subject to the mandatory CCNS approval) the following: 1)Rs.4,800 crores ($827.5 million) for medium-refits of two Type 877EKM SSKs and a service life-extension programme (SLEP) for one Type 877EKM SSK, plus the mid-life upgrade of the three Project 15 DDGs; 2)Rs.1,770 crores ($305.17 million) for procuring six Atlas Elektronik-built ACTAS ultra-low-frequency towed-array sonars for the three Project 15 DDGs and three Batch-1 Project 1135.6 FFGs, procuring 10 HUMSA-NG hull-/bow-mounted panoramic sonar suites for the three Project 15 DDGs, four Project 15B DDGs and three Project 16A FFGs, and procuring traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS-2) retrofit kits for all fixed-wing turboprop aircraft of the IN; 3) Rs.6,800 crores ($1.172 billion) for procuring 118 Arjun Mk1A MBTs along with related mobile field workshops, a Base Repair Workshop, a platoon gunnery simulator, plus ammunition stocks; 4) Rs.900 crores ($155.17 million) for TAC4G broadband communications networks from Israel Aerospace Industries for the Indian Army’s Tezpur-based IV Corps, Dimapur-based III Corps and Leh-based XIV Corps; 5)22 Boeing-built AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopters plus related equipment and services, all collectively valued at $1.4 billion (Rs.8,120 crores), plus 15 Boeing-built CH-47F Chinook heavylift utility helicopters worth$1.4 billion (Rs.8,120 crores); and 6)16 Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk ten-tonne NMRHs worth Rs.1,800 crores ($310.34 million). Also cleared for procurement on a fast-track basis were all-terrain weapon locating radars and long-range man-portable thermal imagers for the Border Security Force (BSF), as well as close to 200 8 x 8 heavy-duty left-hand drive trucks (to be delivered by BEML-TATRA Sipox UK) for housing Pinaka-1 MBRLs their command posts, ammunition resupply vehicles and mobile field repair workshops, as well as 29 DRDO-developed/Bharat Electronics Ltd-built ‘Swathi’ weapon locating radars and their related field repair workshops. Total outstanding requirement for such trucks as of September 2010 was 1,676 units. 
Lastly, funds were released for the IN’s existing Dwarka-2 forward operating base in Porbandar to be expanded into a permanent naval base that will be spread over 500 acres and will host both warships and submarines. It will be known as INS Sardar Patel.
On that very day, the DAC authorised the MoD’s DRDO to begin the process of prototype development of the Arjun Catapult. Subject to successful user-trials being concluded by early 2016, 40 such units will be ordered at a cost of Rs.820 crores ($141.37 million, or $3.53 million per unit).
As far as the present-day state of the eight surviving Type 877EKM SSKs goes, Russia’s Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering had confirmed to me last March that the authorised total technical service life of each such SSK is not 20 years or 26 years as has been claimed by several retired IN officials over the past few days, but 35 years. Furthermore, each such SSK undergoes only one medium refit (inclusive of a mid-life upgrade) once after completing 13 years of service, and on its 26th year in service, it will undergo a service life-extension programme (SLEP) or a long-refit (inclusive of further upgrades) so that it will remain in service for a total period of 35 years. As part of the SLEP for the remaining eight Type 877EKM SSKs, the IN in future plans to equip them with thin-line towed-array sonars as well as new-generation optronic periscopes. Thus, while the IN will by 2018 be able to muster eight Project 08773 SSKs and retain the last of them in service will 2027.
The Severodvnsk-based Zvezdochka State Machine-Building Enterprise has to date upgraded five of the eight Type 877EKM SSKs to Project 08773 standard at an aggregate cost of Rs1,560 crore (or an average of US$156 million per unit):

* INS Sindhughosh S-55, whose keel was laid on May 29, 1983, was launched on July 29, 1985 and was commissioned on November 25, 1985 and it was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2002 and 2005.

* INS Sindhudhvaj S-56, whose keel was laid on April 1, 1986, was launched on July 27, 1986 and was commissioned on November 25, 1986.

* INS Sindhuraj S-57, which was commissioned on September 2, 1987, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1999 and 2001.

* INS Sindhuvir S-58, which was commissioned on December 25, 1987, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1997 and 1999.

* INS Sindhuratna S-59, which was commissioned on August 14, 1988, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2001 and 2003.

* INS Sindhukesari S-60, which was commissioned on October 29, 1988, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1999 and 2001.

* INS Sindhukirti S-61, which was commissioned on October 30, 1989, has been declared as a writeoff.

* INS Sindhuvijay S-62, which was commissioned on October 27, 1990, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2005 and 2007.

* INS Sindhurakshak S-63, which was commissioned on October 2, 1997, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between August 2010 and January 2013.
Next in line for a medium-refit and upgrading to Project 08773 standard is INS Sindhushastra S-64, which was commissioned on May 16, 2000. This will be followed by the medium-refit of INS Sindhudhvaj S-56.--all this being confirmed by the MoD way back in September 2013. Contracts for both medium-refits will be concluded between 2015 and 2019.  INS Sindukesari S-60 will soon proceed to Severodvnsk for its final SLEP.

Project 75 Conundrum
ARMARIS’ then Chairman Peter Legros had on July 10, 2005 confirmed that a revised package was being finalised under which an adjustable price mechanism (known as REM) to offset the cost escalations caused by delays in finalisation of the Project 75 contract (involving the licenced-construction of six single-hulled 1,565-tonne CM-2000 Scorpene diesel-electric submarines—all to be assembled by the MoD-owned Mazagon Docks Ltd, or MDL) would be arrived at by the MoD’s Price Negotiations Committee in the near future. On October 6, 2005 the contract for was finally inked, with the then French Ambassador in New Delhi Dominique Girard and the MoD’s Additional Secretary (Acquisitions) D Banerjee signing on the contract worth Rs 18,798 crore. Of this amount, Rs.2,700 crores (400 million Euros) was set aside for MDL to place orders with both foreign OEMs and local vendors for materials (all grouped under the category MDL-Procured Materials, or MPM) like 80 HLES high-yield steel steel (coming from ArcelorMittal), pipings, shaftings and valves. The contract also stated that the MoD had the option of procuring another four MDL-built Scorpene SSKs between 2015 and 2020—these being the AM-2000 version of the Scorpene and equipped with an AIP plug-in module. Metal-cutting for the first CM-2000 SSK began on May 25, 2007, and keel-laying of the first three SSKs took place in December 2006, December 2007 and August 2008, respectively. By late 2009, however, it had become evident that the various India-based industrial vendors that had been contracted for supplying the pipings, shaftings and valves had failed to comply with the stringent build-specifications of both DCNS of France and Spain’s Navantia (which together had formed the ARMARIS consortium). In fact, both the IN and MDL had warned the MoD about such an eventuality and had suggested way back in mid-2005 that of the six CM-2000 SSKs, the first two ought to be built at DCNS’ Cherbourg-based shipyard (if this was done, then the IN would have received its first two CM-2000s by late 2012) and during their manufacturing stages, the various contracted Indian industrial vendors would be mentored by their French and Spanish counterparts to attain the required degree of production competencies, thereby ensuring consistency in QC and QA levels once MDL began licence-building the remaining four Scorpene SSKs. However, since this did not happen, as predicted, the Indian vendors failed to produce components that were compliant with OEM-mandated specifications and this, consequently forced MDL to exercise the only option then left on the table: place orders with France-based and Spain-based OEMs for supplying such components at an extra cost of Rs.4,700 crores (700 million Euros). Consequently, the total cost of Project 75 was hiked to Rs.23,562 crores in February 2010, along with revisions in delivery schedules. New indents for MPMs were placed between mid-2010 and November 2012. On top of all this, internal project mismanagement by MDL created additional complications. For instance, although four batches of a total of six CD-based Transfer of Design Data (TDD) packages had reached MDL by the first quarter of 2013, they could not even be opened because the CAD-5 software to run the CDs had not been acquired by MDL. Similarly, though DCNS had advised MDL in 2006 to buy a 2000-tonne press for bending the thick steel plates supplied byArcelorMittal, MDL acquired it only in 2011. By then, the contract for bending the steel plates had been outsourced to Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Ltd. The press now lies idle in MDL, with no steel to press since all the hulls have already been made. MDL had also signed a 65 million Euros contract with both DCNS and Navantia for deputing an ‘Advising & Overseeing Team’, and ended on March 15, 2013 and this contract was renewed only late last year. The first Scorpene SSK is now scheduled for delivery in September 2016 (instead of December 2012 as originally planned), and thereafter, one each every nine months through to May 2019.
The above shameful saga only raises some pertinent questions that no one has bothered to ask so far: why did the MoD and its Department of Defence Production & Supplies, along woth the Govt of India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) decide to licence-build all six Scorpene CM-2000 SSKs despite the grave reservations expressed by both IN HQ and MDL? And did anyone or a group of officials making up the decision-making loop become direct or indirect financial beneficiaries through such willful criminal negligence at the cost of the Indian exchequer?  
This then brings us to the option for procuring the four AM-2000 SSKs. While the performance parameters of both the CM-2000 and AM-2000 variants remain the same, the length of the AM-2000 increases to 70 metres and its submerged displacement is 1,870 tonnes, against the 61.7 metres and 1,565 tonnes of the CM2000. Both SSK variants will have a crew complement of 31 (with a standard watch-team of nine) and endurance of 50 days. The AM-2000’s hull too will be built with HLES-80 high-yield stress-specific steel, which will allow the SSK to reach diving depths of up to 300 metres (1,150 feet) and achieve an average of 240 days at sea, per year, per submarine. The AM-2000, just like the IN’s six CM-2000s, will also feature a connection point for allowing a DSRV to dock during collective crew-rescue operations.

Though the DRDO’s Ambarnath-based Naval Materials Research Laboratory (NMRL), along with the Kochi-based Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), have since 2002 been trying to developing an on-shore fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion (AIP) system that will enable an SSK to stay submerged continuously for about 25 days, till to date, no significant R & D breakthroughs have been achieved nor are they expected to be achieved in the latter half of the decade. Apart from the NMRL and NPOL, other DRDO laboratories and industrial entities that are involved with this R & D venture are Larsen & Toubro, THERMAX, IOCL, TEXOL, Indian Institute of Petroleum, AKSA, CEEFES, C-DAC, DIGITRONICS, NSTL, RCI, ROLTA and MDL. This then leaves the IN with only two AIP options: either go for the DCNS-developed MESMA (Module d’Energie Sous-Marine Autonome) system, or opt for the Stirling Engine. In MESMA, ethanol and liquid oxygen are mixed in a high-pressure burner to a temperature of 700 degrees Celsius, which acts as a heat source for a primary water-loop, which is pressurised at 60 bar, thereby allowing operations to full diving depth (a bar is a measure of pressure roughly equivalent to one atmosphere; at the sea surface the pressure is 1 bar, at 10 metres it is 2 bar, at 20 metres it is 3 bar, at 100 metres it is about 10 bar and at 600 metres it is 60 bar). The primary loop passes through a steam generator. The steam, which is greater than 20 bar and 500 degrees Celsius, spins a turbine attached to an alternator. The alternator charges the SSK’s battery. The MESMA AIP on the three Agosta 90B SSKs of the Pakistan Navy is capable of producing 200kW of energy, which provides enough energy to for a light battery-charging rate when the SSK is cruising at 6 Knots. Newer versions of MESMA use diesel instead of ethanol that, like the Stirling Engine, limits the additional AIP fuel supply to just liquid oxygen.

The Stirling-based AIP is a closed-cycle engine that uses helium as the working fluid. Diesel and liquid oxygen are mixed in a high-temperature burner to a temperature of 750 degrees Celsius, which acts as a heat source for an enclosed quantity of helium. The helium is driven through a repeating sequence of thermodynamic changes. By expanding the helium against a piston and then drawing it into a separate cooling chamber for subsequent compression, the heat from the external combustion of diesel and oxygen can be converted into work that can then be turned into electrical energy by a DC generator. The DC generator charges the battery. Gases from the process are mixed with cooling water in a special carbon dioxide dissolver and discharged into the sea. This AIP uses less pressure than a MESMA, operating at 20 bar. Each Stirling Engine is capable of producing 75kW of energy, with two or more installed on each SSK.


Blowing The Lid Off The INS Sindhukirti Saga
For far too long, the ‘desi’ band of journalists covering national security issues has consistently alleged that almost all foreign OEMs—and especially those hailing from Russia—have never lost any opportunity to take India for a ride, that India has always been at the receiving end of their ‘devious’ marketing efforts, and consequently, India can never depend upon such OEMs when it comes to the crunch. The most recent example of ‘yellow journalism’ has appeared here:


News-reports like the one highlighted above always inevitably contain only selective facts, which in turn tell only one side of the story, and consequently, the truth always becomes the first casualty. So what exactly is the hitherto-untold saga of the INS Sindhukirti? To get to the bottom of matters, we need to go back to the year 2004 when the IN has headed by Admiral Madhvendra Singh(he was the Chief of the Naval Staff between December 29, 2001 and July 31, 2004). INS Sindhukirti had by then been in service for 15 years and was due for its mid-life medium-refit—a job that could be done only at a Russian shipyard—since neither the USSR nor Russia had ever allowed/authorised any other shipyard abroad (be in it India or China) to undertake such jobs.
It was at this time that Chennai-based The India Cements Ltd’s N Srinivasan (presently its Vice Chairman & Managing Director and also Chairman of the ICC) teamed up with a former IN submariner by the name of Commodore S Shekhar (see his bio-data at: http://www.globalsar.com.my/shekhar.html), who is the  Promoter and Managing Director of JMPS Sanjivini Consultants (Pvt) Ltd, for exploring ways and means of entering India’s market for submarine MRO-related businesses. Together, Srinivasan and Shekhar did a detailed feasibility study on the prospects of conducting in-country medium-refits of the IN’s fleet of Type 877EKM SSKs in cooperation with Russia-based OEMs. The feasibility study, conducted with the assistance of Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp, was next taken to the Chairman & Managing Director (CMD) of state-owned and Vizag-based Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL), Rear Admiral (Ret’d) Ajit Tewari, who was previously the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (P & P) at Naval HQ and after his retirement, became HSL’s CMD on February, 3, 2004. This where the scene gets murky, since Naval HQ sometime in mid-2004 authorised HSL (which came under the MoD’s administrative control only on February 8, 2008) to begin work on INS Sindhukirti’s medium-refit (with Srinivasan and Shekhar reportedly acting as project consultants for HSL) despite the fact that HSL had by then not inked any kind of military-industrial agreement with Rosoboronexport State Corp (consequently, HSL at that time was not authorised by either the Govt of the Russian Federation or any Russian OEM for undertaking any kind of medium-refit-related activity on any Type 877EKM SSK).
It was only on October 3, 2006 that Rosoboronexport State Corp inked a Rs.650 crores contract with HSL for rendering industrial-cum-technological assistance to HSL for undertaking the INS Sindhukirti’s medium-refit-cum-upgrade—a task that was originally due for completion by 2010. Rosoboronexport State Corp in turn signed a back-to-back contract with the Severodvnsk-based Zvezdochka State Machine-Building Enterprise, which became HSL’s principal industrial partner for executing the INS Sindhukirti’s medium-refit-cum-upgrade. Zvezdochka subsequently began materials supplies as well as turn-key activities that included: completion of entire degutting in May 2007, completion of blasting on the entire hull structure for defect survey in February 2008, removal of hard-patches from all six compartments, installation and commissioning of two pipe-bending machines at HSL, and qualifying and type-certifying HSL’s welders to take up repairs on INS Sindhukirti’s hull structures. And by May 2008, Zvezdochka had delivered to HSL all technical/engineering documentation that was required for undertaking the medium-refit-cum-upgrade.
The question that then arises is, why will INS Sindhukirti be delivered to the IN only in March 2015, when Zvezdochka takes between 24 and 28 months to refit-cum-upgrade a Type 877EKM SSK? The answer is elementary: it is all about skilled human resource mobilisation. Zvezdochka typically employs more than 200 personnel in three shifts to complete the job in two years, while HSL until late 2008 could mobilise only 50 workers. Furthermore, HSL bagged the contract for INS Sindhukirti’s medium- refit-cum-upgrade at a time when highly skilled human resources like welders were in high demand at the nearby Ship Building Centre (SBC), which had then been leased by the MoD to Larsen & Toubro (L & T) for undertaking final assembly of the S-2/Arihant SSBN’s hull superstructure. L & T, which began shipping the S-2/Arihant’s hull-rings (fabricated at Hazira) and internal bulkheads and fitments (fabricated at Powai), literally poached all of HSL’s pool of skilled human resources by offering them much higher salaries and related perks—all of which left HSL high-and-dry. HSL consequently had no other option but to recruit new personnel and with Zvezdochka’s assistance, train them from scratch until they could acquire a credible degree of job proficiency—a task that easily consumed almost four years. And that’s the reason why INS Sindhukirti’s medium-refit-cum-upgrade could not be completed by 2010 as originally scheduled.
(to be concluded)

India-PRC Boundary Dispute Decoded

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India’s First catastrophic Error: Failing to detail her territorial boundary claims in a consistent manner between 1950 and 1954 and issuing conflicting political maps (below):
As a result, the PRC was free to make territorial claims, especially in the Western Sector (below) and also secure the Aksai Chin area uncontested and without any military opposition.
India’s second catastrophic error: Initiating the ‘Forward Policy’ (below) under which logistically unsustainable and militarily indefensible forward military observation posts and pickets were set up (below):
And as a result of all this...
This then brings us to the present-day ground situation:

2nd Test-Flight Of Nirbhay Strategic Cruise Missile A Total Success

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The nuclear-capable LACM yesterday had a flight-time lasting 80 minutes and cruised over a distance of 1,157km at a speed of Mach 0.7. Eight more test-flights now remain to be conducted prior to its entry-into-service with India’s Strategic Forces Command in ground-launched, submarine-launched and air-launched versions. 

New Force Accretions Are Welcome, But There's More On The Waiting List-2

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The Indian Army’s (IA) special operations forces, known as SF (Para), will at last begin acquiring the vital force-multipliers that were promised to them as far back as 2004! Yesterday, the MoD’s Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) cleared the decks for the DPB to initiate sole-source contractual negotiations for a number of items for not only the SF (Para) formations, but also for the IA’s newly-created XVII Corps, which, essentially, is a warfighting formation that will specialise in highland warfare and will also be air-mobile in nature.  
To be ordered in the near future will be 8,356 Spike-SR ATGMs (FROM Israel’s RAFAEL) and related 321 ultra-light ATGM launchers worth Rs 3,200 crore, plus ELTA Systems-built ELM-2138T ‘Green Rock’ Tactical Counter Rockets, Artillery & Mortars (C-RAM) Systems, and ELBIT Systems Electro-Optics’ Long View CR optronic sensors. On the other hand, for equipping the Indian Army’s existing 356 infantry battalions (inclusive of 44 mechanised infantry battalions) of the 1.13 million-strong IA and the projected 30 new infantry battalions to be raised in the 13th five-year defence plan (2018-2022) 1,914 FGM-148 Javelin ATGM launchers and up 37,860 missile-rounds (including war wastage reserves) and 12,000 SMAW-2NE launchers and up to 80,000 rounds of various types are planned to be procured in future.
Presently, the IA is authorised by the MoD to have a total of 81,206 ATGMs, with each infantry battalion deployed in the plains being armed with four medium-range (1.8km-range) and four long-range (4km-range) ATGM launchers (each with six missiles), and those in the mountains have one of each type along with six missiles for each launcher. In reality, however, the IA’s total existing inventory of ATGMs now stands at only 44,000 that includes 10,000 second-generation MBDA-developed and BDL-built SACLOS wire-guided Milan-2 ATGMs and 4,600 launchers; 4,100 second-generation MBDL-supplied Milan-2T ATGMs; 15,000 second-generation 4km-range 9M113M Konkurs-M SACLOS wire-guided ATGMs licence-built by BDL, plus another 10,000 that are now being supplied off-the-shelf by Russia’s JSC Tulsky Oruzheiny Zavod. Also on order are 443 DRDO-developed third-generation Nag fire-and-forget ATGMs along with 13 DRDO-developed NAMICA tracked ATGM launchers.
The DAC, led by then Defence Minister A K Antony, had taken up the procurement of the fire-and-forget FGM-148 and SMAW-2NE for clearance on April 2, 2013, following which the MoD’s approved the DRDO’s proposal for jointly developing the high-altitude warfare-optimised warheads for the two anti-armour weapon systems. By the first half of next year, therefore, the MoD and its wholly owned DPSUs like Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) will be able to ink military-industrial agreements with US-based Raytheon for both the joint development of thermobaric and HE/FRAG penetration-cum-blast warheads as well as the licenced-production of the FIM-148 Javelin’s missile rounds (the launchers will be licence-assembled by BDL) as well as the SMAW-2NE’s modified 83mm Mk80 rocket (containing a thermobaric HEDP warhead), while the re-usuable launchers will be licence-assembled by OFB.
The IA had zeroed in on the FGM-148 Javelin as far back as 2008 after it had conducted in-country summer user-evaluations of the RAFAEL of Israel-built Spike-ER ATGM. During these evaluations, seven out of the 10 missiles fired missed their targets because their on-board uncooled long-wave infra-red (LWIR) sensors failed to distinguish their targets from their surroundings (an identical problem had also beset the Nag ATGM’s uncooled LWIR sensors in 2012 during user-evaluations). In contrast, the high-altitude warfare-optimised Javelin will use a cooled mid-wave IR (MWIR) sensor that will be able to passively lock-on to targets at up to 50% farther range than an uncooled sensor, thus allowing the firing crew greater and safer standoff distance, and less likely to be exposed to counter-fire. As far as weight is concerned, the cooling equipment adds less than 2 lb per weapon. The uncooled sensor is not only less reliable, but its long-LWIR spectrum is only compatible with a dome made of softer materials that vulnerable to abrasion in harsh environments (e.g., deserts) and consequently require replacement more often. The cooled seeker’s MWIR spectrum allows a durable hardened dome, and it is better than LWIR in discerning threats in certain geographic locations or environmental conditions. An uncooled sensor thus brings increased repairs, decreased operational availability, and dangerous vulnerabilities, while a cooled IIR sensor saves lives, lessens fratricide, minimises collateral damage, lowers risk, and protects its firing platforms/crew.
It was in 2003 that IA HQ had formulated a General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) in 2003 for acquiring the Milan-2T, armed with a tandem-warhead. The tandem warhead was to be licence-built by BDL under ToT from MBDA. The GSQR of the in-service Milan-2 had provided for an essential range as 1,850 metres and a desirable range of 2,000 metres. The GSQR of 2003 for the Milan-2T had indicated the range as 2,000 metres. The RFP for procurement of 4,100 Milan-2Ts was issued to BDL in January 2007. The MoD’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) did not find the product offered by BDL compliant with the GSQR as the range of 2,000 metres offered had only 1,850 metres under wire-guidance phase, while the last 150 metres was left unguided (along with the first 75 metres after missile launch). The case for procurement was therefore closed in May 2007. 
Subsequently, BDL confirmed that the guidance-range of the Milan-2T would be 2,000 metres. The case was re-opened and trials of the Milan-2T were conducted in February 2008. Based on the firing trial results, Indian Army HQ did not recommend its introduction into service in view of difficulties in engaging moving targets during the last 150 metres. In addition, the requirement was not met in terms of flight-time and overall weight. Furthermore, third-generation ATGMs were already available in the global market by June 2006. Based on  representations from the staff union of BDL to the then Minister of State for Defence Production & Supplies (since non-placement of orders for Milan-2Ts would result in redeployment of BDL’s workforce and already procured materials common to Milan-2/-2T would have to be junked), it was decided to procure a minimum required quantity of Milan-2Ts in May 2008 by amending the GSQR in August 2008 for the Milan-2T with 1,850 metres range and with the waiver of in-country firing-trials, after considering the long lead-times required for procuring third-generation ATGMs, and the fact that the shelf-life of existing stocks of Milan-2 would expire by 2013. The revised RFP was issued to BDL in September 2008 as per the amended GSQR. The MoD concluded a procurement contract with BDL in December 2008 for the supply of 4,100 Milan-2T ATGMs at a cost of Rs.587.02 crore with a staggered delivery schedule to be completed within 36 months from the effective date of contract.

The RPO-A & C-90A LAW Procurement Sagas
The IA had, since the 1980s, never really embraced the idea of procuring one-man portable shoulder-fired, reusable anti-armour weapons (LAW) capable of defeating armoured vehicles, enemy bunkers and other reinforced positions. It was only in 1996 that LAWs were procured in small quantities and this was followed in June 199 during OP Vijay, in an effort to meet its urgent requirements, by the Army HQ proposing the procurement of 1,800 disposable bunker-bursting LAWs (600 RPO-A Shmelsfrom Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp and 1,200 from Spain’s Instalaza SA). The proposal also indicated that 600 more LAWs were required under the 9thArmy Plan. In response to the MoD’s enquiries, Russia’s KBP Tula offered to supply its RPO-A Shmel at a unit price of US$3,600 for an order of 600 and at the rate of US$3,500 for an order of 1,200 units. The MoD urgently concluded a procurement contract in June 1999 for 1,200 RPO-As each priced at US$3,500 with a delivery schedule in two lots of 600 pieces each, thereby aggregating US$4.2 million (Rs.18.22 crore), with deliveries commencing within two months from the date of contract signature. A delegation of the IA had witnessed a live-firing demonstration of the RPO-A as early as in September 1995. In its evaluation report, the delegation had observed, among other things, that target engagement could not be analysed beyond 350 metres vis a vis the 1,000-metre range claimed by KBP Tula in its technical offer; the firing could be conducted only during daylight as no night-sighting device was developed; and the thermobaric warhead’s terminal effect could not also be assessed as there was no incendiary effect. The then Chief Scientific Adviser to the MoD had also brought to the notice of the MoD in November 1995 that the DRDO representative in the delegation had reported that during the demonstration of September 1995, 14 RPO-As were fired at a range of 200 metres and none of the shots hit the targets at that range. However, the delegation recommended procurement of the weapon only as a one-time buy, suggesting that future requirements be met indigenously by the DRDO and OFB. Accordingly, 300 RPO-As were procured in September 1996 as a one-time buy. Against these recommendations of the delegation, the MoD at the instance of Army HQ once again decided to go ahead with follow-on procurements of another 300 RPO-As at a total cost of Rs.18.22 crore even though it did not meet the end-user’s operational requirements. Deliveries commenced only after August 1999.
The MoD concluded a procurement contract on June 30, 1999 with Instalaza SA for the off-the-shelf supply of 1,200 C-90A LAWs worth US$1.66 million (Rs.7.15 crore). As per the terms of the contract, Instalaza SA had to offer the C-90As for inspections at its premises within six weeks from the date of contract signature, and immediate delivery and transportation by air-freight in one lot thereafter. Two days after signing the contract, Instalaza SA indicated that the consignment could be despatched by air and it would extend all co-operation to deliver the goods by air after receipt of instructions from the MoD. Accordingly, the MoD amended the clause regarding the mode of despatch from ‘Ship’ to ‘Air’ on July 8, 1999 Instalaza SA intimated its readiness to despatch the consignment after it was duly inspected by its authorities in August 1999. However, Instalaza SA expressed apprehension on airlifting the goods as they fell under the ‘dangerous category’. The freight agent also intimated the MoD by September 1999 about its inability to obtain requisite airspace transit clearances from the country of origin and the other countries involved. Consequently, the MoD amended the contract clause relating to the mode of despatch on October 7, 1999, reverting back to ‘Ship’. Eventually, the C-90As arrived on December 11, 1999, four months after being ready for dispatch, while the MoD had in August 2000 claimed that the delay occurred due to factors beyond its control.
Which ATGMs For Rudra & 
LCH Helicopters?
Any Takers For SAMHO?
Further Force-Multiplier Accretions On 
The Way
The ELM-2138T C-RAM is a mobile, autonomous system designed to respond to evolving light artillery threats in land operations, and support a variety of ground forces missions, including force protection, fast-response to enemy-attack, and friendly-fire correction. Installed on all-terrain vehicles (ATV), the system comprises a dual-band radar to acquire and track trajectories of ballistic munitions such as rockets, artillery and mortars. The ELM-2138T calculates the launching point and predicts the point of impact. Whenever a threat to friendly forces is detected, a warning is sent to the area’s control centre and to the interception systems to respond to the threat and its source.
Elbit Systems Electro-Optics’ Long View CR, weighing less than 12.5kg, combines a very long-range continuous optical zoom FLIR, long-range day cameras, integral eye-safe laser rangefinder, GPS and a magnetic compass all in one, compact configuration. For dismounted operations, the Long View CRis operated on a miniature electronic goniometer enabling high azimuth and elevation accuracy. It can be carried in a backpack or mounted on a vehicle, making it especially suitable for long-range intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) missions performed by special operations forces, or forward observers (FO) in stationary observation posts or reconnaissance vehicles. With its proprietary algorithms and technologies, the Long View CR has the unique ability to acquire long-range targets or to observe small targets, such as enemy combatants, in high spatial resolution under severe visual conditions day or night.
The XVII Corps will in future be equipped with two force-multipliers: the  TAC-4G broadband fourth-generation cellular network, and the Real Time Intelligence Center (RICent) multi-sensor modular Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system—both from ELTA Systems. TAC-4G is based on a flat-IP network architecture which provides flexible and fast communications between many users. This includes fast-and-secure communications between different points and support of concurrent running of multiple applications, many of which require high bandwidth. The high flexibility of TAC-4G along with additional inherent capabilities such as information security, on-the-move network infrastructure, and support of multiple applications, positions the system as an optimal solution for addressing the complex military communications requirements. 
TAC-4G also supports a wide variety of multimedia applications and allows quick and easy addition or removal of applications. It also implements the ‘network-centric warfare’ principle; allows various-level commanders the highest level of control and effective activation of various warfighting, logistics and maintenance forces; allows, real-time battlefield management and control; uses the cost-effective commercial cellular network providers’ infrastructure, which allows shorter implementation time and fewer risks in comparison to other alternatives that are not based on COTS infrastructures.
RICent is designed to produce 24/7 all-weather geo-spatial  imagery intelligence (IMINT) through the real-time processing and integration of images generated by a variety of space-based, airborne and land-based IMINT sensors. RICent’s multi-sensor exploitation and intelligence dissemination processes employ a variety of automatic and semi-automatic tools essential for quick detection, acquisition and identification of time-critical targets, extracted from the huge volumes of imagery data. Its field-proven capabilities for very high-throughput automated geo-spatial image intelligence processing are also essential in effective wide-area environmental monitoring and for responding quickly to natural disasters.
For further improving command-and-control connectivity for those IA and ITBP detachments responsible for both manning the LAC and undertaking long-range reconnaissance patrols, the fast-track acquisition of up to 80 lightweight ELK 1895 manpack tactical SATCOM terminals has been approved. The IA presently has 280 briefcase-based SATCOM terminals built by ECIL, but they are getting outdated technologically. The ELK 1895 manpack SATCOM terminals with Ku-Band transmission/reception capability for almost unlimited ranges will thus be welcomed as a vital force-multiplier. Each such terminal will include two-three suitcases to hold an antenna, dish and other equipment. The first 40 ELK 1895 terminals are meant for the IA’s Northern, Central and Eastern Commands, which together cover the three sectors of LAC—western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh). 
MoD-Owned Goa Shipyard Ltd Building Two Wholly India-Financed 75-Metre NOPVs For Sri Lanka Navy, Bags Contract For Supplying Four More To Vietnam
China’s Border Infrastructure Landmarks
ITBP At Chumar

Glimpses Of 10th Airshow China Expo At Zhuhai-1

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 At the expo, the Pakistan Air Force will ink a contract with China’s state-owned Aerospace Long-March International Trade Co Ltd (ALIT) for acquiring a Regiment of the 70km-range LY-80E LR-SAM.
Earlier, ALIT had sold to Iran a customised version of the LY-80E, known as Sayyad-2.
Some More Exhibits...
And Some More...

Glimpses Of 10th Airshow China Expo At Zhuhai-2


IAF Formally Inducts BrahMos-1 Block-3 Into Service

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The Indian Air Force (IAF) this morning formally inducted the BrahMos-1 Block-3 ground-launched supersonic ‘top-attack’ cruise missile into service, thus becoming the third Indian armed service to procure the BrahMos-1 after the Indian Navy (BrahMos-1 Block-1) in 2005 and the Indian Army (BrahMos-1 Block-2) in 2007. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Air Staff of the IAF, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, symbolically accepted the first ‘BRAHMOS Technical Position’ (the IAF-specific mobile autonomous launcher) at the New Delhi-based HQ of BrahMos Aerospace.

Glimpses Of IDEAS-2014 Expo In Karachi
Strangely, PAC Kamra has yet to display a scale-model of either the JF-17 with its full load of air-to-ground PGMs, or of the tandem-seat JFT-17, which was showcased by AVIC last month at Zhuhai (below).
Meet The Maldives’ New ‘All-Weather Friend’
Defending Vietnam’s Offshore Islands In The Spratlys With IMI-Built EXTRA MBRLs & Orbiter-2 Mini-UAS
Revisiting The SHORADS Versus MR-SAM Debate In Malaysia
In 2002, when the Govt of Malaysia had decided to equip the Malaysian Army’s air-defence artillery group (Grup Artlleri Pertahanan Udara, or GAPU) with VSHORADS/MANPADS and SHORADS, contracts were inked on April 15, 2002 for 15 MBDA-made 9km-range Jernas SHORADS systems (inclusive of missiles and Blindfire/Dagger fire-control radars) worth US$315.48 million, IGLA-1 9K310 VSHORADS/MANPADS with Dzighit launchers supplied by Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp (for GAPU and the Royal Malaysian Air Force, or RMAF) worth US$48 million, plus 100 Anza Mk1 (QW-1) VSHORADS/MANPADS worth US$21.3 million from Pakistan for the Army’s 10 Brigade (Para). This was subsequently followed by the procurement of FN-6 VSHORADS/MANPADS (64 missiles, instead of the 160 required for a Battery) on September 19, 2008 for GAPU, and several Anza Mk2 (QW-2) VSHORADS/MANPADS for 10 Brigade (Para). The THALES Starburst VSHORADS/MANPADS systems acquired in the early 1990s for the RMAF and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) have since been decommissioned.
Rewinding back to 2002, when the GAPU had evaluated up to seven different types of SHORADS, the ones deemed most ideal at that time were MBDA’s Aspide 2000 and CPMIEC of China’s LY-60D. However, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, in his all-knowing wisdom, preferred to award the procurement contract to MBDA for the Jernas. Fast-forward to 2007, when, in order to establish a hierarchical, layered and in-depth national air defence system, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) projected a requirement for a minimum of 20 Batteries of enhanced short-range air defence systems (E-SHORADS) for the Army, three Batteries (or one Regiment) of medium-range surface-to-air missiles (MR-SAM) for the RMAF, an additional 200 very short-range SAMs (VSHORADS) for the Army, six gapfiller radars for the RMAF, and a similar number of low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) tactical air defence radars, plus four passive surveillance systems (PSS) for the Army, all to be procured during the 9thMalaysia Plan (2006-2010) and the following 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-1015). While the RMAF and Royal RMN were in favour of acquiring the MR-SAMs, the Army, understandably, wanted additional VSHORADS/MANPADS and SHORADS. However, all such plans got disrupted due to the global financial meltdown of 2008.
Fast-forward to today, when both radar-guided SHORADS and E-SHORADS are being increasingly overshadowed by new-generation vertically-launched MR-SAMs. For instance, in Europe, the MBDA-developed Aster-15/Aster-30 vertically-launched MR-SAM/LR-SAM combination is in use, while for cruise missile defence (CMD), the vertically-launched VL-Mica is available. In Germany, the IRIS family of vertically-launched MR-SAMs are being procured, with the latter (IRIS-T) using an IIR seeker for CMD, while the radar-guided MR-SAM version is optimised for intercepting hostile airborne combat aircraft. In Russia, no new-generation radar-guided SHORADS has been developed since the 1990s and instead, only the vertically-launched S-350E Vityaz MR-SAM has been developed. Similarly, in South Korea, the Cheongung (Iron Hawk) vertically-launched MR-SAM co-developed by a consortium of entities that included Russia’s Almaz Design Bureau, the ADD, LIG-Nex1, Samsung-THALES and Doosan DST, is now in series-production, replacing earlier-generation MR-SAMs and SHORADS of US-origin. In India, the country’s three armed services have decided to do away with radar-guided SHORADS altogether and instead procure the Barak-2 vertically-launched MR-SAM. For CMD, India is on the lookout for IIR seeker-using SHORADS to meet its SL-QRM and QR-SAM requirements. Similarly in Singapore, the SAF has not sought any replacements for its Rapier radar-guided SHORADS, and has instead procured the SpyDer-SR from Israel for CMD. The fire-and-forget SpyDer-SR uses Python-5 missiles equipped with IIR seekers.
Since the new-generation MR-SAMs are vertically-launched, they are capable of high lateral acceleration, going up to as much as 80 G. This in turn enables such MR-SAMs to effectively engage both low-flying airborne targets as well as high-flying airborne targets. It is for this very reason that even China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had decided in the previous decade not to induct the LY-60D SHORADS into service in large numbers, and instead await the development of the LY-80 MR-SAM (produced by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, or CASC, and marketed by Aerospace Long-March International Import and Export Co Ltd, or ALIT). Consequently, the PLA today has only 1 Regiment of the HQ-64/LY-60D operational with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) Chengdu-based 11 Anti-Air Artillery Brigade (Unit 95607). The interception altitude of the LY-60D is 30 metres-12,000 metres (15 metres–15,000 metres for LY-80) and slant range 1,000 metres–18,000 metres (extended to 20,000 metres recently), as against 3,500 metres–40,000 metres and extendable to 70,000 metres for the LY-80. As an oblique launched system the LY-60D has its limitations compared to a vertically launched system. Its maximum overload after launch is 7 G, compared to 30 G maximum overload available after launch for the LY-80.  
Despite such overwhelming evidence in favour of MR-SAMs, it appears that a turf war between GAPU and RMAF HQ has now erupted, resulting in GAPU insisting, rather strangely, on the procurement of additional SHORADS, and in particular the LY-60D, which had been rejected way back in 2002 by the GAPU and by China itself in 2004! Upon digging deeper, it appears that two persons—Maj-Gen (Ret’d) Husin bin Md Tahak, a former Head of GAPU, and Brig Gen (Reservist) Tan Sri Liew Yun Fah,a Sabah-based timber trader who is now a Vice Presidentof Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (a political party)—are the co-marketeers in Malaysia of the obsolete LY-60D. While both these persons were unsuccessful in their marketing efforts during the tenure of Dato Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi as Minister for Defence(between April 10, 2009 and May 16, 2013), the duo are now confident about striking it rich during the tenure of the present Malaysian Defence Minister Datuk Seri Panglima Hishammuddin bin Tun Hussein. While Maj-Gen (Ret’d) Datuk Husin is a former classmate of Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi (presently Malaysia’s Minister for Home Affairs) and had secured the LY-60D’s sales and marketing agency for Malaysia from CPMIEC on Dato’ Seri Dr Zahid’s recommendation, his marketing efforts were unsuccessful during Dato’ Seri Dr Zahid’s tenure as Defence Minister. Maj-Gen (Ret’d) Datuk Husin has—since Datuk Seri Panglima Hishamuddin’s tenure at MINDEF—joined forces with Tan Sri Liew. In fact, Brig Gen (Reservist) Tan has, since early this year, been introducing himself both in Malaysia and abroad as an adviser to Datuk Seri Panglima Hishammuddin, and has repeatedly claimed both in China and Malaysia that the latter will do whatever the former proposes!
One can only hope that such caricatures do not succeed in enhancing the size of their respective bank accounts at the expense of both the MAF and the Defence Minister’s personal integrity and public probity.

The Devil Always Lurks Within The Detail

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Forget this dictum, and the devil will be ever-ready to haul all our arses back to hell. And this is exactly what has bedeviled the Barak-2 LR-SAM programme of the MoD-owned Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). And what has led to this rather expensive and time-consuming comedy of errors (about which I had known since 2011, but am revealing it all only now) being enacted is nothing else but the sheer lack of managerial skills of  India’s present-day Defence Minister, Arakkaparambil Kurian Antony.  
It may be recalled that India and Israel had inked the 70km-range Barak-2 naval LR-SAM’s joint five-year R & D contract—valued at US$556 million—on January 27, 2006, following 17 months of exhaustive contractual negotiations. For extended ground-based long-range air defence India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) had on July 12, 2007 approved a $2.47 billion project to co-develop the LR-SAM’s 110km-range variant for the Indian Air Force. Subsequently, on February 27, 2009 India signed a $1.4 billion procurement contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for the Barak-2’s IAF-specific LR-SAM variant, and this was followed in April the same year by a $1.1 billion contract for procuring the Barak-2’s naval LR-SAM variant. Both variants were to have been co-developed by a consortium of entities that included the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad-based Research Centre Imarat (RCI) and Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), and the Bangalore-based Electronics R & D Establishment (LRDE); plus Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) on one hand; and a consortium of IAI’s MLM and ELTA Systems business divisions, RAFAEL and RADA Electronics. The LR-SAM’s critical design review was completed by early May 2008 and its DRDL-developed two-stage pulsed rocket motor was successfully test-fired earlier the same year. The first six sets of these rocket motors were shipped to RAFAEL by the DRDL in July 2008 for further test and integration activities. Series production was due to have begun in 2011 at the Hyderabad-based facilities of BDL.
Now, it so happened that during the contractual negotiations stage between IAI, RAFAEL and RADA on one hand and the MoD and DRDO on the other, the DRDO had ‘assumed’ that the Israeli OEMs would deliver fully integrated Barak-2 area air-defence weapon systems to the DRDO, which in turn would supply them to the Indian Navy (IN) through BEL and BDL. However, by 2012 it had become evident that the DRDO’s ‘assumption’ had in fact, morphed into the mother of all fuck-ups. And here’s why: the DRDO had wrongly assumed that the Barak-2 suite, comprising both the LR-SAM rounds and the 9-tonne, mast-mounted ELTA Systems-developed EL/M-2248 MF-STAR S-band volume-search active phased-array radar (APAR), would be fully integrated with the EMDINA Mk2 combat management system, or CMS (developed by the IN’s Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment, or  WESEE) on board the three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG). In reality, since the Barak-2’s risk-sharing co-development effort was solely DRDO-led-and-driven from the Indian side, the DRDO never even bothered to seek WESEE’s feedback regarding systems integration challenges and taskings, and consequently—believe it or not— what the MoD-approved joint R & D contract between the India and Israeli military-industrial consortiums specified on paper only pertained to integrating the LR-SAM rounds with the MF-STAR’s fire-control systems, and never addressed the need for integrating this fire-control system with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS.
Consequently, the WESEE, which since the late 1980s had designed and developed, along with Russia’s St Petersburg-based Northern Design Bureau and SUDOEXPORT FSUE, the BEL-built EMCCA computer-aided action information system (CAAIS) for the three Project 16A FFGs and three Project 15 DDGs, the BEL-built EMDINA Mk1 CMS for the three Project 17 FFGs and four Project 28 ASW corvettes, was tasked by the MoD to only develop the applications software of the BEL-built EMDINA Mk2 CMS, plus help the MoD-owned Mazagon Docks Ltd design and fabricate the 9-tonne main mast housing the MF-STAR for the three Project 15A DDGs. Therefore, no responsibility was contractually fixed (by the MoD in its all-knowing wisdom) on who should integrate the Barak-2 suite with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS. As matters now stand, development of systems integration software began in only late 2012 after a supplemental R & D contract was inked between the WESEE and the Israeli military-industrial consortium, and the final end-product will not be available for in-country firing trials till late 2015.
So why did things go so horribly wrong? There are two reasons for that. Firstly, the MoD’s existing discredited practice of maintaining two separate files—the Service File (owned by the concerned armed services HQ) and the Ministry File (owned by the MoD’s civilian component) for each procurement project, and between which the latter is always the only one that is considered sacrosanct and is the only one that makes its way to the CCNS for final approval, needs to be done away with post-haste. Instead, joint accountability for every procurement decision-making process must be enforced so that the concerned Project Director from the concerned armed services works together with the concerned Joint Secretary of the MoD as an embedded team, instead of functioning within administratively isolated cubicles as is presently the case.      
Secondly, the DRDO, apart from approaching the IN for learning the art of contract negotiations of a military-industrial nature, should also have invested in acquiring a trials vessel on board which both the Barak-2 LR-SAM suite should have been integrated with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS and subjected to a series of developmental firing-trials at sea. Only after the successful completion of such sea-trials and their validation by the WESEE should a series-production indent have been placed by the MoD with the Indian and Israeli military-industrial consortium. One can now only hope that valuable lessons have been learnt by the MoD and DRDO and history won’t be allowed to repeat itself on board the four Project 15B DDGs and seven Project 17A FFGs. 

Creating Comatose Institutions
Another cardinal sin committed by RM A K Antony has been his total inability to transform the HQ of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDH) to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in to a functional institution. While the IDH should have been instructed and empowered by the MoD to introduce an element of discipline in the military procurement system (such as coordinating the procurement of LUH helicopters for the Army, IN and the IAF, and procurement of the combined package of 15 Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavylift helicopters and 145 BAE Systems-built LW-155 ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal howitzers), it can do very little since the officer heading the IDH, the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), is a three-star officer and is therefore junior to the four-star armed services chiefs. A brief explanation of the IDH and the CIDS will help appreciate the procurement process better. Following the Group of Ministers’ report released in February 2001, it was agreed that whle the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would be the primary step in the structural reforms suggested for the MoD, the appointment of a Vice-CDS was instead created within weeks. But as the post of the CDS was soon opposed by the then Parliament’s Select Committee on Defence, the appointment of the Vice-CDS became untenable (vice to whom?). Finally, the Vice-CDS’ office was renamed and the CIDS to the COSC (CISC) came into being in September 2001. The CISC, who heads the IDH, now has two responsibilities: he is answerable to the MoD like any other Secretary in the MoD; and on the military side he is answerable to the Chairman of the COSC. Unfortunately, there are two fundamental limitations to both these roles. For, unlike the four Departments of the MoD—Defence, R & D, Production & Supplies, and Finance—the IDH has not been designated as the MoD’s fifth Department, and hence its activities are not coordinated by the Defence Secretary.

The reason for this is that while the armed services personnel could theoretically be posted within the MoD, a civilian cannot be expected to understand and do the armed services personnel’s job. Consequently, the CISC at present essentially remains answerable only to the COSC, and has little or no reason to report to the Defence Minister. Within the COSC, the individual armed service chiefs remain more aligned with their service needs than with the common causes, and there is always dissonance between the purple team (comprising the IDH with officers from the three armed services) headed by the CISC, and the COSC. This shortcoming can only be overcome with the appointment of the CDS, who is senior, and hence does not report to the COSC. The CDS would then become a voting member of the COSC and in that capacity he would provide single-point military advice to the Defence Minister and the CCNS. Therefore, had the three four-star armed service chiefs been instructed by A K Antony to work together to support the creation of the post of CDS, there would have been no need for them to individually and persistently explain to the Prime Minister’s Office and his National Security Adviser (who by the way needs to have a serving three-star military officer as a Deputy National Security Adviser) the five cardinal truths about national security, and by now the DRDO would have become far more accountable since, fearing technical audits of its diverse R & D projects, it would have ended its skullduggery—one example of which is its proposal to indigenously develop a 155mm/52-calibre ATAGS towed howitzer for the Army, while conveniently forgetting to hold consultations with the IN, which requires turret-mounted 155mm howitzers to serve as the main artillery armament for its future warship acquisitions.
A prime example of wasted opportunities due to sheer mismanagement of both the MoD and the IDH concerns the procurement of CH-47F Chinooks and LW-155 howitzers. While the Indian Army had by 2006 zeroed in on the need for air-portable ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal howitzers and had even drafted a GSQR for its procurement, the IAF, taking a cue from the Army, too finalised its ASQR for heavylift helicopters required for airlifting such howitzers by 2007. At this point in time itself, it should have become obvious even to someone with below-average IQ that irregardless of which howitzer would be ordered (the LW-155 or the Pegasus from Singapore’s ST Kinetics), the only available heavylift helicopter that is certified to airlift both these howitzers in an underslung configuration is the CH-47F—meaning while the howitzer could be selected after a competitive bidding process, the helicopter would have to be procured under a sole-source contract. This in turn meant that, in order to avoid corrupt practices while procuring the CH-47F, it was preferable to order the 15 CH-47Fs not by the direct commercial sale route, but via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. Instead, exactly the opposite was allowed to happen, i.e. Boeing and Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp were invited to: present their commercial bids in July 2009; and send their respective platforms—CH-47F and Mi-26T2—to India for in-country flight-trials on a no-cost-no-commitment basis. At the same time, the MoD conveniently forgot to coordinate matters with IDH and the COSC for the sake of killing two birds with one stone, i.e. requesting BAE Systems and ST Kinetics to send the LW-155 and Pegasus to India so that the Army and IAF could create a combined evaluation team for conducting competitive firepower/mobility evaluations in which both the CH-47F and Mi-26T2 too could have participated.
Another option that could have been pursued by the MoD via the IDH was to ensure that both the CH-47F and LW-155 were available in India for field-trials in February 2009 so that the CH-47F which had been ferry-flown to Bengaluru earlier that month for giving flying demonstrations at the Aero India 2009 expo, would subsequently be available for demonstrating the LW-155’s air-portability to both the Army and IAF. However, all this was not to be.   
Consequently, this is how matters played out in a dysfunctional manner: while both Boeing and Rosoboronexport State Corp submitted their respective proposals to the IAF in October 2009, the MoD’s Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) cleared the proposal for buying 145 LW-155s for $660 million on only May 11, 2012 through the FMS route (even though Army HQ had forwarded all paperwork to the MoD as far back as July 2010 when the LW-155 deal was estimated to cost only Rs.30 billion ($477 million). In addition, an Army ‘maintainability evaluation team’ had visited the US from February 8 to 25, 2011 to examine the LW-155. However, it was only on August 2, 2013 that the MoD officially requested the US for the sale of 145 LW-155s, whose price had then escalated to $885 million. Subsequently, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSAC) on August 7, 2013 notified the US Congress of a potential FMS of the LW-155s along with Selex-built laser inertial artillery pointing systems (LINAPS), warranty, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, as well as engineering and logistics support services and other related elements of logistics support.
Later that year, when the LW-155 was deployed to Sikkim for in-country high-altitude firepower/mobility trials, the absence of the CH-47F was direly felt and consequently, the trials could not be conducted in the areas specified by the Army due to the absence of in-theatre certified heavylift platforms. It is due to this reason that the LW-155 was: unable to demonstrate its direct firing capabilities by day and night; unable to demonstrate its compatibility with the Army’s Firing Tables; unable to demonstrate its air-portability in underslung mode; unable to demonstrate its sighting system at nighttime; and unable to demonstrate its built-in communications system at high altitudes. The IAF too refused to airlift the LW-155 in underslung mode with its existing Mi-26Ts in Sikkim. And why did the IAF refuse to do so? Simply because A) the Mi-26T is not certified to carry this weapon underslung and consequently the IAF does not have SOPs in place to carry out such a heavylift operation; and B) the IAF therefore did not have in its possession the hooks and cables required for rigging the LW-155 to the Mi-26T in underslungconfiguration.  


Yellow Journalism Yet Again
In this news-report (http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/russians-go-slow-sukhoi-fleet-in-trouble), it has been alleged that 50% of the IAF’s Su-30MKI fleet remains grounded because of A) multiple cases of repeated failure of Mission Computer-1 and blanking out of Head Up Displays (HUD) and all Multi-Function Displays (MFD) in flight since 2012. B) Due to non-availability of facilities for overhaul of aggregates (aircraft parts), following which the serviceability (availability for flying) of Su-30MKI is slowly decreasing and demand for Aircraft on Ground (AOG) items on the rise as of December 24,  2013. C) Due to Russia’s inability to set up the MRO workshops at HAL’s Nashik-based facility by December 2013, and that this facility was originally scheduled to overhaul the first Su-30MKI by June 2014. Consequently, five Su-30MKIs are already parked at HAL for extensive overhaul, and another 15 will be due for overhaul in the current year.
Now, let’s separate fact from fiction. Firstly, both the Su-30MKI and MiG-29B-12 were originally designed and certified to log in no more than 120 flight-hours per annum. Despite this, the IAF has been following Western standards of flight operations by requiring its air warriors to log in at least 25 flight-hours per month, or about 275 flight-hours every year, or 2,750 hours in a decade. Furthermore, the IAF has been way behind schedule when it came to service-induction of cockpit procedures trainers and full-flight simulators for the Su-30MKI. Ideally, such flying training aids should have been commissioned into service in a progressive manner since the last quarter of 2002, but this process didn’t commence until the final quarter of 2009. Now, if 275 flight-hours are logged in by a Su-30MKI, then within five-and-a-half-years itself it would have reached its scheduled time-between-overhauls (TBO) of 1,500 hours for both the airframe and turbofans, while the prescribed Russian timetables call for the Su-30MKI to approach its TBO after only a decade, i.e. after the Su-30MKI has been flown for 120 hours every year for at least a decade. What this translates into is that the HAL-owned-and-operated MRO facility for the IAF’s Su-30MKIs should have become operational by early 2008 at the latest. Consequently, HAL is behind schedule by six full years when it comes to commissioning such a MRO facility.  
Now, coming to the issue of the premature in-flight malfunctions of the Su-30MKI’s ELBIT Systems-built Type 967 HUD, THALES-developed MFD-55 and MFD-66 AMLCDs, and the DARE-developed and HAL-built mission computer. Firstly, it must be noted that the malfunctions are not across-the-board or affecting the entire fleet of Su-30MKIs, but only those airframes produced for the last tranche of 10i-standard Su-30MKIs and the first tranche of 11i-standard Su-30MKIs. At most, therefore, no more than 40 Su-30MKIs will be affected by such avionics-related malfunctions. This then brings us to the probable causes of such malfunctions. Prima facie, there is only one probable cause: faulty hardware—most likely wiring harnesses or cable connectors. What has to be established is whether these items came directly from Russian OEMs (in which case product liabilities will those of Rosboronexport State Corp and IRKUT Corp) or were they sourced from India-based OEM-licenced vendors. This can easily be done PROVIDED HAL has its in-house required set of item-specific test-benches and ATE equipment. As another option, HAL can also make use of ADA’s test-benches and ATE equipment, while DARE can be approached for replicating a fully-functional mock-up of the Su-30MKI’s cockpit avionics architecture—since DARE is presently involved with a similar task concerning the cockpits of the projected Super Su-30MKI.
But what is most exasperating is that despite decades of experience in licenced-manufacturing of various types of combat aircraft of foreign origin, neither the MoD’s Department of Defence Production & Supplies nor HAL till this day have grasped the need for achieving 100% indigenisation for the tens of thousands of rotables, consumables and accessories that go into each aircraft-type. Instead, the focus continues to be on the licenced-production of airframes through raw materials sourced locally and from abroad. Such a distortion can only result in an undesirable reliance on foreign OEMs for the smallest but most critical components, which in turn severely compromises the IAF’s operational sovereignty over its aircraft/weapons assets.
Lastly, a word on the so-called combat aircraft fleet availability rates in peacetime. No air force in peacetime boasts of combat aircraft fleet availability rates of 75%. Such high rates are mandatory for only flying training aircraft like BTTs, AJTs and LIFTs. In reality, the availability rate of combat aircraft fleets hovers between 50% and 60%. If the national security scenario worsens over a period of time, then the availability rates are increased progressively (as was the case with the IAF in both 1999 and 2002), depending on the type of conflict envisaged, i.e. limited high-intensity conflict confined to a single theatre, or a full-blown all-out war. In case of the latter, fleet availability rates are jacked up to 90% for Day-1 of the war. By Day-2, the rate drops to 75% and by Day-4, the availability rate stabilises at 50% while ensuring a high tempo of daily sortie generation. It is based on such estimates that any self-respecting air force does its force-structure planning.

Significant Project Milestones Of S-2/ARIHANT SSBN

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Project Commencement Date: November 20, 1988
Commencement of Civil-Engineering Activities at Kalpakkam for Land-Based Nuclear Propulsion Plant (using a 83mWth pressurised water-cooled water-moderated reactor designed by Russia’s Afrikantov OKBM) also known as S-1, or ‘Half Boat’: 1989, with work being completed by 1999
Commencement of Metal-Cutting for S-2: January 5, 1998
Keel-Laying Ceremony Of S-2’s Hull: June 21, 1998 carrying the hull codename P-4102
Criticality Attainment of S-1:  November 11, 2003. S-1 became fully operational on September 22, 2006
S-2’s Hull Launching Ceremony: July 26, 2009 at the Indian Navy-owned Shipbuilding Centre (SBC) at Visakhapatnam, with S-2 being christened as ARIHANT
Attainment of PWR Criticality on-board S-2/Arihant: August 10, 2013
Commencement of S-2/Arihant’s Sea-Trials: December 15, 2014
 
 

DRDO-Developed Low-Drag Glide-Bomb Data
The 1,000kg low-drag, high-explosive aerial bomb has been developed and is being produced by OFB Khamaria. The bomb, with a designation of Mk12, has a length of 4,000mm and weighs about 930kg. 
The DRDO-developed 100km-range, 1,000kg low-drag glide-bomb has been jointly developed with Russia’s Joint Stock Company ‘Scientific Production Association Bazalt’ (JSC SPA Bazalt) and its local industrial partner Basant Aerospace Pvt Ltd. 
While the DRDO developed the on-board MINGS-based inertial and terminal navigation system, the glide-kits and rear-end structural sections have come from JSC SPA Bazalt. The PGM will be used primarily against static targets like bridges, railway junctions, and logistic hubs for POL and ammunition storage. 
The Russia-origin glide-kit will also be used by the IAF’s existing Mk11N high-explosive, 1,000lb low-drag aerial bombs.

Compounded Irrationalities Due To Systematic Stupidity

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As the saying goes, “Those who know much, talk little”. But its meaning seems to have been lost on India’s new Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) Manohar Parrikar, if we are to believe what he was reported to have said at an on-the-record press conference on December 30, 2014 regarding the procurement of 189 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (M-MRCA). Most of the ‘desi’ newspapers attributed two statements to Parrikar: (1) additional licence-built Su-30MKIs are adequate for the IAF in case it is decided not to procure the Rafale; and (2) The Su-30MKI is an adequate aircraft for meeting the air force’s needs. Now, while it is understandable for a select group of ‘desi’ journalists to deliberately twist-and-turn the Raksha Mantri’s statements/observations (since for the past 18 months they have either been promoting, for their own vested financial interests, the procurement of either the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or the Eurofighter EF-2000), in case these ‘desi’ journalists for once did get it right and correctly quoted the Raksha Mantri, then India is indeed in some serious trouble.
Let me explain how and why. Neither the Su-30MKI nor the MiG-29UPG/MiG-29K were ever designed as multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA). Their design and performance parameters were instead optimised for air dominance/air superiority, with standoff all-weather precision strike undertaken from medium altitudes being a secondary capability. It is for this reason that the erstwhile USSR had developed the Su-24 and Su-27IB/Su-34 as all-weather, terrain-hugging deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSA), and the Su-25 as a dedicated tactical strike/close air support aircraft. Consequently, neither the Su-30MKI’s nor the MiG-29UPG’s/MiG-29K’s airframes have the stress tolerances that are required for flying terrain-hugging flight profiles. Their existing X-band multi-mode radars  or MMR (RLSU-30MK NO-11M ‘Bars’ and the Zhuk-M2E) therefore don’t come with low-altitude terrain avoidance mode or automatic terrain-following capability or weather-mapping mode, and neither are they equipped with low-altitude navigation pods.
Consequently, the only true M-MRCAs that are operational today in an area between India and Japan is the Republic of Singapore Air Force’s Boeing-built F-15SGs, which come equipped with Raytheon-supplied APG-63(V)3 AESA-MMR, Boeing/ELBIT Systems joint helmet mounted cueing system (JHMCS), TIGER Eyes Sensor Suite comprising Lockheed Martin’s AAQ-13 LANTIRN-ER navigation pod (containing a  mid-wave staring-array FLIR sensor and a terrain-following radar and forward-looking infra-red sensor), an AAQ-33 Sniper XR targetting pod containing a mid-wave staring-array FLIR sensor with a 40,000-feet laser and charge-couple device (CCD) TV, and the AAS-43 infra-red search-and-track (IRST) system containing a passive long-wave IR sensor.  
Simply put, therefore, the IAF is in dire need of procuring an M-MRCA fleet with automatic terrain-following capability—which the Rafale is optimised for. Presently, the IAF operates 3 MiG-29B-12 squadrons (now being upgraded to MiG-29UPG standard), 9 MiG-21 Bison squadrons, 4 Jaguar IS squadrons, 1 Jaguar IM squadron, 10 Su-30MKI squadrons, 3 Mirage 2000H/TH squadrons (being upgraded to Mirage 2000UPG standard), 3 MiG-27UPG squadrons, and 2 MiG-27M squadrons, making a total of 35 squadrons. Although the sanctioned strength of the IAF is 42 combat aircraft squadrons (which is due for increase to 50 squadrons by 2024, at least on paper), of these, those equipped with MiG-21 Bisons, MiG-27UPGs and MiG-27Ms will have to be decommissioned by 2017 at the latest.
Presently, the IAF is gearing up to form the first ‘Tejas’ Mk1 squadron—No45 ‘Flying Daggers’ Sqn—which will initially be first raised in Bengaluru before relocating to Sulur in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, this March. Present plans call for the first four IOC-standard) Tejas Mk1 MRCAs built by the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to be delivered by March 31, 2015, another six by March 31, 2016, and another eight by March 31, 2017. This squadron will, however, be declared fully operational only in 2022, once its 18 Tejas Mk1s are upgraded to FOC standard. The second Tejas Mk1-equipped squadron, comprising 20 FOC-standard MRCAs, will be formed up in 2017 and will become fully operational by March 31, 2020. All Tejas Mkls will be equipped with Israel Aerospace Industries/ELTA Systems-supplied EL/M-2032 MMRs, which will possess both automatic terrain-followingand weather mapping modes of operation.    
Going by calculations based on universal norms, I have estimated the flyaway unit cost of procuring 40 Tejas Mk1s as being US$52 million. To this must be added the cost of air base customisation and procurement of weapons packages, all of which works to out about US$72 million per aircraft.  
Meanwhile, to replace the MiG-27UPGs and MiG-27Ms, 68 Jaguar IS aircraft are presently being upgraded to DARIN 3-standard so that they can undertake all-weather tactical strike/close air support operations. This Rs.31.3 billion (US$0.57 billion) contract was awarded to HAL in March 2008 and is due for completion by December 2017. The upgraded Jaguar IS too will have on board the EL/M-2032 MMRs possessing both automatic terrain-following and weather mapping modes of operation.    
From the above, it becomes clear that the IAF is now in desperate need of M-MRCAs with credible deep penetration strike capabilities and capable of flying terrain-hugging profiles. It is also well-known that the IAF wants to arrest the steady decline of its frontline combat aircraft inventory ASAP. The only available options—all non-negotiable—are as follows:
1) Ink the procurement contract for 189 Rafales latest by June 2015.
2) Increase the size of the Su-30MKI fleet to no less than 350 by procuring the first 50 Super Su-30MKIs in semi-knocked-down condition from Russia’s IRKUT Corp, starting 2017, while concurrently commencing the upgrading of in-service Su-30MKIs in successive tranches to Super Sukhoi-standard.
3) Increase the quantum of Jaguar IS being upgraded to DARIN 3-stadard from 68 to 125 and re-engine the entire fleet with Honeywell-supplied F-125 turbofans.  
Now a brief explanation on why the Rafale M-MRCA procurement’s contract signature has been subjected to delays. Firstly, there was the financial crunch over the past two years. Secondly, the Union Ministry for Home Affairs had in 2012 issued mandatory industrial security-related regulations that called for comprehensive vetting (a most time-consuming process) of all technical and managerial personnel of those India-based Tier-1, Tier-2 and Tier-3 companies that were selected for the licence-manufacturing/licenced-assembly components of the Rafale M-MRCA. Thirdly, since French aerospace OEMs have always made use of France-origin precision machining, riveting and welding equipment and related test-benches, this time too they insisted that HAL and its sub-contractors procure all such hardware exclusively from French OEMs, instead of issuing global tenders for such industrial hardware procurements. Had HAL not agreed to comply with this key issue, all the involved French OEMs would have been unable to issue certificates of airworthiness for all those Rafales licence-built by HAL. It is this issue that has been most time-consuming and in the end, HAL had no other choice but to give-in.

Consolidated Data On Army-Specific & Air Force-Specific Akash-1 E-SHORADS

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Army-Specific Variant
Air Force-Specific Variant

The Great Aero India 2015 Tamaasha

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On February 18, when Shri Narendra Damodardas Modi becomes India’s second ever Prime Minister to inaugurate the Aero India expo (the first was Shri H D Deve Gowda), he, accompanied by Defence Minister Shri Manohar Parrikar and Minister of State for Defence Shri Rao Inderjit Singh, can be expected to view both the aerobatic demonstrations by both home-grown and foreign platforms as well as visit those exhibition halls housing the exhibits of India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) as well as those of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). It remains to be seen if the expo organiser—the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Exhibition Organisation (DEO)—will take the assembled VVIPs to view the exhibits of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). In case the VVIPs do make it there, this by itself will constitute a grim reality check. Why so? Because traditionally, the booth—itself left segregated in an insignificant corner inside a makeshift exhibition hall—is largely left unmanned. Anyone familiar with ISRO’s exploits and achievements will indeed find this hard to believe or digest, but this has been a fact of life for far too long! One therefore can only hope that NaMo takes stock of this and demands urgent remedial measures from the DEO. 
Let’s now venture into the expo proper: although it has been hailed as an aerospace expo, Aero India has traditionally been strictly for military aviation. Why? Simply because the DEO has no idea about what exactly constitutes the aerospace industries and markets. Consequently, no one from the DEO bothers to canvass abroad for participation by the space agencies and OEMs from countries like the US, France and Russia. Similarly, you won’t find any reputable foreign MRO service provider, nor any original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing commercial aircraft interiors, galley equipment, avionics, in-flight entertainment systems, etc. etc. Likewise, if anyone thinks that the expo will play host to OEMs for airport ground support hardware or aerobridges, he/she will definitely draw a blank. Of the 328 OEMs from 33 countries participating in Aero India 2015, the US will have the largest representation with 64 companies, followed by France with 58 companies, the UK with 48, Russia with 41 and Israel with 25. Although the total number of foreign companies participating has risen sharply from 212 in Aero India 2013 to 328 this year, rest assured that 99% of them will be hawking their products for off-the-shelf purchases.
Participation by Indian exhibitors, which has risen from 156 companies in 2013 to 266 this year, will be accounted for mostly by the DPSUs and DRDO laboratories, with only a tiny sprinkling of MSMEs. For the very first time there will be participation from three states—Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh—that wish to attract foreign OEMs setting up shop in their territories. 
Suggested Reality Checks
Here are a few questions that NaMo and Shri Parrikar ought to ask their Mod-owned DPSU hosts if and when they visit their respective pavilions:
Why has the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) consistently shied for a full decade now away from obtaining EASA airworthiness certification for the Dhruv ALH?  
Why has the Indian Army’s Aviation Corps not yet raised its first squadron of the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunship despite taking delivery of the first such helicopter back in February 2013?
What is the Dhruv ALH’s percentage of claimed indigenisation by weight, by volume, by cost, and by technological content? This is because imported equipment may constitute only 20% of the platform by weight and volume, but could account for as much as 80% of the cost and technology content.
Similarly, what will be the claimed indigenisation by weight, by volume, by cost, and by technological content of the HAL -developed Light Utility Helicopter’s (LUH) and Light Combat Helicopter’s (LCH)?
Which entity—HAL or the DRDO’s Aeronautical development Agency (ADA)—should be primarily responsible for commercially marketing the Tejas family of multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA)? And this is why I’m asking this question: If a certain customer, let’s say Egypt, is interested in procuring the Tejas Mk1 MRCA’s tandem-seater version configured as a lead-in-fighter trainer (LIFT), but it wants to procure the aircraft with non-Israeli multi-mode pulse-Doppler radars, helmet-mounted displays and laser designation pods, which entity should be held accountable for delivering the customer-specified end-product: HAL, the aircraft manufacturer, or ADA, the aircraft designer-cum-systems integrator?
Which OEM supplies all the synthetic resins that are used for fabricating all the co-cured composite airframe structures for the Dhruv ALH, LCH, LUH and the Tejas MRCA? Is the OEM a ‘desi’ one?
Why does India still need to import Ni-Cd batteries for the Tejas MRCA, Dhruv/Rudra ALH, HJT-36, Mi-25 and Mi-35P platforms, as well as for the Searcher Mk2 and Heron UAVs?
Why has no one in India ever thought about devising indigenous alternatives to imported weapons ejector racks/pylons for platforms like the Dhruv/Rudra ALH and Tejas MRCA?
Why has the DRDO failed to develop chaff countermeasures kits for both fixed-wing and rotary-winged manned military platforms?
If the hybrid RLG/GPS-based inertial navigation system developed by the DRDO’s RCI laboratory has been successfully flight-tested numerous times on board different types of ballistic and cruise missiles, then what prevents it from being used on-board platforms like the Tejas MRCA and LCH?
When will the fully functional DRDO-developed Rustom-1 MALE-UAV begin entering service? Why has the DRDO failed to adhere to the original service-entry deadline of late 2013?
Why has the DRDO failed so far to develop COMINT and ELINT payloads for both the Rustom-1 and Rustom-2 MALE-UAVs?
Why does the DRDO-developed Ku-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR) occupy twice as much space volume as that of the in-service EL/M-2055D SARs delivered by the ELTA Systems subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries?
Does the DRDO possess any technological roadmap for developing a family of airborne AESA-MMRs? Or has it restricted itself to developing only the ‘Uttam’ AESA-MMR for the projected Tejas Mk2/LCA (Navy) Mk2 MRCA when, worldwide, established OEMs and developers of AESA-MMRs are busy introducing newer mission-specific applications, such as the EL/M-2022ES that can go on-board both UAVs and manned maritime surveillance/ASW platforms?

Will the MoD insist on procuring left-hand-drive TATRA heavy-duty trucks from BEML for mounting the DRDO-developed and BEL-built S-band Arudhra MPRs and Ashwini MRSRs? Or will the MoD ensure a level playing-field by soliciting competitive bids from both BEML and India’s private-sector truck manufacturers?

Analysing Exercise COPE TAUFAN-2014 & The Maiden Deployment To Southeast Asia Of The USAF’s F-22 Raptors

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Intertestingly, neither the F-22s nor the Su-30MKMs were seen carrying the DRS Technologies-supplied ACMI pods during the dissimilar air combat exercises.

Walkaround Of 5.54-tonne Zhi-10 (WZ-10) Thunderbolt Attack Helicopter Of Pakistan Army’s Aviation Corps

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The WZ-10 was originally designed by Russia’s Kamov OKB, and was subsequently developed by the PLA’s 602nd Research Institute, Changhe Aircraft Industries Group (CAIG) and China Helicopter Research and Development Institute (CHRDI).
Guidance system: semi-active laser
Launching platform: attack helicopters, UAVs
Effective range: 2,000 metres to 7,000 metres
Diameter: 170mm
Length: 1,775mm
Weight: 47kg
Hit probability: no less than 88% within effective range
Warhead: Tandem HEAT
Penetration: 1,400 mm/0°
Stabilised EO sight
TV detection range: 10km
TV identification range: 8km
Thermal imager detection range: 6km
Thermal imager identification range: 5km
Ground laser illuminator
Maximum illuminating range: 6km

Taking The Final Call On What Was Originally Proposed By France On February 20, 2006

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Chronology Of The M-MRCA Procurement Saga

Indian Air Force (IAF) formulates its Air Staff Qualitative Requirement (ASQR) for medium multi-role combat aircraft (M-MRCA) in the late 1990s.

* Request for Information (RFI) for 126 M-MRCAs, with an option for another 63, issued in late 2001. 
* Dassault Aviation offers to supply 40 Rafale M-MRCAs to the IAF in a single-source G-to-G deal. The offer is made by Charles Edelstenne, the then CEO of Dassault Aviation, when he calls on the then Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh in New Delhi on February 20, 2006. The IAF’s then Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal A K Nangalia is also present at this meeting. Edelstenne is part of the entourage of the then visiting French President Jacques Chirac.
*Issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP) was planned for December 2005. However, the formal 211-page RFP is released only on August 28, 2007. The RFP contains single-stage two-bid system criterion (separate quotes for the technical and for commercial evaluation forming part of the submissions from various concerned OEMs). Bidders are given a time-frame of six months to respond to the RFP by March 2008. The RFP includes a direct industrial offsets obligation of 50%, raised from the original official requirement of 30% as contained in the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Procurement Procedures of 2006. The RFP states that the IAF will initially acquire of 86 single-seat and 40 two-seat M-MRCAs, and retain the option to acquire another 63 M-MRCAs at a future date. Of the 126, 12 single-seaters and six tandem-seaters are required to be supplied off-the-shelf in flyaway condition, while the remaining 108 are to be licence-built in India. This will include 74 single-seaters and 34 tandem-seaters, of which 11 will be built from semi-knocked down (SKD) kits, 31 will be built from completely knocked down (CKD) kits, and 66 made from indigenously manufactured kits (IMK).

By late May 2009, the IAF’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) concludes its technical and staff evaluations of the RFP responses from the six bidders.

* Sequential in-country flight evaluations of all six contenders begin in mid-August 2009 and continue through to May 2010. Two teams of IAF test-pilots conduct the flight evaluations at Bengaluru, Leh and Jaisalmer. Besides possessing cold-weather terrain, Leh is a high-altitude location, while Jaisalmer is a desert area where hot winds blow. Planning for the trial schedule began in early 2009, with the IAF test-pilots being trained at the respective bidder’s country of origin to fly the aircraft, under Phase-1. Phase-2 calls for flight-trials in Indian airspace and in Phase-3, the six M-MRCA contenders are run through a series of tests to check the efficacy of their guided-munitions by firing them at firing ranges located within the respective bidder’s country of origin.
* All six flight evaluation reports, duly vetted by the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC), are completed by mid-July 2010.

In April 2011, the IAF shortlists Dassault Aviation’s Rafale and Eurofighter GmbH’s EF-2000 Typhoon.
* On January 31, 2012, the MoD announces that the Rafale has been selected as the IAF’s new-generation M-MRCA and estimates that contractual negotiations should be completed by October 2012 by the MoD’s Commercial Negotiations Committee (CNC) after receiving approvals from the Competent Financial Authority (CFA).
* On April 10, 2015, the Govt of India formally requests both the French government and Dassault Aviation to supply on a G-to-G basis 36 Rafales (32 single-seaters and four tandem-seaters) as soon as possible, subject to contract negotiations for these 34 Rafales being successfully concluded within a 90-day period. Concurrently, supplementary contracts will be inked with SNECMA Moteurs for two spare M88 turbofans, with Dassault Aviation for ground-support hardware for first- and second-line MRO, with THALES for a cockpit procedures trainer and a full-flight tactical training simulator, with MBDA for the guided-weapons package, and with Dassault Aviation for a maintenance training simulator.
Eventually, in the fullness of time, the IAF will end up with 189 Rafale M-MRCAs. That's a given. But the negotiations had got stuck over the cost of licenced-production of the 108 units. India was haggling over the labour cost parameters that are graded from 1 to 10. While the Russians had obtained Grade 6 for the Su-30MKI licenced-production programme, the French were asking for 8, while the Indians wanted it to be limited to 7. So, in the end, a compromise was struck under which India would order 36 Rafales off-the-shelf without any offsets of any kind and the French in turn would tone down their stance & come down to 7. Therefore, in nett terms, the French have won and India’s illogical negotiating shortsightedness (from 2012 till now) has been fully exposed. And NaMo too has realised at last that there are clear technological and human resource limits to how far the ‘Make in India’ mantra can be flogged. And this deal for 36 Rafales was conceived entirely by Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley and was fully endorsed by the PMO. Everyone else was in the dark on this issue. If 153 Rafales can be similarly ordered in successive tranches, then that will be the ideal solution. Because paying an exorbitant price for the so-called licenced-production of Rafales just to keep a few thousand employees of HAL gainfully employed for the next 20 years DOES NOT stand up to logic. Nor does such licenced-production lead to self-reliance of any kind anywhere. Far better therefore to utilise the money saved for the Tejas Mk2/LCA (Navy) Mk2 R & D effort, where at least 80% indigenisation can be expected in all domains except for the propulsion system.


‘Make in India’ For Rafale Has Already Begun
As for those ‘desi’ journalists claiming that the off-the-shelf procurement/s of the Rafale M-MRCA will pose a huge setback to the Govt of India’s ‘Make in India’ industrial promotion policy, the poster below shows just how totally wrong these ‘desi’ journalists are. They obviously did not do their homework during the Aero India 2015 expo last February!  

Ukraine-Origin Products On-Board Su-30MKI
When the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, Ukraine was left with about 30% of the Soviet-era military-industrial facilities on its territory, including about 750 factories and 140 scientific and technical institutions. Presently, 300 enterprises, institutions and organisations  employing more than 250,000 people are producing military equipment in Ukraine. Of these, 75 are registered as manufacturers of military products and services that are subject to state secrecy, including rocket and guided-missile technologies. 
The state holding company Ukroboronprom, established in 2010, oversees 134 Ukrainian state-owned military-industrial enterprises that employ 120,000 workers. Ukraine exports the rest, in the amount of US$1.3 billion worth of arms annually, which made Ukraine the eighth-largest weapons exporter in the world between 2009 and 2013. Ukroboronprom’s sales reached US$1.79 billion in 2013, an increase of 17% in 2012. Russia was the third-largest buyer of Ukraine-origin military hardware from 2009 to 2013, after the PRC and Pakistan. 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Ukroboronprom decided to halt all exports of weaponry and military-industrial hardware to Russia, whose outstanding orders from Ukraine in the civilian and defence sectors were at that time valued at more than US$15 billion. Terminating these contracts has adversely affected 79 Ukrainian and 859 Russian military-industrial firms. Ukrainian exports represent only a small fraction—between 4% and 7%—of Russia’s overall military imports. The number of buyers of Ukraine’s nuclear and ballistic missile technologies is fairly small but includes the PRC, North Korea, Syria, and Iran. PRC and North Korean agents have on several occasions been caught attempting to break into YUZHMASH for trying to acquire long-range ballistic missile technologies.
Ukraine’s total arms exports have been growing steadily, from US$20 million in 1994 to US$600 million in 1997 and US$1.5 billion in 2001. In 2002 the Industrial Policy Ministry of Ukraine and China’s Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) signed a protocol on cooperation in the military-industrial arena. Ukraine’s present-day weapons shipments to China in 2002 amounted to a mere US$50 million a year.  In 2002, Ukraine became the world’s fourth-largest weapons exporter and sold weapons and military technologies to China worth US$700 million, which accounted for 31% of Ukrainian exports that year. In 2011, 43% of Ukraine-built weapons were sold to the PRC, while in 2013 Ukraine became the PRC’s second-largest trade partner in the CIS, while China became Ukraine’s biggest military customer in Asia.

Pakistan Navy's Project S-26/Type 032 Qing-Class & Project S-30/Type 032 Qing-Class Submarines

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China’s R & D programme to develop the double-hulled Project S-26/Type 032 Qing-class and Project S-30/Type 032 Qing-class SSK submarines—all to be powered by China-developed Stirling Engine air-independent propulsion systems—was begun in January 2005. 
The first and only S-26 was launched at Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan in September 2010, and it completed its harbour-trials by September 2012. Its sea-trials commenced on October 16, 2012 in the Bohai Sea. The S-26 has a length of 92.6 metres, width of 10 metres, hydroplane width of 13 metres and a height of 17.2 metres. It has a draught of 6.85 metres when surfaced with a displacement of 3,797 tons. It operates at a submerged depth of 160 metres, but can dive as deep as 200 metres. Maximum surfaced speed is 10 Knots and maximum submerged speed is 14 Knots. It can operate with a crew of 88 for 30 days without resupply, or 200 crewmen for three days.
The S-30 will have a submerged displacement of 6,628 tons, and will be armed with four vertically-launched Babur long-range land-attack cruise missiles and two submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), most likely the upgraded JL-1 SLBM. Construction of the first S-30 is presently underway at Wuhan. Deliveries, however, will not commence until 2020 at best.  
The S-26 and S-30 submarines are being developed by China solely for the Pakistan Navy, and they will not enter service with the PLA Navy. The Pakistan Navy will procure four S-26s and four S-30s. China will also supply Pakistan with a submarine rebuild centre (SRC) that will be located at Ormara, and a VLF communications facility that will be located at Turbat. Deliveries of the S-26 submarines will begin by 2017.

Fitments Of Project 15A DDG INS Kolkata D-63

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Official press-briefings of the type given by the Indian Navy (IN) on August 13 regarding the INS Kolkata D-63—the first of three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG) on order for the IN—are always important for two reasons: for what is disclosed, and for what is not. For instance, while the IN stated that INS Kolkata is 90% indigenous by cost, it never went beyond that (thereby repeating history, for, on April 29, 2010, the IN had claimed that the total indigenous effort accounted for 60% of the cost of producing each Project 17 guided-missile frigate (FFG). My personal estimation is that in terms of hardware, INS Kolkata can boast of less than 50% indigenous content. And each Project 15A DDG’s acquisition cost is almost US$950 million (Rs.38 billion), while that of each Project 17 FFG is US$650 million (Rs.26 billion). The cost escalation in these two shipbuilding projects has been about 225% for Project 15A, about 260% for Project 17, with the main reasons contributing towards cost escalations being: delay in supply of warship-building D-40S steel by Russia, escalation due to increases in expenditure of the services rendered by Russian specialists on account of inflation during the build-period, impact of wage revisions due from October 2003, and finalisation of cost of weapons and sensors. 
INS Kolkata, whose keel was laid down on September 23, 2003, was launched on March 30, 2006. Therefore, detailed design of this class of DDG (using TRIBON CAD software) by a joint team comprising the IN’s in-house Directorate of Naval Design (DND)—which celebrates its 50 years of existence this year—and the MoD-owned shipbuilder Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), should have been concluded by mid-2002. But this was not to be, since the weapon-and-sensor fitments were yet to be selected at that time. It was only on January 27, 2006 that India’s MoD-owned Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inked the Barak-2 LR-SAM’s joint five-year joint R & D contract—valued at US$556 million—following 17 months of exhaustive negotiations. And the follow-on US$1.1 billion procurement contract for Barak-2 LR-SAMs and the three EL/M-2248 S-band multi-function search-and-target acquisition radars (MF-STAR)—the first naval active phased-array radars to become operational with a navy of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—was inked in April 2009. As a result, it can be safely inferred that the DND had finalised only about 70% of the DDG’s design by 2003. 
What cannot be denied, however, is that the IN’s DND and its captive centre of excellence—the Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE)—along with MDL, have succeeded in fabricating and delivering an engineering marvel, despite several institutional handicaps. For instance, designing and building the main mast housing the EL/M-2248 was no small achievement. This APAR comprises four 3 x 3-metre fixed-array faces (each weighing 1,500kg) based on a modular tile-array architecture providing full 360-degree coverage. Liquid cooling is used to dissipate heat at the arrays. The EL/M-2248’s on-board processors and power-suppliers together weigh 900kg and are housed within six cabinets--two for the processors and four for the power-supply hardware. The entire MF-STAR suite thus weighs 6,900kg.In addition to 3-D long-range airspace volume search, the EL/M-2248 simultaneously provides ASCM approach warning; target classification; maritime surface surveillance; active and semi-active SAM support; fire-control for the OTOBreda 76/62 SRGM; and multiple targets engagement capabilities. It can detect a combat aircraft flying at high altitude at ranges of up to 250km, while an incoming ASCM can be detected at ranges of up to 25km.
The INS Kolkata’s CMS-15A combat management system (CMS), developed by the WESEE, includes the IAI-developed  Weapon Control System (WCS), which performs threat evaluation and resource allocation functions, thereby optimising the capabilities of the CMS. The WCS thus provides simultaneous long-range volume search, threat alert, target verification/acquisition, target classification, track-while-search, and dedicated track, multi-long-range intercept support, and kill assessment capabilities. It is also characterised by:

* Wide intercept envelopes against a wide variety of targets.

* Quick reaction, short response time and minimum intercept range, these being crucial in scenarios of late target detection, high-speed attacking weapons, and restrained response policy.

* Long-range area defence.

* Effective against targets from low-altitude to their maximum operational flight altitude.

* Simultaneous multi-target engagement capability and multi-missile co-existence capability for ensuring effectiveness against saturation attacks. 

* De-confliction and coordination capabilities in dense and complex scenarios.

* Advanced ECCM features.

* Built-in threat evaluation, resources allocation and engagement coordination with other on-board defence systems.

* 2-way data-link with LR-SAMs (housed within eight 8-cell modules each weighing 1,700kg) increases mission success and target selectivity by providing the missile with real-time in-flight targetting updates, and providing real-time kill assessment to support shoot-look-shoot operations.

* Multi-system interoperability (task force-level as well as carrier battle group-level operations), under which each system may operate either as a standalone unit, supported by own sensors for engagement and guidance; or integrated in a multi-warship task force. Joint task force-level operation enables coordinated engagement of threats, mission optimisation (engaging each target with the optimal interceptor, in the optimal time) and resource sharing.

* Advanced Net-of-Nets architecture to ensure interoperability with other air-defence assets, such as remote/airborne radars mounted on aerostats) and external command-and-control centres).

* The Barak-8 LR-SAM’s flexible dual-pulse motor propulsion system provides high manoeuvrability at target interception range throughout its wide envelope.

* High-performance missile warhead specially designed for catering to a wide variety of airborne targets, and which guarantees robust target destruction.

* Built-in fratricide avoidance for undertaking safe air-defence operations near friendly air-traffic.

* Gunnery support capability, including combined missiles/gun engagement.
Expected To Go On-Board In Future
 Or
Though it was way back in late 2007 that the IN was introduced to the concept of operating remote-controlled RHIBs equipped with dunking sonars, it was only in late 2011 that the IN decided to acquire such systems since, unlike active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar, the dunking sonar-on-a-RHIB can be operated in both shallow and deep waters (up to an operational depth of 300 metres or 985 feet), are easily and quickly deployed, are much cheaper and impose no restrictions whatsoever on warship manoeuvrability, especially in situations when a warship is being engaged by wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes. It is for all these reasons that the IN in early 2012 refused to order either the NAGAN active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar that was being developed by the DRDO’s Naval Physical & Oceanographic Labs (NPOL) or the ATLAS Elektronik-developed ATAS, which had earlier been selected after competitive bidding for the three Project 15 DDGs and three Project 1135.6 Batch-1 FFGs. The IN now plans to acquire a few ROVs from Textron Systems and equip them with the NPOL-developed LFDS, with all structural and systems integration work being done by a joint team of personnel hailing from NPOL and WESEE.
But what accounts for the long delays in commissioning INS Kolkata? Obviously, MDL cannot be blamed since it is the IN’s DND that was unable to freeze the Project 15A DDG’s design concept well before the commencement of hull construction. Another reason for the delay has been the WESEE’s inability to build either a dedicated shore-based facility for undertaking weapons-and-systems integration R & D, or to acquire a test vessel for on-board tests-and-trials of various sensors, weapon systems and propulsion sub-systems. Contrast this with what China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) has done for undertaking similar activities: at the PLAN’s Wuhan Naval Research Facility at Huangjia Lake southeast of Wuhan, a giant full-scale replica of the top-deck, island and citadel of the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier (Liaoning 16) was built, and a similar effort is now underway there to build a full-scale mock-up of the citadel and integrated mast of the PLAN’s futuristic Type 055 DDG.  
In addition, since March 1997, the PLAN has acquired at least three test vessels, with the first of these being the 6,000-tonne Dahua-class vessel (Shiyan 891) that was built by Shanghai-based Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard and became operational in January 1998. The second such vessel—Hua Luogeng 892—was commissioned in August 2005. The third vessel—893—was commissioned in November 2011. It features a raised-bow breakwater to reduce water over the bow and a never-before-seen 30-feet-tall, 3-feet-diameter SATCOMS antenna on the forecastle. The ship has an enclosed foremast instead of the latticework mast structures found on 891 and 892. The foremast’s three yardarms feature new paired round flat-faced ESM antennae, plus radomes housing weapons targetting Ku-band and UHF-band data-link antenna. 

Russia's T-14 Object 148 Armata MBT Fails To Impress

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R & D work on Russia's clean-slate design T-14 Object 148 Armata main battle tank (MBT) commenced in 2011, with Moscow so far investing 15 billion Rubles (US$239 million) in this R & D project, with another 39 billion Rubles ($622 million) due to follow. To date, the Russian Army has taken delivery of only 12 pre-production prototypes of the T-14 Armata, all of which were ordered in 2013. 
Even though a procurement contract for series-production T-14s is in place for deliveries through to 2017, no long-term contract has been signed as yet. According to the T-14’s OEM, Uralvagonzavod JSC, large-scale series-production is key to reducing the unit price of the Armata. Consequently, the Russia Army is required to order no fewer than 40 Armata MBTs in 2016, 70 in 2017, and 120 annually beginning in 2018 in order to maintain stable, affordable production-levels. Even then, it will take more than 20 years to produce Russia’s desired number of 2,300 Armata MBTs—thereby pushing the deadline for completion of series-production into 2035, while the original target date had been 2020 at an estimated cost of $9.2 billion.
The T-14 Armata, weighing close to 55 tonnes and powered by a 1,500hp multi-fuel engine, features an unmanned turret, with all three crew members (driver, gunner and commander) being accommodated within a crew capsule located in the frontal section of the MBT’s hull. Main armament is a 2A82A 125mm smoothbore cannon that is fed by a bustle-mounted armoured automatic loader equipped with 32 rounds. The MBT’s sides are fitted with a new appliqué armour package along three-quarters of the MBT’s length, with the rear three-quarters being protected by slat armour.
On the whole, in my personal view, the T-14 Armata, touted as being Russia’s first new-generation main battle tank (the previous tanks starting from the T-54 till the T-90 were all medium battle tanks), appears to be poorly engineered, and when compared to the Arjun Mk2, the latter is still superior in several aspects.
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