Clearing The Mist On the IAF's Airborne EW Suites For Combat Aircraft & Helicopters

October 21, 2013, 2:12 pm

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The integrated EW suite (shown below) for the Tejas Mk1 MRCA as envisaged by the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and designed by the DRDO’s Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE).

This suite, however, remains unproven, although it has been flight-tested on an HS-748 Avro flying testbed by the DRDO’s Centre for Airborne Systems (CABS) since 2007. To certify this EW suite on the Tejas Mk1 MRCA, at least 40 additional test-flights on a PV-1 flying testbed will be required, which in turn will further delay the Tejas Mk1’s operational flight certification by at least 18 months. Making matters further complicated is the sub-optimal performance of the DARE-developed RWR-118 radar warning receiver (see below)—a fact which forced the Indian Air Force (IAF) to reject it for the MiG-29UPG upgrade programme.

The IAF’s MiG-29UPGs, in fact, have the IAF’s most advanced internally-mounted integrated EW suite, which includes Elettronica of Italy’s ELT-568 AESA-based jamming system (see below), which will also go on board the yet-to-be-upgraded Su-30MKIs.

The IAF is now favouring the installation (for both the Tejas Mk1 and Tejas Mk2) of an EW suite that will include SaabTech’s radar warning receiver and laser warning receiver along with the MILDS-F missile approach warning system (MAWS) sourced from EADS/Cassidian. This package has already been selected for both the EMB-145I AEW & CS programme, as well as for the Super Su-30MKI upgrade programme.

SaabTech’s radar warning receiver, laser warning receiver and MAWS have already been selected by the IAF for its Dhruv Mk4 ALH and Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), and by the Indian Army for its Rudra helicopter-gunships.

Shown below is the DARE-designed EW suite architecture for the Super Su-30MKI, inclusive of the MAWS, RWR, LWR and CMDS installations. Interestingly, the scale-model is shown equipped with twin wingtip-mounted escort jamming pods and a belly-mounted and DARE-developed SIVA HADF pod. The IAF is expected to select the EL/L-8251 jammers for the SEAD version of the Super Su-30MKI. The DEAD-optimised Super Su-30MKI, on the other hand, will be equipped with the SIVA pod along with four Kh-31P Krypton supersonic anti-radiation missiles.

The SEAD-optimised and DEAD-optimized Super Su-30MKIs will also be equipped with EADS/Cassidian’s Ariel Mk3 towed RF-decoys.

Ukraine-origin EW Suites for the IAF’s Mil family of helicopters are shown below.

The IAF’s 40 upgraded MiG-27UPGs each have an internal EW suite comprising the Chemring-built CMDS, BEL-built ‘indifferent’ Tarang Mk2 RWR and an ELTA Systems-supplied EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod. The upgraded MiG-21 Bisons, on the other hand, have ELTA-supplied CMDS and ‘indifferent’ DARE-developed and BEL-built Tarang Mk2 RWRs, plus the external EL/L-8222 ASPJ pods.

 

 

When it comes to the IAF’s fleet of Jaguar IS/IT fleet of strike aircraft, a total of 17 Jaguar IT tandem-seat aircraft and 20 single-seat Jaguar IS—built by HAL between 2005 and 2009—have been equipped with DARIN 2-standard missions avionics (comprising 30 LRUs in all), Chemring-built CMDS, ‘indifferent’ Tarang Mk2 RWRs, and internally-mounted ELTA Systems-supplied EL/M-8022 self-protection EW suite.

For the DARIN-3 upgrade programme (which was approved in 2008), an initial 58 single-seat Jaguar IS aircraft will be subjected to a ‘deep upgrade’ by HALBIT Avionics along with HAL’s Mission & Combat System Research & Design Centre (MCSRDC), Overhaul Division, and the IAF’s Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) and Software Development Institute (SDI). The first prototype of the DARIN 3-standard Jaguar IS took to the skies on November 28, 2012. Each DARIN 3-standard Jaguar IS will be fitted between 2014 and 2017 with ELTA-supplied EL/M-2032 multi-mode pulse-Doppler radar, HAL-Edgewood’s OSAMC core avionics computer, Elbit Systems’ Targo HMDS, EL/M-8022 jammer, BDL-built CMDS, SaabTech’s RWRs and LWRs, EADS/Cassidian’s MILDS-F MAWS, and Raytheon-supplied munitions control unit (MCU) for making the aircraft’s weapons management system compatible with the 15 different types of munitions that have been specified by the IAF. Following this, the IAF’s seven DARIN 1-standard Jaguar IMs too will be retrofitted with DARIN 3-standard avionics.

 

Self-Protection Suites For An-32RE Transport Aircraft

 

Airborne EW Suite-Related Sub-Systems Developed By

Indian Industry

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Where The ROK Was Right & Where India Went Wrong

November 6, 2013, 11:24 am

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As Jitendra Singh, India’s Minister of State for Defence, accompanied by Avinash Chander, Scientific Adviser to India’s Defence Minister plus Secretary of the MoD’s Department of Defence Research & Development plus Director-General of the MoD’s Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO), toured the various pavilions hosting Made-in-Republic of Korea (ROK) exhibits during the International Aerospace and Defence Exhibition (ADEX-2013) at the KINTEX expo site in Seoul between October 29 and November 3, 2013, they must have wondered exactly how the DRDO’s counterpart in the ROK, the Daejon-based Agency for Defense Development (ADD) has, since the 1980s, managed much faster turnaround times when it came to exploratory development and systems development schedules for new-generation weapon systems. Just sample the following comparative track-records:  

The Cheongung (Iron Hawk) MR-SAM (above) co-developed by a consortium of entities that included Russia’s Almaz Design Bureau, the ADD, LIG Nex1, Samsung-THALES and Doosan DST, was developed within a five-year period and entered the series-production phase last year. In Russia, the Cheongung will soon be produced as the S-350E Vityaz.

The ADD and LIG Nex1, in the mid-1990s, co-developed the 180km-range Hyunmu-1 surface-to-surface battlefield support missile (SSBSM), followed by the 300km-range Hyunmu-2 SSBSM and the 1,000km-range Hyunmu-3 LACM (below), all within a decade.

The ADD, along with ROTEM and Samsung-THALES, began co-developing 61-tonne K-2 Black Panther main battle tank (above) in 1995 at a cost of US$230 million and by March 2007 the K-2 had entered limited series-production. Following this, in June 2007, the ROK and Turkey successfully negotiated a contract worth $540 million under which a re-engineered K-2 will be licence-built in Turkey as the Altay MBT.

The ADD, along with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), began co-developing the KT-1 ‘Woongbi’ basic turboprop trainer (below) in 1988. By June 1991, nine prototypes were built, and the KT-1’s maiden flight took place in November 1991. The first of 85 KT-1s meant for the ROKAF was delivered in 2000 and between April 2003 and May 2005, 27 KT-1Bs had been exported to Indonesia. In June, 2007, Turkey ordered 55 KT-1Ts while in November 2012, Peru contracted KAI for the procurement of 20 KT-1Ps worth $208 million.

In 1992, work began on developing the T-50 Golden Eagle (below) multi-role combat aircraft (under the KTX-2 project), with 70% of the R & D effort being funded by the ROK government, with KAI picking up the tab for 17% of the required funds and Lockheed Martin the remaining 13%. The T-50’s maiden flight took place in August 2002 and by December 2003 the ROKAF had placed orders for 25 T-50s. The T-50 entered active service with the ROKAF in 2005. In May 2011, Indonesia ordered 16 TA-50Is worth $400 million, and deliveries commenced in September 2013.

In less than a decade, the ADD along with LIG Nex1 has developed and delivered three types of ASW weapons: the Blue Shark lightweight torpedo (below), the Red Shark vertically launched anti-submarine rocket, and the Tiger Shark wire-guided heavyweight torpedo).

The Chun-ma (Pegasus) SHORADS, co-developed by the ADD, LIG Nex1, Doosan DST and Samsung-THALES between 1989 and 1999, has since evolved into the Crotale Mk3 (below) and uses the LIG Nex1-developed DS-20K missile. 42% of the R & D work on vectronics was done by Samsung and 58% by THALES.

The C-Star subsonic anti-ship cruise missile (above) was co-developed by the ADD and LIG Nex1 between 1996 and 2003, with exploratory R & D work being undertaken between 1996 and 1998, followed by systems development between 1999 and 2003. On the other hand, the Ray Bolt ATGM’s exploratory R & D effort lasted from 2007 till 2009, while systems development work began in 2009 and will end next year.   

 

India’s Track-Record Thus Far

Since the time the programme for indigenously developing the ‘Tejas’ multi-role light combat aircraft (LCA) was initiated in August 1983, when India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) sanctioned an interim R & D expenditure of Rs5.6 billion for carrying out the project definition phase (PDP), it has cost India Rs140.47 billion—spent over a period of 28 years—to acquire the core technological and industrial competencies required for producing a home-grown MRCA. In the process a total of 40 laboratories owned by the DRDO, 25 academic institutions, 300 public-/private-sector companies, and a combined design/engineering team made up of 600 personnel had to be roped in to realise the national dream of developing a fourth-generation MRCA for both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN).

Despite such efforts, the production-series versions of the Tejas are not yet available, nor are their flight simulators and various automated test equipment (ATE)—required for the intermediate avionics workshops—anywhere near to being delivered to the IAF, while drafting of the 30 MRO and six flight manuals is nowhere near completion. Suffice to say that without all these, the IAF just cannot initiate the process of service induction of the Tejas Mk1 MRCA, i.e. operational conversion, be it initial or final, remains a distant pipedream.  

Following a 25-year R & D effort costing Rs 10billion ($200 million), series-production of the 25km-range Akash-1 extended short-range air-defence missile system (E-SHORADS) continues at a snail’s pace, with delivery schedules not being adhered for both the IAF—its launch customer, and the Indian Army (IA). The first IAF order for two Akash-1 squadrons, valued at Rs 12.21 billion, was placed in May 2009 and comprised 250 missile rounds, 36 AAFL-1 wheeled launchers (built by TATA Power’s Strategic Electronics Division), nine battery command centres, nine Rajendra L-band passive phased-array target engagement radars, and nine S-band Rohini 3-D central acquisition radars. The second order from the IAF, valued at Rs42.79 billion ($925 million) came in November 2009 for an additional two squadrons, which included 750 missile rounds. This was followed in January 2010 by the third order, this time for six squadrons. Prime contractor for the IAF-specific Akash-1 E-SHORADS is the MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), with Hyderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) being the principal sub-contractor.

The IA in late 2011 had placed an order for up to nine Regiments of Akash-1, valued at Rs 125 billion ($2.8 billion), approval for which was obtained in June 2010 from the MoD’s Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC). The Union Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) on March 17, 2011 cleared the induction of an initial two Akash-1 Regiments valued at Rs 14.18 billion, each with six Batteries.

It was in July 1983 that the IA finalised its General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) for the 214mm Pinaka-1 multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system, with service induction being targetted from 1994 at a rate of one Regiment per annum. R & D work began in December 1986, following the sanctioning of Rs 264.7 million in R & D funds. Targetted date for systems development was December 1992. However, it was only on March 29, 2006 that the IA awarded Tata Power SED and Larsen & Toubro’s Heavy Engineering Division a $45 million contract to produce the first 40 Pinaka-1 MBRLs.

The DRDO’s project to develop an L-band ‘Swathi’ weapon locating radar (WLR) at a cost of $49 million got the green light in April 2002, with the DRDO promising to complete all R & D work within 40 months so that BEL could commence deliveries of the 42 WLRs as projected by the IA. However, while all R & D work was completed in only late 2011, the IA is now having second thoughts about procuring the ‘Swathi’ and has instead decided to float global RFPs for procuring 29 WLRs worth $285.3 million through the competitive bidding process.   

The Nag ATGM, developed at a cost of Rs 17 billion since 1983, is nowhere near service-entry. Its THALES-designed and supplied uncooled long-wave infra-red (LWIR) seeker was only last year re-engineered to incorporate a new-generation focal plane array (FPA) supplied by Sofradir of France.

It was in September 1988 that the IA felt the need for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The IA finalised its GSQR in May 1990, following which the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) began R & D work on the 380kg Nishant UAV. Despite the first technology demonstration UAV making its maiden flight in 1995, the IA placed its first orders for 12 Nishants in only May 2007. Similarly, the Lakshya pilotless target aircraft, under development by the ADE since the late 1980s, entered the series-production stage in only mid-2007 and to date only 27 units have been ordered by the IA, IN and IAF from the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). And in late 2011, the DRDO promised to deliver to the IA an all-singing-and-dancing version of the Rustom-1 MALE-UAV—equipped with a belly-mounted optronic payload—by 2014. Also to be delivered by then will be a version of the Nishant tactical UAV (also equipped with a belly-mounted optronic payload) sporting a wheeled tricycle undercarriage.

After incurring an R & D expenditure of $62.5 million since 1983, the DRDO officially terminated the project to develop the ‘Trishul’ SHORADS on February 27, 2008.

It was in the late 1980s that the DRDO’s Vizag-based Naval Science and Technological Laboratory (NSTL) initiated R & D work on developing three types of torpedoes: a lightweight torpedo, a heavyweight electric torpedo, and a heavyweight thermal torpedo. The first, known Torpedo Advanced Light (TAL) was meant to be a 220kg torpedo capable of being launched from warships and helicopters, have a top speed of 33 Knots in both deep and shallow waters, incorporate a self-homing guidance system, and was to be powered by electric batteries which would last for six minutes. It was only in 1998 that the TAL’s technical trials began, while user-trials commenced only by 2007. The IN began service-inducting the BDL-built TALs only two years ago.  

It was on December 24, 2008 that the NSTL had stated that the ‘Varunastra’ heavyweight electric torpedo being developed by it will be ready for service-entry by 2009. The Varunastra, weighing 1.5 tonnes, having a length of 7.6 metres and a 30km-range, was meant to be launched from shipborne twin-tube launchers already developed indigenously by Larsen & Toubro. However, it was only on September 26, 2013 that the NSTL stated that it had completed the creation of state-of-the-art facilities required for the design, testing and prototype production of heavyweight torpedoes like the Varunastra, meaning user-trials of the Varunastra are still two years away.

Similar is the case of the NSTL-developed Shakti thermal torpedo that runs on monopropellant fuel, which can burn without oxygen and so is useful in underwater operations. Under development since 1996, the NSTL took nearly seven years to develop the engine and fuel for Shakti. The monopropellant fuel can generate 400kW of power and enable the Shakti to move at faster speeds (almost double that of an electric torpedo) and at depths of up to 600 metres. Technical trials of the Shakti are still underway in shallow waters, and user-trials won’t commence till 2016 at best.

 

So When And Where Did And Does

India Go Wrong?

(to be concluded)

Regional Naval Updates

November 28, 2013, 12:06 pm

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Since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the landing platform dock (LPD) and the amphibious assault ship (LPH) have emerged as an instrument of soft power, with their on-board fleets of multi-purpose utility helicopters, landing craft, and air-cushion vehicles; plus their command-and-control capabilities and cavernous holds proving to be invaluable for disaster relief, small-scale policing or mass civilian evacuation operations. At the same time, the LPDs and LPHs have today emerged as invaluable tools for undertaking asymmetric warfare (against pirates in the high seas), expeditionary amphibious campaigns (such as those undertaken by the Royal Navy in 1982 to retake the Falklands Islands), and low-intensity maritime operations involving vertical envelopment tactics, which the Indian Navy (IN) calls “effecting maritime manoeuvres from the sea”.

It was in the September 2004 that I had penned an analysis on the need for the IN to urgently begin planning for acquiring a modest fleet of no less than three LPHs for it to undertake both humanitarian relief operations within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) whenever required, as well as prepare for the prospects of undertaking power projection-based expeditionary amphibious campaigns with its own integral naval infantry assets (as opposed to the still existing flawed practice of transporting a mere mechanised battalion of the Indian Army (IA) on board large landing ship tanks (LST-L). It, therefore, came as no surprise almost four months later when Navy HQ, headed at that time by Admiral Arun Prakash, the Chief of the Naval Staff, directed the Directorate of Plans & Operations to begin preparing the NSQRs for procuring a fleet of LPHs with a great sense of urgency. However, matters did not move swiftly enough on the procurement front, despite the articulation and unveiling by Navy HQ of its doctrines for effecting maritime manoeuvres from the sea though joint amphibious warfare operations. This, however, did not deter the Navy from setting up—on June 24, 2008—its Advanced Amphibious Warfare School and Fleet Support Complex--in the enclave that will come up along the beach road on the outskirts of Kakinada, about 500km from Hyderabad, in the state of Andhra Pradesh. It is here that the Navy is quietly but progressively raising its first of three naval infantry battalions (to eventually become a Brigade-strength formation), which will be trained and equipped to undertake both amphibious and vertical envelopment air-assault operations.

On the procurement front, matters began to move only in October 2010 when the Cabinet Committee on National Security accorded approval to Navy HQ to begin drafting the Request for Information (RFI) regarding the acquisition of four LPHs and related hardware under the ‘Buy and Make Indian’ clause of the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP-9). Under this clause, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) can invite proposals (based on a capability definition document) from those Indian shipbuilders from both the public sector and private sector that have the requisite financial and technical capabilities to enter into joint ventures with foreign shipbuilders and together undertake indigenous construction of the warships. In early December 2010, the Navy HQ issued its RFIs to Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Company Ltd, Cochin Shipyard Ltd, Mazagon Docks Ltd, Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd (GRSE), Larsen & Toubro Ltd, and the Vizag-based Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL). These shipyards were required to forward a Detailed Project Proposal outlining the roadmap for the development of design and construction of the LPDs. After the RFI responses were submitted by March 7, 2011 the Detailed Project Proposal, thereafter, was examined by a Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) constituted by the MoD’s Acquisition Wing to verify the credentials of the foreign partners, together with confirming the acceptability of the respective joint ventures between the Indian shipyard and its foreign collaborator. By September 2011, the Indian shipyards shortlisted for issue of the RFPs were intimated. The Request for Proposals (RFP), however, was issued earlier this month.

Foreign shipbuilders offering LPH solutions include DCNS of France with its Mistral-BPC 21,300-tonne LPH, Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems with its 20,000-tonne MHD-200 LPH (with two separate heli-decks on two levels), Fincantieri of Italy with its 20,000-tonne Mosaic LPH design, South Korea’s Hanjin Heavy Industries & Constructions Co with its 18,800-tonne Dokdo-class LPH, and Navantia of Spain with its Athlas 21,560-tonne LHD. The favourite contenders are expected to be Navantia and Ficantieri.

A separate RFP will be issued in future for licence-building high-speed air-cushioned vehicles from either US-based Textron Marine and Land Systems (LCAC) or Hanjin Heavy Industries & Constructions Co (LSF-2), LCMs (with designs being offered by Navantia and Hanjin Heavy Industries & Constructions Co), or high-speed catamarans, for which France’s CNIM is likely to offer its L-CAT catamaran.

A detailed analysis of the RFP for the LPH requirement brings out several interesting indicators about both the overall configuration of the desired vessel and its performance/operational capabilities. For instance, the RFP has specified that the length of the vessel should be 213 metres; the draught should not exceed 8 metres; the endurance at sea must be for 45 days; the propulsion system of should be of the integrated full-electric propulsion (IFEP) type; the vessel must have a suitable well-deck for carrying amphibious craft like LCMs or LCACs and LCVPs on davits and should have the capability to launch these craft when underway; the vessel must be able to house combat vehicles (including main battle tanks, infantry combat vehicles and heavy trucks on one or more vehicle deck; and the vessel should be able to undertake all-weather operations involving heavylift helicopters of up to 35 tonnes MTOW. Weapon systems and mission sensors to go on board the projected four vessels will all be pre-selected (known also as customer-furnished or buyer-nominated equipment). Such hardware will include the point-defence missile system (PDMS), close-in weapon system (CIWS), anti-torpedo decoy system, countermeasures dispensing system and 20mmmm heavy machine guns. In addition, each of the four vessels will be required to have one E/F-band combined air-surface surveillance radar, one C/D band air surveillance radar, and an integrated marine navigation system employing X- and S-band navigation radars.

The IN has finally zeroed in on integrated full-electric propulsion (IFEP) systems, starting with the four projected LPHs to be procured (one directly from a yet-to-be-selected foreign OEM, and three to be licence-built by a MoD-owned shipyard in cooperation with a private-sector shipyard). Present-day warships worldwide utilise a combined-diesel-and-diesel (CODAD), combined-diesel-and-gas (CODAG), combined-gas-and-gas (COGAG) or combined-diesel-Electric-and-gas (CODLAG) propulsion configurations. At cruising speeds a CODLAG system employs diesel generators to supply electricity to the electric motors that drive the propeller shafts. When high speeds are required, gas turbines engage the shafts via cross-connecting mechanical transmissions (gearboxes). In an IFEP system-equipped warship, on the other hand, there is no mechanical connection between the prime mover and shaft. Instead, both the gas turbines and diesels are configured as electricity generators. While the diesels provide the vessel’s base load electrical supply, including low-speed propulsion, the turbines are switched in for peak power. The benefits of IFEP include: flexibility in locating machinery (only the propulsion motor needs to be coupled mechanically to the shaft-line); fuel efficiency (when the warship is operated at part load); low noise and vibration; built-in redundancy (electrical machines may have more than one set of windings, fed from different sources, so power is still available if one set fails); reliability (a mean-time-between-failures of more than 100,000 hours); reduced maintenance costs (due, for instance, to the absence of gearboxes); and the scope for increased automation and reduced crew complement.

The IN’s LPHs will also employ fixed-pitch propellers. Controllable-pitch propellers and their associated complex hydraulics are not required since the motor, and thus the shaft, can be electrically reversed. However, the IN is against the procurement of podded propulsion systems—a point that could well go against the Mistral BPD-class LPH that DCNS of France is offering for the IN. It is thus widely expected that the IN will zero in on an IFEP system developed by UK-based but GE-led Converteam industrial consortium.

Coming now to the weapons suite, the IN has a choice of combinations to choose from, including the SeaRAM and Phalanx Block 1B from Raytheon, Sadral from MBDA integrated with OTOBreda of Italy’s twin-barrel 30mm/82 Compact or the Goalkeeper from THALES Nederland, the combination of Phalanx Block 1B and Barak-1 from Israel Aerospace Industries, and the combined Palma PDMS/CIWS from Russia’s Tulamashzavod JSC. It is believed that the Phalanx Block 1B/Barak-1 combination is the Navy’s preferred choice. The Navy’s shipboard decoy control and launching system of choice is the Kavach, which has been developed by the DRDO and is being built by Mahindra Defence. The combat management system and ELINT/EW suites will be procured off-the-shelf as standard fitment along with the LPHs.

Helicopters For LPHs

Initially, when the IN was in the process of drafting the RFP for the four LPHs, it also wanted to draft a separate RFP for procuring 44 heavylift utility helicopters as well. This, however, was opposed by the Indian Air Force (IAF), which then insisted on having a decisive say on finalising the QRs for such helicopters, since it is believed that the IAF wanted to be the one undertaking the vertical envelopment/replenishment roles. As matters now stand, it is most unlikely that the IAF will be allowed to take over such roles because A) the IAF does not possess any heavylift helicopter configured for shipborne operations. B) none of its Mi-17V-5s are equipped with emergency flotation systems (which is mandatory when flying over water). C) the IN and IAF have totally divergent air traffic management (ATM) protocols, and since it will be the IN that will be the sole provider of ATM services for the tactical airspace below which amphibious assault operations will be undertaken by the Sagar Prahari Bal (whose sanctioned strength is 15,000-strong), logic demands that the IN raise its own dedicated fleet of shipborne heavylift helicopters as well. If the IN’s views prevail, then the potential contenders could include the AgustaWestland AW-101, and Sikorsky’s S-92 Super Hawk or CH-53K Super Stallion.

Fleet Replenishment Tankers

For supplying the IN with five fleet replenishment tankers, RFPs have been issued to Indian shipbuilders only, who are now scouting for suitable designs from foreign shipbuilders. These five vessels will supplement the INS’s two relatively new fleet replenishment tankers—INS Deepak (A50) and INS Shakti (A57)—built by Fincantieri of Italy in a record period of two years as per the terms of the 139 million Euros contract signed between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Fincantieri in October 2008. Built at Fincantieri’s Yard 6186 at Muggiano, the first double-hulled tanker was launched on February 12, 2010 and was commissioned into service on January 21, 2011. The second tanker—INS Shakti—was commissioned on October 1, 2011. As part of the direct industrial offsets package for the first fleet tanker, Fincantieri had in 2008 placed an order worth 14.3 million Euros with Bharat Electronics Ltd for the supply of a composite communications system, versatile communications suite, ESM system, and an optronic fire-control system.

Each of the two tankers is 175 metres long, 25 metres wide and 19 feet high, and has a displacement at full load of 27,500 tonnes. Each of them are powered by two 10,000kW diesel engines that drive the twin adjustable-pitch propellers. The tanker can reach a maximum speed of 20 Knots, can refuel four warships at the same time, has a hangar to accommodate a 10-tonne helicopter, and can provide accommodation for 250 personnel, including its crew complement. The tankers’ construction programme at Muggiano involved three different shipyards of Fincantieri, using state-of-the-art ship construction methods and concepts with extensive parallelism and concurrent engineering to deliver them in a challenging timeframe of two years. The double-hull configuration provides greater safety against accidental oil spillages in accordance with latest MARPOL regulations.

However, the acquisition of these two tankers had its share of controversy, when the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India criticized the acceptance of inferior-grade steel used in the manufacture of the two fleet tankers, saying that it amounted to according “undue favour to a foreign vendor in the procurement of fleet tankers”. The CAG also saw a problem with the excess provisioning of spares worth more than Rs300 million (US$6 million) and under-realisation of industrial offsets benefits to Indian industry’ under the Rs9.36 billion ($200 million) contract. The CAG’s report revealed that the original RFP had a mandatory stipulation requiring the use of ‘DMR-249A or equivalent grade steel’ in the construction of the two fleet tankers, which it said is almost double the cost of ordinary steel. The report added that in order to maintain its approved force levels, the IN’s Shipbuilding Plan had envisaged the addition of two fleet tankers by 2008 and 2011, respectively. Accordingly, a RFP was issued to 12 firms in November 2005. In response to the RFP, only three firms responded—Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp, South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd (HHIL), and Fincantieri. Out of them, only Rosoboronexport offered a technical proposal for using DMR-249A or equivalent steel. HHIL’s proposal was rejected due to non-compliance with the RFP’s provisions, which included non-usage of DMR-249A steel. Fincantieri’s proposal was stated to be compliant with the RFP conditions. However, the firm proposed usage of DH-36 steel instead of DMR-249A. The justification offered by Fincantieri for selection of DH-36 to the MoD’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) included problems in sourcing DMR-249A steel, the normal use of ordinary steel for tankers and an explanation on why the high-resilience performance of DMR-249A was not necessary for the tankers. This was despite Fincantieri’s own admission that DH-36 has less weight and less resilience when compared to DMR-249A, and the chemical compositions of DH-36 grade steel and DMR-249A steel being different and therefore they cannot be treated as equivalent to each other. The prices of these two grades of steel are also different, since DMR-249A is more expensive than DH-36 grade steel. “Nonetheless,” said the CAG, “the TEC opined that DH-36 was equivalent to DMR-249A and accepted Fincantieri’s technical bid without taking due cognizance of the competing offers made by Rosoboronexport and HHIL. The Technical Oversight Committee too ruled in favour of Fincantieri after the commercial bids were opened, since Fincantieri emerged as the lowest bidder with a quote of Rs7.23 billion. The offer of Rosoboronexport was rejected as it was costlier, being based upon the prices of DMR-249A or equivalent steel”.

Resolving The CM-400AKG Supersonic ASM Conundrum

Let us begin with what is available to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN) in terms of maritime strike capabilities. The PAF’s No8 ‘Haiders’ Squadron operating out of Karachi’s Masroor Air Base presently operates only two Dassault Aviation-built Mirage-VPA3s, each of which can be armed with two MBDA-built 55km-range subsonic AM-39 Exocet ASCMs. They will be replaced in the near future by six JF-17 Thunder MRCAs, each of which will be able to carry two IIR-guided CM-802AKG subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) plus one data-link pod for man-in-the-loop guidance (a configuration identical to what the PLA Navy has adopted for its JH-7A maritime strike aircraft and which is similar to the RAFAEL-built Popeye PGM/Pegasus data-link pod combination). 

The CM-802AKG, 40 of which have been ordered by the PAF, has a range of 230km, weighs 670kg, and comes with a blast-penetration warhead weighing 285kg.

The PN, on the other hand, has at its disposal 120 C-602 ASCMs of which along with 40 8 x 8 transporter-erector-launcher vehicles, three Agosta 90B and two Agosta 70B SSKs that can be armed with subsonic Boeing UGM-84A Harpoon ASCMs, plus six Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion LRMR/ASW aircraft armed with subsonic AGM-84A Harpoon ASCMs, along with several ship-launched subsonic AGM-84A Harpoons and 180km-range subsonic C-802A ASCMs. 

The C-602 is a conventional cruise missile design, with mid-body wings that deploy following launch. The fixed ventral air inlet is mounted slightly forward of the cruciform tail fins. The missile is 6.1 metres long (without the 0.9 metre-long launch booster), and weighs 1,140kg. The solid propellant booster weighs an additional 210kg. 

The C-602 has a cruise speed of Mach 0.6, carries a 300kg HE blast-fragmentation warhead, is powered by a small turbojet, and has a stated range of 280km, with the missile flying at an altitude of 30 metres during the cruise phase of an engagement. In the terminal phase, the missile descends to a height of seven metres, and it can be launched from truck-mounted launchers, from warships as well as from medium multi-role combat aircraft.

It is evident that when both the PAF and PN are already in possession of formidable sea denial capabilities, it makes little sense to go for a supersonic ASM that is claimed by its Chinese OEM to have an IIR terminal seeker. Incidentally, all existing operational supersonic ASCMs to date, like the 130km-range, Mach 2.3, 1.5-tonne, 225kg self-forging fragment warhead-armed Hsiung Feng-3/Brave Wind-3 of Taiwan; Russia’s 4.15-tonne, Mach 3, 120km-range Raduga Kh-41 Zubr armed with 320kg HE warhead; Russia’s Novator 3M54E Klub-S/N, India’s BrahMos-1; and Japan’s 200km-range, Mach 2+ Mitsubishi ASM-3, all make use of on-board active radar seekers for terminal guidance, simply because no supersonic ASCM-based IIR sensor has the kind of target detection/lock-on range of up to 26km.

The 910kg/2,000lb CM-400AKG, possessing a claimed engagement envelope of 240km (130nm) a maximum cruise speed of Mach 4, airframe diameter of 0.4 metres, and 200kg blast-penetration warhead, has apparently been designed to be launched when the JF-17 reaches cruise speeds of between 750kph and 800kph at altitudes of between 26,200 feet and 39,400 feet. While its on-board RLG-INS offers a CEP of 50 metres (164 feet) during the mid-course navigation phase, the CEP reportedly gets reduced to 5 metres when the IIR seeker is activated during the terminal guidance phase. 

If it is imperative that the JF-17 attain an altitude of either 26,200 feet or 39,400 feet in order to launch its two CM-400AKGs in ripple-fire mode, the element of surprise will be lost very early since the missile is not sea-skimming and will be detected by warship-mounted active phased-array volume search radars like the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR, while the airborne JF-17 will be easily located and tracked by AEW platforms like the Ka-31 AEW helicopters while the JF-17s are still 250km away from the IN’s targetted carrier battle group. And lastly, the JF-17 will have to continue cruising at medium altitudes so that the underbelly data-link pod can continue to maintain line-of-sight contact with the CM-400AKG’s (and even that of the CM-802AKG) on-board IIR imagery transmitter. Incidentally, neither during the Airshow China 2012 in Zhuhai last November nor during the recently concluded Dubai 2013 Airshow was any data-link pod displayed by Chinese OEMs like CETC International. 

Countering The ASCM Threats
The IN today is sufficiently well-protected against subsonic ASCMs, thanks to the combination of indigenously developed shipborne jammers and RAFAEL-built Barak-1 CIWS, which will in future be supplemented by the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR/Barak-2 LR-SAM combination, along with IAI/ELTA Systems-supplied EL/M-2222S NAVGUARD, which is an active phased-array radar-based missile approach warning system (MAWS) that automatically detects, classifies and verifies incoming threats, and consequently  triggers the targetted warship’s hard-kill/soft-kill self-defence systems.

How China’s CH-3 UCAV Has Become Pakistan’s Burraq UCAV

On November 25, 2013, Pakistan’s ISPR announced that the Pakistan Army and PAF had inducted the first batch of ‘indigenously developed’ strategic UAVs, namely the Burraq and Shahpar UAV Systems, into the Pakistan Army and PAF. It was claimed that the Burraq has been developed by Pakistan's state-owned NESCOM. 

However, a closer examination of the photo of the Burraq released by the ISPR clearly proves the fact that it is merely a NESCOM-assembled CH-3, which has been developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp (CASC) and AVIC Defense as amulti-purpose medium-range UAV system suitable for battlefield reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, data relay and electronic warfare. The CH-3 can be armed with twin laser-guided AR-1 anti-armour missiles, has a cruising speed of 220kph, 12-hour maximum endurance, and a 200km line-of-sight communications radius.

How Will The IN Face-Off Against The PN In Future

It is fairly evident now that while on one hand the IN—with its Project 1241RE FAC-Ms armed with P-20 ASCMs, Project 1241REM FAC-Ms armed with Uran-E ASCMs and Project 25/25A corvettes armed with P-20/Uran-E ASCMs—will not be able to replicate the kind of successes in scored on its western seaboard on December 4, 1971 with its Project 205 FAC-Ms firing P-15 ASCMs, the PN too will not be able to replicate what it had achieved on September 6, 1965. And it can also be inferred that in the event of future conventional hostilities between India and Pakistan, the three armed services of both countries will fight their own set-piece battles as per their individual war-plans, and not according to a single operational war-plan aimed at the attainment of strategic objectives through synergistic and synchronised warfighting efforts. Furthermore, it has been the case since mid-1998 that future wars in the subcontinent under a nuclear overhang will be of the limited, high-intensity-type and not all-out conventional wars. Consequently, in the event of the Indian Army’s (IA) HQ Northern Command adopting a pro-active warfighting posture and deciding to launch a limited, pre-emptive ground offensive across the LoC, the IAF’s Western Command can be expected to help the IA increase its operational tempo by lending close air support and achieving tactical air superiority, but the IN will be forced to remain a mute, non-participating spectator since 1) it will lack the wherewithal and tools (like long-range warship-launched/submarine-launched/air-launched long-range cruise missiles) required for making meaningful contributions to the land battle; and 2) India’ apex-level civilian decision-makers—being risk-averse by nature—will not be in favour of vertical military escalation. Thus, the IN will be unable to put into motion its much-touted ‘effecting maritime manouvres from the sea’ warfighting plans.    

The IN’s inability to gain sea control and battlespace superiority during the first 72 hours of an all-out conventional war between India and Pakistan was convincingly demonstrated during a wargame (shown in the slide above) that was played out in Delhi in 1986 when EX Brass Tacks was in full-swing. At that time, it was convincingly demonstrated that the PN and PAF of that time could easily create and sustain a ‘cordone sanitaire’ measuring 266km in depth, which in turn could easily neutralise any kind of threat posed by an IN carrier battle group.  

Matters did not improve at all by mid-1999 when OP Vijay and OP Safed Sagar were launched. At that time, while the IN’s sole aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, was undergoing one of her periodic refits (thereby denying the IN’s combined Western and Eastern Fleets the element of battlespace air superiority), the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) did not issue an operational directive to the IN simply because India had then not formally declared that she was in a state of war with Pakistan and therefore, both OP Vijay and OP Safed Sagar were both classified at best as an Air-Land counter-insurgency campaign, not even limited war. Consequently, the IN at best only mobilised itself in a limited manner and under OP Talwar, deployed out to the northwest portion of the Arabian Sea for the purpose of conducting missile-firing drills (see slide above). Thus, bravado aside, the IN was denied the chance to demonstrate its sea-control and sea-denial capabilities. This state of affairs was again repeated in 2002 during OP Parakram.

Coming now to present-day matters, the IN’s war-planners are faced with 1) the PN’s formidable, multi-tier sea-denial capabilities (already explained above) throughout Pakistan’s coastline; and 2) the steady growth of the PN’s elite undersea warfare arm, now comprising three MESMA AIP module-equipped Agosta 90B SSKs and to be joined in future by two upgraded Agosta 70B SSKs and up to six Type 032 Qing-class SSKs equipped with Stirling Engine-type AIP modules. 

As the slide below illustrates, any CBG of the IN will be extremely hard-pressed to launch any kind of credible, sustained expeditionary power projection campaign against the PN. The only viable offensive option for the IN remains its fleet of eight Type 877EKM SSKs (each of which will in future be able to launch four Novator-built 3M-14E Klub-S LACMs while staying submerged 100nm away from Karachi), if one assumes that the PN’s principal surface combatants and FAC-Ms will be bottled-up within their respective homeports during a future round of hostilities since they will be targetted for sure by the IN’s AGM-84L Harpoon ASCM-armed P-8Is as well as by the IAF’s Jamnagar AFS-based 10 Jaguar IMs (armed with AGM-84L Harpoon ASCMs) and six MiG-29UPGs armed with Kh-35UE ASCMs.   

If at all the IN wants to wage credible, offensive AirLand campaigns, then there are only three available options that need to be exercised:

Firstly, while it is agreed that a big aircraft carrier is vulnerable and its steep construction and operating costs are good reason for possessing an aircraft carrier fleet with smaller vessels like INS Vikramaditya and Project 71/IAC-1/INS Vikrant, the problem one will discover later is that such aircraft carriers, even if fractionally smaller then the big flattop, cause the effectiveness of their air-wings to rapidly decease, while their vulnerability to mission-kill or loss exponentially increases, and their lifetime maintenance cost (primarily due to their dependence on fossil fuels) becomes much higher over 30+ years than that of a 65,000-tonne big-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Moreover, while being vulnerable to attack, the big-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is still arguably one of the toughest warships to sink. Furthermore, if it takes 4 tonnes of LGBs to accomplish a strike mission regardless of inclement weather conditions, then the IN will be required to deploy against such a target at least three MiG-29Ks armed with LGBs and LDPs, plus another two MiG-29Ks for tactical offensive air superiority and at least four MiG-29Ks configured as aerial refuelling tankers. 

Sustaining such daily air taskings for a 7-day period (assuming three such strike sorties are launched daily) easily translates into a requirement for at least 60 MiG-29Ks. Incidentally, initial operational training for the five pilots who would each fly a MiG-29K for 1,700 hours during the life of the aircraft conservatively cost US$2 million. Fuel, spare parts and maintenance cost $60 million over the life of the MiG-29K, leading to an estimated total life-cycle cost of $120 million each. On average, a MiG-29K squadron has to annually fly some 500 hours, or about 32.5 hours per pilot, to maintain warfare readiness, and that is just during the 12-month home-cycle. Once deployed at sea, squadron flight-hours will increase to approximately 650 per month, or 38 per pilot. One-third of these hours are expended for maintaining the currency and qualifications of the pilot. In the end, over the full extent of its airframe TTSL, the average MiG-29K will log just 20% of its mandated flight-hours in combat. Much of this time will involve transiting to and from the operating area, with 30 minutes per flight, at most, being dedicated to the operational mission. The effectiveness of such missions can best be measured in ordnance expended. For instance, to achieve the same returns on investment as a long-range Nirbhay-type LACM (costing no more than $3.5 million), a MiG-29K will need to fly nearly four times the number of sorties.

Which then brings us to the second option: invest big-time on long-range warship-launched, air-launched and submarine-launched LACMs. While an air-launched BrahMos-1/A ASCM makes sense for land-based Su-30MKIs and MiG-29Ks, carrier-based MiG-29Ks require three types of air-to-ground PGMs: lightweight 700km-range LACMs, 300km-range cruise missiles containing runway-cratering sub-munitions, and 500lb LGBs. Concurrently, the IN’s future principal warfare combatants (like DDGs) that are still on the drawing boards do need to be equipped with silos containing no less than 24 vertically-launched, 1,200km-range LACMs armed with conventional warheads.

Lastly, initiate without any further delay the development of a 5,000-tonne SSGN that can operate as both a self-seeking hunter-killer as well as a submerged launcher (from its torpedo-tubes) of no less than eight 1,200km-range LACMs armed with conventional warheads. While AIP-equipped Scorpene SSKs are up to the task of providing ASW screens around vital naval and economic coastal installations, when it comes to cruising submerged at high speeds while escorting CBGs or even when operating alone inside hostile waters, the SSGN has no equal. 

Remembering India’s True Heroes—The Fallen & The Living

December 15, 2013, 12:28 pm

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(narrative to follow)

Tejas Mk1 MRCA’s Projected Operational Configurations

December 25, 2013, 12:28 pm

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Though the Tejas Mk1 MRCA will fully certified as an operational platform only by 2016, as it exists today, the MRCA’s tandem-seat operational conversion trainer variant is probably the best available lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) with significant export prospects.

The slide below shows the various external add-on sensors, target acquisition/designation systems and dissimilar air combat training aids that will make the Tejas Mk1 a truly potent MRCA.   

The slide below shows the lightweight precision-guided munitions available for the Tejas Mk1.

The slide below shows the PGMs and sensors/fire-control systems for the Tejas Mk1 in the defensive counter-air mission configuration.

The slide below shows the Tejas Mk1 in the tactical interdiction mission configuration.

Finally, the slide below shows the Tejas Mk1 in the battlefield interdiction (close air-support) mission configuration.

Multiple Ejector-Rack Options Available

KS-1A MR-SAM Scores First Export Success

January 15, 2014, 10:34 am

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Myanmar’s Tatmadaw (armed forces) in early November 2013 inked a contract with CPMIEC of China under which the latter will, starting June 2014, begin delivering a regiment of KS-1A medium-range surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) system. This is China’s first export order for the KS-1A MR-SAM, which has been on offer for export worldwide since the late 1990s. Bangladesh’s air force, meanwhile, is close to ordering from South Korea the Cheongung (Iron Hawk) MR-SAM,  co-developed by a consortium of entities that included Russia’s Almaz Design Bureau, the ADD, LIG Nex1, Samsung-THALES and Doosan DST, was developed within a five-year period and entered the series-production phase last year. In Russia, the Cheongung will soon be produced as the S-350E Vityaz.

The KS-1A can serve as a close-in area air defence system to complement the more advanced systems, as well as performing as a gapfiller to preclude the need for additional, expensive strategic SAM systems. It was developed in the 1980s as a replacement for the HQ-61 SAM system. Due to reasons which have not been publicly disclosed, the KS-1 did not enter military service in China when development was completed in 1994. A likely reason was the poor manoeuvring capability of the missile. It could only engage targets with a 5g manoeuvring capability, making the KS-1 largely ineffective for defending against new-generation combat aircraft. The KS-1A is presently operational with both the PLA Army and PLAAF as the HQ-12 MR-SAM. The latest version of the system is known as the KS-1C, which features cannister-encased missile rounds.

The PRC’s 2^nd Aerospace Academy, now known as China Academy of Defence Technology, or CADT, (also known as the China Changfeng Mechanics & Electronics Technology Academy) of the 7^thMinistry of Machinery Industry (now known as CASIC), in 1981 began developing a 57.5km-range tactical endo-atmospheric interceptor missile called the KS-1, which was meant to intercept incoming tactical ballistic missiles. The first test-firing of the missile took place in 1989 and the KS-1 system was first publicly revealed at Le Bourget during the 1991 Paris Air Show. All R & D work on the KS-1 was concluded in 1994, following which series-production of the MR-SAM rounds began at the Gui Yang-based Guizhou Aerospace Industry Company Ltd. The newer KS-1A’s TWS-312 engagement control centre (ECC) and its SJ-231 missile guidance system (that includes the C-band HT-233 passive phased-array tracking-cum-engagement radar) are series-produced by the Xi’an-based Shaanxi Tianhe Industry Group. The latter two are mounted on TAS-5380 8 x 8 heavy-duty cross-country vehicles.

The KS-1A employs a single-chamber dual thrust, solid-fuelled missile, weighing 886kg, and comes equipped with a command line-of-sight guidance system under which mid-course correction commands are transmitted to the guidance system from the ECC. A control actuator system is located at the tail end of the missile behind the propulsion system. The HT-233 radar carries out airspace search, target detection, target track, identification, missile tracking, missile guidance and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) functions. The HT-233 radar is automatically controlled by a digital weapons control computer housed within the ECC, and cable link is used to connect the SJ-231 to the TWS-312, which is the only manned station in a KS-1A Battery and it provides the human interface for control of all automated functions. The ECC communicates with all KS-1A Fire Units as well as with higher-echelon command headquarters, and has on board an Air Situation Display console and Tracking Display console that adopt customised BITE technologies, and have embedded simulated training software for engaging more than 100 airborne targets in various flight profiles, all of which can be used for operational training in peacetime.

The HT-233 radar, operating in the 300MHz bandwidth, has a detection range of 120km and tracking range of 90km. The radar antenna has 4,000 ferrite phase shifters. It can detect targets in azimuth (360°) and elevation (0° to 65°). It can track some 100 airborne targets and can simultaneously engage more than 50 targets when used in conjunction with a Brigade-level ECC (which can handle automatic command-and-control of three subordinate HQ-12/KS-1A Regiments). In some cases a KS-1A Fire Unit receives early warning of enemy ballistic missile launch, along with direction and time-of-arrival data. Target engagement can be carried out by the HT-233 in manual, semi-automatic or automatic mode. When the decision has been made to engage the target, the ECC selects the Launch Battery or Batteries to be used and pre-launch data is transmitted to the selected missile via microwave line-of-sight data links. The target position data is downloaded to the missile to aid the missile’s target acquisition. After launch, the missile is acquired by the HT-233 radar. 

The missile’s track command up-link and down-link between the missile and the HT-233 allows the missile’s flight to be monitored and provides missile guidance commands from the ECC’s weapons control computer. As the missile’s closest approach to the missile is reached (50 metres), a proximity fuze detonates the directional high-explosive blast fragmentation warhead. The missile’s engagement zone is between 300 metres and 27km in terms of altitude, while it has a slant range of between 7km and 57km, and a maximum speed of 1,200 metres/second. The KS-1A Fire Unit includes a 6 x 6 TAS-270A vehicle housing a slewable oblique under-rail suspension dual launcher carrying two missile rounds. The Fire Unit can deploy in three ways: the vehicle mode, the trailer mode, and the stand-alone mode. It carries two ready-to-fire missiles, is capable of remote operations, and is 360-degree slewable.

To make the KS-1A a cost-effective yet lethal MR-SAM, it was decided to adopt the command-link guidance approach. Under this, the HT-233 radar (using an integral IFF transponder, a spectrally pure TWT transmitter, two-stage superheterodyne correlation receiver for channels, high-speed digital signals processor, real-time engagement management computer, secure guidance command up-link, and a radar data processor) would accurately track both the airborne target and launched missile, while a flight/trajectory control computer inside the SJ-231 would calculate the required flight-path corrections for the missile, which would then be transmitted via a data-link to the missile’s on-board digital flight control system (including a digital autopilot, telemetry command receiver and decoder, and a transponder) for bringing the missile as close as 50 metres to the targetted aircraft, following which the proximity fuze will trigger the HE fragmentation warhead.

Presently, one KS-1A Battery can simultaneously engage three targets with missiles, and comprises 36 missiles, one SJ-231 ECC station and one HT-233 radar (for 3-D target search, detection, acquisition, identification and engagement; clutter rejection and missile guidance), one Type 305A S-band 3-D mobile tactical air defence radar (with a 250km-range), three power supply vehicles, six 6 x 6 missile launcher vehicles (that are dispersed to launch sites located up to 10km away from each other, with the launch platforms being microprocessor-driven and controlled through an electro-mechanical servo system), six missile transporter-loading vehicles, one tractor, one missile-test vehicle, three missile transport vehicles, one electronics maintenance vehicle, two tools vehicles, and one power supply vehicle.

When networked with a Brigade-level ECC, a kill probability of not less than 90% of small-formation airborne targets (less than four aircraft whose airspeed is not greater than 700metres/second) can be achieved (when ripple-firing two missiles against a single target), and more than 95% when the target’s speed is not greater than 560 metres/second and the intruding airborne target density is not greater than four aircraft a minute. In terms of performance, therefore, the KS-1A is in the same league as (but much cheaper than) Raytheon’s RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), while being superior to the 45km-range BUK-M2E of Russia’s Almaz Antey Concern.

The improved KS-1A was publicly revealed at the Zhuhai Air Show in 2000. It is a command-guided missile with a range of 57.5km, capable of intercepting targets at altitudes of up to 27,000 metres. It enjoys a 15km increase in effective range over the earlier HQ-61, and as such represents a relatively significant improvement in air defence capability. The KS-1C variant made its public debut at the 2012 Zhuhai Air Show.

The KS-1A MR-SAM is extremely flexible in employment and deployment. It is best employed as a Regiment. However, its three Batteries can be employed for independent tasks if required. This is called the Autonomous Mode. The three Batteries can be deployed in various geometric formations, as suited to the vulnerable area/point being protected and the extent desired to be sanitised from hostile airborne threats. Similarly, the Battery can deploy its launchers in a way as to be optimal for target engagement as the threat is perceived ab-initio, or as it evolves during combat. Cross-country mobility enables quick re-deployment and the radar-based sensors can be so positioned as to achieve the optimum kill zone. The KS-1A Batteries can protect static, semi-mobile as well as mobile assets. These may be critical national assets in the hinterland or large mobile armoured formations (either Integrated Brigade Combat teams or Armoured Divisions) thrusting into enemy territory. The Regimental ECC and the Battery-level ECCs must be deployed in a manner, which will provide a clear line-of-sight to the Batteries, which may be placed up to a maximum of 30km away from each other. This requires the mast of the microwave communications antenna (on the radars, ECCs and Firing Units) to be raised to the required appropriate height.

The Type 305A radar must be sited while keeping in mind the screening constraints. The radar’s antenna must be aligned accurately by knowing its position and orientation with respect to the north. This information is made available to the Type 305A’s mission computer from a fibre-optic gyro-based autonomous land navigation system (ALNS). Care should be taken to align the Type 305A’s antenna with the ALNS and the system must be calibrated. The levelling of the Type 305A’s antenna needs to be accurate in order to avoid any tilt, which would introduce a bias. The SJ-231 is also provided with ALNS to measure its latitude, longitude and orientation with respect to the true north. This information is required by both Battery-level ECC and the Type 305A’s mission computer. The MR-SAM Firing Units operate automatically and are remotely controlled by the Battery-level ECC, which may be up to 1.5km away. Control is effected via microwave line-of-sight radio or line-cable links. 

The Type 305A automatically starts tracking targets at a distance of around 250km providing early warning to the KS-1A system and its operators. The target track information is transferred to Regimental ECC, which automatically classifies the targets. The three HT-233s start tracking targets around a range of 100km. This data too is transferred to Regimental ECC, which then performs multi-radar tracking and carries out track correlation and data fusion. Target position information is then sent back to the HT-233s, which use this information to acquire the prioritised targets with the help of the Battery-level ECC, which can engage a target(s) from the selected list at the earliest point of time, and is is assigned the target in real-time by the Regimental ECC. The availability of missiles and the health of the missiles are also taken into consideration during this process. Fresh targets are assigned as and when intercepts with assigned targets are completed. A single shot kill probability (SSKP) of 98% has already been achieved by the system taking into consideration various parameters of the sensors, guidance command, missile capabilities and kill zone computations.

There are a number of possibilities for deploying the KS-1A in autonomous Battery-level mode and in Regimental-level mode for neutralising the threat profiles with optimally defined multi-target engagement scenarios. In the Regimental-level mode there are a number of proven configurations to defend vulnerable areas depending upon the nature of the expected threat pattern and characteristics of the threats. Similarly, up to four B batteries in autonomous mode can be deployed to defend vulnerable areas/points. In all its deployment patterns, the KS-1A offers a multi-target and multi-directional area air defence capability. All its ground-based and airborne components are integrated in a plug-and-flight architecture under which the software-based integration of all hardware-based elements permits the autonomous management of various functions such as programmable surveillance, target detection, target acquisition, target identification and tracking, threat evaluation, threat prioritisation, interception assignment and target engagement.

Depending on the operational scenario—whether to defend a vulnerable area or vulnerable point—the KS-1A’s operational deployment pattern can be selected from either of the three above-mentioned types. In all the three patterns, up to four KS-1A Batteries (with 48 ready-to-fire missiles and four SJ-231 stations) can function together seamlessly even when deployed over a wide area and are linked to a Regiment-level ECC by secure microwave line-of-sight data links as well as mobile troposcatter communications terminals. When an entire Regiment of KS-1A MR-SAMs is deployed, use is made of a Type 305A ‘gapfiller’ airspace surveillance radar to provide a single integrated airspace picture to the Regimental ECC. The Type 305A and four SJ-231 stations can be networked with a Sector Operations Centre (SOC) via a DA-6 tactical internet controller using either underground fibre-optic links or land-mobile broadband, multi-channel, beyond line-of-sight, digital troposcatter communications terminals. 

This same type of systems architecture using the above-mentioned tools can be employed to develop an integrated, hierarchical air defence network that seamlessly integrates the LR-SAM, MR-SAM, E-SHORADS and VSHORADS into one monolithic guided-missile-based air defence system. To make the HT-233 radar virtually invulnerable to hostile electronic jamming, a number of ECCM features have been incorporated, including narrow transmit and receive beams, very low sidelobe antenna, automatic frequency selection mode, interference analysis and mapping, and randomness in frequency, space and time.

DRDO’s EMB-145I AEW & CS At Sakhir Air Base During The Bahrain International Airshow 2014

January 20, 2014, 2:52 pm

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Coastal Security/Constabulary Operations Versus Provision Of Maritime Security

January 26, 2014, 12:45 pm

≫ Next: DEFEXPO 2014 Highlights-1........Enjoy Them!

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The ‘desi’ journalists never cease to indulge in yellow journalism and superstitious oversimplifications (when the problem in  reality is far more deep-rooted), as evidenced by the contents of this report:

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2014/01/frigate-ins-talwar-jinxed-second-time.html

Next, we have this report: 

(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-submarine-ins-sindhughosh-grounded-mumbai-harbour/1/338413.html) 

This report claimed that the Indian Navy’s (IN) submarine arm “got a very rude jolt” when one of its Type 877EKM SSKs—INS Sindhughosh—ran aground at around 5.30pm on January, 17, 2014 while trying to berth itself alongside at the naval base in Mumbai at a time when low-tide had set in (it was originally scheduled to enter by 4pm, it seems). What the ‘desi’ news-reporter—who filed this report—obviously did not know was that whenever a submarine enters or exists any naval base at very slow speeds, it always has its on-board echosounder turned on and the submarine’s navigator knows only too well what are the natural or man-made obstacles below the vessel. And many a time when low-tide sets in, submarines already berthed alongside are gently allowed to settle down over the silt and after high-tide sets in, naval divers are routinely sent to visually inspect the bottom-portion of submarine’s hull for any signs of structural damage, which indeed is a very rare occurrence. Likewise, when an inbound submarine’s echosounder indicates any obstacle due to low-tide setting in, the vessel immediately shuts off its propeller and comes to a complete standstill, and the hull is allowed to gently rest atop the silt below. Once the tide rises again, the submarine also rises accordingly and depending on visibility levels, the vessel either proceeds to its accorded berthing slot on its own power, or is towed in by a tug-boat containing a harbour pilot. That is what really transpired on January 17 and by no means did INS Sindhughosh run aground nor did the SSK’s bow-mounted sonar-dome (containing the cylindrical-array sonar) suffer any damage.   In fact, the berthing area for SSKs inside the naval base in Mumbai (see diagram below) has silted up because dredgers have been unable to remove silt from there due to the submerged wreck of INS Sindhurakshak, which awaits salvaging. 

Finally, we have this report (http://m.indianexpress.com/story/1967964/hindia/india/) about INS Betwa—a Project 16A FFG—which was recently reported by yet another ‘desi’ news-reporter as having run aground or colliding with an unidentified object while approaching the naval base in Mumbai, and that the hull-mounted, fibre-glass-built sonar-dome had cracked due to this collision, leading to faulty readings and ingress of saltwater into the sonar-dome. In reality, one does not have to be a rocket-scientist to realise that hull-mounted, fibre-glass-built sonar-domes are robust structures that are built to withstand the kind of turbulence and pressures that one encounters during Sea State 6. Secondly, the FFG’s echosounder is always available for use when the vessel is entering any naval base and consequently, the question of running aground doesn’t even arise. Lastly, the sonar-domes of all three Project 16A FFGs (containing the hull-mounted panoramic sonar) are mounted a little further behind the bottommost section of the bow (only the six Project 1135.6 FFGs, three Project 15A DDGs and four Project 28A ASW corvettes have their sonar-domes contained within a bulbous compartment located at the bottommost section of the bow) and therefore, it is impossible for flotsam like timber-logs to directly collide with the sonar-dome of a Project 16A FFG. Consequently, the only other probable explanation is that INS Betwa’s sonar-dome cracked due to normal wear-and-tear.

When it comes to the issue of collisions between IN warships and merchant marine/fishing vessels, fact of the matter is that none of the IN's principal surface combatants are presently equipped with passive infra-red search-and-track systems (IRST), which ought to be mandatory whenever any warship—large or small—undertakes incessant coastal security patrols. Such sensors effectively supplement both the on-board marine navigation radars as well as target detection/target engagement radars like the Garpun Bal-E. While the IN’s X-FAC-Ms along with those of the Indian Coast Guard Service (ICGS) are being progressively retrofitted with ELBIT Systems-supplied COMPASS gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems, the same does not hold true for the IN’s FFGs, DDGs, guided-missile corvettes, AOPVs and auxiliary vessels like fleet replenishment tankers and LST-Ls.

In fact, only the three Project 17 FFGs, plus the six 105-metre NOPVs now in delivery, are presently equipped with gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems—these being those co-developed by India’s VEM Technologies Pvt Ltd and the UK’s Vinten-Radamec and being used primarily for optronic fire-control in support of the OTOBreda 76/62 SRGM. The three Project 15A DDGs too will have them.

The obvious and only solution therefore is to retrofit the IN’s each existing DDGs, FFGs, guided-missile corvettes and NOPVs, as well as the ICGS’ OPVs and AOPVs with dual high-definition gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems, which will dramatically improve the all-weather situational awareness of the officers-on-watch on board such warships. Such solutions are already available from OEMs based in the US, Canada, France, Germany and Israel.

SAGEM’s EOMS-NG (electro-optical multifunction system–new generation) and Vampir-NG optronic panoramic surveillance system—presently being offered by SAGEM through its authorised Indian distributor Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Ltd, is a day/night, multifunction, gyrostabilised optronic system. It offers complete functionality over 360°, including infra-red surveillance, identification, tracking, laser rangefinding and fire-control system. Remote-controlled from two consoles operating in tandem from a warship’s close-in air-defence bridge, the EOMS-NG helps assess the warship’s immediate environment, controls self-defence weapons and enhances the safety of helicopter operations. The EOMS-NG’s operating concept, based on high-rate panoramic shots, gives it the observation capability equivalent to 100 fixed cameras. 

Let us now proceed to the root-causes of the MRO/serviceability problems afflicting the IN’s operational fleet. That successive Govts of India between the early 1990s and November 2008 had no idea about what constituted coastal security becomes evident from the fact that, despite the 10 IED blasts that rocked Bombay on March 12, 1993, resulting in 257 killed or missing and 713 injured (and caused by 8 tonnes of RDX, detonators, gelatine, AK-56s and pistols plus their ammunition reloads and magazines, and hand-grenades that were ferried by sea to landing sites at Dighi and Srivardhan along Maharashtra’s coastline at between February 3 and 7, 1993), no attempt was made till early 2009 for securing the coastlines of Gujarat and Maharashtra through the establishment of a multi-sensor coastal surveillance system (CCS).

The Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security had recommended as far back as in February 2001 the setting up a CSS in the form of shore-based remotely-operated radar stations (also equipped with optronic sensors) in areas of high sensitivity and high traffic density to provide continuous, gap free, automatic detection and tracking of maritime targets, thereby providing a reliable tactical situation display. Although the MoD had constituted a Working Group in 2002 for implementing the CSS scheme, it took till 2004 to decide which agency would execute the project. In January 2005, the project was entrusted to the ICGS, which immediately initiated a Statement of Case (SoC) for the scheme. Nonetheless, there were further delays and it took four years to sign a Memorandum of Understanding in December 2008 with the Director General Light Houses and Light Ships (DGLL), the Ministry of Shipping, and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in view of the inter-ministerial issues and financial implications. Apart from this, numerous revisions (six till July 2007) in the SoC at the instance of the MoD contributed to the delay. Finally, in February 2009 the Cabinet Committee on National Security approved the CSS and automatic identification system (AIS) chain together with related communications equipment along India’s coastline under Phase-I for 46 dual S-/X-band radars and optronic sensors at an approximate cost of Rs350 crore. The non-competitive and sole-source RFP for the establishment of a chain of static optronic sensors at 46 sites was in August 2009, which was awarded rather arbitrarily to the MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and mysteriously failed to invite the country’s private-sector entities for submitting their bids. The field evaluation trials of BEL-built sub-systems of foreign origin began in December 2009 but were suspended in February 2010 due to unsatisfactory performance of the thermal imager, low-light-level TV (LLLTV) and charge-coupled device (CCD) camera. Subsequently, field trials of the optronic sensors of four foreign vendors were carried out in June and August 2010 at Chennai. The thermal imager of Israel’s Controp and the CCD camera with LLLTV from Canada’s Obzerv met the RFP criteria and passed the field-trials. Following this, the staff evaluation was undertaken by ICGS HQ. The staff evaluation report was approved by the MoD in December 2010.

It was only on November 24, 2011 that Saab TransponderTech of Sweden on was awarded a SEK116 million contract by the DGLL for supplying a national CSS network costing Rs.600 crore and stradling the entire Indian coastline. The system includes TERMA of Denmark’s Scanter 2001 dual-band (S/X) radars each with 50km-range, and equipment for regional and national control centres. Users of the CCS apart from DGLL will be the IN, ICG and DG Shipping. Saab will implement the project, which includes installation, commissioning, training and support together with its Indian partner, Elcome Marine Services. The project was targetted  for completion within 18 months. The CSS that the DGLL has ordered comprises both radars and optronic sensors at 74 locations. The sensor sites connect via VSAT links to form a Wide Area Network. Saab has delivered the network servers and software, the CoastWatch operator software, including SAR support and advanced databases and statistical functions to nine control centres—six regional and three national. The control centres are being operated by the DGLL. There is also an option within the contract to include another 12 sensor sites.

Provision of coastal security through persistent surveillance and target detection for protecting India’s vast 7,517km-long coastline, 1,197 islands and 2.01 million sq km of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a multi-asset and multi-layered assignment that is best achieved through a combination of shore-based, seaborne, airborne and space-based hardware which, only when employed in a combined and synchronised manner, will generate a comprehensive picture of what’s happening or who is going where and how into the sea (the so-called domain of maritime awareness or DMA), especially the Arabian Sea, which is spread over an area of 38.6 lakh sq km. While the Govt of India has, since November 2008, welcomed the IN’s desire for providing the leadership for coastal security roles and operations, it obviously continues to be oblivious of the cost in terms of conventional naval war preparedness. Why then is the IN condemning its warships and crew on an evidently self-defeating task? Primarily, for two reasons. Firstly, after the 26/11 terrorist attacks, everyone within the country’s civilian officialdom collectively pointed fingers at the IN, implying that since the medium of infiltration was through the sea, it had to be the IN’s failure. The Govt of India, though wiser than the popular perception, opportunistically decided to play along in order to prevent the criticisms coming its way. In fact, the political leadership’s incomprehension of India’s coastal borders and their vulnerabilities can be gauged by the fact that after OP Vijay/OP Safed Sagar/OP Talwar in 1999, when the then NDA coalition government appointed a task force to suggest security measures for securing India’s frontiers, the focus was only on land. And the subsequent Group of Ministers’ report on India’s border management referred to coastal borders in only a cursory manner. Secondly, why the IN got sucked into the coastal security domain was partially its own fault. In 2010, when incidences of Somali piracy were making headlines every day, the IN’s Western Naval Command decided to initiate a month-long anti-piracy exercise as a matter of routine. This exercise, which generated tremendous deterrent value in the high seas, soon unintentionally morphed into a full-fledged operation. And once the Govt of India realised that the IN to do more effectively what the ICGS’ job ought to be, it simply washed its hands away, while the ICGS developed a dependency-on-the-IN syndrome.        

Immediately after 26/11, the Govt of India rushed matters by making the IN the lead provider of coastal security (the IN up till then had only been responsible for providing maritime security and coastal defence) and prematurely fixed the areas of responsibilities (AOR) for the ICGS and the various State Marine Police agencies without first appreciating their respective capacities and capabilities. In October 2010, the IN submitted a detailed 262-page technical blueprint on the ‘integrated national maritime domain awareness project’ to all the concerned Union ministries and the 14 coastal states and union territories of India. This detailed blueprint centred around the creation of the IN’s multi-spectrum National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network (NC3IN), whose HQ is now in Gurgaon, Haryana. The blueprint called for an additional allocation of Rs.9 billion for implementing the entire project, whose principal aim is to generate a common operational picture of all ongoing activities at sea through an institutionalised mechanism for collecting, fusing and analysing information from technical and other sources like the CCS, satellite-based automatic identification systems (AIS), vessel traffic management systems (VTMS), fishing vessel registration and fishermen biometric identity databases. The proposal also called for the need to create state- level monitoring centres in coastal states/union territories to act as nodes for the national DMA network and upgradation of the four existing joint operations centres at Mumbai, Kochi, Vizag and Port Blair, as well as the creation of a shipping hub and fisheries monitoring centre. The blueprint also identified the need to establish VTMS at the 56 non-major ports that handle international traffic. While India's 13 major ports either have or are being equipped with VTMS, except for Port Blair, Mumbai, Chennai and the Gulf of Khambat, none of the 200 non-major ports have any identification or surveillance systems as yet. The blueprint also called for a VTMS for the eastern off-shore development areas like the one set up for the western ones.

The area stretching from the shore out to 3nm into the sea was made the responsibility of the Marine Police agencies, while the area from 3nm out to 12nm (territorial waters) was entrusted to the ICGS, while the area beyond the 12nm limit out into the high seas became the IN’s AOR. Now, as per international norms and conventions, the area stretching out from a country’s baseline right to a distance of 24nm is known as the contiguous zone within which a country’s fiscal and health laws apply. 200nm ahead of the baseline lies the EEZ. Unfortunately, prior to 26/11, conceptualisation of India’s various maritime borders was never understood or taken seriously. Consequently, when the state-level Marine Police agencies were brought into the loop for providing coastal security, they never understood what all this meant, since they had all been under the assumption that India’s borders ended at the shorelines. Additionally, several of these state-level agencies grasped rather lately that coastal security was a pan-India issue and that despite territorial/jurisdictional reservations, eventually all the maritime agencies operating out of India’s coastal states will have to follow one unitary national directive.

Another major problem was the unavailability of trained manpower to man the various coastal police stations of the Marine Police agencies (initially 73 marine police stations were established under a Rs.329.62 crore plan (this was to be followed by an additional allocation of Rs.1,579.91 crores for another 131 police stations). Of these, 32 marine police stations are on the west coast, with 12 of them being in Maharashtra). And wherever some human resources were available, they loathed their offshore patrolling taskings since they were not trained in seamanship. Such personnel soon discovered that cruising on the sea on board high-speed interceptor craft was quite different from cruising cruising on a lake or river. Thus far, 340 FICs (Motomarine SA-built Hellraiser and Invader) have been approved for import. These are being licence-assembled in India by the MoD-owned GSL and GRSE, with the latter being contracted for the supply of an initial 78 FICs for those marine police agencies straddling the Bay of Bengal. The 12-tonne FIC—called Hellraiser—is built of glass-reinforced plastic (GRP), costs Rs25 million per unit, and is capable of a top speed of 38 Knots (70 kph). The boat is 13 metres long and has an endurance of 75nm with 25% reserve fuel capacity. It can carry four crew members along with a patrolling party of 16 persons. The boat is fitted with two inboard main engines of 500HP each with waterjet propulsion. These boats have been designed and constructed for deployment in Indian territorial waters for day and night surveillance and investigation of suspected vessels in and around harbour, anchorage and along the sea coast. The boats are highly seaworthy and unsinkable type having 10% reserve buoyancy even when filled with water. An on-board radar provides the boat’s commander with automatic, real-time updates of maritime activity received from navigation, positional, and position-tracking sensors such as AIS, automatic radar plotting aids, and full-motion optronic sensors so as to afford greater clarity in the tactical picture and thus improve decision-making. The live data is shared amongst the nodes in the network via an intelligent router, thus allowing critical and prioritised information to be broadcasted on the best line connectivity available over up to four different channels using HF, VHF, UHF, SATCOM or WIFI.

The Invader 5.4-tonne FIC can attain speeds of 40 Knots, is 9.60 metres long, and has an endurance of 75nm with 25% reserve fuel capacity. The boat can carry four crew members along with a patrolling party of 10 persons and comes fully equipped with life-saving, fire-fighting and communications facilities. The boat is fitted with two outboard Motors of 275HP each for propulsion and manoeuvring. The wheel house is fitted with anti-ballistic panels for protection of the patrolling crew to withstand firing from an AK-47 assault rifle at 10-metre range. Deliveries of the Invader and Hellraiser FICs have so far taken place for the marine police agencies of Maharashtra (28 ordered), Goa (five ordered), West Bengal (18 ordered), Tamil Nadu (44 ordered), Gujarat, Kerala, and the Andaman & Nicobar Administration (eight delivered). Maharashtra, meanwhile, is procuring an additional 29 patrol boats costing Rs1.5 billion from Mumbai-based Marine Frontiers Pvt Ltd. The night patrolling capabilities of the Hellraiser and Invader families of FICs are severely limited in view of the non-availability of dedicated COTS-based navigational radars (like those from FURUNO). In addition, the non-availability of night vision binoculars/goggles on-board also affected their efficacy for dark-hour patrols. In addition, both the ICGS and various marine police agencies also lacks vital equipment such as hand-held GPS receivers, night-vision binoculars, SAR transponders, and emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRB).

A far bigger challenge has been the creation and operationalisation of a hierarchical, multi-agency coastal security ensemble as part of the IN’s visionary DMA—something that required all stakeholders to cooperate with one another and evolve an over-arching set of standard operating procedures (SOP) and rules of engagement (ROE)—all under a centralised command-and-control structure overseen by the IN. This has proven to be the most complicated challenge to overcome, since both the IN and ICGS never really had interacted with state-level and Central civil agencies like harbour/port authorities, Marine Police, Customs and Immigration agencies, and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). Even though the IN, to its credit, had created several Joint Operations Centres (JOC) by late 2009 and had driven home the point that these JOCs were coordinating and not command centres, a high degree of agency mistrust and turf-protection mindsets continue to prevail, thereby preventing the JOCs from being fully functional and subverting such well-meaning multi-pronged initiatives. As a compromise, the IN has thus far succeeded in establishing telephone hotlines between all concerned agencies as an interim solution, and has also convinced the Union Home Secretary to prevail over his state-level counterparts who, in turn, have taken some tangible steps towards coaxing the various state-level agencies to send their representatives to their workstations within the JOCs.

In addition to these, the IN has, post-26/11, initiated the ‘Sagar Kavach’ series of exercises (at a rate of two exercises per year per coastal state) aimed at sensitising all stakeholders towards the concept of coastal security. This task too has proven to be difficult to implement, since non-IN and non-ICGS agencies did not participate with the same degree of enthusiasm until the IN invited the Chief Secretaries of the concerned coastal states to chair the debriefing sessions after the conduct of each such exercise. Bottomline: no amount of sensitisation will produce tangible results unless each stakeholder is made accountable for its part.

Consequently, the IN is now paying the price for such ill-conceived initiatives by being compelled to play policing or constabulary roles, which were previously tertiary, as one of its primary tasks. Instead of insisting that provision of maritime defence/security should be its only task, the IN has accepted the additional responsibility of providing coastal security, a move that has serious national security implications since it diminishes the IN’s conventional warfighting capabilities. For instance, out of the 365 days between August 2010 and August 2011, all principal surface combatants of the IN’s Western Naval Command were involved in patrolling for almost 280 days, causing needless wear-and-tear of frontline operational warships. Prior to 26/11, such warships of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command used to participate in fortnight-long exercises twice a year, with enough time in-between for recoup, recovery, review of warfighting doctrines and tactics, and embarking on naval diplomacy. Now, with the heightened focus on coastal security, the damage wrought to the IN is three-fold: DDGs costing Rs.3,500 crore and FFGs costing Rs.2,500 crore are being used for chasing pirates, thereby taking a toll on the service lives of such warships since they have limitations on serviceable engine-hours when used at low-speeds; a defensive mindset is overwhelming the IN’s rank-and-file, which in turn serves to diminish the IN’s sea deterrence capacity; and dilution of its primary role is coming at the cost of exercising with friendly navies. Though an instrument can be used for multiple purposes, it is best used only when it is used for the role that it was designed for. Otherwise, it operates a lower efficiencies and at higher costs. And this is exactly what’s happening with the IN’s frontline surface combatants. Military capabilities come at an extremely high premium. But if the Govt of India feels that the armed forces will not be called upon to perform their primary roles (i.e. conventional warfighting), then it should disband the armed forces and save the premium. After all, why spend Rs.1,000 on a job that can be done with Rs.100? Better invest that money elsewhere.     

The Way Forward

And yet, despite lavish spending on hardware procurements by the MoD and Union MHA, today, it can hardly be said that India’s 7,516km-long coastline is secure, if not impregnable. While India is not as vulnerable today as she was in November 2008, improvement has only been marginal and the country still needs a lot of luck. After all, provision of comprehensive coastal security is not like a polythene bag inside which one can put India, with all the bad people remaining outside. Ideally, instead of the IN, the ICGS should have been designated as the nodal agency for coordinating with all other civilian stakeholders. But that was not to be. Now, the IN needs to hand over to the ICGS at the earliest the task of providing coastal security. In reality, the IN should have no locus standi within India’s territorial waters. Instead, only the ICGS and the various Marine Police agencies of the coastal states should be made responsible for providing coastal security. 

As per the ICGS’ in-house analysis (for the 2002-2007 Plan), it requires 175 ships and 221 aircraft for effective patrolling of the EEZ, coastal and shallow waters. Against this, India’s CAG audit report reveals that the ICGS had only 68 ships/vessels and 45 aircraft as of January 2008. Out of the 28 ships/vessels available with for patrolling of the entire West Coast, 16 ships/vessels, of all types, were based in the Maharashtra and Gujarat areas. Ten ships in 2007 and 14 ships/vessels in 2008 and 2009 deployed in the Maharashtra and Gujarat area were responsible for EEZ and International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) patrolling. Compared to the force-level of 122 vessels envisaged in the Perspective Plan for the period 1985-2000, the ICGS had by December 2010 possessed only 65% of the required force-level in terms of ships. With respect to the aviation arm, the corresponding figure was 48%. As of December 2010, the ICGS had not processed the cases for acquisition of deep-sea patrol vessels (DSPV), medium patrol vessels (MPV) and aerostat-mounted optronic sensors, even though they were envisaged in the Perspective Plan 1985–2000. During the 9^th Plan (1997-2002) period the ICGS was able to achieve only about 50% of its targetted acquisitions. During the 10^th Plan (2002-2007) period, of the 61 ships planned for acquisition, the procurement action for only 26 ships could be finalised, i.e. a mere 43%. More importantly, not a single acquisition fructified in the plan period against the planned targets. The ICGS acquired 12 vessels, against the contracted-for 26, well after the plan period, only by December 2010. The procurement action for the remaining 35 vessels was carried over to the 11^th Plan period (2007-2012). Of these 35 vessels, only 27 vessels had been contracted for by December 2010. Although new projects had been sanctioned during the 11^th Plan period, taking into account the planned decommissioning of ships, it proved be difficult for the ICGS to achieve the Perspective Plan (1985-2000) force-levels even by 2012 i.e. by the end of the 11^th Plan. The deficiency is now to the extent of 17% and 45% in respect of vessels and aircraft. Presently, 72% of FPVs/IPVs, 47% of AOPVs/OPVs and 37% of interceptor boats are either on extended lives or their extended lives have also expired. Three OPVs meant to be decommissioned in 2003, 2005 and 2006 still remain in service as the contract for their replacement was signed only in February 2006 and the replacements were expected between February 2010 and November 2011, respectively. Thirteen IPVs were to be decommissioned between 1998 and 2006. However, approval of the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council under the ‘Acceptance of Necessity’ clause was obtained only in August 2006. The contract was concluded in March 2009 and the first vessel was delivered by only August 2011, i.e. 12 years after the first vessel was due for decommissioning.

The ICGS presently has government sanction to operate four squadrons of Do-228s, four squadrons of SA.316B Alouette-III/Chetak helicopters and one squadron of Dhruv ALH helicopter. As high as 82% of the Chetaks and 54% of the Do-228s are more than 17 years old. This age profile compares unfavourably with the prescribed life of Chetaks (15 years) and that of Do-228s (25 years). In order to meet its requirements primarily for SAR and afloat operations, the Coast Guard’s Development Plan for 1992-1997 had provided for the acquisition of two twin-engined helicopters for which the ICGS had identified the HAL-built Dhruv ALH. However, the first ALH was delivered only in March 2002 and the second ALH in March 2003. The ICGS concluded the contract only in March 2003 with the MoD-owned HAL. Subsequently, a third and fourth Dhruv ALH were received in March 2004 and March 2005, respectively, without any government sanction and contract. The availability of Dhruv ALHs was poor as they remained under evaluation since service induction (2002-2005) till May 2009. Even during evaluation, their serviceability ranged from 21% to 40% and the entire Dhruv ALH fleet was grounded in November 2005 and flying was re-started only in January 2007. Even after seven years of induction of the first helicopter and after incurring an expenditure of Rs162.03 crore, the Dhruv ALH still does not meet the ICGS’ operational requirements, according to the CAG. The Dhruv ALH is thus being exploited only for basic flying as the present state of the helicopters precludes accomplishment of any mission-oriented flying. Worse, the Dhruv ALHs in ICGS service have not yet been fitted with weather radars, which is a major limitation. Fitment of operational role equipment has also been kept in abeyance. Consequently, these helicopters can neither be exploited for SAR missions nor for afloat operations, pending the resolution of many issues, including rescue hoist trials and certification, structural provisions for SAR operations (like fitment of flotation gear), radar flickering and Doppler failure (of the DRDO-developed and BEL-built Supervision SV-2000 chin-mounted radar), and AFCS software updates for auto-hover capability. Furthermore, fleet serviceability has been poor. On an average the ICGS’ Dhruv ALHs have spent more time at HAL’s facilities than with the squadron since their induction. In September 2007, for every Dhruv ALH, out of 100 hours of flying undertaken by the helicopter, only 30 hours and 40 minutes contributed towards service flying and the remaining was towards maintenance test-flights. The helicopter has been plagued by premature component failures and frequent groundings for complying mandatory servicing instructions and modifications. Lastly, the shipborne deployment has not yet been achieved due to problems in blade-folding even though the ICGS’ new AOPVs have been specifically designed to accommodate the Dhruv ALH on board. The ICGS has a total requirement of 12 twin-engined helicopters against which it presently has four Dhruv ALHs. However, due to extreme dissatisfaction with these helicopters, the ICGS has no other choice but to import alternatives like AgustaWestland Aerospace’s AW-139.

Despite the MoD and Union Ministry of Finance (MoF) curtailing the ICGS’ projected requirements, actual capital expenditure as a percentage of capital outlay ranged between 82% in the 9^thPlan and 53% in the 10^th Plan. This was due to delays in finalisation of procurement process and delayed signing of contracts; abnormally slow progress on the part of MoD-owned shipyards to construct the ships; and neutralisation of requirement of spares through revenue budget, cancellation of project, expiry of validity of approvals of the procurement process, delayed supply of spares, inconclusive trials, etc. In addition, procedural delays at all levels, i.e. ICGS HQ, MoD and Union MoF, were responsible for non-utilisation of the budget. For instance, the delayed conclusion of contact for Interceptor Boats worth Rs213 crore took place in only March 2006, wherein the proposal was mooted as early as December 2001 for procurement. In addition, there was non-sanction of new schemes by the MoD. Thus, the procurement of four new Do-228s, five FLIR turrets for installation on board existing Do-228s as well as integration of ELTA Systems-built EL/M-2022(V)2 radars could not take place in the year 2007-2008 and consequently, Rs70.47 crore had to be surrendered on this account. Lastly, due to the slow progress of construction of ships by the MoD-owned shipyards, Rs120 crore was surrendered in 2008-2009. By the end of the 10^th Plan period (2002-2007), even though the ICGS had activated 23 coast guard stations, a large number of these stations continued to function with infrastructural/fleet deficiencies. These deficiencies were yet to be made good as of December 2010 at most of the stations. Post 26/11, the Govt of India had sanctioned 14 new stations in a span of 18 months (between June 2009 and November 2010). However, only five had been activated till December 2010.

(to be concluded)

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DEFEXPO 2014 Highlights-1........Enjoy Them!

February 5, 2014, 9:05 am

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 Day-1 Highlights

Day-2 Highlights

Day-3 Highlights

Some More Homegrown Product Exhibits

DEFEXPO 2014 Highlights-2........Enjoy Them!

February 12, 2014, 12:29 pm

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The table below, based on data released by the IAF HQ and ADA, gives the actual estimated service-induction timelines for the Tejas Mk1 and Tejas Mk2 MRCAs and was published by FORCE's DEFEXPO 2014 Special 08-02-2014 on page 16. The Hon. RM A K Antony will therefore be well-advised to refer to this table the next time the MoD wants to blurt out the kind of notional IOC/FOC timelines that have been announced since February 2011! 

The Blind Leading The Blind

March 3, 2014, 4:08 pm

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This is what ‘desi’ broadcast TV channels like HEADLINES TODAY have been practicing over the past 48 hours. For instance, certain news-anchors of this channel have claimed that “all existing Type 877EKM Kilo-class SSKs are in a decrepit state, they are not seaworthy, that most of their 25-year shelf-lives and life-cycles are over,” and therefore they are all “floating coffins”. Facts, however, tell another story altogether. For, it is downright criminal to claim that these SSKs are using batteries with expired shelf-lives. In the case of INS Sindhuratna S-59, which recently underwent an unscheduled short-refit, it was using the 240 units of batteries (costing Rs.11 crores in all and possessing 40% of residual life) that had been removed from INS Sindhukesari S-60 since the latter is presently undergoing a short-refit.  

To date, all eight surviving Kilo-class SSKs use batteries made by EXIDE Industries and such batteries, in production since the early 1990s, have also been exported to Algeria and Iran. EXIDE also supplies batteries for the four IN-operated Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs. 

(see:http://www.exideindustries.com/corporate/business/submarine)

About five years ago, another India-based battery manufacturer—HBL Power Systems Ltd (see http://www.hbl.in/defence.asp)--which by then was already supplying batteries for IN-owned torpedoes of Russian and Italian origin as well as for all DRDO-developed tactical and strategic missiles, approached Indian Navy HQ and requested it to certify its newly-developed submarine batteries for usage. When IN HQ refused, HBL filed a case in the Delhi High Court against the IN. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) then told Justice Katju (who was then hearing the case) that since the IN already had a long-term contract with EXIDE for procuring submarine batteries, it will not consider a competitive procurement scenario. Furthermore, since the IN had only a single set of batteries on hand that was meant for installation on board INS Sindhurakshak S-63 (which was then due to proceed to Zvezdochka State Machine-Building Enterprise at Severodvinsk for her medium-refit), it could not spare this set for the sake of holding competitive field evaluation trials along with the set of batteries built by HBL. Justice Katju, however, stated that this was simply not on and consequently ruled in favour of HBL. The MoD then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court against the Delhi High Court’s ruling and argued that any delays encountered in the delivery of batteries meant for INS Sindhurakshak will only severely compromise national security. Fortunately for the MoD, the Supreme Court quashed Justice Katju’s earlier ruling and delivered a verdict in favour of the MoD, much to the IN’s relief.  

Coming now to the present-day state of the eight surviving Type 877EKM SSKs, Russia’s Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering has confirmed to me that the authorised total technical service life of each such SSK is not 20 years or 26 years as has been claimed by several retired IN officials over the past few days, but 35 years. Furthermore, each such SSK undergoes only one medium refit (inclusive of a mid-life upgrade) once after completing 13 years of service, and on its 26^th year in service, it will undergo a service life-extension programme (SLEP) or a long-refit (inclusive of further upgrades) so that it will remain in service for a total period of 35 years.  

INS Sindhughosh S-55, whose keel was laid on May 29, 1983, was launched on July 29, 1985 and was commissioned on November 25, 1985 and it was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2002 and 2005. INS Sindhudhvaj S-56, whose keel was laid on April 1, 1986, was launched on July 27, 1986 and was commissioned on November 25, 1986. INS Sindhuraj S-57, which was commissioned on September 2, 1987, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1999 and 2001. INS Sindhuvir S-58, which was commissioned on December 25, 1987, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1997 and 1999. INS Sindhuratna S-59, which was commissioned on August 14, 1988, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2001 and 2003. INS Sindhukesari S-60, which was commissioned on October 29, 1988, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 1999 and 2001. INS Sindhukirti S-61, which was commissioned on October 30, 1989, has been declared as a writeoff. INS Sindhuvijay S-62, which was commissioned on October 27, 1990, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between 2005 and 2007. INS Sindhurakshak S-63, which was commissioned on October 2, 1997, was subjected to a medium-refit and was also upgraded to Project 08773 standard between August 2010 and January 2013INS.  Next in line for a medium-refit and upgrading to Project 08773 standard by the Zvezdochka State Machine-Building Enterprise is INS Sindhushastra S-64, which was commissioned on May 16, 2000.

Between 1997 and 1999, INS Sindhuvir was retrofitted with the LAMA-EKM AICS integrated console and the PIRIT control system, along with a loop antenna for VLF communications that was sourced from France’s NEREIDES. These were also installed on board INS Sindhuratna between 2000 and 2002, in addition to the Apassionata-EKM.1 integrated navigation system (using SAGEM's SIGMA 40 RLG-INS) and the Calibre-PLE fire-control system associated with the Club-S family of precision-guided munitions (3M-14E land-attack cruise missile and 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missile). 

Between 2002 and 2005, INS Sindhughosh incorporated all of the above, plus the DRDO-developed and BEL-made USHUS cylindrical-array bow-mounted sonar, CCS Mk2 composite communications system and a SIRS radiation monitoring system). Between 2005 and 2008, INS Sindhuvijay incorporated all of the abov e-mentioned enhancements along with a DRDO-developed and BEL-built ‘Porpoise’ ESM suite, MCA external antenna, York-built cooling machines, WAAS-built C-310 torpedo countermeasures and their BDL-built dispensers, and Sulzer-built high-pressure air compressors). An identical fitment was carried out on INS Sindhurakshak (containing 12 India-origin systems installed) between 2010 and 2013 by Zvezdocka, which deployed more than 200 workers in three shifts to complete each of the refits in two years. 

Thus, of the five Type 877EKM SSKs upgraded so far to Project 08773 standard at an aggregate cost of Rs1,560 crore (or an average of US$156 million per unit), four of them were armed with 3M-14E and 3M-54E missiles.

For helping the IN’s naval dockyards to undertake the periodic short-refits, SUDOEXPORT has facilitated and overseen the ToT to several India-based MRO companies, some of which are highlighted below.

INS Sindhukirti was ripped open in 2004 without Russian approval/licence by the Vizag-based Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL). While that was the easy part, putting it back together was far more complex and beyond the capability of HSL. By 2008 the INS Sindhukirti had become the IN’s ‘dry-dock queen’. HSL had signed a contract on October 3, 2006 with IN for the medium-refit plus upgrade of this SSK. In this regard, contracts were concluded with Rosoboronswervice India and SUDOEXPORT for material supplies as well as for turn-key modernisation works. As per the planned schedule, HSL was to have: completed the SSK’s degutting by May 2007, completed blasting on the entire hull structure for defect survey by February 2008, completed the removal of hard-patches from all six compartments, commissioned two pipe-bending machines, completed qualifying HSL’s welders to take up repairs on hull structures, and receive all related technical documentation from Russia by May 2008. Officially, INS Sindhukirti, for whose medium-refit plus upgrade the IN had already paid Rs650 crore, was to re-enter service back in 2010. But till this day the medium-refit work—where the SSK is stripped of all equipment, her hull inspected for wear-and-tear and machinery replaced—awaits completion and the IN therefore has classified this SSK as a permanent writeoff.

As part of the SLEP for the remaining eight Type 877EKM SSKs, the IN in future plans to equip them with thin-line towed-array sonars as well as new-generation optronic periscopes.

The IN’s Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs were ordered on December 11, 1981. The first two SSKs (S-44 Shishumar and S-45 Shankush) were built by HDW and were inducted into service in September and November 1986, respectively. The remaining two (S-46 Shalki and S-47 Shankul) were licence-built by MDL and entered service in February 1992 and May 1994.

All four SSKs subsequently underwent mid-life refits from 1999 to 2010 during which they were equipped with ATLAS Elektronik’s ISUS-90 combat management system, CSU-90 cylindrical active/passive bow-mounted sonar, passive planar flank arrays and intercept arrays (for providing warning against approaching torpedoes), passive ranging array, a three-dimensional mine and obstacle avoidance sonar; along with Alenia Sistemi Subacquei’s C-310 submarine-fired torpedo decoy dispensers and a self-noise monitoring system. The hunt is now on for reelable thin-line towed-array sonars, optronic periscopes and anti-ship cruise missiles to be installed on board the four SSKs when they undergo SLEP so that their service-lives will be extended for enabling them to remain in service till 2025.

Thus, while the IN will by 2018 be able to muster eight Project 08773 SSKs and retain the last of them in service will 2027, the last of the four Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs will remain in service till 2029.  

Let us now turn to the issues of SSK availability by factoring in the SSK deployment-cycles that are equally divided between periodic repairs at port, sea-trials and actual operational patrols. It is estimated that of the 13 submarines presently available to the IN (inclusive of the INS Chakra SSGN), no more than eight are available during peacetime as of now. This is woefully inadequate when one takes into account the steadily increasing operational tempo of the IN’s undersea warfare arm since the late 1990s. For, till the early 1990s, the SSKs—aided by LRMR/ASW platforms like the Tu-142M—undertook patrols only for: monitoring the twice-a-year naval exercises conducted by the navies of Pakistan, monitoring the movements of out-of-area naval warships belonging to the US and China, and taking part in twice-a-year naval exercises conducted by the IN’s eastern and western fleets. Since the late 1990s, however the scope of surveillance missions to be undertaken have increased manifold in order to monitor: the supply of WMD-related hardware by sea from China and North Korea to Pakistan and Iran, the movements of the PLA Navy’s various task-forces that have been deployed to the Horn of Africa for conducting anti-piracy escort missions since 2007, and the annual exercises conducted by the expanding navies of Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. In addition  to all this the IN’s submarine arm has to be committed to various annual bilateral exercises that it now routinely conducts with the navies of the US, France, the UK, Indonesia, Japan and Singapore and on top of all this are the two of the IN’s own exercises conducted every year. To cope with all this is clearly beyond the capabilities of the eight SSKs that can be spared for such a hectic operational schedule. And this is why the IN desperately the six Scorpene SSKs and in the longer term, no less than 12 SSNs.

Now, coming to yet another piece of unresearched and highly speculative report from HEADLINES TODAY and TIMES NOW about the MoD asking the CBI to investigate certain activities of Rolls-Royce and what possible repercussions this might have on the Indian Air Force and IN, the fact of the matter is that this has nothing to do with powerplants meant for aircraft. Instead, it concerns only marine industrial gas-turbines destined for India’s oil-and-gas sector. ONGC, which is due to order some new-build deep-sea offshore drilling rigs from a consortium of Singapore-based companies, is interested in procuring new-build marine industrial gas-turbines for not only these rigs, but also for some existing rigs that use the much older Rolls-Royce Allison 501K and Avon Mk1535 gas-turbines. Consequently, for this contract from the ONGC, Rolls-Royce is competing against the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd—which is offering the LM-2500 marine industrial gas-turbine that it builds under licence from US-based GE Aero Engines. That’s what this is all about and it has nothing to do with either military aviation or HAL’s corporate governance and all this will ultimately be borne out in future by the CBI enquiry, rest assured. 

The Devil Always Lurks Within The Detail

March 15, 2014, 3:54 pm

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Forget this dictum, and the devil will be ever-ready to haul all our arses back to hell. And this is exactly what has bedeviled the Barak-2 LR-SAM programme of the MoD-owned Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). And what has led to this rather expensive and time-consuming comedy of errors (about which I had known since 2011, but am revealing it all only now) being enacted is nothing else but the sheer lack of managerial skills of  India’s present-day Defence Minister, Arakkaparambil Kurian Antony.  

It may be recalled that India and Israel had inked the 70km-range Barak-2 naval LR-SAM’s joint five-year R & D contract—valued at US$556 million—on January 27, 2006, following 17 months of exhaustive contractual negotiations. For extended ground-based long-range air defence India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) had on July 12, 2007 approved a $2.47 billion project to co-develop the LR-SAM’s 110km-range variant for the Indian Air Force. Subsequently, on February 27, 2009 India signed a $1.4 billion procurement contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for the Barak-2’s IAF-specific LR-SAM variant, and this was followed in April the same year by a $1.1 billion contract for procuring the Barak-2’s naval LR-SAM variant. Both variants were to have been co-developed by a consortium of entities that included the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad-based Research Centre Imarat (RCI) and Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), and the Bangalore-based Electronics R & D Establishment (LRDE); plus Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) on one hand; and a consortium of IAI’s MLM and ELTA Systems business divisions, RAFAEL and RADA Electronics. The LR-SAM’s critical design review was completed by early May 2008 and its DRDL-developed two-stage pulsed rocket motor was successfully test-fired earlier the same year. The first six sets of these rocket motors were shipped to RAFAEL by the DRDL in July 2008 for further test and integration activities. Series production was due to have begun in 2011 at the Hyderabad-based facilities of BDL.

Now, it so happened that during the contractual negotiations stage between IAI, RAFAEL and RADA on one hand and the MoD and DRDO on the other, the DRDO had ‘assumed’ that the Israeli OEMs would deliver fully integrated Barak-2 area air-defence weapon systems to the DRDO, which in turn would supply them to the Indian Navy (IN) through BEL and BDL. However, by 2012 it had become evident that the DRDO’s ‘assumption’ had in fact, morphed into the mother of all fuck-ups. And here’s why: the DRDO had wrongly assumed that the Barak-2 suite, comprising both the LR-SAM rounds and the 9-tonne, mast-mounted ELTA Systems-developed EL/M-2248 MF-STAR S-band volume-search active phased-array radar (APAR), would be fully integrated with the EMDINA Mk2 combat management system, or CMS (developed by the IN’s Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment, or  WESEE) on board the three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG). In reality, since the Barak-2’s risk-sharing co-development effort was solely DRDO-led-and-driven from the Indian side, the DRDO never even bothered to seek WESEE’s feedback regarding systems integration challenges and taskings, and consequently—believe it or not— what the MoD-approved joint R & D contract between the India and Israeli military-industrial consortiums specified on paper only pertained to integrating the LR-SAM rounds with the MF-STAR’s fire-control systems, and never addressed the need for integrating this fire-control system with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS.

Consequently, the WESEE, which since the late 1980s had designed and developed, along with Russia’s St Petersburg-based Northern Design Bureau and SUDOEXPORT FSUE, the BEL-built EMCCA computer-aided action information system (CAAIS) for the three Project 16A FFGs and three Project 15 DDGs, the BEL-built EMDINA Mk1 CMS for the three Project 17 FFGs and four Project 28 ASW corvettes, was tasked by the MoD to only develop the applications software of the BEL-built EMDINA Mk2 CMS, plus help the MoD-owned Mazagon Docks Ltd design and fabricate the 9-tonne main mast housing the MF-STAR for the three Project 15A DDGs. Therefore, no responsibility was contractually fixed (by the MoD in its all-knowing wisdom) on who should integrate the Barak-2 suite with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS. As matters now stand, development of systems integration software began in only late 2012 after a supplemental R & D contract was inked between the WESEE and the Israeli military-industrial consortium, and the final end-product will not be available for in-country firing trials till late 2015.

So why did things go so horribly wrong? There are two reasons for that. Firstly, the MoD’s existing discredited practice of maintaining two separate files—the Service File (owned by the concerned armed services HQ) and the Ministry File (owned by the MoD’s civilian component) for each procurement project, and between which the latter is always the only one that is considered sacrosanct and is the only one that makes its way to the CCNS for final approval, needs to be done away with post-haste. Instead, joint accountability for every procurement decision-making process must be enforced so that the concerned Project Director from the concerned armed services works together with the concerned Joint Secretary of the MoD as an embedded team, instead of functioning within administratively isolated cubicles as is presently the case.      

Secondly, the DRDO, apart from approaching the IN for learning the art of contract negotiations of a military-industrial nature, should also have invested in acquiring a trials vessel on board which both the Barak-2 LR-SAM suite should have been integrated with the EMDINA Mk2 CMS and subjected to a series of developmental firing-trials at sea. Only after the successful completion of such sea-trials and their validation by the WESEE should a series-production indent have been placed by the MoD with the Indian and Israeli military-industrial consortium. One can now only hope that valuable lessons have been learnt by the MoD and DRDO and history won’t be allowed to repeat itself on board the four Project 15B DDGs and seven Project 17A FFGs. 

Creating Comatose Institutions

Another cardinal sin committed by RM A K Antony has been his total inability to transform the HQ of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDH) to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in to a functional institution. While the IDH should have been instructed and empowered by the MoD to introduce an element of discipline in the military procurement system (such as coordinating the procurement of LUH helicopters for the Army, IN and the IAF, and procurement of the combined package of 15 Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavylift helicopters and 145 BAE Systems-built LW-155 ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal howitzers), it can do very little since the officer heading the IDH, the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), is a three-star officer and is therefore junior to the four-star armed services chiefs. A brief explanation of the IDH and the CIDS will help appreciate the procurement process better. Following the Group of Ministers’ report released in February 2001, it was agreed that whle the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would be the primary step in the structural reforms suggested for the MoD, the appointment of a Vice-CDS was instead created within weeks. But as the post of the CDS was soon opposed by the then Parliament’s Select Committee on Defence, the appointment of the Vice-CDS became untenable (vice to whom?). Finally, the Vice-CDS’ office was renamed and the CIDS to the COSC (CISC) came into being in September 2001. The CISC, who heads the IDH, now has two responsibilities: he is answerable to the MoD like any other Secretary in the MoD; and on the military side he is answerable to the Chairman of the COSC. Unfortunately, there are two fundamental limitations to both these roles. For, unlike the four Departments of the MoD—Defence, R & D, Production & Supplies, and Finance—the IDH has not been designated as the MoD’s fifth Department, and hence its activities are not coordinated by the Defence Secretary.

The reason for this is that while the armed services personnel could theoretically be posted within the MoD, a civilian cannot be expected to understand and do the armed services personnel’s job. Consequently, the CISC at present essentially remains answerable only to the COSC, and has little or no reason to report to the Defence Minister. Within the COSC, the individual armed service chiefs remain more aligned with their service needs than with the common causes, and there is always dissonance between the purple team (comprising the IDH with officers from the three armed services) headed by the CISC, and the COSC. This shortcoming can only be overcome with the appointment of the CDS, who is senior, and hence does not report to the COSC. The CDS would then become a voting member of the COSC and in that capacity he would provide single-point military advice to the Defence Minister and the CCNS. Therefore, had the three four-star armed service chiefs been instructed by A K Antony to work together to support the creation of the post of CDS, there would have been no need for them to individually and persistently explain to the Prime Minister’s Office and his National Security Adviser (who by the way needs to have a serving three-star military officer as a Deputy National Security Adviser) the five cardinal truths about national security, and by now the DRDO would have become far more accountable since, fearing technical audits of its diverse R & D projects, it would have ended its skullduggery—one example of which is its proposal to indigenously develop a 155mm/52-calibre ATAGS towed howitzer for the Army, while conveniently forgetting to hold consultations with the IN, which requires turret-mounted 155mm howitzers to serve as the main artillery armament for its future warship acquisitions.

A prime example of wasted opportunities due to sheer mismanagement of both the MoD and the IDH concerns the procurement of CH-47F Chinooks and LW-155 howitzers. While the Indian Army had by 2006 zeroed in on the need for air-portable ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal howitzers and had even drafted a GSQR for its procurement, the IAF, taking a cue from the Army, too finalised its ASQR for heavylift helicopters required for airlifting such howitzers by 2007. At this point in time itself, it should have become obvious even to someone with below-average IQ that irregardless of which howitzer would be ordered (the LW-155 or the Pegasus from Singapore’s ST Kinetics), the only available heavylift helicopter that is certified to airlift both these howitzers in an underslung configuration is the CH-47F—meaning while the howitzer could be selected after a competitive bidding process, the helicopter would have to be procured under a sole-source contract. This in turn meant that, in order to avoid corrupt practices while procuring the CH-47F, it was preferable to order the 15 CH-47Fs not by the direct commercial sale route, but via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. Instead, exactly the opposite was allowed to happen, i.e. Boeing and Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp were invited to: present their commercial bids in July 2009; and send their respective platforms—CH-47F and Mi-26T2—to India for in-country flight-trials on a no-cost-no-commitment basis. At the same time, the MoD conveniently forgot to coordinate matters with IDH and the COSC for the sake of killing two birds with one stone, i.e. requesting BAE Systems and ST Kinetics to send the LW-155 and Pegasus to India so that the Army and IAF could create a combined evaluation team for conducting competitive firepower/mobility evaluations in which both the CH-47F and Mi-26T2 too could have participated.

Another option that could have been pursued by the MoD via the IDH was to ensure that both the CH-47F and LW-155 were available in India for field-trials in February 2009 so that the CH-47F which had been ferry-flown to Bengaluru earlier that month for giving flying demonstrations at the Aero India 2009 expo, would subsequently be available for demonstrating the LW-155’s air-portability to both the Army and IAF. However, all this was not to be.   

Consequently, this is how matters played out in a dysfunctional manner: while both Boeing and Rosoboronexport State Corp submitted their respective proposals to the IAF in October 2009, the MoD’s Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) cleared the proposal for buying 145 LW-155s for $660 million on only May 11, 2012 through the FMS route (even though Army HQ had forwarded all paperwork to the MoD as far back as July 2010 when the LW-155 deal was estimated to cost only Rs.30 billion ($477 million). In addition, an Army ‘maintainability evaluation team’ had visited the US from February 8 to 25, 2011 to examine the LW-155. However, it was only on August 2, 2013 that the MoD officially requested the US for the sale of 145 LW-155s, whose price had then escalated to $885 million. Subsequently, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSAC) on August 7, 2013 notified the US Congress of a potential FMS of the LW-155s along with Selex-built laser inertial artillery pointing systems (LINAPS), warranty, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, as well as engineering and logistics support services and other related elements of logistics support.

Later that year, when the LW-155 was deployed to Sikkim for in-country high-altitude firepower/mobility trials, the absence of the CH-47F was direly felt and consequently, the trials could not be conducted in the areas specified by the Army due to the absence of in-theatre certified heavylift platforms. It is due to this reason that the LW-155 was: unable to demonstrate its direct firing capabilities by day and night; unable to demonstrate its compatibility with the Army’s Firing Tables; unable to demonstrate its air-portability in underslung mode; unable to demonstrate its sighting system at nighttime; and unable to demonstrate its built-in communications system at high altitudes. The IAF too refused to airlift the LW-155 in underslung mode with its existing Mi-26Ts in Sikkim. And why did the IAF refuse to do so? Simply because A) the Mi-26T is not certified to carry this weapon underslung and consequently the IAF does not have SOPs in place to carry out such a heavylift operation; and B) the IAF therefore did not have in its possession the hooks and cables required for rigging the LW-155 to the Mi-26T in underslungconfiguration.  

Yellow Journalism Yet Again

In this news-report (http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/russians-go-slow-sukhoi-fleet-in-trouble), it has been alleged that 50% of the IAF’s Su-30MKI fleet remains grounded because of A) multiple cases of repeated failure of Mission Computer-1 and blanking out of Head Up Displays (HUD) and all Multi-Function Displays (MFD) in flight since 2012. B) Due to non-availability of facilities for overhaul of aggregates (aircraft parts), following which the serviceability (availability for flying) of Su-30MKI is slowly decreasing and demand for Aircraft on Ground (AOG) items on the rise as of December 24,  2013. C) Due to Russia’s inability to set up the MRO workshops at HAL’s Nashik-based facility by December 2013, and that this facility was originally scheduled to overhaul the first Su-30MKI by June 2014. Consequently, five Su-30MKIs are already parked at HAL for extensive overhaul, and another 15 will be due for overhaul in the current year.

Now, let’s separate fact from fiction. Firstly, both the Su-30MKI and MiG-29B-12 were originally designed and certified to log in no more than 120 flight-hours per annum. Despite this, the IAF has been following Western standards of flight operations by requiring its air warriors to log in at least 25 flight-hours per month, or about 275 flight-hours every year, or 2,750 hours in a decade. Furthermore, the IAF has been way behind schedule when it came to service-induction of cockpit procedures trainers and full-flight simulators for the Su-30MKI. Ideally, such flying training aids should have been commissioned into service in a progressive manner since the last quarter of 2002, but this process didn’t commence until the final quarter of 2009. Now, if 275 flight-hours are logged in by a Su-30MKI, then within five-and-a-half-years itself it would have reached its scheduled time-between-overhauls (TBO) of 1,500 hours for both the airframe and turbofans, while the prescribed Russian timetables call for the Su-30MKI to approach its TBO after only a decade, i.e. after the Su-30MKI has been flown for 120 hours every year for at least a decade. What this translates into is that the HAL-owned-and-operated MRO facility for the IAF’s Su-30MKIs should have become operational by early 2008 at the latest. Consequently, HAL is behind schedule by six full years when it comes to commissioning such a MRO facility.  

Now, coming to the issue of the premature in-flight malfunctions of the Su-30MKI’s ELBIT Systems-built Type 967 HUD, THALES-developed MFD-55 and MFD-66 AMLCDs, and the DARE-developed and HAL-built mission computer. Firstly, it must be noted that the malfunctions are not across-the-board or affecting the entire fleet of Su-30MKIs, but only those airframes produced for the last tranche of 10i-standard Su-30MKIs and the first tranche of 11i-standard Su-30MKIs. At most, therefore, no more than 40 Su-30MKIs will be affected by such avionics-related malfunctions. This then brings us to the probable causes of such malfunctions. Prima facie, there is only one probable cause: faulty hardware—most likely wiring harnesses or cable connectors. What has to be established is whether these items came directly from Russian OEMs (in which case product liabilities will those of Rosboronexport State Corp and IRKUT Corp) or were they sourced from India-based OEM-licenced vendors. This can easily be done PROVIDED HAL has its in-house required set of item-specific test-benches and ATE equipment. As another option, HAL can also make use of ADA’s test-benches and ATE equipment, while DARE can be approached for replicating a fully-functional mock-up of the Su-30MKI’s cockpit avionics architecture—since DARE is presently involved with a similar task concerning the cockpits of the projected Super Su-30MKI.

But what is most exasperating is that despite decades of experience in licenced-manufacturing of various types of combat aircraft of foreign origin, neither the MoD’s Department of Defence Production & Supplies nor HAL till this day have grasped the need for achieving 100% indigenisation for the tens of thousands of rotables, consumables and accessories that go into each aircraft-type. Instead, the focus continues to be on the licenced-production of airframes through raw materials sourced locally and from abroad. Such a distortion can only result in an undesirable reliance on foreign OEMs for the smallest but most critical components, which in turn severely compromises the IAF’s operational sovereignty over its aircraft/weapons assets.

Lastly, a word on the so-called combat aircraft fleet availability rates in peacetime. No air force in peacetime boasts of combat aircraft fleet availability rates of 75%. Such high rates are mandatory for only flying training aircraft like BTTs, AJTs and LIFTs. In reality, the availability rate of combat aircraft fleets hovers between 50% and 60%. If the national security scenario worsens over a period of time, then the availability rates are increased progressively (as was the case with the IAF in both 1999 and 2002), depending on the type of conflict envisaged, i.e. limited high-intensity conflict confined to a single theatre, or a full-blown all-out war. In case of the latter, fleet availability rates are jacked up to 90% for Day-1 of the war. By Day-2, the rate drops to 75% and by Day-4, the availability rate stabilises at 50% while ensuring a high tempo of daily sortie generation. It is based on such estimates that any self-respecting air force does its force-structure planning.

Indigenously-Designed RF & Optronic Seekers For DRDO-Developed PGMs

March 29, 2014, 12:30 pm

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Projected Two-Tier BMD Network Architecture As Envisaged By DRDO

April 27, 2014, 3:22 pm

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Astra Mk1 BVRAAM Design & Performance Parameters

May 5, 2014, 11:44 am

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Interesting Innovations

May 7, 2014, 3:19 pm

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Elbit Systems yesterday unveilled its SKYLENS wearable heads-up display (HUD) for enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) applications. Packed in a lightweight, easy-to-install device, similar to a pair of sunglasses, SKYLENS is a revolutionary approach to meet the challenges of today’s aviators. 

Suitable for day and night operations and for all weather conditions, the system provides heads-up information while minimising the dependency on airport instrumentation. Equipped with SKYLENS, aircraft are capable of take-off and landing in low-visibility conditions and in locations that non EVS-equipped aircraft could not access previously. SKYLENS, a part of the ‘Clearvision’ EFVS family, displays high-resolution symbology and video on a transparent visor, providing pilots with cutting-edge heads-out capabilities. 

Designed and built for use by commercial and military aviation anywhere in the world, the system provides a unique solution for retrofitting existing platforms, small cockpit aircraft and helicopters. The new system, which is in advanced processes of airworthiness certification, is expected to enter into service by end of 2016.

Meanwhile, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is at an advanced stage of integration and ground testing for the EL/M-2022ES active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar—the latest addition to its best selling EL/M-2022 maritime patrol radar (MPR) family. The EL/M-2022ES AESA-MPR, developed by IAI's subsidiary and group, ELTA Systems Ltd, implements the proven operating modes of the EL/M-2022 family, together with additional modes derived from the unique capabilities of AESA technology. The radar system combines mechanical scanning in the horizontal plane with fine-beam-shifting, and full electronic scanning in the vertical plane, providing improved detection, particularly at high sea states, and enabling efficient use of the radar in air-to-air and air-to-surface modes. Using state-of-the-art signal processors, based on the latest powerful multi-core components, allows implementation of new algorithms that take maximum advantage of AESA technology. A significant improvement in target detection performance is in imaging modes such as inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) and in ground moving target indication (GMTI) modes. The system is undergoing qualification tests for airborne applications, preparing it for delivery by mid-2015 and is fully compatible with current radar installations, meaning it can easily be retrofitted on to existing Heron-1 and Searcher Mk2 MALE-UAVs.

China's Home-Grown Hierarchical, Integrated Air-Defence System Solutions

June 6, 2014, 2:29 pm

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 Long-Range Sensors

Long-Range SAMs

Medium-Range Sensors

Medium-Range SAM

The LY-80E’s maximum/minimum interception altitude is 18km/15 metres, while its maximum interception range for combat aircraft is 40km, and between 3.5km and 12km for cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 50 metres at a speed of 300 metres/second. Single-shot kill probability is a claimed figure of 85 per cent against combat aircraft, and 60% against cruise missiles.The MR-SAM rounds are cannisterised, and are cold-launched in vertical mode. The missile guidance system is of the composite type, comprising initial independent inertial guidance plus intermittent illumination, and semi-active homing terminal guidance. A single LY-80E MFV can engage four targets simultaneously, and the entire system has a reaction time of 12 seconds. 

The MR-SAM round’s weight minus the launch tube is 615kg, while that with the launch tube is 1,300kg. Missile length is 5.010 metres, diameter is 0.340 metres, maximum missile overload is 25 G, and the cruising speed on a high and long trajectory is more than 750 metres/second.

A single GV controls two to four MFVs, with six rounds of MIT equipping each MFV. The SV comes equipped with a solid-state S-band 3-D passive phased-array radar mounted atop a raisable mast. Once the target is detected, the SV performs automatic IFF, threat judgment, flight path processing and provide target engagement information for the tracking-and-guidance radar. The S-band radar has a slant range of 140km and can detect targets flying at an altitude of 20km. Up to 144 targets can be monitored, and of these, 48 can be tracked. The GV performs target acquisition and tracking, and identification of target-types. It also controls the missile-launching and illuminates the target after the missile is fired. The L-band passive phased-array radar atop the GV has a range of 85km, can detect up to six targets and track four of them, and provide fire-control/guidance for up to eight MR-SAM rounds. The L-band tracking radar adopts a two dimensional phase-scanning system that consists of sub-systems such as an antenna, feed line, beam controller, transmitter, receiver, frequency source, signal processing, software and data processors, servo unit, anti-jamming sub-system, antenna base, cooling unit and simulator. It searches and tracks the targets, measures the 3-D coordinate data and sends it to the fire-control unit, which in turn receives target indication information and combat orders from the CV, and organises the fire-channels for engaging the targets. Besides, it also reports the operational and equipment statuses of the MFV.

E-SHORADS Sensors & SAM

SHORADS Sensors & SAM

VSHORADS Sensors & Weapons

Export-Only Solutions

In Addition to the above, CETC, CPMIEC and NORINCO have since 2002 developed several types of customised, country-specific air-defence systems ranging from LR-SAMs to VSHORADS (see below) solely for export in Africa, Central/South America,  the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Analysing Exercise COPE TAUFAN-2014 & The Maiden Deployment To Southeast Asia Of The USAF’s F-22 Raptors

June 24, 2014, 10:58 am

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Intertestingly, neither the F-22s nor the Su-30MKMs were seen carrying the DRS Technologies-supplied ACMI pods during the dissimilar air combat exercises.

44th Successful Firing Of BrahMos-1 Supersonic LACM

July 8, 2014, 4:16 pm

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The third successful test-firing of the BrahMos-1 Block-3 supersonic land-attack cruise missile took place at 10.38am on July 8, 2014 from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur in Balasore, Odisha. Following its launch, the missile flew through the designated 290km distance at Mach 2.8, culminating in a steep dive toward its designated target. Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, confirmed that it was a text book launch achieving 100% results, executed with high-precision from a wheeled Mobile Autonomous Launcher (MAL) prepared by the Indian Army’s 3^rdBrahMos-1 regiment (the two earlier regiments possess the BrahMos-1 Block-2 missiles), which is now being formed. In a historical first, the Block 3 missile’s advanced navigation-cum-guidance system used an indigenously developed software algorithm for integrating inputs from multiple GPS navigation satellites (like Glonass & IRNSS-1).

Blindly Muddling Through With Eyes Wide Open

August 2, 2014, 7:51 pm

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This, at best sums up the approach taken by those ‘desi’ journalists who, until recently, had vociferously alleged that the deal to acquire 12 AW-101 VVIP transportation helicopters from UK-based AgustaWestland was a tainted one. And the reason these ‘desi’ nitwits went totally off course was that instead of concluding that 2 + 2 = 4, they ASSUMED—based only on circumstantial evidence—that 2 + 2 = 22. No wonder they are all now in collective shock after an Italian court decided that all charges of international corruption would be dropped against Finmeccanica (the Italy-based holding company of AgustaWestland), and Finmeccanica would only pay a “negligible fine” for falsifying invoices, but this was “not in any way an admission of any wrongdoing or liability” by Finmeccanica. What this means I will explain later, but let us now examine how the ‘desi’ journalists missed the woods for the trees by, first, misinterpreting facts, and second, by jumping to untenable conclusions. 

The investigation into charges of international corruption involving Finmeccanica commenced in 2011 after an open succession war between Francesco Guarguanglini, who was then heading Finmeccanica, and his successor, Giuseppe Orsi, who in 2011 was Finmeccanica’s Chairman and CEO. In late 2012, when Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition government, which had as coalition partners parties such as the far-right Lega Nord (which was alleged to have received financial kickbacks), was replaced by one led by technocrat Mario Monti, this reportedly prompted Lorenzo Borgogni, a former top employee of Finmeccanica and an Orsi-baiter, to blow the whistle on the Rs 3,546 crore (Euro 556 million, or US$757 million) AW-101 contract, which had been inked on February 8, 2010. Borgogni told prosecutors in a detailed statement that kickbacks were allegedly paid by AgustaWestland for securing the AW-101 contract through the use of middlemen and that the total amount of financial kickbacks came up to Euro 51 million (Rs.362 crore). Borgogni detailed how the money was paid through a network of middlemen and consultants like Guido Ralph Haschke, Carlo Gerosa and Christian Michel, with the main allegation being that at least Euro 10 million was funnelled back to Italy and paid to the Lega Nord political party in return for its support to Orsi’s bid to become Chairman and CEO of Finmeccanica. In his statement, Borgogni said that Finmeccanica had decided to divert Euro 21 million for commissions meant for Europe-based consultants, knowing how risky it was to hire Indian citizens as agents for securing Indian military procurement contracts.

Borgogni had alleged that the Euro 21 million was generated through inflated bills and bogus engineering contracts, with regular monthly tranches of payments being made between 2007 and 2011. These payments averaged to a Euro 55,0000 per month towards the end. Guido Haschke, on the other hand, had claimed in his confession that he received a kickback of Euro 20 million of which Euro 400,000 was paid off to the brothers Juli ‘Jolly’ Tyagi, Docsa Tyagi and Sandeep (Julie) Tyagi, who in turn allegedly transferred a certain amount of money, not yet quantified, to ACM S P Tyagi, CAS of the Indian Air Force (IAF) from 2004 to 2007. In addition, another Euro 11.6 million came through inflated bills and invoices that were in the guise of engineering contracts placed with IDS Infotech, a Tunisia based engineering consultancy. While Guido Ralph Haschke is the CEO and partner of GADIT SA of Lugano and Tunis-based GORDIAN SERVICES SARL, Carlo Gerosa is Haschke's partner in the above companies (as well as in Chandigarh-based Aeromatrix, an engineering and IT outsourcing company), and British citizen Christian Michel is the owner of London-based Global Service Trade Commerce, and of Dubai-based Global Service FZE. Allegedly, Finmeccanica first paid the sum of Euro 400,000 to Haschke and Gerosa, through a consultancy contract between AgustaWestland and Gordian Services SARL. Later, these two signed engineering contracts with companies IDS Infotech India and IDS Infotech Tunisia, allegedly to cover up the payments of money to pay unidentified Govt of India officials. Christian Michel allegedly received Euro 30 million for supporting the corruptive activities meant to bag the AW-101 order. The first kickbacks, however, were allegedly made as early as on December 6, 2005, with Haschke receiving Euro 100,000 through an India Services Agreement vide letter AG/ME/05/188 by AgustaWestland to Haschke's Gordian Services SARL. This agreement was renewed for the next three years through more follow-on agreements, including one marked AG/ME/06/235 and sent by AgustaWestland.

AgustaWestland’s contract with IDS Infotech had promised a payment of 5% of the value of the AW-101 deal. The contract was signed on January 1, 2007 and said that AgustaWestland will utilise its engineering activity and consultancy if it secures the AW-101 order. It also said that AgustaWestland would avail the engineering, design and software services of IDS once the sale & purchase agreement is signed by AgustaWestland and the Govt of India. Payment records have shown that AgustaWestland made regular transfers to IDS Infotech between 2007 and 2011 through Tunisia, totalling over Euro 21 million, which is just under 5% of the total value of the AW-101 contract.

One contract (known as post-contract services agreement) worth Euro 6 million (paid in 22 installments of Euro 275,000 each), placed with Michel’s Global Services FZE by AgustaWestland, was meant for ensuring positive media coverage of the AW-101 deal. This agreement also stated that Michel was required to ‘advise and assist’ AgustaWestland in all aspects of performing the contract and provide it with details of changes in the laws pertaining to India’s MoD procurement procedures. Michel was also required to identify and inform AgustaWestland of any hostile press activity that may have impacted on the execution of the contract, in addition to assisting AgustaWestland in the development of risk mitigation strategies to minimise the impact of any hostile press activities, and also give routine feedback on Indian media activity. Such payments were indeed made after the AW-101 contract was signed. For instance, Euro 275,000 was paid to Michel’s company account 60601358922302 in Lloyds TSB Bank’s Dubai branch on May 5, 2010. In another transaction, the same amount was debited from AgustaWestland’s Barclays bank account number 52773044 to Michel’s Dubai account on August 3, 2011.

Plausible Inferences

Following the Italian court’s recent verdict, it can now be stated with certainty that A) there is no prima facie evidence of any kind of wrongdoing, such as engaging in bribery, international corruption or contract violation; and B) the case was always about ‘falsifying invoices’ in order to ensure compliance with contract implementation. Explained further, what this means is that as per the MoD’s Defence Procurement Procedures, if the contracted OEM cannot ensure full compliance with the agreed-upon quantum of direct industrial offsets, then the OEM is mandatorily required—as penalty—to surrender a quantum of funds amounting to 5% of contract value to the MoD. In fact, this is exactly what Fincantieri SPA of Italy did three years ago when it voluntarily paid back to the MoD 5% of the contract value of the Euro 159.32 million procurement contract for two fleet replenishment tankers that were ordered for the Indian Navy back in October 2008. Therefore, in all probability, what Finmeccanica and AgustaWestland did together was create the façade of trying to fulfill their mandatory direct industrial offset obligations in the hope of not being required to surrender the amount of 5% of contract value back to the MoD.

It is also now abundantly clear that AgustaWestland never had to solicit anyone’s help either within India or outside for securing the AW-101 contract. How come? Simply because the three-engined AW-101 was from Day-1 the only viable contender to satisfy an operational requirement whose prime prerequisite was the provision of the best degree of survivability. That’s precisely the reason why the AW-101 was selected in the previous decade by the US Marines and the US Secret Service for serving as the primary VVIP transportation helicopter for the US President. In fact, the IAF and the Special Protection Group had to do hardly any spadework in terms of evaluations and bidding processes, and whatever was eventually done by both was to merely ensure the façade of conducting a global, competitive bidding process. No wonder the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has to date registered hardly any progress in its investigations, despite it taking just days to file a First Information Report (FIR) in March 2013 against ACM (Ret’d) S P Tyagi, and 12 others, alleging cheating and criminal conspiracy, and subsequently interviewing ACM (Ret’d) Tyagi, former National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, former Special SPG Director B V Wanchoo, and former Intelligence Bureau Director, E S L Narasimhan.

But that still does not explain why the services of the three Tyagi brothers were enlisted by Haschke and Gerosa. The only plausible reason for this that their services were enlisted for lobbying on behalf of AgustaWestland with various potential civilian helicopters operators—a crucial point totally overlooked by both the ‘desi’ journalists as well as the CBI. For, unknown to many is the fact that the projected civilian helicopter market in India will be at least thrice the size of the country’s combined military helicopter market between now and 2020. Potential customers include the various state governments, private hospitals, and corporate charter companies specialising in servicing the private tourist charter market as well as providing offshore helicopter services to the oil-n-gas industry in India.

Presently, the market leader in all these sectors is US-based Bell Helicopters, which has sold more than 100 helicopters, inclusive of the Bell 407, Bell 412EP and Bell 430. Coming next is AgustaWestland with its already-sold A-109E Power and AW-139. Next comes Eurocopter with its Dauphin-2s, AS.355 Twinstar and EC-135, and lastly followed by Sikorsky with its S-76C and S-76C++ variants. Over the years, the AW-139 has emerged as the choice favourite for both various state governments as well as private air-charter companies like Global Vectra Helicorp Ltd, Heligo Charters Pvt Ltd and India Flysafe Aviation Ltd. The AW-139 is also the frontrunner for meeting the Indian Coast Guard Service’s requirement for 14 shipborne medium-lift SAR helicopters, as well as for replacing Pawan Hans’ existing fleet of Dauphin 2s. And since neither state governments nor state-owned entities like Pawan Hans are subjected to stringent procurement norms of the type codified by the MoD, an intense ‘do-whatever-it-takes’ lobbying effort is always required in order to taste success. The CBI would therefore be well-advised to explore this particular angle, instead of groping in the dark with the AW-101 deal. 

But way beyond all this, the greatest damage to India, her MoD and the IAF has been done by none other than the former Raksha Mantri, Arakkaparambil Kurian Antony. And here’s why. By unilaterally terminating the contract on January 1, 2014 after only three AW-101s had been delivered, Antony for all intents and purposes created a horrendous precedent by WRONGLY admitting, without any prima facie evidence on hand, that the MoD’s procurement procedures were deeply flawed, and that they had loopholes despite the most stringent, redundant and multi-tiered checks-and-balances having been put in place. Translated into layman’s terms, what this means is that each and every procurement decision either already taken or to be taken by the MoD can now be easily challenged and even reversed by anyone who is not a wellwisher of India. Needdless to say, Antony has caused incalculable damage to the IAF’s hard-won institutional reputation.   

What Antony should have done was await the legal verdict from the Italian courts and based on the verdict’s pronouncements, he should have decided on the next step forward, i.e. if AgustaWestland and/or Finmeccanica were guilty of violating the MoD’s contractual norms and procedures, then by all means go full-speed ahead to seek financial compensation through liquidated damages from the OEM. What eventually happened was exactly the opposite, i.e. the MoD unilaterally encashed the bank guarantees worth about Rs.2,200 crore that had been provided by AgustaWestland to the State Bank of India, and followed it by terminating the AW-101 contract. Consequently, the nett loser in this sordid episode is once again the end-user, i.e. the IAF. Therefore, it is now more than obvious that when the UPA-2 coalition government decided to terminate the AW-101 contract, its decision was based purely on its own non-negotiable prospects for political survival, with the country’s supreme national interests becoming totally negotiable.    

The Future

To be honest, it’s quite bleak for the IAF’s VVIP transportation aircraft fleet at this point in time. And that’s because the IAF now has no other choice but to go for a VVIP transportation variant of the Mi-17V-5 helicopter. In this helicopter, the main gearbox drives the hydraulic pumps, which supply hydraulic power for the flying controls. Though the Mi-17V-5’s hydraulic system has a main and standby channel and both of them have independent tanks, pumps, accumulators and pipelines, both the pipelines feed only a single booster, which in turn moves the control surfaces. Though there are a total of four boosters in the system, one critical weakness is that if there is a leakage in any of the four boosters, there is a possibility of the entire oil from both the main and the standby systems leaking out. The mandated emergency procedure for a total hydraulic failure is to have both pilots flying the Mi-17V-5 in unison to a landing. As per the Flight Manual of this helicopter, the aircrew is required to abandon the Mi-17V-5 in case of total hydraulic failure. In case they cannot, then they have to resort to flying by both pilots to land immediately. Therefore, the procedure given in the Mi-17V-5’s Flight Manual for total hydraulic failure does not inspire confidence in those helicopter pilots who are certified for VVIP transportation. All of them feel that this helicopter cannot be flown with a total hydraulic failure, and that this aircraft cannot even be taxied on ground with total hydraulic failure.

Consequently, the only available common-sensical and logical option now left on the table is to bite the bullet, restore the bank guarantee that’s already been encashed, and commence negotiations with AgustaWestland for both a revised delivery schedule for the remaining AW-101s and for restoring the already-delivered AW-101s back to flightworthy condition. To even contemplate doing anything else to replace the AW-101s will only result in fatal disasters in future—this being the writing on the wall and not just a mere prophecy.