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Profiling The Indian Army's UFH Procurement Saga

May 18, 2017, 4:34 pm
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It was in 2006 that the Indian Army (IA) had zeroed in on the need for air-portable ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal howitzers (UFH) and had even drafted a GSQR for its procurement. At the same time, the Indian Air Force (IAF), taking a cue from the IA, too finalised its ASQR by 2007 for heavylift helicopters required for airlifting such UFHs. The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Acquisitions Committee (DAC) had approved procurement of an initial 145 UFHs for equipping an initial six artillery regiments on June 19, 2006 and an RFP was issued to ten manufacturers on January 14, 2008. 
ST Kinetics was the only one to submit a technical and commercial offer for its Pegasus UFH on June 30, 2008. The report of the Technical Evaluations Committee (TEC) was next submitted to the MoD’s Director General (Acquisitions) on March 23, 2009. Since this was, again, a single-vendor situation, the process was put on hold, which was around the same time that ST Kinetics got blacklisted by the MoD. The MoD subsequently tried to initiate procurement of such UFHs from the US through the direct Foreign Military Sale (FMS) route, with a Letter of Request being issued by the MoD to the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on May 19, 2009, asking for the BAE Systems-built LW-155/M-777 UFH. An IA delegation next visited the US between January 9 and 16, 2010 for further evaluations of the LW-155/M-777. Following this, the DSCA offered to despatch two 4.2-tonne LW-155/M-777 UFHs for ‘confirmatory trials’ to India and requested 84 rounds of 155mm ammunition of different types made by the MoD’s Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) for the purpose. The trials were completed in a haphazard manner in Pokhran, Ladakh and Sikkim.
Back in 2007, it should have become obvious even to someone with below-average IQ that regardless of which howitzer would be ordered (the LW-155/M-777 or the Pegasus from Singapore’s ST Kinetics), the only available heavylift helicopter that is certified to airlift both these howitzers in an underslung configuration is the CH-47F—meaning while the howitzer could be selected after a competitive bidding process, the helicopter would have to be procured under a sole-source contract. This in turn meant that, in order to avoid corrupt practices while procuring the CH-47F, it was preferable to order the 15 CH-47Fs not by the direct commercial sale route, but via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. Instead, exactly the opposite was allowed to happen, i.e. Boeing and Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp were invited to: present their commercial bids in July 2009 and send their respective platforms—CH-47F and Mi-26T2—to India for in-country flight-trials on a no-cost-no-commitment basis. At the same time, the MoD conveniently forgot to coordinate matters with IA HQ and IAF HQ for the sake of killing two birds with one stone, i.e. requesting BAE Systems to send the LW-155/M-777 to India so that the IA and IAF could create a combined evaluation team for conducting competitive firepower/mobility evaluations in which both the CH-47F and Mi-26T2 too could have participated.
However, all this was not to be. Consequently, this is how matters played out in a dysfunctional manner: while both Boeing and Rosoboronexport State Corp submitted their respective proposals to the IAF in October 2009, the DAC cleared the proposal for buying 145 LW-155/M-777 UFHs via the FMS route only on May 11, 2012 through the FMS route (even though Army HQ had forwarded all paperwork to the MoD as far back as July 2010 when the UFH deal was estimated to cost only Rs.30 billion (US$477 million). In addition, an Army ‘maintainability evaluation team’ had visited the US from February 8 to 25, 2011 to examine the LW-155/M-777. However, it was only on August 2, 2013 that the MoD officially requested the US for the sale of 145 LW-155/M-777 UFHs, whose price had then escalated to $885 million. Subsequently, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSAC) on August 7, 2013 notified the US Congress of a potential FMS of the LW-155/M-777 worth $885 million along with SELEX LINAPS Digital Gun Management Systems (DGMS) using the FIN3110 inertial navigation units (INU), warranty, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, as well as engineering and logistics support services and other related elements of logistics support.
When the LW-155/M-777 was deployed to Sikkim for in-country high-altitude firepower/mobility trials, the absence of the CH-47F was direly felt and consequently, the trials could not be conducted in the areas specified by the IA due to the absence of in-theatre certified heavylift platforms. It is due to this reason that the LW-155/M-777 was: unable to demonstrate its direct firing capabilities by day and night; unable to demonstrate its compatibility with the IA’s Firing Tables (because the IA had not yet ordered BMCS modules and 850,000 modules were ordered in only early 2016 from URENCO and Nexter Systems); unable to demonstrate its air-portability in underslung mode; unable to demonstrate its sighting system at nighttime; and unable to demonstrate its built-in communications system at high altitudes. 
The IAF too refused to airlift the LW-155/M-777 in underslung mode with its existing Mi-26Ts in Sikkim and Ladakh simply because A) the IAF’s existing Mi-26Ts are not certified to carry this weapon underslung and consequently the IAF does not have SOPs in place to carry out such a heavylift operation; and B) the IAF therefore did not have in its possession the hooks and cables required for rigging the LW-155/M-777 to the Mi-26T in underslung configuration. 
It was only on February 15, 2016 that the DSCA finally submitted a $737 million offer for India to acquire 145 LW-155/M-777 UFHs, following which the Cabinet Committee on National Security cleared the acquisition on November 15, 2016. The contract was thereafter inked on November 30, 2016. The contract entails a 30% direct industrial offsets clause, under which around $210 million is now being invested back into India b y BAE Systems in the form of an UFH assembly, integration and test (AIT) facility in India in partnership with Mahindra Defence. In future, another 500 UFHs will be ordered. The first two LW-155/M-777 UFHs were air-freighted to India in fully assembled condition on May 18, 2017 and this will soon be used for compiling the ballistics chart (using OFB-made ammunition and imported BMCS modules) for usage in the plains and mountains. This chart will subsequently be uploaded into the LINAPS. Three more UFHs will be delivered in September 2018. The delivery schedule will gather pace from March 2019 onwards, with five UFHs bein g delivered  every month till all 145 are inducted by June 2021.
Meanwhile, the final round of ‘confirmatory trials’ of the first three production-batch OFB-built Dhanush-45 155mm/45-cal towed howitzer are now underway, with successful conclusion of such being expected by mid-June 2017.
Next in line is the procurement of 814 155mm/52-cal motorised mounted gun systems (MGS).
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Islamic Republic of Iran’s RMA Analysed

June 3, 2017, 5:52 pm
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When it comes to defending the sovereignty of its national airspace and the related air-defence identification zone (ADIZ), the Islamic Republic of Iran has, since mid-2004, been undertaking a mammoth upgradation of its hierarchical air-defence system with the help of Russia, China and North Korea. Command, control and communications of Iran’s air-defence networks s is split into three institutions. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) controls manned airborne platforms and air-traffic management, while the Air-Defence Force (IRIADF) or Khatam al-Anbiya Air-Defence HQ, which split off from the IRIAF in 2008, commands and controls all ground-based air-defence systems. The Revolutionary Guard Corps (PASDARAN) is responsible for strategic air-defence and ADIZ monitoring, plus the operations of ballistic missile early warning systems.
Between 2009 and 2016, the PASDARAN and IRIADF have worked together to commission four different VHF-band long-range over-the-horizon radars (OTHR) throughout Iran. 
The first 1,500km-range Ghadir OTHR was commissioned at Garmsar in Semnan province on June 2, 2014, while the second OTHR was commissioned in Ahvaz in Khuzestan province onJuly 4, 2015).
The third followed last year, this being located between the towns of Andisheh and Qods just west of Teheran. It faces southeast at approximately 151 degrees and is thus able to cover most of central Iran and the Persian Gulf. The Garmsar-based OTHR features four horizontal phased-arrays placed along a square and a central vertical array. The four primary arrays are approximately 39 metres in width and together form a square with sides measuring approximately 55 metres. This configuration provides 360-degree coverage of nearly all Iran and Iraq, the far southeast of Turkey and parts of northeast Saudi Arabia. All three Ghadir OTHRs are in fact Russia-supplied Rezonans-NE OTHRs.
Iran’s latest OTHR is the 3,000km-range Sepehr OTHR that is located in a mountainous part of the Kordestan province in western Iran. The site is 27km north of the city of Bijar. 
Construction work began in mid-2012 and was complete by October 2013. This OTHR provides 360-degree coverage of all Iran as well as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Pakistan. It also provides partial coverage of Eastern Europe, southwest Russia (including Moscow), western India and most of the Arabian Sea. 
The Sepehr is in fact Russia’s Voronezh-M VHF-band OTHR, whose first field-trials were conducted in March 2007, and the first such OTHR in Russia was commissioned on February 11, 2012. The Sepehr and Voronezh-M both use planar phased-aeeay antennaethat cover in the azimuth from 245 to 355 degrees, and in the elevation from 2 to 70 degrees. The radars’ blind range is 100km, and the maximum target altitude is about 4,000km.
In addition to these OTHRs, the IRIADF has commissioned into service a number of Russia-supplied tactical air-defence radars like the 1L119 Nebo SVU VHF-band system, Fath-14 VHF-band system, Kasta-2KE2E VHF-band radar, Matla-ol-Fajr VHF-band system, and the Kayhan UHF-band radar.
Days Of Imperial Glory
In the period between 1967 and 1979, Iran was the custodian of the world’s fifth largest fleet of military aircraft. The Imperial Iranian Air Force’s (IIAF) 1 Tactical Air Base at Teheran’s Mehrabad Airport comprised of the  11 Tactical Fighter Squadron operating McDonnell DouglasF-4E Phantom-2 M-MRCAs, 12 Tactical Fighter Squadron flying F-4Es, 13 Combat Instructor School with F-4Es, 11 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron with RF-4Es, Northrop RF-5s and Lockheed RT-33s, 11 Tactical Transport Squadron with Lockheed C-130E/H Hercules transports, 12 Tactical Transport Squadron with C-130E/Hs, one MRTT squadron with Boeing B.707s and B.747s (the IIAF was the world’s sole operator of KC-747 MRTTs), one Fokker Friendship F-27 Transport Squadron, 11 Search & Rescue Squadron and one Support Squadron with F-33s and L-20s; the 2 Tactical Air Base at Tabriz that comprised the 21 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5E Tiger-2 L-MRCAs, 22 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 23 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 21 Counter Insurgency Squadron with Grumman O–2As, 21 Search & Rescue Squadron, and one Support Squadron with F-33s; the 3 Tactical Air Base at Hamadan (Shahrokhi) housing the 31 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 32 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 33 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 34 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 31 Search & Rescue Squadron and one Support Squadron with F-33s; 4 Tactical Air Base at Dezfull (Vahdati) comprising the 41 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 42 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 43 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron with  F-5Es, 41 Search & Rescue Squadron and one Support Squadron with F-33s and L-20s; 5 Tactical Air Base at Agha Jari (Omidieh) with its 51 Tactical Fighter Squadron flying F-5Es, 52 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 53 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 51 Search & Rescue Squadron and one F-33 Support Squadron; 6 Tactical Air Base at Bushehr comprising the 61 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron with F-4Es, 62 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 63 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Ds, the 61 Search & Rescue Squadron and one F-33 Support Squadron; the 7 Tactical Air Base at Shiraz comprising the 71 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 72 Tactical Fighter Squadron with Grumman F-14 Tomcats, 73 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron with F-14s, 71 Tactical Transport Squadron with C-130E/H, 72 Tactical Transport Squadron with C-130E/H, 71 Search & Rescue Squadron and one F-33 Support Squadron; the 8 Tactical Air Base at Isfahan ( Khatami ) comprising the 81 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-14s, 82 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron with  F-14s, 81 Search & Rescue Squadron, and one F-33 Support Squadron;  9 Tactical Air Base in Bandar Abbas with its 91 Tactical Fighter Squadron flying F-4Es, 92 Tactical Squadron with P-3F Orion LRMR/AQSW platforms, 91 Search & Rescue Squadron and one F-33 Support Squadron; and the 10 Tactical Air Base at Chabahar comprising the 101 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-5Es, 102 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, 103 Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-4Es, the 101 Search & Rescue Squadron, and one F-33 Support Squadron.
The IIAF’s first squadron of 13 F-5A/B Freedom Fighter L-MRCAs entered service on on February 1, 1965. On that date, 11 F-5As and two F-5Bs arrived at the 1 Tactical Air Base at Mehrabad. These F-5s were declared operational in June 1965. The 12 RF-5As were ordered in October 1967. Subsequently, Iran in 1972 purchased a total of 104 F-5As, RF-5As and 23 F-5Bs. 
This was followed by the procurement of 166 F-5Es and F-5Fs, plus 15 RF-5E tactical reconnaissance platforms between 1974 and 1976, enough to equip eight squadrons. The first F-5E/F tranche was delivered in January 1974, when 28 F-5Fs were received for operational conversion training. By this time, IIAF had disposed of virtually all of its earlier-model F-5A/B aircraft, selling them to Greece, Turkey, Ethiopia, South Vietnam, and Jordan, although some F-5Bs were retained for flying training purposes.
The order for 16 F-4Ds for the IIAF was placed in 1967. A second batch of 16 F-4Ds was ordered later. The first batch of F-4Ds arrived in Iran on September 8, 1968, with a total of 32 F-4Ds being ultimately delivered. Iran had ordered a total of 208 F-4Es and  32 RF-4Es. The first tranche of these were delivered in March 1971. A total of 177 F-4Es (plus eight F-4Es borrowed from the USAF and subsequently returned) and 16 RF-4E were delivered between 1971 and 1979. On February 28, 1979 the US government placed an embargo on further arms deliveries to Iran. Consequently, the remaining 31 F-4Es and 16 RF-4E were never delivered.
In August 1973, the IIAF selected the F-14 Tomcat as its new-generation air dominance combat aircraft, following which the initial contract was signed in January 1974 for 30 F-14s, but in June 50 more were added to the contract. At the same time, Iran’s state-owned Bank-e-Melli stepped in, and agreed to loan Grumman US$75 million to partially make up for a US government loan of $200 million to Grumman, which had just been cancelled. This loan saved the F-14’s R & DTE programme and enabled Grumman to secure a further loan of $125 million from a consortium of US banks, ensuring at least for the moment that the F-14 R & DTE programme would continue. 
The principal air base for IIAF F-14 operations was at Isfahan’s Khatami Air Force Base and 1 Squadron at Shiraz Tactical Fighter Base. The first two of 79 F-14s arrived in Iran in January 1976. By May 1977, when Iran celebrated its 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi Dynasty, 12 had been delivered. The last F-14 bought by Iran was retained in the US for use as a test-bed. Iran had also ordered 714 Hughes AIM-54A Phoenix LRAAMs, but only 284 had been delivered by 1979. A follow-on order for 400 AIM-54As was never executed by the US.
On October 27, 1976, Iran placed orders for 160 General Dynamics F-16A/B Block 15 M-MRCAs, and this was followed by a follow-on order for another 140 F-16s. MRO-related equipment for the F-16s had arrived in Iran as early as 1978 (these were later sold to Pakistan in the early 1980s). However, the entire F-16 procurement contract was cancelled in 1979 at a time when the first 75 F-16s were already being prepared for delivery. Consequently, these F-16s were sold by the US to Israel’s IDF-AF.
By 1979, the IIAF was also operating 60 C-130E/H Hercules transports, 30 T-33A basic jet trainers, 40 Boeing CH-47C Chinook transport helicopters,  12 Fokker Friendship F-27 transports, two KC-747 MRTTs (out of the 10 that were ordered), 12 KC-135 MRTTs, six Sikorsky RH-53D Sea Stallions and 20 Agusta-Sikorsky  AS-61A helicopters. The Imperial Iranian Navy was operating six Lockheed P-3F Orions, while the Imperial Iranian Army was operating 70 Bell 214A and 50 Bell 212 utility helicopters, plus 204 Bell AH-1J attack helicopters.
The IIAF’s airspace surveillance radar stations were located at Teheran (UK-supplied radar at Doushan Tapeh), Karadj (US-supplied radar), Tabriz (UK-supplied radar), Mashhad (UK-supplied radar), ShahrAbad (UK-supplied radar), Dezful (US-supplied radar at Dehlooran), Hamadan (US-supplied radar at Soobashi), Bushehr (UK-supplied radar), Isfahan (US-supplied radar), Bandar Abbas (US-supplied radar), Bandar Jask (US-supplied radar), Kish Island (US-supplied radar), and Chabahar (US-supplied radar). 
In addition, the IIAF procured eight Westinghouse TPS-43E gapfiller radars for installation at sites like Bandar Lengeh, Bandar Taheri, Kohkilooyeh near Behbahan, Abdanaan near Dezful, and Kerend near Ghasre Shirin. More than 90% of the hardware had been delivered by 1979. All these 19 radar sites and facilities were built in less than 15 years (between 1962 and 1977). The IIAF’s Air-Defence Command, in addition to these radar sites, also had six combat aircraft from each air base on alert (2 aircraft on 5-minute alert, two on 15-minute alert and two on 30-minute alert)—a total of 60 combat aircraft at any time on any given day.
The US-supplied radars did not perform well in the hot and humid weather of the Persian Gulf. Several attempts by Westinghouse and Allied Signal/Bendix to upgrade the radars did not correct the problem. Those radars installed along the Persian Gulf and Kish Island could achieve only ‘Zero Detection’. In 1972 an extensive radar coverage optimisation study was carried out by the IIAF with the help of the USAF, FAA, and US universities and industries. A thorough search for more suitable radar sites and extensive meteorological investigations of the Persian Gulf region’s weather behavior patterns, from zero feet to 10,000 feet ASL, and inter-operability and suitability of yielding the desired interlaced-meshed radar coverage of Iranian airspace by various radar systems were conducted, which eventually led to further analysis regarding the automation of ADIZ/ADGES networks, and the deployment of AEW & C platforms. The IIAF eventually zeroed in on the E-3 AEW & CS platform, with the requirement being for eight platforms. However, only five were contracted for and the first three were ready for delivery in 1979.  Unlike ground-based radars, the rotodome-mounted radars of bthe E-3 were not troubled by the ‘ducting’ phenomenon prevalent in Persian Gulf region. The E-3 order was eventually cancelled by Teheran after the Islamic Revolution and these E-3s were consequently sold by the US to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
(to be concluded)
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Islamic Republic of Iran’s RMA Analysed-2

June 20, 2017, 11:00 am
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PADAJA’s Regional Air-Defence Network
Command-and-control at the regional level is provided by the IRIADF’s or Khatam al-Anbiya Air-Defence HQ’s (PADAJA) nine regional commands, each headquartered in a sector operations center (SOC). These are sometimes referred to as divisions. Each region has authority over a number of air-defence groups—each equivalent to a Brigade—and independent sites for radars. The regional commands are as follows:
1) Northern Region: Headquartered in Teheran, it spans part or all of the Teheran, Alborz, and Mazandaran provinces.
2) Central Region: Headquartered in Isfahan, it spans part or all of the Isfahan, Qom, and Markazi provinces. Its command is co-located with that of TAB-8.
3) Northwest Region: Headquartered in Tabriz, it spans East and West Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Zanjan, and part of Kurdistan province. Its command is co-located with that of TAB-2.
4) Western Region: Headquartered in Hamedan, it spans parts of Kurdistan and Markazi provinces, as well as Hamedan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan. Its command is co-located with that of TAB-3.
5) Southwest Region: Headquartered at an unknown location—likely co-located with existing air bases at Omidiyeh or Dezful—it spans the Khuzestan province and parts of nearby Kohgiluyeh va Boyer Ahmed. It includes at least four groups (Ahvaz, Dezful, Omidiyeh, Behbahan). It is frequently referred to as the 4th Air-Defence Region.
6) Southern Region: Headquartered in Bandar Bushehr, it spans the Bushehr and Shiraz provinces, as well as Kharg Island.
7) Southeast Region: Headquartered in Bandar Abbas, it spans the Hormozgan province, and part of Sestan-Baluchistan, as well as the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding islands. It is frequently referred to as the 6th Air-Defence Region.
8) Eastern Region: Headquartered in Birjand, it spans South Khorasan, parts of Sestan-Baluchistan and Razavi Khorasan, and all of the Yazd and Kerman provinces.
9) Northeast Region: Headquartered in Mashhad, it spans the Razavi and North Khorasan provinces, as well as parts of Golestan. Its command is located at TAB-14.
During the days of monarchy in the 1970s, the ground-based air-defence network comprised MIM-23A/B Hawk MR-SAMs (150 missiles acquired in 1966, 39 launchers and 1,811 missiles worth $687 million acquired between 1974 and 1979), and 81 Rapier SHORADS launchers with 2,450 missiles. During the Iran-Iraq War, 25 Hawk launchers and 235 missiles were delivered by the US via Israel in 1986 under the Iran-Contra deal.
Ground-based air-defence cannons in-service included 100 Oerlikon Contraves GDF-003 35mm systems procured in 1975 with related 50 Super-Fledermaus fire-control radars, 100 ZSU-57-2 SPAAGs procured from the USSR in 1967 along with 200 second-hand ZSU-23-4 Schilka SPAAGs between 1973 and 1978.
In the late 1980s, Iran also fielded seven Almaz S-200VE Vega LR-SAM Batteries (comprising 42 launchers) with a range of up to 200nm, covering much of the western, central and southern portions of the nation. 10 more S-200VE Batteries were procured from Ukraine in 1992.
Throughout the 1990s, Iran also procured seven HQ-2J (Sayyad-1) MR-SAM Batteries with 356 missiles and three JY-14 radars from China between 1999 and 2001; two self-propelled 2K12/Kvadrat Batteries with 120 3M9 MR-SAMs in 1995-1996, and 29 Tor-M1E TELs and 7509M338 missiles (for seven Batteries) worth $700 million in early December 2005—all from Russia.
This was followed by the procurement of four S-300PS LR-SAM Batteries (two each from Belarus and Croatia), using 5V55KD missiles) along with related 30N6 and Nebo SVU VHF radars, 36D6 surveillance radars, 76N6 low-altitude detection radars, 30N6 fire-control systems and 5P85-1 launch vehicles.
In 2007, Iran ordered four S-300PMU2 LR-SAM batteries with 150 48N6 missiles worth $800 million from Russia. These were delivered between July and October 2016 and were test-fired in-country on March 4, 2017 during EX Damavand.
Also procured were two 1L119 Nebo SVU mobile solid-state digital VHF-band radars from Russia in 2007 and 2010, and two Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza radar jamming and deception systems in 2011, which operate over the Ku and X bands (8-18 GHz frequency range)and whose effective range is 150km. Each Avtobaza covers a 360-degree hemisphere, monitoring up to 60 targets simultaneously. 
In the VSHORADS/MANPADS and SHORADS arenas, Iran procured from China 500 HN-5A missiles between 1986 and 1988, 1,100 QW-1s (Misagh-1/Vanguard) between 1996 and 2006, and 650 QW-2/Misagh-2 between 2006 and 2015, and six Batteries of Shahab Thaqeb/FM-80 SHORADS with 250 missiles.
As far as domestic innovations go, a motorised version of the ZSU-57-2, called ‘Bahaman’ has been developed. This system comprises two 57mm air-cooled S-68 guns that are fed from magazines. Each magazine holds four rounds. The Bahaman fires fragmentation-tracers against airborne targets and armour-piercing tracers against ground-based targets.
For defence against land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), Iran contracted China’s Sichuan Hua King Machinery Manufacturing Co to develop the ‘Asefeh’ 3-barrel 23mm cannon that has a rate of fire of 1,500 rounds per minute. It fires both 23 x 115 or 23 x 152 cartridges. The 23 x 152 round is licence-manufactured by the Iranian Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) and is used with the ZU-23-2 family of light anti-aircraft guns. It has an average overall length of 237mm and a belt diameter of 35mm.The use of a larger round and heavier projectile with the ‘Asefeh’ produces a higher recoil force. The 23 x 152 case is belted. The ‘Asefeh’ entered service in late 2013.
In the early 1990s, Teheran decided to replace its MIM-23 and HQ-2J MR-SAMs with a new-generation system that could be used for both ground-based air-defence as well as naval air-defence. Accordingly, some examples of the IRIN’s in-stock RIM-66 Standard MR-SAMs (128 of which were procured between 1976 and 1978) were supplied to both Russia and China for re-engineering.
In Russia, the Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP), the Novator Design Bureau, the Altair Design Bureau, the Dolgoprudniy Scientific and Production Plant, MNII Agat and Mariyskiy Machine-Building Plant were tasked with developing the two variants of the MR-SAM.
In China, the China National Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp (CPMIEC) led the re-engineering effort. The Russian end-products were the Buk-M1E for ground forces, and the naval 3S90E Shtil-1—both of which used the 9M317ME missile.
In Iran, this system became known as ‘Ra’ad’ (Thunder) while the missile was called ‘Ta’er-2’. CPMIEC’s solution was the LY-80 family of vertically-launched MR-SAMs. Following competitive evaluations, Iran selected CPMIEC’s solution and thus was born the‘Sayyad-2’ MR-SAM for ground-based air-defence, and the LY-80N naval variant, known in Iran as ‘Mehrab’. 
CPMIEC has in the previous decade also supplied 24 S-band target detection radars (the same used by China’s LY-60 SHORADS) for replacing the Oerlikon Contraves-supplied Skyguard/Super Fledermaus fire-control systems. This is known in Iran as the ‘Kashef-1’ radar.
As for the much-touted Bavar-373 air-defence system, it is in reality a trilateral industrial cooperation project involving China, North Korea and Iran that had commenced way back in 2004. While CETC Int’l of China has developed and supplied theQamar active phased-array engagement radar and the YLC-2V ‘Meraj’ 3-D S-band early warning radar, the Sayyad-3 LR-SAM is a re-engineered HQ-9 missile produced by North Korea for its Pon’gae-5/KN-06 LR-SAM system). The complete Bavar-373 system will be ready for service-induction by 2020.
As an interim measure, the PADAJA has undertaken a limited upgrade of its stockpiles of MIM-23 MR-SAMs. Known as the ‘Mersad’ air-defence system, each Battery uses four types of radars.
The target detection radar, called ‘Kavosh’, is an upgraded clone of the original MPQ-50 and its maximum range has been increased to 150km and an IFF transponder has been added. A new continuous-wave acquisition radar called ‘Jouiya’ is used to detect and track low-altitude airborne targets.
The high-power illuminator (called ‘Hadi’) is an upgraded version of the MPQ-46, with an additional optronic tracker being attached. For area air-defence, the Mersad uses a 250km-range ‘Hafez’ early warning radar. The re-lifed missiles are now called ‘Shaheen’.
 
On May 25, 2014 the PADAJA unveilled two new systems. These were: 1) ‘Fakour’ fibre-optic command-and-control system, which is responsible for gathering, fusing, and distributing tactical information within the IRIADF’s sectors. 2) The ‘Rasool’ secure communications system, which is responsible for linking the Matla ul-Fajr and Fath-14 VHF-band radars with other elements of the air-defence network. 
The Fakour is employed as a command-post for fusing and distributing sensor information at the tactical-level. This means gathering data from a range of active/passive sensors, which is next fuzed to produce a unified situational awareness picture of the airspace that in turn can be used to cue airborne and ground-based air-defence weapons. Based on descriptions of the Fakour’s compatibility with the IRIADF’s sector-operations-centres (SOC), it can be inferred that the Fakour will be deployed within existing SOCs. The Fakour itself comprises three elements: The Operations Section, which is mounted on a large containerised trailer, and is responsible for processing received data and using it to plan and coordinate subordinate operations through seven workstations. The Communications Section, which is mounted on a smaller containerised trailer and is responsible for signals reception and transmission. This helps protect the operations section by allowing it to function without emitting. For intra-system communications, the different sections are linked by fibre-optic or conventional cables, and for external communications this section is equipped with HF, VHF, UHF, AM/FM, and microwave radios, which can be used for audio and data transfer (at a reported rate of 32mbit/s). The Communications-Relay Section is equipped with a truck-mounted microwave relay station. All elements of Fakour were supplied by China’s CETC Int’l.
The ‘Rasool’ is a fibre-optic communications node associated with VHF-band target acquisition radars. It can be used to integrate the radar with other elements of a local air-defence network, or with distant command-and-control centres. The Matla ul-Fajr radar family includes the MuF-1 and MuF-2, which are upgraded derivatives of the Soviet-era P-12/18 radars. Both operate in the VHF bandwidth, which has led to them being described as counter-stealth radars. They are visually characterised by their distinctive Yagi-style antennae arranged in rows on a retractable mast mounted on a containerised trailer.  The MuF-1 is a 2-D (range, azimuth) radar with a maximum range of 300km and altitude of 20km. It is characterised by its 12 antennae arrayed in two rows of six. The MuF-2 is a 3-D (range, azimuth, height) radar with a maximum range of 480km. It is characterised by its 32 antennae arrayed in four rows of eight.
The ‘Rasool’ comprises two vehicles: a communications shelter, and a relay station. The latter is the same as the one used with the Fakour, and comprises a truck-mounted microwave station (32 mbit/s capacity). The communications shelter, mounted on an Iveco 4 x 4, is fitted with HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave radios, and associated encryption and recording hard/software. 
Linking the Rasool with the radar itself is via fibre-optic wiring. An example of how the Rasool is employed can be found at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP), and the air-defence group assigned to protect it. Assets deployed for the FFEP’s point-defence include one MuF-1 radar for two half-strength MIM-23 Batteries, and a handful of ZU-23-2 Batteries, plus a small truck fitted with a mast-mounted microwave transmitter, and a larger containerised Battary command port trailer, which itself is linked to a smaller container with an unknown roof-mounted transmitter/receiver.
Presently, the PADAJA exercises command-and-control over 24 air-defence radar stations and 41 active SAM sites inside Iran. The HQ-2J sites are shown in red, MIM-23 sites are orange, S-200VE sites are purple, 2K12/Kvadratsites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green. There are seven active HQ-2J sites, 22 active MIM-23 sites. seven active S-200VE sites, six SAM deployment locations with two sites occupied by 2K12/Kvadrat Batteries, with the remaining four being occupied by Tor-M1Es. 
In addition, there are 31 unoccupied, prepared HQ-2J sites, and seven S-200VE Batteries spread throughout the country. The four northernmost S-200VE sites are positioned to defend the northern borders and the region surrounding the capital of Teheran. A fifth site is for defending facilities in and around Isfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. 
The last two sites are at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively. There are five key areas defended by MR-SAM systems: Teheran, Isfahan, Natanz, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. HQ-2J sites are currently 33% occupied, with MIM-23 sites being approximately 50% occupied. Teheran is defended by five MIM-23 sites, two HQ-2J Batteries, and a 2K12/Kvadrat Battery. 
There are also four empty sites in the same area. The southwestern two sites are prepared for HQ-2Js, while the northwest and southeast sites are prepared for MIM-23s. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner MIM-23 barrier and an outer HQ-2J barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. 
However, this layout is a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. Two S-200VE sites are also in the vicinity, and the other two S-200VE sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital. There are two MIM-23 sites and one HQ-2J site in the vicinity of Isfahan. One of the MIM-23 sites, as well as the S-200VE site in the area, is located on the grounds of TAB-8, with the MIM-23 site situated to provide point-defence of the air base. The HQ-2J site and the remaining MIM-23 site are located south of Isfahan proper. An empty MIM-23 site is also located in Isfahan, representing a dispersal site for the Battery at TAB-8.
Nuclear-related industrial facilities near Natanz are afforded layered, hierarchical air-defence coverage by SHORADS and MR-SAMs. Natanz is defended by one HQ-2J site, three MIM-23 sites, one 2K12/Kvadrat battery, and four Tor-M1E TELARs. The SHORADS and MR-SAMs were first deployed between September 2006 and September 2009. The Bushehr region is defended by four MIM-23 sites and an HQ-2J Battery. Two MIM-23 sites are located on the grounds of the Bushehr military complex, with a third site being located offshore on Kharg Island, while the HQ-2J Battery is located further inland from the military complex nearer to Choghadak. TAB-6 is also home to an S-200VE Battery. There are three unoccupied HQ-2J sites and a single unoccupied MIM-23 site in the area as well. Three unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear R & D locations, such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action, given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region. The remaining unoccupied HQ-2J site is located on an islet northeast of Kharg Island. Bandar Abbas is defended by one HQ-2J Battery and one MIM-23 Battery. There is also an S-200VE site in the region.
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Shanghai-Based CSSC's Jiangnan Shipyard Launches First 10,000-Ton Type 055 DDG

June 28, 2017, 2:33 pm
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The Type 055 DDG was preceded by the Type 052B DDGs, Type 052C DDGs and the Type 052D DDGs.

Type 052B DDG
Type 052C DDG
Type 052D DDG
Now, compare ther above evolutionary designs with the evolution of India’s Project 15 DDG family, comprising the Project 15, Project 15A and Project 15B hull designs.

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Recent PLAN Movements In IOR & The China-India Border Standoff

July 5, 2017, 5:34 pm
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The 26th PLA Escort Naval Fleet, comprisingType 054A FFGs Huanggang 577 and Yangzhou 578 and the fleet tanker Gaoyouhu 966 from the PLAN’s East China Sea Fleet departed from Zhoushan City of east China’s Zhejiang Province on April 1, 2017 and arrived at its mission area in the Gulf of Aden after successively passing through the Miyako Strait, the Makassar Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Indian Ocean.
This Fleet also contained a double-hulled Type S-20 Yuan-class SSK along with a Type 925 Chongmingdao 302 submarine support vessel, and that is why the Fleet avoided entering the Malacca Straits, which requires all submarines to surface while cruising through this Strait. Both this vessel and the SSK later did an operational turnaround in Karachi in late May 2017. 
By the third week of June 2017 there wasan increase in activity by PLAN vessels in the Indian Ocean. A Type 813 auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ship, Haiwingxing 852 (Neptune), of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet, was spotted entering the Indian Ocean via the Sunda Strait, and this vessel will monitor the forthcoming week-long India-US-Japan Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal from July 10.
The Type 813 AGI ship displaces about 4,000 tons and is used for SIGINT/ELINT data pertaining to the performance of radars and their IFF transponders, telemetry, navigation systems and acting jamming systems. There are two domes on the vessel’s superstructure that house high-sensitivity passive sensors for recording distant enemy radar emissions.
The PLAN presently operates six AGI vessels. The Beijixing 851 (Polaris) servfes with the East Sea Fleet, the Haiwangxing 852 (Neptune) with the South Sea Fleet, the Tianwangxing 853 (Uranus) with the East Sea Fleet, the Tianlangxing 854 (Sirius) with the North Sea Fleet, the 855 AGI vessel with the South Sea Fleet, and the Kaiyangxing 856 (Mizar) with the North Sea Fleet. 
The seventh such vessel is now being fitted-out at the Shanghai-based, CSSC-owned Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard.
The China-India Standoff Explained  
With Maps
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DRDO-Owned & Navy-Operated MRIS Vessels Take Shape, As Does The S-3 SSBN

July 18, 2017, 4:27 pm
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The first of two DRDO-owned and Indian Navy-operated Missile-Range Instrumentation Ships (MRIS) is presently undergoing outfitting alongside the 560-metre jetty of the MoD-owned Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) in Visakhapatnam. Officially dubbed as an Ocean Surveillance Ship (P-11184), its keel-laying ceremony had taken place on June 30, 2014. Sanctioned at a cost of Rs.1,500 crore, this MRIS is expected to be commissioned into naval service by the first quarter of 2018 (instead of the original deadline of December 2015). 
This vessel was designed by Vik Sandvik Design India, and it has a length of 175 metres, beamwidth of of 22 metres, a draught of 6 metres, and a total weight of 10,000 tons. An aft helicopter deck capable of housing a 12-tonne NMRH-type helicopter has also been incorporated. Crew complement will be 300, while the propulsion package will comprise twin two 9,000kWdiesel engines, designed to give a maximum cruise speed of 21 Knots.
The MRIS, when operational, will host two types of tracking radars: a long-range L-band active phased-array tracking radar for monitoring the flight trajectory of ballistic missiles like ICBMs and SLBMs, and an X-band precision tracking radar, this too being an active phased-array type that will be used for tracking the in-bound flight trajectories of MIRV-type warheads. The long-range L-band active phased-array tracking radar will be a derivative of the indigenously designed and developed L-band, monopulse Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) that is now operational at ISRO’s Sriharikota-based Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SHAR). 
The MOTR, developed at a cost of Rs.245 crores between 2012 and 2015, can track 10 different objects simultaneously with a range of nearly 1,000km. While objects measuring up to 30cm by 30cm can be tracked at a distance of 800km, in case of objects measuring 50cm by 50cm size, the radar can track at a slant range of 1,000km. The active phased-array antenna contains 4,608 radiating elements, and the entire radar weighs 35 tonnes, is 12-metre-long and 8 metres-tall. Astra Microwave Products Ltd supplied the T/R Modules and DC-DC converters.
The second MRIS is being built at a cost of Rs.425 crores by the Kochi-based Cochin Shipyard Ltd and is expected to be delivered by late 2019. Contract for this vessel was inked in early August 2015. Once ready, this 130-metre-long MRIS will be equipped with a smaller version of the MOTR, known as the M-MOTR, as well as X-band active phased-array precision-tracking radar. This MRIS will be used for monitoring the flight trajectories of long-range subsonic and supersonic land-attack cruise missiles, especially during their terminal phases of flight.  
The two MRIS vessels will perform roles similar to those of the USNS Howard O Lorenzen (T-AGM-25), which features dual-band X- and S-band active phased-array radars, a common radar suite controller, and other ancillary equipment. The X-band radar is used for collecting data from several objects from different targets, while the S-band radar is used for collecting data from specific objects of importance. Raytheon provided the X-band radar and the common radar suite controller, while the S-band radar was provided by Northrop Grumman.
Meanwhile, the Indian Navy is gearing up for the launch of its second homegrown SSBN, the S-3, at the Vizag-based and Navy-owned Shipbuilding Centre (SBC), which has been leased to Larsen & Toubro for fabricating these SSBNs there. The Navy has already procured an Anti-Diver Net that will be deployed around the S-3 after its launch (before the year-end) so that it can be safely berthed alongside the SBC when undergoing final fitting-out and the subsequent harbour-trials.
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PLA's India-Specific Operational Orientation + Location Of China-India Standoff & PLA's Early Warning/Logistics Infrastructure Along LAC Explained

July 27, 2017, 3:10 pm
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PLA Air Bases east of Arunachal Pradesh
Yanggong Plateau, Heqing, Dali, Yunnan, China
 PLA Air Bases in Qinghai Plateau & Opposite CARs
 ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh
ALGs in Sikkim
PLA Helipad at Yushagang in Chumbi Valley
PLA SIGINT Station North of Doklam Plateau
PLAAF Airspace Surveillance Radar Station North of Doklam Plateau
PLA SIGINT Station Opposite Finger Area
PLA BDR Garrison & Helipads north of Doklam Plateau
Yadong’s Helipads
PLA SIGINT Station Opposite Sora Funnel
PLA Helipads Opposite Sora Funnel
PLA BDR Rapid-Reaction Garrison at Duojiaka in Chumbi Valley
PLA BDR Battalion HQ north of Bum La
PLA Helipad North of Bum La
PLA SIGINT Station North of Bum La
PLA BDR Garrison near Thagla Ridge
Nyingchi Helicopter Base
PLAAF Airspace Surveillance Radar Station North of Linzhi
Linzhi Military Garrison
PLA Helipad Opposite Barahoti
Lhasa Gonggar Airport
PLAAF Airspace Surveillance Radar Station at Ganba La Near Lhasa
HQ-12 MR-SAM Site in Lhasa Gonggar
Lhasa's Dongguan Helicopter Base
Yaophu POL Storage Facility North of Lhasa
Qiama POL Storage Facility in Lhasa
52 (Mountain) Motorised Infantry Brigade at Linzhi
53 (Mountain) Motorised Infantry Brigade at Bayi Nyingchi
54 Mechanised Infantry Brigade at Sangri
651 Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade at Bayi Nyingchi
Shigatse Airport
Ngari Gunsa Airport
Shiquanhezhen Helicopter Base
Rutog POL Storage Facility Near Aksai Chin
PLAAF's Hetian Air Base
PLAAF's Kashi Air Base
For conducting theatre-wide airborne reconnaissance along the LAC, the PLAAF employs four Tu-154Ms equipped with belly-mounted SAR sensors that were imported from Russia in the mid-1990s. They are based at Beijing Nanyuan air base and are operated by the 102 Air Regiment of 34 Transport Division.
The Indian Air Force, on the other hand, makes use of two Bombardier Aerospace Global 5000 ISTR platforms that operate out of Charbatia Airport in Odisha State.
For real-time battlefield air reconnaissance, the IAF makes use of Su-30MKIs equipped with EL/M-2060P SAR sensors in pod-mounted configuration.
Lightning Strike Through Vertical Envelopment In The North East: The PLA’s Options
The year 2016’s series of annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises within that portion of the Western Theatre Command that includes the Tibet Military District (TMD) and Xinjiang Military District (XMD)—facing the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC)—which commenced in late March 20016 and continued through to September, witnessed significant accretions, with the most notable among them being the introduction of a solitary KJ-500 turboprop-powered airborne early warning and control (AEW & C) platform of the PLAAF, plus the deployment of LY-80 MR-SAMs in place of the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs, and lastly the air-dropping of a Regiment of ZBD-03 airborne infantry combat vehicles (ICV) along with ‘Pathfinder’ elements drawn from the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) XV Airborne Corps at two distinct locations: at the base of the Kunlun mountain  range under XMD’s jurisdiction, and at a firing range southeast of Lhasa but north of the Yarlong Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River.
 
The exercises also revealed unmistakable signs of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command’s efforts to develop two staging areas for offensive air-mobile campaigns: one in Qionglai air base in western Sichuan that will become the fourth permanent base for the PLAAF’s XV Airborne Corps; and Feng Huang Shan helicopter base to Army Aviation Brigades equipped withZ-19WZ ‘Black Cyclone’ tandem-seat light attack helicopters (LAH), plus Mi-17V-5 and Z-8K utility helicopters for ferrying the PLA Army’s Battalion-sized light mechanised infantry regiments (LMIR, or kuaisu fanyin budui, also known as Resolving Emergency Mobile Combat Forces, or REMCF) whose principal role will be to seize and hold the string of advanced landing grounds (ALG) and gapfiller air-defence radar stations belonging to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland.
Airpower Developments
It may be recalled that the PLAAF has since 2010 been deploying Su-27SK/Su-27UBK/J-11A heavy-MRCAs belonging to the Shizuishan-based 6thAir Division’s 16th Air Regiment, and J-10A MMRCAs from the Mengzi-based 44th Air Division’s 131st Air Regiment (based in Luliang) out to the dual-use airports at Lhasa Gonggar (facing Sikkim and northern West Bengal) and Ngari (facing Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir, plus Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) twice every year during summertime and wintertime for two-week-long deployment periods. These used to be accompanied by corresponding deployments of the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs of the PLAAF’s Chengdu-based 11th Anti-Air Artillery Brigade (Unit 95607), which has three Regiments--21st, 22nd and 23rd--equipped with the HQ-64/LY-60D E-SHORADS, and HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs. The latter were routinely deployed at fixed launch-sites located at Lhasa Gonggar and the dual-use Shigatse Airport until now.
 
Since late 2012, the 651st Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, based atNyingchi, began taking over from the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1Ds of the 11th Anti-Air Artillery Brigade’s 22nd Regiment. The 651st comprises a regiment of LY-80 70km-range MR-SAMs (containing 16 TELs each loaded with six MR-SAM vertical launch-cells), a Regiment of 18 tracked PGZ-04As (each armed with four FN-6 VSHORADS launchers missiles and four 25mm cannons), a Regiment of FM-90 SHORADS, and a composite battalion that has 108 FN-6 VSHORADS/MANPADS launchers, 24 Type 73 towed 37mm anti-aircraft guns and 18 towed twin 35mm PG-99 ‘Giant Bow’ anti-aircraft guns. Also included are LIMAN ground-based jammers, JY-27A VHF-band anti-PGM volume-search radars as part of the LY-80 MR-SAM regiment, YLC-18 S-band 3-D acquisition radars for the FM-90s (now replacing the older LSS-1/Type 120 L-band 2-D low-altitude acquisition radars), YLC-6 S-band 2-D low-level air-defence radars for the FN-6s, Type 73s and PG-99s. For airspace surveillance, there is one JL-3D-90A S-band 3-D radar operated by the PLAAF at the Ganba La radar station southwest of Lhasa, plus another one north of Shigatse Airport. These are joined by three Army-operated YLC-2V 3-D S-band acquisition radars located around Ngari Airport and Qamdo Bangda Airport, and these are supported by SIGINT Stations located in an arc stretching from the Depsang Bulge in Ladakh all the way up to Walong in Arunachal Pradesh. The PLAAF’s Air-Defence Reporting Centre for monitoring the TMD’s air-defence identification zone (ADIZ) is located at Ganba La. A new radar station was commissioned in June 2016 in the western Sichuan plateau at an altitude of 3,996 metres. 
Going hand-in-hand with these developments are increasing efforts by both the PLAAF and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to undertake joint air campaigns that since 2011 have been rehearsed under the ‘Shaheen’ series of joint exercises. It may be recalled that the ‘Shaheen’ series of bi-annual exercises commenced in 2011 when, for the first time ever as part of EX Shaheen-I, a PLAAF contingent with four Su-27UBKs from the 8th Flight Academy (also known as ‘Blue Army Aggressors’) deployed to Rafiqui air base in Shorkot, Pakistan. This exercise, lasting for over two weeks starting March 11, saw the PAF fielding its Mirage VEFs and F-7PGs executing various various air-to-air and air-to-ground combat scenarios. 
The PLAAF’s 8th Flight Academy operates Su-27UBKs and Su-30MKKs that simulate enemy air force tactics during dissimilar air combat training exercises. The PLAAF possesses three such ‘Blue Army Aggressor’ squadrons (the first of which was raised in June 1987), with the other two flying J-10As and J-7E light interceptors. All three squadrons operate under the PLAAF’s Canzhou-based Flight Test and Training Base in Hebei province. The second joint air exercise—EX Shaheen-II—was conducted between September 3 and 22, 2013 at Hotan air base in the Hetian Prefecture of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. For this, the PAF flew in its F-7PGs and Mirage-IIIEPs. This was for the first time in the PLAAF’s history that a foreign air force had conducted a joint exercise inside China’s airspace. Participating PLAAF assets included J-10As of the Hotan-based 109th Brigade, JH-7As of the Urumqi-based 37th Air Division Division’s 110th Brigade, J-8Fs from the Hotan-based 109thBrigade, and Su-27SKs and Su-27UBKs from the Korla-based 111thBrigade.
The third such bilateral air exercise—EX Shaheen-III—was held at the PAF’s Rafiqui air base in the northeastern province of Punjab between May 5 and 28, 2014. The PLAAF sent four J-10A/B M-MRCAs along with a detachment of air-defence controllers and ground-support crew, while the PAF deployed up to eight of its JF-17s and Mirage-VEFs. EX Shaheen-IV was conducted at the Yinchuan air base in the Southern Command (previously part of Langzhou MR) between September 12 and October 4, 2015. During these exercises, three different types of frontline combat aircraft from each of the two air forces were fielded—this being a first. In addition, the PLAAF for the very first time deployed one of its KJ-200 turboprop-powered AEW & C platforms, while for the PAF this was the first time that it went for air exercises outside China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The PLAAF’s combat aircraft assets taking part in the exercises included J-11As and Su-27UBKs belonging to the Shizuishan-based 6th Air Division’s 16thAir Regiment, J-10As from the Mengzi-based 44th Air Division’s 131st Air Regiment (based in Luliang) and a detachment of JH-7A bombers from the Urumqi-based 37thAir Division Division’s 110th Brigade. The PAF sent two JF-17 Thunder light-MRCAs, two Mirage-IIIEP tactical interdictors and two F-7PG light interceptors, which were accompanied by an IL-78MKP aerial refuelling tanker. EX Shaheen-V began on April 9, 2016 and lasted till April 30. During this exercise, the PAF for the first time deployed its ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle AEW & C platforms (from which the KJ-500 is derived) for airborne battle management missions.
 
Manoeuvre & Air-Mobile Warfare
Since mid-2009, the PLA’s mechanised formations located in TMD and Sichuan province have been inducting into service new-generation tracked armoured vehicles, like Type 96A medium battle tanks (replacing the earlier Type 85 tanks) and ZBD-04A/B ICVs (replacing the ZBD-89 ICVs) equipped with integral, mast-mounted battlefield surveillance radars and anti-UAV radars. First to be re-equipped was the 2nd Armoured Battalion of the 54th Mountain Brigade (Unit-77625), located in Duilongdeqing County; followed by an armoured regiment of the Chongqing-based 13thGroup Army’s 37th Mechanised Infantry Division and another armoured regiment of the 149th Light Mechanised Infantry Division (located at Leshan, Sichuan province) that also comes under the 13th GA; and lastly, the armoured regiment of the 14th Group Army located in Kunming, Yunnan province. 
These formations every year in December undergo mobility-cum-firepower exercises at the Yanggong Plateau (at an altitude of 5,000 metres) in northwestern Yunnan, where the cold and dry environment of the type prevalent in the Dolam Plateau and Chumbi Valley along the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction along the Siliguri Corridor offers a realistic training ground in terms of both climate and terrain. A medium battle tank with a 105mm rifled-bore cannon and powered by water-cooled 780hp diesel engine that has been undergoing user-evaluations throughout TMD since 2012 is the ZTQ-105, which has now begun entering service in limited numbers.
For the swift insertion of mechanised forces specialising in blocking/choking operations in the highlands along mountain passes inside TMD that are facing Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, the PLAAF’s XV Airborne Corps (presently headquartered in Xiaogan, north of Wuhan in Hubei province) plans to relocate one of its Divisions near to Qionglai air base in western Sichuan so that they can be airlifted by the PLAAF’s Y-9 and Y-20 transport aircraft belonging to the 10th Air Regiment and 12thAir Regiment of the 4th Transport Division that is located at Qionglai. 
Presently, the XV Airborne Corps’ 43rdAirborne Infantry Division is stationed at Kaifeng in Henan province, while the 44thand 45th Airborne Infantry Divisions are in the Wuhan area at Guangshui and Huangpi. Starting early April 2016, a ‘Pathfinder’ Company of the XV Airborne Corps equipped with Type OL-2 combined laser rangefinder/target designators, meteorological sensors and secure tactical radios was parachuted from PLAAF IL-76MDs and Y-9s (taking off from Qionglai) at locations in the Dolam Plateau and practiced forward air control operations.
In early May, a mechanised regiment equipped with ZBD-03 ICVs,CS-SH-1 122mm motorised howitzers and 4 x 4-mounted CS-SM1 WM-81 82mm breech-loading mortarswas air-dropped near the Kunlun mountain range.
Subsequently, after the melting of the thick snow covering the Ngari Prefecture in TAR in late June, two additional air-drops of a similar nature were carried out in late June and mid-August. Also ferried in to Lhasa and Ngari by IL-76MD transports were vehicular TS-504 multi-point field troposcatter communications systems.
 
Future force multiplier accretions in support of the XV Airborne Corps will take the form of Y-20 airlifters, the first of which was delivered to the PLAAF on June 15, 2016 and it was formally inducted into the PLAAF on July 6. The first two Y-20s with the serial numbers 11051 and 11052 were delivered to the 12th Air Regiment located at Qionglai. Developed by Xi’an Aircraft Corp (XAC), the Y-20 has an empty weight of 110 tons. The Y-20’s R & D effort was accelerated after the large earthquake in 2008 in Sichuan province. Assistance was sought from Ukraine’s Antonov Design Bureau. The head-section of a full-scale metal mock-up was constructed by 2008. On August 20, 2009 XAC started to build the rear fuselage of the first prototype. In April 2010 the full-scale mock-up was completed. In January 2012 the airframe of the first prototype was built. A total of three prototypes (001-003) were built by 2013, with the 002 prototype being the static fatigue-test airframe. The first low-speed taxiing of prototype 20001 took place on December 21, 2012 at the China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE) in Yanliang.
The maiden flight first took place on January 26, 2013. The 001 prototype (serial no.781) later wore a dark blue colour scheme after being transferred to CFTE. The third prototype (serial no.783) made its maiden flight on December 16, 2013 and it underwent various tests at different locations. Additional prototypes were built and flew in 2015, including nos.785 and 788. The last prototype (no.789) flew for the first time on February 6, 2016. The Y-9, apart from air-dropping ZBD-03 ICVs, can also carry 25 tonnes of cargo, or 132 paratroops. The YunShuji-9 project was begun back in 2001 as an enlarged version of the PLAAF’s workhorse Y-8 (An-12B clone) transport aircraft. The Y-9 has a built-in ro-ro rear-ramp for quick offloads/airdrops. It has a maximum range of 3,000km.
 
Vertical Envelopment
Since late 2008, the PLA Army’s LMIRs located in TMD, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces have been hard at work on devising innovative ways and means of undertaking offensive air-mobile, especially heliborne, operations across wide frontages. Formations that have already undergone ‘transformation’ include the battalion-sized LMIRs of the 52ndMountain Brigade, 53rd Mountain Brigade and 54th Mountain Brigade, all spread over the military sub-districts of Shannan, Shigatse and Nyingchi in TMD; plus the 149th Highland Mechanised Infantry Division, located at Emei in Sichuan province.
 
The LMIRs are optimised for highland and high-altitude warfare. Within each LMIR, tactical formations are task-organised Groups instead of the traditional 3 x 3 structured organisations. Digital messaging in the form of ‘call-for-fire’ is standard norm, along with an automated situational awareness protocol. In a style of warfare where the ‘shock-and-awe effect’ really matters, the impact of an LMIR overrunning hostile command-and-control nodes, ALGs, radar stations and logistics centres could truly be devastating. While a full PLA infantry regiment normally comprises three manoeuvre battalions, in the LMIR its three companies combine the flexibility of dismounted infantry with the mobility of motorised forces without having a significant logistics tail. Unique to the LMIR is the fleet of 8 x 8 ‘Mountain Cat’ family of all-terrain vehicles (ATV), each of which routinely carries six infantrymen: a squad leader, gunner, driver, and three others that form a dismounted fire-team. 
The 8 x 8 ATVs and weapons (built by Yongkang ADBTEV Vehicle Co Ltd in Zhejiang, Chongqing Yonghui Technology Development Co Ltd, Chongqing Jinguan High-Technology Group, and Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicles Manufacturing Co Ltd) are lightweight with reduced logistical footprint, thereby allowing for more roads and bridges to be used during operations. Each ATV is also equipped with a winch, tactical radio, ‘Beidou’ (Compass) GPS receiver, and tactical data terminal. It is capable of negotiating very rough terrain and with a quick modification, is amphibious. The ATV can be armed with either a QJZ-89 12.7mm heavy machine-gun, QLZ-04/Type-91 35mm magazine-fed automatic grenade launcher, LPD-50 flamethrower, or one 82mm mortar. The ATV also has a provision for mounting a NDM-86 7.62mm sniper rifle, or a 120mm PF-98A recoilless light anti-tank weapon on a pintle at the front-left of the ATV. 
Other vehicles used by the LMIR are the 4 x 4 SX-1 ‘Brave Warrior’ and ‘Iron Eagle’ fast attack vehicles (FAV). For direct fire-support, these FAVs each mount a 12.7mm machine gun. For indirect fire-support the FAVs come armed with CS-SM1 WM-81 82mm breech-loading mortars. Several air-defence versions with a secondary direct-fire role are armed with the Type 87 twin 25mm cannons, HJ-12 ‘Red Arrow’ anti-armour guided-missiles, LG-5 40mm automatic grenade launchers firing programmable airburst grenades, JS 12.7mm sniper/anti-materiel rifle, and dual FN-6 surface-to-air missiles. Both the 8 x 8 ATVs and 5 x 5 FAVs can be both internally loaded inside utility helicopters, or are underslung.
Two new types of hardware now entering service with the LMIR are the CH-901 loitering tactical attack drone and the ‘Hunting Eagle’ gyrocopter. Powered by high-power lithium ion battery, the CH-901 can carry either an explosive warhead, or additional cameras and a recovery parachute. The CH-901’s takeoff weight is 20 lb, is armed with a 6 lb fragmentation charge or a shaped-charge warhead capable of penetrating four inches of armour. The standard CH-901 configuration comprises a group of three drones, one launch-tube and a controller, with a total weight of 100 lb. the drone cruises at up to 75mph with an endurance of 2 hours in the reconnaissance configuration, or 1 hour as an attack drone, with a range of 10 miles. The recce version has an estimated lifespan of 20 missions. Target detection is achieved from a distance of 1 mile while flying 1,500 feet over its target. The operator acquires the target using the on-board camera (visible light or thermal imaging) and then locks-on for the attack phase. Once locked-on, it can follow even a fast-manoeuvring target trying to escape. The ‘Hunting Eagle’, developed by Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicles, operates in the search-and-rescue, border control, reconnaissance, anti-riot, and other surveillance roles. It can also be used to self-deploy special operations forces on missions inside enemy territory. Gyrocopters are different from helicopters in having an unpowered main rotor. A rearward-facing, engine-powered propeller provides thrust, and once sufficient speed is gained, the main rotor begins to rotate, providing lift. 
Another force-multiplier that has been operational since early 2013 in support of LMIRs is the Z-19WZ ‘Black Cyclone’ LAH built by the Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HAIG). This LAH features a narrow forward fuselage with tandem compact layouts. The aft fuselage sports a fenestron-type tail rotor section. Maiden flight of the first Z-19WZ prototype took place in May 2010. It comes fitted with a nose-mounted gyro-stabilised sensor/targetting ball-style turret, a mast-mounted millimetric-wave radar, and stubby wings with weapons pylons. The powerplant comprises two WZ-8A turboshafts developing 632kW (848hp). The Z-19WZ’s main role will be armed reconnaissance and scouting. It does not carry a rapid-fire cannon, and instead comes armed with laser-guided Blue Arrow BA-7 anti-armour and TY-90 anti-aircraft missiles, and unguided rockets.
Thus, the specialised heliborne air-assault credentials of the LMIR make it ideally suited for sub-conventional warfare scenarios, while offering greatly increased tactical flexibility (in terms of pick-up, insertion, and extraction of forces) when performing special operations against hostile air bases, ALGs, rear-area POL sites and ammunition storage warehouses. There is no requirement for the utility helicopters for airspeed reduction while en route, nor any manoeuvring restrictions at the landing zone due to the pendulous sling-load. 
Logistically too, the LMIR has a small footprint. All ammunition consumed does not require material handling equipment to move, and can thus be internally loaded within helicopters. Fuel consumption for an entire LMIR during a 450km-long march is estimated at a modest 225 gallons (846 litres) of diesel. Resupply of an inserted LMIR is easily accomplished via utility helicopters like the Mi-17V-5, which is routinely capable of carrying two 242-gallon (915 litre) internal fuel tanks for ferry-flight purposes and these fuel-tanks can be re-configured for refuelling vehicles. All these advantages make the LMIR a superb tool for executing lightning fast air-assault raids. 
While dismounted air-assault forces traditionally land on their objective, the added mobility of an LMIR allows it the option of being inserted a terrain-feature away from the objective. By inserting the LMIR away from the defenders instead of on top of them, the most vulnerable phase of an air-assault operation is thereby avoided. Land, unload, form up, orient leaders, and then advance toward the objective is the typical sequential mission protocol that is followed. While some surprise may be lost, the tremendous tactical mobility of the LMIR adds an element of deception as its actual objective is not obvious.
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Products From A Self-Confessed “Teacher Without Any Dreams”

August 2, 2017, 8:12 pm
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A consortium of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) R & D institutions is claiming to have achieved vital developmental breakthroughs in the arenas of integrated electric propulsion systems (IEPS), pump-jet propulsion systems for nuclear-powered submarines, high-energy warship-mounted laser-based directed-energy weapons for air-defence, and superconductive magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) arrays. The involved institutions include the Lake Huangjia-based  Wuhan Naval Research Institute, China Shipbuilding Industry Corp’s (CSIC) wholly-owned Wuhan Institute of Marine Electric Propulsion (WIMEP)—also known as the 712 Research Institute—and the  Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Department of Micro/Nano Electronics. 
Beijing recently established a Scientific Research Steering Committee to help it develop cutting-edge military technology. This new body has been modelled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which was set up after the USSR’s Sputnik satellite launch in 1957 to spearhead R & D on pioneering military systems to maintain the US’ qualitative edge over the Soviet Union. The new Steering Committee is working with the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission, which was set up last year and also reports to the Central Military Commission. The Committee is focussing on developing not only the hardware but also the related applications software packages.
It was in August 2013 that the CSIC-owned WIMEP had first revealed the design of a gas turbine-based IEPS for future warships. An IEPS uses a gas-turbine or diesel-generator to produce electricity that powers motors, which turn propeller shafts or operate waterjets. The system significantly does away with heavy mechanical clutches and highly sophisticated reduction gearboxes that reduce or increase power to the propeller shafts. It also saves space and weight and is easier to control and maintain. It is also quieter to run and can increase a warship’s speed over conventional diesel-engines. The PLAN’s Rear Admiral Ma Weiming, who led the developmental effort of such an IEPS, has claimed that the WIMEP-developed solution is the world’s first IEPS to run on a medium-voltage, direct-current system.
The WIMEP-developed rim-driven pumpjet has a ring-shaped electrical motor inside the pumpjet shroud, which turns the vane rotor (a vane rotor has the fan blades attached to a rotating band built on a cylinder interior, as opposed to a propeller shaft) inside the pumpjet cavity to create thrust. Previous submarine-mounted pumpjets were ‘shrouded propellers’" which consisted of a tubular nozzle covering the propeller.
By removing the shaft of the propeller, the reduction in the number of moving parts decreases the noise made by the pumpjet, as well as saving hull space. In addition, rim-driven pumpjets are easier to maintain, and have less cavitation (bubbles that form during propeller movement), making them even more quiet.The PLAN’ futuristic Type 095 SSNs and Type 096 SSBNs will reportedly incorporate such IEPS and rim-driven pumpjets.
The PLAN’s electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) R & D facility (inclusive of a full-scale operational prototype) is located at Ningbo-Zhuangqiaoin. Developmental work on EMALS negan in the late 1990s and by last year an operational prototype was successfully developed.
The superconductive MAD array, mounted aft of an aircraft, can be used to pinpoint the location of minerals buried deep beneath the earth in Inner Mongolia, for example, with a level of precision as high as anything currently available around the world. The device is described as being a high performance equipment and technical solution to resources mapping, civil engineering, archaeology and national defence. Developed by the the  Shanghai Jiaotong University’s  Department of Micro/Nano Electronics in cooperation with the Institute of Geophysics and Geomatics, China University of Geosciences in Wuhan, Hubei, such MAD arrays are also used for detecting submerged submarines navigating at shallow depths. 
The China-developed MAD sensor is different from conventional designs in at least two ways. The first is the large number of probes the device uses. With this array, it can collect much more data than traditional detectors, which tend to use just one antenna. The new MAD also uses a superconductive computer chip cooled by liquid nitrogen. This super-cool environment significantly increases the device’s sensitivity to signals that would be too faint for traditional devices to spot.
 
Rear Admiral Ma Weiming, 57, became a household name in 2011 when he announced during a speech to accept a national technology award that his team had successfully developed an EMALS. Ma, a PLA deputy to the National People’s Congress, hails from Yangzhou in Jiangsu. He graduated from the PLAN’s University of Engineering in Wuhan, Hubei, in 1987 and subsequently elected to teach there. He earned a PhD in electrical engineering from Tsinghua University in 1996 and went on to become the country’s youngest engineering academician five years later. A specialist in maritime propulsion, electrical engineering and related fields, Ma has cultivated/mentored more than 400 Masters and PhD students at the Naval University since the late 1980s. Ma’s exalted status in the PLAN was highlighted by a photograph of then PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli holding an umbrella for Ma during an inspection of the University of Engineering in Wuhan, where Ma works, on a rainy day in June 2016. Rear Admiral Liu Dezhi, a colleague at the university, describes Ma as a workaholic and master problem-solver. Dubbed the father of China’s EMALS, Rear Admiral Ma describes himself as a “teacher without any dreams”. He is one of 17 nominees for 10 Order of August 1 awards that were presented by President Xi Jinping on August 1, the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Red Army, the PLA’s precursor. In the past, Ma had won the National Science and Technology Progress Award twice and in 2015 also won the science and technology achievement prize of the Ho Leung Ho Lee Foundation, a Hongkong SAR-based non-government organisation.
Meanwhile, the first prototype of the S-30 Type 032 Qing-class SSB meant for the Pakistan Navy has been floated at the Wuhan Shipyard. The Pakistan Navy has eight Stirling Engine AIP-equipped double-hulled submarines on order from China: four S-26 Type 032 Qing-class SSKs capable of launching SLCMs, and four S-30 Type 032 Qing-class SSBs capable of launching both SLCMs and SLBMs.
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Likely Points Of PLA Ingress Into India

August 9, 2017, 2:15 pm
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Needless to say, any ingress by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into India-controlled territory will be small-scale, shallow in depth and of a temporary nature, primarily due to the vagaries of the weather, with the commencement of winter snowfall throughout the LAC from November ensuring that the PLA is unable to stay put in a dug-in manner between now and November. The following slides illustrate the likely ingress areas and the locations of India’s quick-reaction military detachments and logistics bases.
North Ladakh
Southern Ladakh
Himachal Pradesh
Uttarakhand
Arunachal Pradesh
Back in mid-2001, I was a witness to a PLA Army ‘transgression’ in the Taksin area of Arunachal Pradesh, which was then manned by a Battalion of the Gorkha Rifles. A 1,400-strong PLA Army contingent, comprising only 360 armed personnel and the rest comprising buglers and drum-beaters all waving China’s red-coloured flags, rolled in well past 3am in the morning and formed an arc around GHORA OP. At dawn, when the PLA’s presence was fully assessed, the Indian Army decided to respond in kind later that night. Meanwhile, throughout the day, the buglers and drum-beaters were playing tunes of Bollywood songs. Well past mid-night, the Gorkha Battalion began redeploying to the immediate surrounding mountain ridges as part of an outflanking move. By dawn, the PLA infantrymen were being stared down by the fully armed Gorkhas sitting on dominating high ground. Soon a white-colour flare was fired by the surrounded PLA contingent below, and the Indian Army immediately reciprocated (this being the signal for accepting the PLA’s request for a flag meeting. An Indian Army contingent comprising some 20 personnel—led by a Brigadier—and accompanied by an official of the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) came within 200 metres of the Senior Colonel who was leading the PLA contingent. The Senior Colonel through hand-signals requested the Brigadier to come over to the area where the PLA contingent was camping. The Brigadier responded by signaling through his hands that the meeting ought to be held in the mid-point. The Senior Colonel agreed and as he started advancing forward, the soldiers behind him started retracing a few of their steps backward. When the two contingent commanders were face-to-face, not a word was exchanged and all that the Senior Colonel did was to unfurl a poster attached to a flagstaff, which said in English: YOU ARE IN CHINESE TERRITORY. PLEASE WITHDRAW. Without waiting for an answer, he next beckoned some of his subordinates to come forward who bore giveaways like woollen blankets and winter clothing. They laid these on the ground and without uttering a word, the entire contingent began withdrawing back to China-controlled territory. Needless to say, the standoff was over, having lasted less than 18 hours, and the entire stockpile of giveaways was subsequently distributed among the local inhabitants of Taksin with the compliments of the Indian Army. 
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LCA-AF Mk.2 Can Still Become A Reality. Here's How

August 14, 2017, 4:36 pm
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A revised roadmap dealing with the propulsion system for both the Tejas Mk.1A and the LCA-AF Mk.2 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) is slowly but gradually emerging, following the satisfactory conclusion of recently-held negotiations between India’s MoD-owned Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) and France’s SAFRAN Group.
If and when it is implemented (it is still awaiting authorisation from the Govt of India), the planned 83 Tejas Mk.1As will use the GE-supplied F404-IN20 turbofans, and after these engines reach the end of their total technical service lives (TTSL), they will be replaced by a new 98kN-thrust (with afterburning) turbofan that will use the M88-2 engine’s core section supplied off-the-shelf by France’s SAFRAN, while up to 60% of the turbofan’s components will be derived from those already developed by the DRDO’s Bengaluru-based Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) for the Kaveri turbofan. All these modified components (including second-generation single-crystal turbine blades) will be co-developed with the help of military-technical mentoring by SAFRAN. So, for 83 Tejas Mk.1A MRCAs, the turbofans to be procured should comprise 83 F404-GE-IN20s, plus 83 of those turbofans that will be co-developed by GTRE and SAFRAN.
For the LCA-AF Mk.2 MRCA, the turbofan to be co-developed by GTRE and SAFRAN will, from the very outset, become the definitive propulsion system. However, the question of exactly how many LCA-AF Mk.2s need to be ordered has not yet been answered by the Indian Air Force (IAF).
This, in turn means that GTRE and SAFRAN will have until 2026 to come up with the definitive turbofan for the commencement of airworthiness-related flight-test regime for both the Tejas Mk.1A and the LCA-AF Mk.2’s weaponised prototypes. Initially, however, the LCA-AF Mk.2’s flying prototypes will be powered by F414-GE-INS6 turbofans.
As I had explained earlier, it all depends on how or whether at all SOUND COMMON SENSE can be or cannot be applied. Let me elaborate: the Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 platforms, even after re-engining, will be able to stay in service for only another 15 years. Since these aircraft are now used for tactical air interdiction and battlefield air-interdiction (since the deep-strike roles will be taken over by the Rafales and several Su-30MKIs, while tactical interdiction/defensive counter-air roles will eventually be taken over by up to 150 single-engined imported MRCA like the F-16 Block 70), there exists a market for fourth-generation battlefield air-interdiction/defensive counter-air  MRCAs—roughly 160 aircraft—required for replacing the Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 platforms. This is where the LCA-AF Mk.2 ought to come in, but the project will have to be INTELLIGENTLY managed, i.e. make the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) the prime contractor answerable to IAF HQ, while reducing the DRDO’s Bengaluru-based Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) to just a design services provider. HAL in turn should be empowered through sufficient managerial autonomy to appoint its own clusters of public-sector/private-sector vendors as sub-systems/components suppliers, so that HAL does only final-assembly and systems integration. Above all, HAL must be allowed to come up with a financial plan under which such an industrial consortium will be required to put up 80% of the LCA-AF Mk.2’s non-recurring developmental costs, this of course being offset by a guaranteed, irrevocable order for 160 LCA-AF Mk.2s. HAL in turn must be able to guarantee a fully functional/ certified, weaponised LCA-AF Mk.2 at best by 2028 (if developmental work commences in 2018). If this is done, then the IAF will not have to worry about incurring additional costs for force modernisation and it will then stop opposing the LCA-AF Mk.2’s service-induction. Similarly, the Indian Navy (IN) should be bold enough to use a variant of the LCA-AF Mk.2 as a shore-based maritime-strike platform. Meanwhile, the tandem-seater version of the Tejas Mk.1A can be made to serve as lead-in fighter-trainers (LIFT) for both the IAF and IN.
All this is definitely doable from both financial and military-industrial standpoints, but it will require enormous amounts of sound common-sense to be pooled from within the Union Ministry of Finance, MoD, and the IAF and IN HQs so that a comprehensive project management roadmap can be articulated and adhered to without any deviations.
Interestingly, the IAF has mandated that IF the fifth-generation AMCA is to be indigenously developed by ADA, then use must be made of F414-GE-INS6 turbofans for that portion of the flight-test regime that is dedicated to the optimisation of the medium-weight AMCA’s airframe (the Su-57 FGFA on the other hand is a heavyweight fifth-generation MRCA), flight-control logic and the digital fly-by-wire flight control system.
What Is Required For Design/Performance Optimisation Of LCA-AF Mk.2
For achieving the required angles-of-attack, instantaneous/sustained turn-rates and climb-rates (i.e. agility metrics), the LCA-AF Mk.2’s airframe will have to sport LEVCONs of the type already developed for the IN’s LCA (Navy) Mk.1 MRCA.
 
For all-passive target acquisition-cum-tracking beyond the range of the biological Mk.1 eyeball, an infra-red search-and-track sensor will have to be mounted aft of the nose-section and just ahead of the nose landing gear section, since this will get rid of the obstruction of field-of-view posed by the fixed aerial refuelling probe (supplied by UK-based Cobham) mounted in the MRCA’s starboard side. Two IRST sensor options ought to be explored for installation: either UK-based Selex ES’ Skyward, or the IRST-21 from Lockheed Martin.
The selected IRST sensor will have to be seamlessly integrated with the Elbit Systems-developed TARGO helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) so that it can present a synthesized image of the tracked target on the HMDS’ visor along with superimposed fire-control cueing data required for slaving the IIR sensor on-board the all-aspect RAFAEL-built Python-5 SRAAM when operating in both lock-on-before-launch and lock-on-after-launch modes.
For the on-board AESA-MMR, the modes of operation should include multi-target detection and concurrent tracking/fire-control (for mid-course guidance for the Astra-1 BVRAAM), terrain avoidance, weather search, traffic collision avoidance, moving ground target indication, Doppler beam-sharpening, and synthetic aperture ground mapping. Although the DRDO’s LRDE laboratory began developing the ‘Uttam’ AESAR-FCR since 2012, its full-scale model displayed at the Aero India 2017 expo in Bengaluru last February revealed that a lot more work is required in the area of weight reduction. In addition, unless an environment control system (ECS) is indigenously developed for meeting the AESAR-FCR’s co9oling requirements, additional developmental work will have to be undertaken to integrate the AESAR-FCR with an imported ECS.
This, in turn, will necessitate the acquisition by the DRDO’s LRDE and CABS laboratories of a turbofan-powered airborne testbed that, apart from hosting the prototype AESAR-FCR/ECS combination, will also have to accommodate all the data servers required for the real-time recording-cum-monitoring of all the performance parameters of the prototype AESAR-FCR/ECS combination. An alternative option—if available—would be to ship the prototype AESAR-FCR/ECS combination abroad to a country which is willing to offer the services on a commercial basis of a suitable airborne test laboratory.
The ADA-designed cockpit for the LCA-AF Mk.2 (which was unveilled in 2013) has already been deemed as ‘deficient’ by the IAF, which has since then been showing its preference for the Cockpit-NG suite that was originally developed by Israel’s Elbit Systems and can easily be provided by the HALBIT joint venture of Elbit Systems and HAL.
In fact, the IAF also prefers the same Cockpit-NG suite for the F-16 Block 70s that are on offer from Lockheed Martin and it needs to be noted that Elbit Systems had originally developed the Cockpit-NG suite for the global F-16 mid-life upgrade market, and now even Saab has selected the Cockpit-NG for its JAS-39 Gripen-Es.
For comprehensive self-protection, the LCA-AF Mk.2 will be required to internally accommodate a wide-band self-protection jammer, integrated digital radar warning receivers-cum-jamming transmitters, laser warning receivers and missile approach warning system (MAWS) sensors (similar to what Sweden’s SaabTech has developed and is now supplying for installation on-board the HAL-developed Rudra, LCH and LUH helicopters).
While the DRDO’s Bengaluru-based DARE laboratory has already developed the jammer as well as the integrated digital radar warning receivers-cum-jamming transmitters (that have already been installed on the upgraded Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 flying prototypes), the LEDS laser warning receiver will have to come from SaabTech, with the MAWS being the AAR-60V2 MILDS-F from Cassidian of Germany.
The LCA-AF Mk.2’s airframe will be required to internally host four integrated digital radar warning receivers-cum-jamming transmitters, two LEDS laser warning receivers (preferably on re-designed wingtips) and six MAWS sensors in a distributed-architecture layout in order to ensure all-aspect hemispheric coverage.
The LCA-AF Mk.2’s airframe will be required to internally host a new-generation jet-fuel starter, as well as an on-board oxygen generation system (OBOGS).
The DRDO-developed aircraft stores release and ejection mechanism (ASREM) will have to be incorporated into yet-to-be-developed dual ejector-racks and triple-ejector-racks similar to RAFAUT of France’s AT-730 triple ejector-rack (that contains three TG-480 ejectors) and AUF-2 dual ejector-rack.
 
Incorporation of an actuated cockpit canopy opening/shutting mechanism, along with a retractable aerial refuelling probe (also available from Cobham), should be desirable for incorporation as well.
 
It is only after incorporation of all the above-mentioned elements that a final call ought to be taken on the required quantum of fuselage stretch and increase in wing area of the LCA-AF Mk.2. It, therefore, may well be that the current estimate of a 1-metre fuselage stretch required for incorporation is premature and needs to be worked out again in finer detail in close consultations with the IAF and IN.
List Of Major Sub-Systems On Tejas Mk.1
Composites-Based Airframe Content
DRDO-Developed Components
Involved Private-Sector/Public-Sector Industrial Vendors
Critical Foreign Components On Tejas Mk.1
The image below depicts the airframe design of the LCA that was proposed to ADA by GE Aero Engines way back in 1987. Had this design been adopted by ADA then itself, several of the aerodynamic shortcomings witnessed later in the ADA-designed Tejas Mk.1 L-MRCA could have been eliminated at the very outset.
And this is what the IAF had in mind when it was decided in the 1970s to indigenously develop the LCA.
And finally, the F-16 Block 70 on offer to the IAF has the potential of being upgraded to the F-16U Falcon-21 configuration during its projected mid-life deep upgrade, which is explained below in graphic form.
The F-16U Falcon-21 had been designed by Lockheed Martin as far back as the early 1990s and it can accommodate several of the fifth-generation sensor-fused avionics that are presently on-board the F-35 Lightning JSF family of MRCAs.
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Debunking The PLA's Over-Hyped Manoeuvre Warfare Capabilities

August 27, 2017, 11:11 am
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Since the past decade, a widespread disinformation campaign has been mounted—both officially and unofficially—to over-hype and over-estimate the manoeuvre warfare capabilities of China’s People’s Liberation Army. The reality, however, belies all such claims. Today, the battle tank inventory of the PLA comprises of three types, with the most prolific being the Type 96A medium battle tank (about 1,500 built to date) that is deployed throughout central and western China, followed by the Type 96B medium battle tank (about 800) that is deployed throughout southern China, and finally the Type 99A heavy main battle tank (about 700 are in service) that is deployed throughout northern China (facing North Korea and Mongolia). The bulk of the PLA’s battle tank inventory is still made up of Type 59II, Type 80 and Type 85IIA medium tanks. The Type 96A’s export designation is VT-2, while that of the Type 96B is VT-4. The Type 99A has yet to be approved for export.
Type 96A/VT-2/MBT-2000 Medium Battle Tank
Type 96B/VT-4/MBT-3000 Medium Battle Tank
Type 99A Main Battle Tank
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Mini-UAVs Will Get Zapped By EMP All Over NCR, For Starters

September 2, 2017, 5:53 pm
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In the absence of comprehensive legislation governing the usage of privately-owned unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) anywhere within Indian airspace, there has been a steady proliferation of mini-UAVs, especially those being imported from China. In the latest instance, a staffer of the Russian Embassy in Delhi was seen operating a mini-UAV within a designated no-fly zone in New Delhi:

(watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6NJz83P9NY)

Over the past two years, there were several other such instances in several cities throughout India, including a recent one in Mumbai that was spotted hovering dangerously close to the city’s international airport. Pending the drafting and approving of comprehensive legislation for deterring such min-UAV flights, the Union Home Ministry has just placed orders for an initial 12 vehicle-mounted high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) zappers from Germany’s DIEHL Defence for enforcing the no-flying zone directives within the Natgional capital Region. This is just for starters, and it will be followed in the near future by the CISF acquiring similar systems for ensuring the safety of air corridors around India’s major international and domestic airports.

The HPEM acts directly on the control electronics of mini-drones by means of electromagnetic pulses, thus causing mission abort. This means: regardless of the control method used (autonomous or radio-controlled), the mini-drone becomes inoperable upon impact of HPEM pulses at distances of up to several hundred metres and triggers the fail-safe function.The HPEM also provides the possibility of scalable range and the ability to also intercept entire swarms of mini-drones simultaneously. The HPEM does not cause harm to individuals and several of them are already being used worldwide for stopping cars and protecting large events (Olympic Games and summit meetings).

http://www.diehl.com/fileadmin/diehl-defence/user_upload/flyer/160523Flyer_HPEM_UAS.pdf
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Will Nag/NAMICA-2 Combination Enter Service?

September 10, 2017, 4:37 pm
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Though the successful test-firings of the Nag ATGM/NAMICA-2 combination passed its most crucial developmental milestone on September 8 and 9, 2017, this has perhaps come too late and it now remains to be seen if the Indian Army will conduct the definitive user-trials, without which service-induction cannot take place.
 
It may be recalled that user-trials of the 4km-range Nag ATGM’s uncooled LWIR sensor were carried out in hot desert conditions in Rajasthan on July 28 and 29, 2012 at the Mahajan firing range against both moving and static targets for different ranges of 2.8km and 3.2km, with the ATGMs then being fired from the NAMICA-1 tracked launchers.
Of the four missiles fired then, only one hit the target. In all, eight firing-trials were planned, between July and August 4. On July 28, while one Nag ATGM, tested for a range of 2,500 metres, hit the bull’s eye, the second failed to destroy a target 700 metres away owing to a problem in its uncooled LWIR sensor. In the subsequent trials on August 1, two Nag ATGMs missed their targets positioned at 1,300 metres and 2,500 metres, respectively, since there was inadequate thermal contrast for the LWIR sensor to lock-on and track the target before the missile was launched. Consequently, the uncooled LWIR sensor proved to be accurate only up to 2.5km in extremely hot conditions.
 
It was then that the Indian Army arbitrarily moved the goalpost by demanding that the DRDO re-engineer the NAMICA-1 by incorporating a commander’s panoramic target acquisition/lock-on sensor/ Undaunted, the DRDO rose up to the challenge and developed the NAMICA-2 (now housing a COMPASS optronic panoramic turret procured by Bharat Electronics Ltd from ELBIT Systems).
The DRDO also modified the LWIR sensor by incorporating IR-CCD processor chips supplied by France’s ULIS-SOFRADIR. Since then, this modified sensor has successfully engaged all eight of its targets—both fixed and moving.
 
Each NAMICA-2—destined for equipping the Recce & Support Battalions of the Indian Army’s Mechanised Infantry formations (especially when undertaking river-crossing operations)—can carry 12 Nag ATGMs, with six of them in ready-to-fire mode out to a distance of 4km. The ATGM has a flight speed of 230 metres per second, is armed with a 8kg tandem shaped-charge warhead, has a rocket motor using nitramine-based smokeless extruded double base sustainer propellant, has a single-shot hit probability of 0.77 and a CEP of 0.9 metres, and has a 10-year maintenance-free shelf-life.
On paper, the Indian Army remains committed to the procurement of 443 Bharat Dynamics Ltd-built third-generation Nag fire-and-forget ATGMs along with 13 OFB Medak-built NAMICA-2 tracked ATGM launchers.
Presently under development is the helicopter-launched version of the Nag, known as HELINA. This ATGM uses the same uncooled LWIR sensor as the Nag ATGM, and has a range of 7km. The HELINA, using the ‘Rudrastra’ cannister-encased twin-launcher system, will arm both the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships as well as the LCH attack helicopters of both the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.
Under development is a DRDO-developed active fire-and-forget, adverse-weather millimeter wave (MMW) radar sensor for a 15km-range version of the HELINA. However, the R & D cycle of this ATGM is unlikely to be completed by 2019 at the very latest, and consequently, the Indian Army’s initial 60 HAL-developed ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships will in all probability be armed with up to 960 HELINAs equipped with LWIR sensors.
NORINCO’s Answer To Nag/NAMICA-2
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Why CHHAMB Continues To Matter: A Historical Perspective

October 1, 2017, 3:24 pm
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Unless we derive lessons from our past mistakes, we are condemned to repeat those very same mistakes in future. This is what we can learn after conducting critical appreciations of the all of India’s wars and near-war situations with Pakistan since 1965. Publicly available critical literature (see the books below) now enables us to go back in time to map out as well as draw objective inferences from the past military campaigns of the subcontinent in a chronological manner with a reasonable degree of accuracy—all of which will serve to dictate the inevitable next round of military hostilities between India and Pakistan in the time to come. And these in turn will dictate the nature of India’s future war directives/rules of engagement (to be issued during peacetime to India’s armed forces by the executive branch of the Govt of India), and these in turn will dictate the articulation of both the joint warfighting doctrines and tactics of India’s three armed services, plus their respective force modernisation plans.
For any war planner to understand plan an integrated AirLand warfighting campaign aimed at liberating Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, the first and foremost task is to study and analyse the military campaigns of the Indian Army’s Western Theatre Command that were conducted in 1965 and 1971, starting with the UN-sponsored/sanctioned 1948 Karachi Agreement and the limitations it posed on India’s military options with regard to Jammu & Kashmir, followed by an appreciation of Chhamb’s terrain/topography.
1948 Cease-Fire Line Explained
Terrain/Topography of Chhamb Sector
Military Options in 1965
Military Balance
Operation Gibraltar & Its Aftermath
Pakistan’s OP Grand Slam
Indian Army Ripostes
Awesome Power of Defence: How IA’s 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Decimated PA’s 1 Armoured Division in Asal Uttar Between September 8 & 11, 1965
IA’s XI Corps Battle Plan.
IA’s 4 Mountain Division Battle Plan.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment stages forward to Chabal Kalan & moves up to Bhikkiwind/Patti at 6am on September 8.
PA 1 Armoured Division’s Battle Plan.
IA’s Armoured Outflanking Movement.
With boggy terrain to the east & the centre held by the IA in Asal Uttar, PA’s 4 Armoured Brigade had only one route open: from the west. Upon getting information of enemy MBT build-up around Bhura Karimpur, Salim selected his ‘Killing Ground’ to trap the enemy.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment, deployed in two concentric semi-circles, awaits the enemy. The trap is now set.
PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment is completely destroyed in detail.
On September 11, two Squadrons of PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment are destroyed while the remnants are captured at Mahmudpura, including the Commandant and two Squadron Commanders. The PA’s 3 Armoured Brogade withdraws.
 The End-Result
Inferences
First, it is obvious that the war directives (Higher Directions of War) were NEVER clearly spelt out by the then Govt of India. When it was the stated policy of India even then that Jammu & Kashmir was an integral part of India and Pakistan was illegally in occupation since 1948 of vasr areas of J & K, the Govt of India should consequently have directed both the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to plan their respective war campaigns in a manner that would have ensured the recapture of maximum territory within PoK, while ensuring the territorial inviolability of India against any offensive AirLand war campaigns waged by the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force (see the original 3-point directive that was issued on September 3, 1965 below). 
Had such directives been issued by 1963 itself, then the Indian Army would not have been required to wage OP RIDDLE and OP NEPAL inside Pakistan, all of Pakistan’s initial military gains in Chhamb would have been reversed, and at the subsequent post-war negotiations in Tashkent India’s principled stand would have made it impossible for the USSR to demand that all captured territory by either warring side be returned unconditionally.
 
Second, it is evident that the UNMOGIP’s military observers had given ample advance warning to India about the Pakistan Army’s concentration of forces around Chhamb. Consequently, the Indian Army had at least 30 days of warning time to shore up its ground defences and finalise its joint warfighting plans with the Indian Air Force. The failure to do the latter cost India dearly in the early hours of OP GRAND SLAM.
Third, it remains a mystery why two of the Indian Air Force’s four Mi-4 helicopters that were armed were never used for immediate air-support on the battlefields. Had they been used, then by 1971 additional armed Mi-4s would have been available in the western front for helping India achieve the desired decisive results. Though the Indian Air Force was never found wanting when it came to providing close air-support, these were ineffectual in fluid battlefields where it was impossible to chart out the forward line of own troops (FLOT). And this is exactly why there were several blue-on-blue engagements in 1965 where the Indian Army was often at the receiving end of the Indian Air Force. Had the armed Mi-4s been fully integrated with the Indian Army’s combat net radio grid and had they been co-located as integral assets with the Army’s ground formations, then valuable lessons on the intricacies of delivering immediate air-support would have been learnt then itself, and consequently, by 1971 the Indian Army could well have possessed its own fledgling fleet of armed helicopter-gunships! 
Fourth, as the slides below reveal, there was virtually no joint forces training between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force, as a result of which the Army was devoid of immediate air-support whenever required, while the Air Force was devoid of actionable situational awareness inputs from the Army whenever it came to mounting ‘search-and-destroy’ counter-surface force operations’ (CSFO). Actionable situational awareness inputs could have been forthcoming had the Indian Army used its covertly-inserted special operations forces (SOF) inside hostile territory for the sake of monitoring and reporting enemy logistics-related movements through major road/railway junctions.
Fifth, the infantry-heavy formations of the Indian Army were motorised/lorried and therefore could never keep up with the fast-moving armoured cavalry formations. The absence of mechanisation was galling. 
1971 Operations Conducted in Chhamb & Chicken’s Neck Sectors
The above-mentioned narrative of HQ Western Command clearly indicates that detailed war directives from Indian Army HQ were not issued till November 1, primarily because Indian Army HQ itself had not been briefed on the politico-military objectives by the Govt of India. As the pages below will reveal, the various Corps HQs and their field formations of the Western Command were busy planning their respective tactical offensives, until December 1 when Indian Army HQ issued its military directives that mandated the conduct of strictly defensive operations. This in turn resulted in the Jammu-specific formations having to conduct last-minute tactical and logistics-related re-orientations, all of which enormously helped the Pakistan Army realise its offensive war-plans for the Chhamb sector.
Chicken’s Neck Sector Operations
Analysing The Chhamb Sector Operations
The above-descriptions of the battles are official accounts that are devoid of critical appraisals. A far more objective assessment of the prevailing ground realities and shortcomings at the operational-level can be found below.
Other Armoured Campaigns on the Western Front
IAF Air Campaigns on the Western Front
Inferences
Again the politico-military objectives were never articulated to the optimal-level by the Govt of India. While the eastern sector got the attention that it deserved (resulting in an overwhelmingly successful OP CACTUS LILLY), the western front was glossed over. The then Govt of India should have mandated that while the Indian Army was free to conduct minor tactical offensives aimed at straightening certain bulges (like the Shakargarh Bulge and the Chicken’s Neck), top-most priority should have been accorded to: 1) staging major armoured offensives in the Chhamb-Sialkot sectors, and 2) capturing as much territory as possible throughout northern and north-western PoK, going so far as Skardu and the Deosai Plains. In fact, the Indian Army at that time did possess enough numerical superiority and offensive firepower for achieving these objectives. Yet again, it was only the myopic political leadership of that time that failed to spell out the desired PoK-specific war directives for the benefit of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force. 
Consequently, there arose a lack of doctrinal clarity within the Indian Army, which in turn prevented the much-needed institutional re-structuring in terms of increased mechanisation and the introduction of immediate air-support rotary-winged platforms within the Army Aviation Corps.
After 1965, the Indian Air Force had greatly reformed its CSFO operating protocols and these were highly successful on the eastern front, where the Indian Army’s offensive ground formations never operated in a vacuum and always enjoyed excellent synchronisation with the Indian Air Force. This was primarily due to the invaluable actionable situational awareness inputs coming from the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini.
As a result, the Air Force’s Su-7BMK and Hunter interdictor/strike aircraft deployed on the eastern front were each able to able to mount three CSFOs on a daily basis. However, this feat could not be replicated on the western front since, once again, the Indian Army was unable to provide actionable situational awareness inputs.
It was due to this that over a period of 12 days, the Indian Army’s 1 Corps managed to advance a bare 13km against Pakistani covering troops.
The 1972-1998 Period
Common-sense would have dictated that after 1971, the Indian Army ought to have been authorised to raise its own Army Aviation Corps that would be equipped with recce-and-scout helicopters (RSH), attack helicopters, and medium-lift utility helicopters for casualty evacuation. Instead, the Indian Air Force continued to oppose the Army’s procurement of different types of helicopters, even after the Army Aviation Corps was established in 1986. At that time, in the Joint Implementation Instructions, it was mandated that the Army Aviation Corps would operate only helicopters below 5 tonnes in weight. Since then, the Air Force has successfully cited this document to block the expansion of the Army Aviation Corps. The blame lies with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has consistently avoided a decision, preferring to refer to this contentious issue as being “a family affair”. Whenever the Army Corps Aviation sent up a proposal relating to aviation assets, the MoD would send it to Air HQ for comments, knowing full well that the Air Force would effectively kill the proposal.
The Indian Army’s in-house think-tanks, which after OP Parakram in 2002 had been hard at work aimed at turning the lumbering Army into an agile, lethal, versatile and networked force capable of matching the PLA’s on-going force-modernisation efforts through re-organisation, restructuring, force development and relocation (all these being based on 13 transformation studies carried out so far), had by 2011 come up with a firm plan for expansion of the Army Aviation Corps whose main elements were: Creation of integral Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) for each of its three Strike Corps and 10 Pivot Corps over a 15-year period between (2007-2022), with each CAB attached to the Strike Corps comprising two squadrons each with 12 attack helicopters, one squadron with 10 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships (for armed tactical battle reconnaissance and casualty evacuation) and five single-engined RSHs. The CABs attached to the Pivot Corps were to comprise two squadrons with 24 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and one squadron of 15 Mi-17V-5 helicopters configured for Battalion-level armed air-assaults and casualty evacuation. Even this plan has since been short-changed, with the Army being allowed to operate only the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and RSHs.
While in May 2011 the Air Force had offered to surrender its sovereignty over the Mi-25/Mi-35P attack helicopters, this was not acceptable to the Army, which at that time also insisted on raising its integral Combat Aviation Brigades (for conducting vertical envelopment air-assault operations) equipped with armed medium-lift utility helicopters—something which the Air Force objected to. And this, despite the fact that in neighbouring Pakistan, it is the Army’s Aviation Corps that has had since the mid-1980s as its integral assets the fleets of AH-1S HueyCobra helicopter gunships, AS.350B3 armed light observation helicopters and Mi-171 medium-lift utility helicopters.
However, from in the mid-1970s till the late 1980s, the Indian Army did receive authorisation to massively upgrade and expand its land-mobile air-defence artillery network, which on January 10, 1994 led to the creation of the Corps of Army Air Defence. By the mid-1990s, therefore, the Army was well-equipped with two land-mobile Air-Defence Groups equipped with 36  ZRK-SD Kvadrat MR-SAM TELs, 80 OSA-AK and 80 Strella-10M SHORADS TELs, 96 ZSU-23-4 Schilka SPAAGs, 40 mounted ZU-23-2s (out of the 468 ordered), 200  Oerlikon Contraves Super Fledermaus LLAD-FCS, 80 Flycatcher LLAD-FCS, and 40 Reporter LLAD tactical air-control radars.
In addition, the long-overdue process of mechanisation of of the Army’s lorried infantry formations began in earnest since the early 1980s, once service-induction of the 14.3-tonne BMP-1/2 ‘Sarath’ tracked infantry combat vehicles (ICV) began. The first 700 BMP-2s were ordered off-the-shelf in 1984 from the Soviet Union and were delivered by Kurganmashzavod JSC between 1987 and 1991.
An additional 1,000 BMP-2s were ordered in 1985, these being licence-produced in India between 1992 and 2003 at the OFB’s Medak-based facility in Telengana. Yet another 123 BMP-2K ICVs were ordered in 2006 from Russia and were delivered between 2007 and 2008. Another 289 BMP-2Ks—ordered in 2009 and 2011—are now being delivered by OFB Medak. Finally, In October 2014 the MoD gave its nod to OFB Medak to produce 362 more BMP-2s, including 116 NAMICA-2 vehicles.
Against the authorisation of 2,827 and 323 BMP-2s respectively, the Mechanised Infantry and the Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers are today holding only 2,521 and 170 vehicles in various versions that include the.BMP-2 ICV, the armoured amphibious dozer, armoured engineering and recovery vehicle, armoured ambulance, CBRN recce vehicle, carrier command post vehicle, carrier mortar tracked vehicle (198 units), and communications vehicle.
Earlier in 1987, the Indian Army—being acutely aware of the T-72M’s vulnerabilities, had decided to undertake Project Bison—an ambitious upgrade project in cooperation with Yugoslavia’s state-owned Yugoimport SDPR, under which all its T-72Ms would be fitted with the SUV-M-84 digital fire-control system that incorporated a Hughes-built gunner’s sight that was stabilised in two axes and included a thermal imager and laser rangefinder. The gunner’s ballistics computer—developed by Banja Luka-based (in today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina) RUDI ČAJAVEC Rudi Cajevec—was designed to automatically download cross-wind data, vehicle cant, azimuth tracking rate and range, while the gunner manually inputted the data for air-pressure, air temperature, barrel wear, barrel droop and ammunition type. Also planned for retrofit was the 12-cylinder water-cooled V-46TK 1,000hp diesel engine, that would have given the T-72M a power-to-weight ratio of 24.10 hp/tonne (thereby replacing the V46-6 engine that was rated at 780hp). A procurement contract was signed with Yugoimport SDPR in early 1989 and an advance down-payment was made as well, but by 1991, Project Bison had to be scrapped in its entirety as by then civil war had broken out in Yugoslavia, and the country was subjected to an UN-mandated universal arms export/import embargo.
Under Nuclear Overhang
When, as a consequence of the Wangdung/Sumdorong Chu Incident in 1986, the Govt of India a year later authorised the commencement of weaponisation of India’s strategic nuclear deterrent arsenal, it was also incumbent then upon the Govt of India to take the country’s armed forces in to confidence so that a comprehensive ‘Strategic Defence Review’ be conducted in order to re-orientate the military warfighting doctrines and the consequent force modernisation efforts of India’s three armed services. Sadly, this was not done (until late 2002), with the Govt of India choosing to instead rely only on the scientists and technocrats of the country’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) for strategic guidance on operationalising India’s nuclear deterrence posture, little realising the dangerous consequences this was to have in future in terms of diminishing India’s conventional military deterrence—which became evident 12 years later.  
By 1989 India was buffeted by economic crisis, political and social demoralisation, and communal polarisation, while Punjab was still gripped by an active rural insurgency/urban terrorism, while Pakistan was then of the firm belief that the fruits of the decade-long Afghan Jihad could be replicated with success inside Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) by whipping up revisionist/distorted religiosity. Consequently, after the V P Singh-led government was sworn in on December 2, 1989, the kidnapping of 23-year old Rubaiya Sayeed (daughter of the then Indian Union Home Affairs Minister Mufti Mohd Sayeed) by the Pakistan-based Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) took place on December 8. This incident, along with overt Pakistani raising, funding and arming of various Pakistan-based terrorist ‘tanzeems’ (like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen or HuM) opened the floodgates of terrorism inside J & K. By January 1990 a concentrated and venomous campaign by the JKLF and HuM was initiated against J & K’s minority Kashmiri Pandit community throughout the Kashmir Valley through toxic hate-preaching systematically emanating from several Mosques inside the Valley, This on January 18, 1990 reached a fever-pitch, which in turn led a day later to the mass-exodus of some 300,000 Pandits from the Valley to safer areas in Jammu and elsewhere outside J & K. On February 5, (when the then PM of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto and the then Chief Minister of Pakistan’s Punjab province Mian Mohd Nawaz Sharif were trying to outdo one another when it came to supporting the ‘Kashmir cause’) a thousands-strong crowd of Pakistanis tried to forcibly cross the LoC and they were fired upon by India’s Border Security Force, which led to several casualties. A few days later, yet another attempted crossing was also fired upon. On March 13, at a rally in Muzaffarabad, Benazir spoke about waging a 1,000-year war for the sake of Kashmir, while India retorted by stating that if it came to war, Pakistan would not last for even 1,000 days. While Benazir was dismissed as PM in August 1990, the V P Singh-led government fell in November 1990. In February and late March 1992, attempted crossings the LoC—this time by the JKLF—was thwarted by Pakistan’s then PM Nawaz Sharif. In mid-October 1993 a group of terrorists holed themselves up inside the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar (a similar incident had taken place in 1963) along with 150 pilgrims who were held as hostages, and demanded safe passage, threatening otherwise to kill the hostages, blow up the mosque and destroy the relic of the Holy Prophet that housed inside the shrine. Though this crisis was resolved peacefully by mid-1993, India clearly interpreted as this as being nothing but an overt re-enactment of 1965’s OP GIBRALTAR.
This was what made India undertake a national endeavour on February 22, 1994 when India’s Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution that firmly declared that the State of J & K has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means, and that Pakistan must unconditionally withdraw from PoK, which it had forcibly occupied through military means. This parliamentary articulation of a position hitherto implicit or left understated was, in fact, a tectonic change that many ar that time had failed to grasp. But the Indian Army had grasped and understood the full politico-military implications of this resolution, and therefore it began the process of revisiting its force modernisation plans. Consequently, in March 1994 Army HQ formulated its GSQR for tracked self-propelled howitzers (T-SPH) SP by using the 152mm 2S19M1/MSTA-S T-SPH as the baseline performance parameter benchmark. In response to a subsequently-issued RFI, proposals were received in December 1994 from five OEMs and subsequently, field mobility-firepower trials on a no-cost no-commitment basis of four different hybrid T-SPHs (from France, the UK, Russia and South Africa) were conducted between April and July 1995. During these trials, the option of using the T-72M hull for mounting the turret-mounted howitzer proved to be a failure due to powerpack-related mobility deficiencies and thus IA HQ rejected all four offers.
What was required at this stage from the P V Narasimha Rao-led government were new war directives that emphasized the importance of waging limited high-intensity conventional wars of limited duration under a nuclear overhang, which would have replaced the then warfighting doctrine of all-out wars based on overwhelming retaliation—which was conceived in the early 1980s and was based on Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji’s  (who was the Army’s COAS from February 1, 1986 till April 30, 1988, or 820 days) Combat Papers I and II (that were published when he was Commandant of the College of Combat in Mhow in 1980-1981).  In fact, Gen Sundarji himself revisited his classic expositions of the Army’s thinking on this subject in his novel, titled ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’—a suggestively fictional account of his own thoughts on the subject—in 1993. However, India’s ruling political elite at that time had no stomach the glaring objective ground realities, and instead continued to repose more faith in the country’s scientists and technocrats, while totally ignoring the well-meaning operational inputs from the armed forces. Due to this, the end-users of military hardware were forced to accept what the DRDO had to offer, such as liquid-fuelled rocket artillery assets developed by the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based  Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) Research Centre at Imarat (RCI). Subsequently, the Indian Army raised its 333 (in June 1993 and commissioned in October 1995), 444 (raised in October 2003) and 555 Missile Groups (operational by January 2005), each equipped with a total of 60 liquid-fuelled, conventional warhead-armed, 150km-range Prithvi SS-150 surface-to-surface battlefield support missiles (SSBSM), including reserve rounds.
Each SS-150 Missile Group was made up of two Sub-Groups that in turn were made up of two Troops. Each Troop had two SS-150 mobile autonomous launchers (MAL). Thus, each Group had 8 launchers and almost 24 support vehicles (including the Fuel Carrier, Missile Transporter, Oxidiser Carrier, Warhead Carrier), while the number of MALs was then expected to eventually treble to 24. In times of hostilities, the missiles were required to be pre-fuelled (the shelf-life of the liquid propellant while in storage was 10 years) before being deployed to their launch sites where only three vehicles—the MAL, power supply vehicle and one Mobile Command Post (MCP)—would need to be employed. The Prithvi SS-150—officially described by the DRDO as a tactical surface-to-surface missile and by the Army as a battlefield support missile--was fuelled by a liquid propellant (a 50:50 combination of isomeric xylidine and trimethlyamine), with the oxidizer being inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The propellant had a 260 specific impulse—as specified by the Army, which required a range fluctuation between 40km and 150km—and this, according to the DRDO, could only have been achieved by a variable total impulse best generated by liquid propellants. When it achieved operational status, the SS-150, equipped with a strap-down inertial navigation system, had a CEP of 300 metres. Warhead options for the SS-150 included the standard high-explosive unitary warhead (weighing 1,000kg), pre-fragmented and cluster munitions, an incendiary warhead, and a fuel air explosive warhead.
 
Following its launch, the SS-150’s semi-ballistic trajectory took it to an altitude of 30km following which it adopted either a steep downward trajectory at nearly 80 degrees, or a lift-augmented descent trajectory. As far as the latter option went, there were six flight-path variations available (which were pre-programmed prior to launch) in order to defeat or confuse hostile air-defence systems. It is evident from all this that the SS-150, during, hostilities, was envisaged by the DRDO to be meant to be employed for massed, but not effects-based, fire-assaults against largely static targets like troop concentrations, plus railroad and POL junctions, this being done in order to severely degrade the hostile force’s theatre-level conventional force reserves before they could become effective in the forward tactical battle areas. The Indian Army, however, never intended to use the SS-150 in such a manner simply because its warfighting formations were required to have situational awareness only out to a distance of 50km within the tactical battle areas.
Similarly, the Indian Air Force too was forced to induct the liquid-fuelled, single-stage, 250km-range, 8.56 metre-long Prithvi-250 into service in 2003. The SS-250 was first test-fired on January 27, 1996 and again on March 31, 2001. Subsequently, the DRDO and the MoD unsuccessfully tried their best to force the Air Force to view such SSBSMs as substitutes for interdictor/deep-strike combat aircraft and induct the 350km-range Prithvi-2 (test-fired on  May 23, 2008; October 12, 2009; March 27 and June 18, 2010; June 9, 2011; December 20, 2012; August 12, 2013; and December 3, 2013) and the 600km-range, solid fuelled, RLG-INS-equipped Prithvi-3 (test-fired on May 19, 2016; November 21, 2016; andJune 2, 2017) into service, along with the  150km-range, solid-fuelled Prahar SSBSM (developed in a span of less than two years and test-fired only on July 21, 2011). Such SSBSMs simply had no operational value-addedness, given their inability to deliver actionable, high-accuracy fire-assaults and their large, on-ground deployment footprints.
As a result of these above-mentioned mis-steps on the part of successive governments since 1987, when India conducted the Shakti-2 series of weaponised nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998 (which were followed on May 28 and 30 with similar tests being conducted by Pakistan), the conventional warfighting strategies of the Army and Air Force were totally out-of-touch with the new emerging ground realities, which have since then meant that: 

1) Neither India nor Pakistan could any longer wage all-out AirLand wars of overwhelming conventional retaliation deep inside each other’s sovereign territories, since both possessed the type of nuclear WMDs (with yields not exceeding 4 kT) that could be used defensively within each other’s own territories in order to blunt large-scale conventional AirLand offensives.

2) This consequently will henceforth render the Strike Corps formations of both countries largely ineffective all along the international boundary (IB).

3) Waging limited high-intensity conventional warfare became a distinct possibility for as long as such campaigns were conducted within disputed territories, since this does not constitute any violation of international law.

4) Such warfare has be initiated at relatively short notice by India, since Pakistan is geographically linear (with its north-to-south roads and railways running close to the IB) and therefore the latter can mobilise and deploy its warfighting formations using solely its interior lines of communications within 48 hours.

5)The Indian Army, whose offensive strike formations are located deep in the hinterland, is therefore required to restructure its warfighting formations in such a manner so as to keep them permanently deployed at forward locations (within 100km of both the IB and LoC).

6)This in turn requires the pre-positioning of war-waging hardware and their end-users in up to 10 newly-built cantonments close to both the LoC and what Pakistan refers to as the Working Boundary (WB).

7) The Indian Army’s restructured integrated manoeuvrable battle groups ought to be highly mobile, possess far shorter teeth-to-tail ratio, and possess force-multiplier assets when operating in a fluid battlefield where the operational plans are based on real-time situational awareness.
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The State of J & K has 734km of the LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to the Punjab belt running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts.The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the western bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot, which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that Pakistan refers to as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement of 1947 (the so-called standstill agreement) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan.
Even if the then NDA-1 government had by May 1998 publicly announced its intention to conduct a comprehensive strategic defence review aimed at restructuring India’s three armed services in order to address the new ground realities associated with the conduct of limited high-intensity conventional warfare, the chances of Pakistan launching OP BADR against India in northern J & K would have been slim. Given the total ratio of land forces of India and Pakistan, which then was about 2.25 : 1.2 the Pakistan Army’s Military Operations Directorate had then concluded that the initial Indian military reaction would be to rush in more troops inside J & K, thereby further eroding the Indian Army’s offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, the MO Directorate concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so she would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan. It is for this reason that the Pakistan Army had then concluded that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possibility. The Pakistan Army’s consequent operational plan envisaged India amassing troops along the LoC to deal with the threat at Kargil, Drass and Batalik, thereby resulting in a vacuum in the rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen were required step up their sabotage activities in the rear areas, thereby threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would have helped isolate pre-determined pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. This in turn would have created an opportunity for the Pakistani forces at Kargil, Drass and Batalik to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan for OP BADR was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant. But at the strategic-level the Pakistan Army was caught totally off-guard by India’s vertical escalation (by involving the Indian Army through OP VIJAY and the Indian Air Force through OP Safed Sagar) that lasted from April 29 till August 3, 1999.
However, what totally bemused Pakistan’s military leadership at that time was the totally defensive mindset and a total lack of strategic visioning on the part of India’s then ruling political leadership. This was subsequently articulated by none other than Lt. Gen. Javed Hassan—who as the then GOC Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) had played a key role in commanding both Pakistan Army and the then paramilitary Northern Light Infantry (NLI) forces during OP BADR in 1999. He had in the mid-1990s been commissioned by the Pakistan Army’s Faculty of Research & Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers of the Pakistan Army. In ‘India: A Study in Profile’, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Lt Gen Hassan had argued that the ruling Indian ‘baniya’ is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those who are weak,” he had gone on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.” A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he was more of an academic than a commander, and bore that reputation. He, therefore, was the best-placed with a point to prove in a subsequent military appreciation of OP BADR—this being that OP BADR had provided India with a splendid opportunity to enact its February 22, 1994 parliamentary resolution by embarking upon a prolonged high-intensity AirLand offensive across the LoC that could eventually have resulted in the capture of almost the entire district of Baltistan (inclusive of Skardu and the Deosai Plains) at a time when both the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force were clearly unable to give high-intensity battle for more than a week, since the US, by invoking the Pressler, Glenn-Symington and Solarz Amendments since October 1990 had stopped providing product-support for all US-origin military hardware in service with Pakistan’s military, and also because Pakistan was holding only 48 hours worth of military POL stockpiles at that time.    
This inexplicable defensive mindset of India’s ruling political elite was again in full display during OP PARAKRAM, which was launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on India’s Parliament, and was the first full-scale mobilisation since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Cabinet Committee on National Security’s (CCNS) authorisation and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002 when the CCNS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. In the snow-bound areas of J & K the Indian Army had by then relatively few options to launch offensive operations across the LoC, while in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal, but the nuclear overhang became the inhabiting factor. By that time, approximately 52,000 hectares of land along the IB, WB and LoC had been mined with about 1 million landmines. Till July 2003, the Indian Army had suffered 798 casualties due to mishaps in minefields, mishandling of ammunition and explosives, and traffic accidents. The cost of sustaining OP PARAKRAM was pegged by India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rs. 7 crore a day. This worked out to approximately Rs.2,100 crore over 10 months and did not include the cost of mobilisation and de-induction. India’s Parliament was informed in October 2002 that OP PARAKRAM had cost Rs.6,500 crore, excluding the Rs.350 crore paid as compensation to people residing in border states where Indian troops were deployed. The Army was the biggest contributor to the expenses. Figures collated by Army HQ indicated that the cost of mobilisation of 500,000 troops, including pay and allowances, field allowance for one year and transfer grant alone was Rs.700 crore. The wear-and-tear cost of equipment added up to Rs.1,300 crorem while the depletion of mines, ammunition and warlike stores was around Rs.550 crore. Transport and fuel costs together added up to Rs.850 crore.. The total figure for the Army stood at Rs.3,860 crore and did not include the cost of withdrawal of troops (estimated at around Rs.500 crore) and the cost of demining one million mines for which new demining equipment had to be bought from Denmark. Nor did this figure include the cost of deploying (and redeploying) the Navy, the Indian Air Force and the Coast Guard, which was estimated to be another Rs.1,000 crore.
The only one to voice the Indian armed forces’ intense frustration over the continued myopia of India’s then ruling elite was none other than Gen. Sundararajan ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan, who had served as the Indian Army’s Chief of the Army Staff from September 30, 2000 till December 31, 2002. Going on-the-record on February 6, 2004 (see: http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm), he explicitly stated that problems with India’s then prevailing (or obsolete) military doctrine and a lack of clarity within the then Union Cabinet and on its war objectives had undermined OP PARAKRAM at the very outset. Gen. Padmanabhan argued that significant military gains could have been achieved in the first quarter of January 2002, had India’s ruling politicians made the decision to go to high-intensity limited conventional war. These objectives, he said, could have included the “degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in J & K. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed.” Pakistan, the Indian Army planners had then believed, had an interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as possible. The Indian Army on the other hand believed that the best prospects of avoiding such a situation was having forces in place that could rapidly secure limited war objectives across the LoC. “If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done,” Gen Padmanabhan said, “you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.” “War is a serious business,” he continued, “and you don’t go just like that.” Doctrinal baggage, he accepted, had crippled India’s early options in 2002. “You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations,” he said, and “and why my Holding Corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.”
(to be concluded)
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Missing The Woods For The Trees, Putting The Cart Before The Horse

November 20, 2017, 3:03 pm
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Whenever hyper-speculative media hype originates from certain claims made by an over-zealous corporate house, the end-result always tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. And this is exactly what has happened in case of the Indian Army’s requirement of third-generation, manportable ATGMs.  Presently, the Indian Army is authorised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to have a total of 81,206 ATGMs, with each infantry battalion deployed in the plains being armed with four medium-range (1.8km-range) and four long-range (4km-range) ATGM launchers (each with six missiles), and those in the mountains have one of each type along with six missiles for each launcher. 
In reality, however, the Indian Army’s total existing inventory of ATGMs now stands at only 44,000 that includes 10,000 second-generation MBDA-developed and Bharat Dynamics Ltd-built SACLOS wire-guided Milan-2 ATGMs and 4,600 launchers; 4,100 second-generation MBDL-supplied Milan-2T ATGMs; 15,000 second-generation 4km-range 9M113M Konkurs-M SACLOS wire-guided ATGMs licence-built by BDL, plus another 10,000 that are now being supplied off-the-shelf by Russia’s JSC Tulsky Oruzheiny Zavod. Also on order are 443 DRDO-developed third-generation Nag fire-and-forget ATGMs along with 13 DRDO-developed NAMICA tracked ATGM launchers.
 
It was in 2003 that Indian Army HQ had formulated a General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) for acquiring the Milan-2T, armed with a tandem-warhead. The tandem warhead was to be licence-built by BDL. The GSQR of the in-service Milan-2 had provided for an essential range as 1,850 metres and a desirable range of 2,000 metres. The GSQR of 2003 for the Milan-2T had indicated the range as 2,000 metres. The RFP for procurement of 4,100 Milan-2Ts was issued to BDL in January 2007. The MoD’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) did not find the product offered by BDL compliant with the GSQR as the range of 2,000 metres offered had only 1,850 metres under wire-guidance phase, while the last 150 metres was left unguided (along with the first 75 metres after missile launch). The case for procurement was therefore closed in May 2007. Subsequently, BDL confirmed that the guidance-range of the Milan-2T would be 2,000 metres. The case was re-opened and trials of the Milan-2T were conducted in February 2008. Based on the firing trial results, Indian Army HQ did not recommend its introduction into service in view of difficulties in engaging moving targets during the last 150 metres. In addition, the requirement was not met in terms of flight-time and overall weight. Furthermore, third-generation ATGMs were already available in the global market by June 2006. Based on  representations from the staff union of BDL to the then Minister of State for Defence Production & Supplies (since non-placement of orders for Milan-2Ts would result in redeployment of BDL’s workforce and already procured materials common to Milan-2/-2T would have to be junked), it was decided to procure a minimum required quantity of Milan-2Ts in May 2008 by amending the GSQR in August 2008 for the Milan-2T with 1,850 metres range and with the waiver of in-country firing-trials, after considering the long lead-times required for procuring third-generation ATGMs, and the fact that the shelf-life of existing stocks of Milan-2 would expire by 2013. The revised RFP was issued to BDL in September 2008 as per the amended GSQR. The MoD concluded a procurement contract with BDL in December 2008 for the supply of 4,100 Milan-2T ATGMs at a cost of Rs.587.02 crore with a staggered delivery schedule to be completed within 36 months from the effective date of contract.
The Indian Army had zeroed in on the third-generation FGM-148 Javelin as far back as 2008 after it had conducted in-country summer user-evaluations of the RAFAEL of Israel-built Spike-ER ATGM. During these evaluations, seven out of the 10 missiles fired missed their targets because their on-board uncooled long-wave infra-red (LWIR) sensors failed to distinguish their targets from their surroundings (an identical problem had also beset the Nag ATGM’s uncooled LWIR sensors during user-evaluations). In contrast, the Javelin uses a cooled mid-wave IR (MWIR) sensor that can passively lock-on to targets at up to 50% farther range than an uncooled sensor, thus allowing the firing crew greater and safer standoff distance, and less likely to be exposed to counter-fire. As far as weight is concerned, the cooling equipment adds less than 2 lb per weapon. The uncooled sensor is not only less reliable, but its long-LWIR spectrum is only compatible with a dome made of softer materials that vulnerable to abrasion in harsh environments (e.g. deserts) and consequently require replacement more often. The cooled seeker’s MWIR spectrum allows a durable hardened dome, and it is better than LWIR in discerning threats in certain geographic locations or environmental conditions. An uncooled sensor thus brings increased repairs, decreased operational availability, and dangerous vulnerabilities, while a cooled IIR sensor saves lives, lessens fratricide, minimises collateral damage, lowers risk, and protects its firing platforms/crew.
When the then US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, arrived in India on September 16, 2013 for a two-day visit, he came equipped with a proposal aimed at dramatically boosting US-India military-industrial relations. The proposal called for 1) licence-production of the FGM-148 Javelin through 97% transfer of manufacturing technology, but withholding the target recognition algorithms of the MWIR seeker (meaning the seeker’s focal plane array sub-assembly would have to be imported off-the-shelf from Raytheon). 2) co-developing with the DRDO’s Research Centre Imaarat (RCI) and its associated Sensors Research Society (SRS) a fourth-generation version of the Javelin that will feature a dual-mode seeker, hyperbaric warhead, and a longer range of up to 4km. This very same offer, under the auspices of the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), was repeated by the then US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, who reached India on August 8, 2014 for a three-day visit. In fact, by early 2015 private company VEM Technologies had already fabricated a full-scale prototype of the FGM-148 Javelin (see image below) that was displayed at the Aero India 2015 expo.
 
On February 19, 2015 the Kalyani Group issued a press-release that announced the formation of a joint-venture company with Israel’s RAFAEL Advanced Defence Systems (see: http://www.kalyanigroup.com/Final%20Press%20Release%20Kalyani%20Group%20Rafael%20JV.pdf), while the official website of Kalyani RAFAEL Advanced Systems Pvt Ltd (see: http://krasindia.com/) had this to say: KRAS is India’s first private sector Missile sub-systems manufacturing entity. Spread across an area of 24,000 square feet, the KRAS plant in Hardware Tech-Park (In the close vicinity of Rajiv Gandhi International Airport) in Hyderabad will enable production of SPIKE ATGM high-end technology systems within the country. It will be engaged in development of a wide range of advanced capabilities like Missile Technology, Command Control and Guidance, Electro-Optics, Remote Weapon Systems, Precision Guided Munitions and System Engineering for Missile Integration. The facility has been designed to meet the top security classification by adopting highest level of security clearance from Indian and Israel Governments. 
What was highly perplexing was that the KRAS JV was openly announcing its ability to produce Spike ATGMs when even the MoD had not inked any contract for procuring the Spike ATGMs. It is from this juncture that the ‘desi’ patrakaars’ went on an overdrive to peddle the story about the Spike ATGM’s procurement. Here are some examples of such rumour-mongering:

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/kalyani-rafael-advanced-systems-opens-facility-near-hyderabad/article9799805.ece

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/kalyani-systems-rafael-joint-venture-opens-plant-to-manufacture-anti-tank-missiles-4781807/

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Fresh-push-for-Israeli-missile-system/articleshow/50909202.cms

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-firm-to-partner-israel-for-antitank-missiles/article8310952.ece

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/india-to-buy-israelis-spike-missile-for-1-b/article9749112.ece

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/03/27/india-to-buy-spike-anti-tank-missiles-from-rafael/

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-to-buy-8-000-of-these-anti-tank-missiles-from-israel-684662

http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/us-anti-tank-missile-javelin-in-face-off-with-israel-s-spike-113121700038_1.html
One news-report, published on September 1, 2016 (http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/tata-power-to-make-javelin-missile-with-lockheed-martin-jv-116083101441_1.html) even went to the extent of claiming that TATA Power SED had formed a Javelin Joint Venture (JJV) with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for licence-producing the Javelin ATGMs!
 
In reality, the DRDO has since 2012 been co-developing a third-generation MPATGM along with VEM Technologies. The RCI has since then developed the all-composite rocket motor casing, MEMS-based redundant micro-navigation system (RMNS), as well as a new-generation IIR sensor that employs semiconductors using indium gallium nitride and aluminum gallium nitride alloys for the RCI-developed 1024-element staring focal plane arrays operating in the ultra-violet bandwidth that give better solar radiation rejection. User-evaluations of the definitive MPATGM are expected to commence next year, with bulk production commencing sometime in 2020. Both VEM Technologies and BDL will be contracted for mass-producing the MPATGM. As a fall-back measure, in the event of the RCI-developed MWIR sensor not maturing within the given deadline (primarily due to the challenges of developing the all-important target recognition algorithm), then the option of importing the Javelin’s LWIR sensor sub-assembly for integration with the MPATGM still remains open.
 
In addition to the MPATGM, the DRDO along with VEM Technologies is also developing a laser-guided 2.75-inch air-to-surface rocket (first shown at the Aero India 2017 expo) that will be launchable from the Rudra, LUH and LCH platforms.
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Dazzle-N-Destroy Air-Defence Options

December 7, 2017, 2:42 pm
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New-generation mobile, high-energy solid-state laser-based directed-energy weapons (DEW) are fast emerging as cost-effective counter-rocket, counter-artillery, counter-PGM, counter-UAV and counter-mortar systems, since a laser destroys targets with pinpoint precision within seconds of acquisition, then acquires the next target and keeps firing. Such DEWs will thus augment existing kinetic strike weapons like surface-to-air missiles and offer significant reductions in cost per engagement. With only the cost of diesel fuel, a HEL-based DEW system can fire repeatedly without expending valuable munitions or additional manpower. Target destruction is achieved by projecting a highly focused, high-power solid-state chemical laser beam, with enough energy to affect the target, and explode it in midair. This operational concept is thus for the very first time offering the first ‘reusable’ interception element. Existing interceptors use kinetic energy kill vehicles (such as blast-fragmentation warheads), which are not reusable.
A major advantage of HEL effectors is their outstanding flexibility with regard to escalation and de-escalation. Laser beams are eminently scaleable. When fired at optics, radio antennas, radars, ammunition or energy sources, for example, HEL effectors are able to neutralise entire weapons systems without destroying them. At ranges of 2km, mobile HEL effectors in the 50kW laser class clearly demonstrated their ability to locate, track and destroy optics such as riflescopes and remotely operated cameras. HEL effectors have also been used to quickly cut the power-supply cable of a radar mast and then the mast itself. Laser engagement of an ammo box followed by swift deflagration of its explosive content has also been accomplished. When integrated with a vehicle-mounted active phased-array radar for target acquisition/tracking, such HEL effectors can provide air-defence against UAVs of all types, as well as mortar rounds, PGMs and even manned combat aircraft.
The idea that combat aircraft can use solid-state laser-based DEW systems defensively, creating a sanitised sphere of safety around the aircraft, shooting down or critically damaging incoming guided-missiles and approaching aircraft with their laser turrets, is also fast becoming a reality. Fifth-/sixth-generation multi-role combat aircraft will also use such a system offensively, leveraging their stealth capabilities to sneak up on enemy aircraft and striking with speed-of-light accuracy. The introduction of nimble and compact lasers on the aerial battlefield will likely allow combat aircraft designs to cease putting a premium on manoeuvrability, as lasers are speed-of-light weapons. In other words, as long as the enemy can be detected and is within the laser’s range, they are at risk of being fried regardless of how hard they try to evade via hard turns and other high-g manoeuvres. 
Countermeasures will become more about evading initial detection, staying outside an opposing aircraft’s laser’s envelope, and confusing targetting sensors than out-manoeuvring the adversary. In other words, the dogfights of the future will look nothing like they do today. One issue pointed out by Northrop Grumman is that these lasers, along with future engines and avionics, will put out a huge amount of heat, making thermal control a huge concern for stealthy aircraft, IR search-n-track sensors--both air- and ground-based--are only becoming more sensitive and reliable as time goes on. As a result, future stealthy combat aircraft will have to keep their cool in order to remain undetected over the battlefield.
One way aerospace OEMs like Northrop Grumman are looking at dealing with this problem will be by using a large thermal accumulator to control the aircraft’s heat signature while using laser weaponry, although Northrop Grumman seems to be pursuing a different—albeit more shadowy—way of dealing with the problem. Venting the heat off-board only raises the aircraft’s visibility to heat-sealing sensors. Another option is to develop a thermal accumulator, which is a path the USAF is pursuing. An electrical accumulator stores the energy on-board in the same way as a hydraulic accumulator, releasing the latent energy as necessary to generate a surge of power. But Northrop Grumman’s sixth-generation multi-role combat aircraft concept, for instance, eschews the accumulator concept for thermal management because such a system imposes a limitation on the laser weapon’s magazine size or firing rate, forcing the pilot to exit combat until the accumulator is refilled with energy. Northrop Grumman is therefore pursuing a concept that does not rely on accumulators or off-board venting to manage the heat.
Fibre-lasers are typically around 25% efficient at converting DC current to light.  Thus a 50kW, two-minute blast would require over 6kW-hours of juice—or roughly 10 car batteries worth of power (car batteries have typically around 1.2kW-hour theoretical capacity and are 50% efficient in the real world).  However, fibre-lasers are bulky so may not be mountable on vehicles. Therefore, chemical solid-state lasers, are a more likely possibility, but are expensive on a per-shot basis. The biggest problem will likely be the cooling.  For instance, the US Navy’s existing seaborne 15kW HEL effectors already need heavy advanced cooling systems.  That will suck down yet more power, while increasing the system size and weight. The US Navy’s projected 30kW solid-state laser weapon system (LaWS) requires the laser to be able to have several different power settings: from a so-called dazzle effect to confuse sensors to a lethal ability that would be able to splash an UAV or an inbound anti-ship cruise missile, or to disable a small boat.
On land, the US Navy wants its HEL-based DEW to weigh less than 2,500 lb and achieve a minimum 25kW beam strength, capable of shooting down UAVs.  The long-term goal is to sustain a 50kW blast for two minutes with optronics capable of adjusting to environmental conditions like humidity and smoke/haze.  The beam is also expected to have a fast turn-around time--a 20-minute recharge to 80% of total capacity (power and thermal).
Boeing has developed a 10kW HEL-based DEW that weighs 650 lb and will be operated by a squad of eight to 12 soldiers.Able to be assembled in just 15 minutes, this DEW is capable of generating an energy beam to acquire, track, and identify a target—or even destroy it—at ranges of at least 22 miles. Within five years the energy density of this weapon’s batteries could be doubled and the other components should also be further reduced in size to get the weight down to 200 lb. Both Boeing and Raytheon, along with RAFAEL of Israel, are now developing 300kW HEL effectors could fit into 15-tonne trucks. Similarly, Germany’s Rheinmetall, through its 30kW Skyshield air-defence HEL effector, has demonstrated the ability to combine several laser beams on a single target, which develops sufficient power to destroy UAVs, PGMs and cruise missiles.
China’s Jiuyuan Hi-Tech Equipment Corp, a firm under the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), claimed on November 3, 2014 that it has developed a land-mobile HEL-based DEW that can shoot down small aircraft and UAVs out to a distance of 2km within seconds.  It is reportedly effective against aircraft flying at up to 50 metres per second up to a maximum altitude of 500 metres. The definitive Sentinel system can locate small aircraft within a 1.2-mile radius and shoot down small drones flying under 110mph and below 1,600 feet.
Another China-based company—GuoRong Technology—recently conducted technical trials of its truck-mounted DEW that can destroy airborne drones.The company claims that its DEW the laser successfully fired at least twice, including one on a plate of aluminum a few millimetres thick at a distance of 360 metres. In less than 10 seconds, the aluminum plate was pierced with a hole about 4 centimetres in diameter, and the drone, with its control unit destroyed, finally crashed to the ground.
India’s defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) too has been involved with the development of HEL-based DEW since 2008, with all R & D work being conducted at the High Energy Laser Integration Facility in the campus of the Hyderabad-based Centre for High Energy Systems and Sciences (CHESS). The CHESS is mandated by DRDO to be the nodal centre for the design and development of DEWs. Another DRDO-owned laboratory, the Laser Science and Technology Centre (LASTEC) is working on the development of laser source technologies for DEWs, and has so far developed core technologies, including gas dynamic high-power laser (GDL) and chemical oxygen iodine lasers (COIL), and has thus far demonstrated 100kW (multi-mode) GDL and 20kW (single-mode) COIL sources. LASTEC has also developed 1kW fibre-laser through collaboration.
Presently, R & D on 5kW and 9kW fibre-laser sources utilizing complex beam-combining technologies is underway. Power output from these sources will be combined in space for various tactical applications. LASTEC has also initiated work on the development of pulsed fibre-lasers for different military applications. To this end, the laboratory’s ADITYA project was an experimental testbed to seed the critical DEW technologies.
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INS Kalvari S-21 SSK's On-Board Systems & Fitments

December 14, 2017, 4:12 pm
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A unique feature of each of the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene SSKs is an on-board tactical situational awareness display console (above) of the kind normally found on SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. On this single console, the SSK’s Commanding Officer can view overlaid electronic navigation charts, the tactical situation picture, as well as a THALES-provided track table interface to the US Naval Research Laboratory-developed display and analysis tool set, called SIMDIS. The SIMDIS is a set of GOTS software tools in use to support 2-D and 3-D analysis and visualization of the undersea battlefield. SIMDIS allows an integrated real-time view of both time-space position information (TSPI) and telemetry data, and it also provides an intuitive view of complex system interactions before, during and after an event.
The sails of the Indian Navy's CM-2000 Scorpene SSKs (above) differ from those of the CM-2000 Scorpene SSKs of the Royal Malaysian Navy (below) in both looks and content, since the former play host to the VLF buoyant cable antenna suite.
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AAD Endo-Atmospheric Interceptor Headed For Systems Maturity

December 31, 2017, 3:38 pm
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India’s Ministry of Defence-owned Defence Research & Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Hyderabad-based Research Centre Imarat (RCI( and its associated Sensors Research Society (SRS) has since 2012 accelerated efforts to develop a theatre missile defence (TMD) system using the AAD endo-atmospheric interceptor, which is specifically designed for neutralisingthe Pakistan Army’s China-supplied solid-fuelled single-stage DF-11 (Hatf-3/Ghaznavi) 280km-range tactical ballistic missiles and the North Korea-supplied liquid-fuelled single-stage Hatf-5/Ghauri-1/Nodong-1 IRBMs, both of which are conventionally armed. Presently, the Pakistan Army deploys two Missile Groups each of the Ghauri-1 and Ghaznavi (grouped under two separate Artillery Brigades, these being the Hyderabad-based Missile Brigade South comprising Missile Groups 25, 35 and 40; and the Sargodha-based Missile Brigade North comprising the 14, 28 and 47 Missile Groups).
Though the IAF had decided to acquire TMD assets way back in 1996, it was the DRDO that first got into the act of proposing a homegrown solution, for which it initiated the development of the PAD/PDV family of solid-fuelled exo-atmospheric interceptor missiles and AAD/AD-1/-2 family of endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles—with the AAD using an active radar seeker sourced from Russia for terminal guidance (and the THALESRaytheon-supplied S-band Master-A MFCR for mid-course guidance) and the AD-1/AD-2 rounds using medium-wave infra-red (MWIR) sensors for terminal homing.
Of the 15 test-firings of such missiles that have been carried out since November 2006, the PAD was test-fired only once, while the two-stage PDV was test-fired on April 20, 2014 and February 11, 2017. The PDV, which will take at least a decade to mature, is designed to intercept MRBMs (with atmospheric re-entry speeds of 5km/second more than 500km away) at an altitude of 150km. Though the PDV will be cruising at Mach 5, it will be required to attain a peak terminal speed of Mach 11—made possible by the divert thruster placed on top of the second-stage. The divert thruster will generate high lateral acceleration for the ‘end-game’. Both the warhead and divert thruster will be fired simultaneously towards the target once they are within the acquisition range of the PDV’s combined ARSEEK Ku-band RF seeker and the MWIR seeker.
Development of the AAD endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles has witnessed greater urgency, with the AAD being test-fired on December 6, 2007; March 6, 2009; March 15, 2010; July 26, 2010; March 6, 2011; February 10, 2012; and November 23, 2012. Following a three-year interval, the AAD’s missile’s test-firings commenced on April 6, 2015 and were followed by test-firings on November 23, 2015; May 15, 2016, March 1, 2017 and December 28, 2017. The Mach 8 AD-1 is yet to be test-fired and it features all-composite rocket motor casing, MEMS-based redundant micro-navigation system (RMNS), as well as a new-generation MWIR sensor that employs semiconductors using indium gallium nitride and aluminum gallium nitride alloys for the RCI-developed 1,024-element staring focal plane arrays. The AD-2 missile’s terminal-guidance sensor will operate in the ultra-violet bandwidth to give better solar radiation rejection. The AAD’s flight trajectory is shaped through aerodynamic control out to an altitude of 35km and a distance of 200km when used for intercepting re-entry vehicles flying at 9km/second. It is able to sustain up to 30 G, thereby making it unstable. at an altitude of 35km. It stands 7.5 metres tall, weighs around 1.3 tonnes and has a diameter of less than 0.5 metres.
India’s ‘desi’ TMD system using the AAD missiles is still another five years away from maturing, pending the availability by 2020 of a full instrumented TMD test range costing Rs.1,000 crores that will be located at Machilipatnam in Andhra Pradesh (from where the AAD interceptors will be launched from underground vertical-launch cells) and at Rutland Island in the Andaman & Nicobar chain of islands, from where the to-be-targetted ballistic missiles will be launched.
The Machilipatnam-based facility will also house one L-band long-range tracking radar (a licence-built clone of the EL/M-2080 Green Pine early warning radar) along with a launch-control centre, plus a five-array S-band EL/M-2248 MF-STAR target illumination/engagement active phased-array radar that will be mounted in a shore-based structure (which will also house two-way SATCOM data-link antennae) that will bear more than a close resemblance to the island of the Indian Navy’s Project 71/IAC-1 aircraft carrier that is now undergoing fitting-out at the Kochi-based Cochin Shipyards Ltd.
In other words, the Machilipatnam-based facility will be similar in design and deployment layout to Lockheed Martin’s AEGIS ASHORE system, which can be reviewed here:
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/Aegis-Ashore-brochure.pdf
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCt6fq7cvSY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDRrqgX-4Oc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5BEu6EdEZc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITQSKOny5Fk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_McwCnobEg



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IveFdVsiJg
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When Application Of Sound Common-Sense Produces The Best Results

January 8, 2018, 2:09 pm
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The Annual Army Tech Seminar (ARTECH-2018), conducted at the Manekshaw Convention Centre, Delhi Cantonment, on January 8, 2017 also played host to displays of selected innovations of the Indian Army that originated from both within the Indian Army, as well as from Indian industries. 
Shown above  is a Royal Enfield 350 motorbike that was modified last year into a three-wheeler for towing the in-service 120mm Thomson-Brandt AM-50 mortars along mule-tracks in high-altitude terrain. When such 120mm mortars were ordered for deployment in Sikkim during the Doklam standoff, it as discovered that an eight-man crew would be required for dfisassembling each mortar, then strapping them up on a mule-train, and then trudging along for nine hours in order to reach the final destination. The Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers then decided to modify the Royal Enfield 350 motorbike into a towing vehicle, and attach an Eicher-made small engine at the bike’s rear as a booster—all designed to tow the 120mm mortar. The end-result: such a contraption successfully deployed the mortars within a timeframe of one hour while cruising at a speed of 30kph! This modification kit has since been specified for all formations deployed throughout the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.
HIMSHAKTI & HIMRAAJ CIEWS
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North Doklam As Of December 2017

January 18, 2018, 2:17 pm
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