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Is It Really CPEC? Or Is It China's Karakoram Corridor That Is Now Unravelling?-2

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For securing its energy supplies through overland routes, China has since 2005 has been increasing its supply-linkages with Russia and the Central Asian Republics at breakneck speeds. SINOPEC was allowed to buy a chunk of Russian producer Udmurtneft in 2006. In 2013, China acquired 12.5% of Russia's Uralkali, the biggest producer of potash, and CNPC agreed to prepay OAO Rosneft about $70 billion as part of a $270 billion, 25-year supply deal. That was followed by Rosneft’s $85 billion, 10-year accord with China Petrochemical Corp and CNPC's purchase of 20% of an Arctic gas project from Novatek for an undisclosed sum. In September 2014, President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking new markets in Asia for Russian energy exports to replace traditional customers in Europe, announced that he would welcome Chinese investment in Vankor, a vast new oil field in remote eastern Siberia owned by the state firm Rosneft. All of Vankor's output of 440,000 barrels per day of crude is already shipped east, via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline, which includes a spur feeding China's northeast. A Russia-China pipeline will double capacity from 300,000 to 600,000 bpd by 2016. In fact, in 2014, China overtook Germany as Russia’s biggest buyer of crude oil, thanks to Rosneft securing deals to boost supplies via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline and another crossing Kazakhstan. In Beijing on November 9, 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a preliminary agreement under which the Kremlin-run monopoly Gazprom would eventually supply nearly one-fifth of the gas China is expected to need until 2020. All told, the deal, nearly as huge as the countries’ $400 billion gas deal signed in May 2014, meant that Gazprom would supply up to 1.3 trillion cubic feet of gas per year from western Siberia to China in the next 30 years through the new 2,500-mile pipeline, called the Power of Siberia-2. This pipeline will link Russia’s Altai Mountain region to the Xinjiang province of China and northern India.A contract between Russian natural gas company Gazprom and CNPC is for 30 years and calls for 1.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas per year, starting from 2018.And CNPC in 2015 acquired 20% of a $27 billion LNG project in Russia’s far north. It has also been offered equity in oil licence blocks in the Arctic and East Siberia.
Then there is the high-speed rail link that will eventually connect Moscow to Beijing. Vladimir Putin’s vision of a ‘Greater Europe’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok, made up of the European Union and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, is now being replaced by a ‘Greater Asia’ from Shanghai to St Petersburg. Putin agreed to give the planned Silk Road Economic Belt (a regional trade and transportation plan that has been President Xi’s foreign policy priority since 2013) the green light after Xi agreed to include Trans-Siberian and BAM railways in the scheme.
China is now the largest trading partner of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  Beijing has been investing billions of dollars in the energy sector, which include a series of contracts with Kazakhstan worth $30 billion, 31 agreements of $15 billion value with Uzbekistan, and natural gas transactions with Turkmenistan in 2013, which reached about $16 billion. China has also provided loans and aid worth $8 billion to Turkmenistan and is expected to provide at least $1 billion to Tajikistan. In 2015, China upgraded relations with Kyrgyzstan to a strategic level. Presently, Turkmenistan is the largest supplier of natural gas to China, accounting for more than 50% of the total imports. Turkmenistan, which has the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, already supplies China 40 billion cubic metres every year, with exports rising following the opening of a 1,833km-long pipeline in 2009. Both nations had signed a deal in 2007 for the export of 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually for 30 years. Turkmenistan has since agreed to increase its planned supply of natural gas to China by 25 billion cubic metres. Under this deal, CNPC has also received the right to develop the Amu Darya gas fields. For ferrying gas from this area, a 8,700km-long natural gas pipeline, which is the world’s longest, was operationalised on June 30, 2011. The pipeline, which links Turkmenistan with southern China, starts in Huoerguosi on the China-Kazakhstan border, 670km northwest of Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.  Itboosted supplies to China’s booming industrial zones in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hongkong SAR. The pipeline has one trunk and eight branches. Three branches have been completed and the other five will be finished next year.
Earlier in December 2014, the Presidents of Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan inaugurated a railway line that runs from western Kazakhstan to northern Iran. The main goods to be transported via the railway will be oil and other energy products, Kazakh grain and agricultural products, Turkmen cotton and cheap China-origin consumer goods for markets in Central Asia, Iran and beyond. Estimates suggest that by 2020, 10% of trade between China and Europe will be transported via inland rail and road routes. Negotiations on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line, the ‘Silk Road Railroad’ that was initially proposed in 1997, have seen significant progress in recent years.
In Kazakhstan, CNPC beat India by agreeing to pay $4.18 billion in August 2005 for PetroKazakhstan, then China’s biggest overseas oil deal. CNPC had trailed India’s ONGC and its partner Lakhsmi N Mittal’s $4 billion bid at the close of bidding on August 15, 2005. But post-close of bidding, it was allowed to raise the offer price to $4.18 billion, which saw PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian oil firm operating in Central Asia, go to CNPC. Kazakhstan, home to 3% of the world’s recoverable oil reserves, has moved in recent years to exert greater management control and secure bigger revenues from foreign-owned oil and gas projects. Kazmunaigas entered the Kashagan consortium as a shareholder in 2005 and has since then doubled its stake to 16.81%. Kashagan (a Caspian Sea field set to produce 370,000 barrels of oil a day), with reserves estimated at 35 billion barrels of oil in place, produced its first oil in September 2013. It was in July 2013 that the Kashagan project—which contains some of the largest oil discoveries made in the world in the past 40 years—was operationalised. CNPC had then entered the scene with the help of the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank. KazMunaiGaz bought a US-based oil company’s 8.4% interest in the project, and this stake in turn was sold to CNPC for a reported $5.4 billion. The Kashagan project took off eight years later than initially planned and with costs nearing $48 billion, double the early estimates.
In Tajikistan, CNPC and Frances TOTAL in June 2013 completed an agreement with Tethys Petroleum Ltd to develop oil and gas assets under the. Bokhtar project. CNPC’s China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corp subsidiary and Total each took a one-third stake in the concession, which Tethys has said may contain 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas and 8.5 billion barrels of oil. Tajikistan imports more than 90% of the oil and gas it uses, and Dushanbe is eager to develop its domestic resources, much of which lie in the southwest of the country in an extension of the Amu Darya basin, which feeds huge gas fields in neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan’s reserves could meet China’s natural gas consumption for an estimated 24 years. 

The CPEC Conundrum
It is now known that just 6% of what China had promised Pakistan in terms of aid, assistance, and investment between 2001 and 2011 was delivered ($66 billion was pledged in total). And this is because there is no economic rationale to the Kashgar-Gwadar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For, it is physically impossible to maintain year-long connectivity between China and Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which links Kashghar in Xinjiang with Gilgit and Abbottabad through the Khunjerab Pass. Today, the KKH is functional for five months a year at best because of adverse weather. A landslide and flooding in 2010 blocked the highway for more than one year. China and Pakistan have discussed the possibility of building a parallel highway that will feature extensive tunnels that cut through the Khunjerab Pass, rendering landslides irrelevant, but still making it highly vulnerable to earthquakes. Therefore, this idea of extensive tunnelling seems fanciful-and expensive, estimated by Pakistan to cost more than $11 billion
The KKH presently runs approximately 1,300km (915 miles) from Kashgar, following the valley of the Chez River, the Khunjerab Pass (at an elevation of 4,693 metres or 15,397 feet), Hunza (known as the original Shangri-La) for 310km along the Indus River Valley, and along the (Gilgit and) Kunhar Rivers to Islamabad in the Chillas District of Pakistan. Roughly 494km of it lies in Chinese territory, while the remaining 806km traverse through the highest mountains in Pakistan. An extension of the KKH meets the Grand Trunk Road at Raikot, west of Hassanabdal in Pakistan. On June 30, 2006, an MoU was signed between the Pakistani Highway Administration and China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to rebuild and upgrade the KKH. According to SASAC, the KKH’s width will be expanded from 10 metres to 30 metres (33 feet to 98 feet), and its transport capacity will be increased three times its current capacity. In addition, the upgraded KKH will be designed to particularly accommodate heavy-laden vehicles in extreme weather conditions. On January 4, 2010, the KKH was closed in the Hunza Valley, thereby eliminating through traffic to China except by small boats. A massive landslide 15km (9.3 miles) upstream from Hunza’s capital of Karimabad created the potentially unstable Attabad Lake, which reached 22km (14 miles) in length and over 100 metres (330 feet) in depth by the first week of June 2010 when it finally began flowing over the landslide dam. Eventually, a new 24km route along the southeastern side of the lake was completed in 2015 and opened to the public on September 14, 2015. The route comprises 5 tunnels and several bridges. The longest tunnel is 3,360 metres in length, followed by 2,736 metres, 435 metres, 410 metres and 195 metres. The Attabad Tunnel was completed on September 14, 2015. 
Had the intent been to ensure all-weather, year-long road connectivity between China and Pakistan, then logically the Khunjerab Pass should have been discarded as an option, and instead focus should have been laid on five other passes of the Karakoram mountain range. These include the Mintaka Pass at over 4,700 metres above sea level just west of Khunjerab, which was used by travellers on the ancient Silk Route; the Shimshal Pass at 4,735 metres that leads to the Shimshal Braldu River Valley; the Kilik Pass (elevation 4,827 metres or 15,837 feet), 30km to the west of Mintaka Pass, which is a high mountain pass between Gilgit-Baltistan and Xinjiang; the eastern or ‘Old’ Mustagh Pass (altitude of about 5,422 metres);  or the 5,600 metre-high ‘New’ Mustagh Pass, about 16km to the west. 
The Silk Road Fund Co Ltd was established in China in December 2014 to extend investment and financing support worth $45.69 billion in commercial loans to all the envisaged CPEC projects and to promote industrial cooperation with Pakistan. This fund management company—set up as a consortium of leading Chinese banks, including the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank—had initial funds of $10 billion, which have now been raised to $40 billion. The money being offered by China is thus project financing, not aid and not concessionary loans. The Silk Road Fund is injecting the capital into a subsidiary of China Three Gorges Corp. The concessionary nature of the proposed investments comes in when one considers the fact that hardly anybody else is willing to invest in Pakistan. Foreign direct investment into large infrastructure projects in Pakistan is not feasible since no private investor is ready to acquire large stakes in this country, given its internal instability realities. So one has a bilateral commitment from China instead, which is part governmental in that the Silk Road Fund and the China Three Gorges South Asia Investment, a subsidiary of the China Three Gorges Corp.
Out of the pledged $45.69 billion, $33.79 billion has been earmarked for energy projects, $5.9 billion for road construction, $3.69 billion for railway network construction, $1.6 billion for the Lahore Mass Transit, $66 million for Gwadar Port, and a fibre-optic network project worth $4 million. The prioritised, short-term projects involve more than $17 billion in investment. Apart from the 720mW Karot hydropower project between the China Development Bank Corp, EXIM Bank of China and Karot Power Company (Private) Ltd, they include the upgrading of the 1,681km Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi railway line ($3.7 billion); 1,980mW Thar coal-fired powerplants ($2.8 billion); development of two Thar coal mining blocks ($2.2 billion); the Gwadar-Nawabshah natural gas pipeline ($2 billion); imported coal-based 1,320mW power plants at Port Qasim worth ($2 billion); a 900mW solar park in Bahawalpur ($1.3 billion); the Havelian-Islamabad road-link of the KKH ($930 million); a 260mW wind farm at Jhimpir ($260 million); 870mW hydro-electric Suki Kinari project between EXIM Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd and SK Hydro (Private) Ltd; Sahiwal coal-fired powerplant project between industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, Huaneng Shandong Electricity Ltd and Shandong Ruyi Group; and the Gwadar International Airport ($230 million). The Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company, a joint venture of Engro Powergen Ltd and the Sindh government, holds the lease of Thar Block-II coalfields, while its Thar Power Company will construct a series of mine-mouth power plants. In May 2015, Pakistan concluded the implementation and the power purchase agreements for two 330mW projects, which are scheduled to begin commercial operations by December 2017. And the China Development Bank has finalised the terms and conditions for financing a 3.8 million tonnes per annum coal-mining project as well as a power project. On June 25, 2015, Pakistan approved another Thar coal-based mine-mouth power project of 1,320mW capacity, which is being developed by the Shanghai Electric (Group) Corp in partnership with Sino-Sindh Resources, a subsidiary of Global Mining (China) Ltd. Sino-Sindh Resources will receive $1 billion from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. This mine-mouth power project, originally planned to start power generation in 2016, has now been rescheduled for commissioning by 2018. A Letter of Intent from the Chinese banks was issued in March 2015 for 75% project financing of the $2.6 billion project, 25% of which will be equity. In addition, Chinese banks will provide financing for two 660mW imported coal-fired power plants at Port Qasim. A financing cooperation agreement was recently signed by the China Exim Bank and the Port Qasim Electric Power Company for the under-construction project. Pakistan’s National Electric Power Regulatory Authority had approved the upfront tariff on February 13, 2015. The other 660mW project at Port Qasim is being developed by the Lucky Electric Power Company. The two projects are scheduled to begin commercial operations within four years. But they are likely to be delayed as a dedicated jetty for each project has to be constructed for unloading the imported coal, and the contracts for them have not yet been awarded. Meanwhile, the Punjab state government has leased 4,500 acres of land to Chinese investors for the development of Phase-2 of the 900mW Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park, to be commissioned in 21 months. The China Development Bank, Exim Bank of China and Zonergy Co Ltd are involved in it. Likewise, the draw-down agreement for the Jhimpir wind project between UEP Wind Power (the borrower) and the China Development Bank Corp (the lender) has been concluded. The project, having achieved financial closure, is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2016. Given the timelines for completion, these power projects could possibly add reasonable generation capacity to Pakistan’s national grid by 2018, but they would hardly provide any relief to the nation in terms of the fast-growing demand for electricity. And there is no silver lining for consumers as far as the cost of the electricity is concerned. All the Chinese loans will be insured by the China Export and Credit Insurance Corp (Sinosure) against non-payment risks, and the security of the loans is guaranteed by the state. A framework agreement for energy projects under CPEC was recently signed between Sinosure and Pakistan’s Water & Power Ministry to provide sovereign guarantees. Sinosure is charging a fee of 7% for debt servicing, which will be added to the capital cost of a project. For instance, the capital cost of a 660mW project at Port Qasim is $767.9 million. But it goes up to $956.1 million by adding Sinosure’s fee of $63.9 million, its financing fee and charges of $21 million, and interest during construction of $72.8 million; a 27.2% return on equity is guaranteed. Ironically, interest during construction is allowed at the rate of 33.33% for the first year; 33.33% for the second; 13.33% for the third; and 20% for the fourth year. This scenario therefore presents a bleak picture, as the availability of affordable energy will likely remain a pipedream.

Gwadar Port’s Importance To China
Pakistan had identified Gwadar as a naval base site as far back as 1954 when Gwadar was still under Omani rule. Pakistan's interest in Gwadar started when, in 1954, it engaged the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to conduct a survey of its coastline. The USGS deputed the surveyor, Worth Condrick, who in turn identified Gwadar as a suitable site for a seaport. After four years of negotiations, Pakistan purchased the Gwadar enclave from Oman for $3 million on September 8, 1958 and Gwadar officially became part of Pakistan after 200 years of Omani rule. It was offered to the USA for development in the early 1970s, but the US refused to do so. It was only in 2001 that China agreed to co-develop the Gwadar Port by providing $198 million in financial assistance. Gwadar Port was eventually developed by China Harbour Engineering Company at a cost of $248 million between 2002 and 2006. Phase-I covered the building of three multipurpose berths and related port infrastructure and port handling equipment. This phase was completed in December 2006 and commissioned inaugurated on March 20, 2007. Under this phase, the following were constructed: 3 multipurpose berths each with a length of 602 metres and with a combined capacity of bulk carriers of 30,000 DWT) and container vessels of 25,000 DWT, an approach channel 4.5km-long dredged to 12.5 metres depth; a turning basin 450 metres in diameter; one 100-metre service berth; and related port infrastructure and handling equipment, pilot boats, tugs, survey vessels, etc. At the same time, a $200 million Makran Coastal Highway connecting Gwadar to Karachi was completed. Phase-2 of the project, now being built at a cost of $932 million. Will see the construction of 4 container berths, one bulk cargo terminal with a capacity of 100,000 DWT ships, one grain terminal, one ro-ro terminal, two oil terminals (capacity: 200,000 DWT ships each), and one approach channel to be dredged to 14.5 metres depth. Also to be built was a China-supplied oil refinery, plus roads linking Gwadar to Quertta in Balochistan and Ratodeo in Sindh. None of these, however, were implemented, nor was the promised 584 acres of land in Gwadar handed over by the Pakistan Navy to PSA.
Gwadar Port is presently owned by the government-owned Gwadar Port Authority and operated by the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC). Earlier, between 2007 and 2012, it was operated by Singapore’s PSA International. Following the completion of Phase-I, Pakistan had on February 1, 2007 signed a 40-year agreement with PSA International for the development and operation of the tax-free port and duty-free trade zone. PSA International was the highest bidder for the Gwadar port after Dubai’s DP World backed out of the bidding process. In a highly competitive environment, in order to enable Gwadar to compete with its regional peers, the port fees was kept low by allowing a wide range of tax concessions to PSA International to cut operational and business costs. These included complete exemption from corporate tax for 20 years, duty-free imports of materials and equipment for construction and operations of the port and a free economic zone; and zero rate of duty for shipping and bunker oil for 40 years. In addition to these incentives, the provincial government of Baluchistan was also asked to exempt PSA International from the levy of provincial and district taxes. According to this agreement, the Gwadar Port Authority and Pakistan were to get a fixed share i.e. 9% of the revenue from cargo and maritime services, and 15% of the revenue earned from the free-trade zone. PSA International was expected to invest US$550 million in the next five to ten years on creating the operational facilities. The first commercial cargo vessel ‘Pos Glory’ berthed at Gwadar Port with 70,000 metric tonnes of wheat on March 15, 2008. However, by 2011 Gwadar was doing little business as a commercial port, and Pakistan had then asked China to take over the operation.A year later, China confirmed that it would be taking control of Gwadar for a period of 43 years. Pakistan on February 18, 2013 formally awarded a contract for the further construction and operation of Gwadar Port to China. Under this contract, COPHC also won the right to acquire more than 2,000 acres of land.
Work on the port development aspects of Gwadar picked up steam after 2008, when China began sending its warships to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations. In addition, it had become clear to Beijing in 2011 that it desperately required a dedicated naval logistics support base and an air base for supporting the staging operations of People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), such as the one in 2011 that saw China evacuating 35,000 of its citizens from Libya. This is when Beijing started serious work on acquiring such facilities in Djibouti and Gwadar that will support the PLA’s future NEOs that may need to be undertaken in either the Gulf of Aden, or the Mediterranean Sea, or the Persian Gulf.

Miscellaneous Updates

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S-2/Arihant SSBN Showcased In IFR-2016 
Commemorative Booklet
Latest Full-Scale Models Of  NAG and HELINA Anti-Armour Guided-Missiles
Final Configuration Of NAMICA
Existing Long-Range Battlefield Surveillance Sensors & Their New-Generation Variants
IRDE-Led R & D Activities For Multiple Application Optronic Sensors
JF-17 Block-2 Light MRCA With Additional MAWS Sensor Fitment & Aerial Refuelling Probe Undergoing Flight-Tests In Chengdu

Glimpses Of Singapore Air Show 2016

Two More A-50EI PHALCON AEW & CS For IAF

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Following a seven-year wait, India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) will later this month sign a procurement contract with Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for two A-50EI PHALCON AEW & CS (using the IL-476-90 airframe), with each being fitted with the IAI-supplied/installed/integrated ELW-2090 mission avionics suite for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Though the MoD had negotiated and finalised a follow-on US$1.5 billion contract to acquire another three A-50EI PHALCON AEW & CS by November 2008, contract signature could not take place until officials from both Rosoboronexport State Corp and Ilyushin Finance Corp gave firm assurance to the IAF last June that a new-generation successor to the IL-76, called IL-476, featuring a fully-digital fly-by-wire flight control system, glass cockpit avionics and PS-90A-76 turbofans, was available from Russia’s Ulyanovsk-based AVIASTAR SPAircraft Building Enterprise JSC. 
Consequently, the follow-on order for two A-50EI PHALCONs was negotiated with both Rosoboronexport and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) by late last year. From the Russian side the principal industrial contractors will be AVIASTAR SP and Taganrog-based Beriev Aircraft Company. IAI will commence deliveries of the two A-50EIs from mid-2018.
Presently based at the IAF’s Agra Air Force Station as part of No.50 Squadron, alongside No.78 Squadron, which presently operates six IL-78MKI aerial refuelling tankers, the IAF’s first two A-50EI PHALCONs arrived in India on May 25, 2009 and March 25, 2010, respectively. The third platform arrived in Agra in March 2011.

The A-50EI/PHALCON’s EL/M-2075 mission avionics suite of these three PHALCONs includes the L-band active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar (comprising three antenna arrays mounted in a triangular manner) contained within a radome above the fuselage. The electronically-steered beam provides 360-degree coverage around the aircraft and it carries up to 11 mission management personnel for airspace surveillance and airborne battlespace management. BARCO of Belgium supplied the 20-inch AMLCDs for the mission management suit, with Tadiran SpectraLINK supplying the secure digital data links.

SIVA IMR Pod Explained

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In simple terms, the SIVA IMR pod is something similar to the ELTA Systems-developed ELM-2060P radar targetting pod, and it will be used for location of static ground targets/installations. The fact that the DRDO’s PJ-10 Project Office is the nodal agency for developing the IMR pod indicates that this pod will be used in conjunction with the BrahMos-NG (previously known as BrahMos-Mini) air-launched supersonic cruise missile.
While DATA Patterns Pvt Ltd has won the contract to series-produce the BrahMos-NG’s on-board X-band monopulse SAR seeker, the X-band monopulse SAR suite meant for installation inside the IMR pod will be produced by ECIL Ltd.
Systems integration and flight qualification of both the BrahMos-NG and SIVA IMR pod will be jointly undertaken by the Indian Air Force’s Bengaluru-based Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment, HAL’s Nashik Division, BrahMos Aerospace and IRKUT Corp, which is the sole IPR owner of all operating software source-codes used by the Su-30MKI. Service-induction of this weapon system is not expected before 2020.
The existing SIVA HADF pods is used primarily for real-time detection and location of hostile ground-based air-defence radars, with the targetting cues then being uploaded into the Kh-3P anti-radiation missile’s on-board mission computer. This very same pod will in future also be used in conjunction with the DRDO-developed NG-ARM. 

DEFEXPO 2016 Show Report-1

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Without any doubt, from an organising standpoint, the expo was a perfect ‘Maha Satyanaas’, thanks to the Goa State Government’s functioning at neolithic efficiency levels. The following published comments aptly illustrate the ‘refusing to develop’ mindsets of those in the decision-making hierarchies of both the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Goa State Government.
It was refreshing to see the return to DEFEXPO of exhibitors like South Africa’s ARMSCOR and DENEL Group, and Italy’s FINMECCANICA.
However, all foreign exhibitors had nothing new to exhibit, unlike last February’s Singapore Air Show, where DEW-based air-defence systems were showcased.
Let us now take stock of some of the prominent exhibits that were displayed.

DEFEXPO 2016 Show Report-2

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Undersea Webs
A web of strategic projects is now taking firm shape as India enters into closer multilateral military cooperation relationships with Japan, Australia and the United States, as well as regional powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Matters began taking on urgency in late September 2014, after US President Barack Obama and PM Modi have pledged to intensify cooperation in maritime security. Following this, on March 16, 2015 the defence ministers of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the end of the two-day 9th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Langkawi, Malaysia, collectively stated that they wanted India to play a far bigger role in both the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the South China Sea.
In the near future, therefore, under the auspices of the US–India Defence Framework Agreement, foundational pacts like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA), are likely to be inked by the two countries later this year. Concurrently, Japan can be expected to extend funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency for the upgradation of naval air bases and construction of new ELINT/SIGINT stations along the Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands, which is made up of 572 islands (of which only 34 are presently inhabited), stretching around 470 miles north to south. But most importantly, preliminary planning has commenced on a Japan-financed project that calls for 1) laying of an undersea optical fibre cable from Chennai to Port Blair; and 2) the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based surveillance sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point. Once completed, this network will be an integral part of the existing US-Japan ‘Fish Hook’ sound surveillance (SOSUS) network that will play a pivotal role in constantly monitoring all submarine patrols mounted by China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) in both the South China Sea and the IOR. This network will in turn be networked with the Indian Navy’s (IN) high-bandwidth National Command Control and Communications Intelligence network (NC3I), which has been set up under the IN’s National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project at a cost of Rs.1,003 crores. At the heart of the NC3I is the Gurgaon-based, Rs.453 crore Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), whose systems integration software packages were supplied by Raytheon and CISCO. 
Oblique references to all these developments were made in the joint statement that was issued last month after the visiting US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter held delegation-level talks with his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar. The joint statement spoke about: A) new opportunities to deepen cooperation in maritime security and maritime domain awareness; B) commencement of navy-to-navy discussions on submarine safety and anti-submarine warfare; and 3)enhancing on-going navy-to-navy discussions to cover submarine-related issues.
The US was always interested in Japanese and Indian locations for its SOSUS stations. Initially called Project Caesar, this involved running cables out on continental shelves and connecting them to hydrophones suspended above the sea bottom at optimum signal depths. An ‘experimental station’ was established at the north-western tip of Hokkaido in 1957, with the cable extending into the Soya (La Perouse) Strait. It monitored all Soviet submarine traffic going in and out of Vladivostok and Nakhodka in the Sea of Japan.Undersea surveillance systems and associated shore-based data collection stations code-named Barrier and Bronco were installed in Japan in the 1960s. Acoustic data collected at these sites was transmitted by US defence communications satellites to US Navy (USN) processing and analysis centres in the US. In the 1970s, a network between between Japan and the Korean Peninsula was commissioned. By 1980, three stations at Wakkanai (designated JAP-4), Tsushima (JAP-108) and the Ryukyu Islands (RYU-80) were operational in Japan, along with earlier stations built in the Tsushima Straits and the Okinawa area. The existence of old cables at Horonai Point in north-west Honshu, which during the Cold War led out to SOSUS arrays in the Sea of Japan, has been widely described by scuba divers. By the mid-1980s the SOSUS hydrophone arrays stretched from southern Japan to The Philippines, covering the approaches to China.After the collapse of the USSR and the decline of the submarine threat to the US in the early 1990s, the USN allowed its SOSUS systems in the north-west Pacific to atrophy, although some arrays were retained in working order so as to support civilian scientific research (such as tracking whales and monitoring undersea volcanic activity). According to a USN directive issued in August 1994, all seabed-based fixed-arrays in the Pacific were placed on ‘hot standby’; personnel would ‘not be routinely assigned to monitor fixed-array data’ unless that data was required for operational purposes, but in practice the probability of being able to reconstitute them to full operational status was ‘extremely low’. 
However, in the early 2000s, facing an increasing PLAN submarine force and more aggressive PLAN submarine patrols, the USN decided that it needed a new chain of fixed arrays designed primarily to monitor the movement of PLAN submarines between the East China Sea and South China Sea on the one hand, and between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean on the other. Thus was born the US-Japan ‘Fish Hook Undersea DefenseLine’ in early 2005, stretching from Japan southwards to Southeast Asia, with key nodes at Okinawa, Guam and Taiwan. Beginning from near Kagoshima in the southwest part of Kyushu, it runs down the Osumi archipelago to Okinawa, then to Miyako-jima and Yonaguni in the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands, past Taiwan to the Balabac Islands in The Philippines, to Lomkok in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from northern Sumatra to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Three major gaps—between Yonaguni and Suao in north-east Taiwan (120km), between Kaohsiung in south-western Taiwan and the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands (450km) where the East China Sea meets the South China Sea, and across the Bashi Channel (220km) between Hengchun at Taiwan’s southernmost tip and Luzon Island in The Philippines—were plugged. In addition, the USN installed a new SOSUS network, stretching from Sasebo down to Okinawa, in 2006, when the US cable-laying ship USNS Zeus operated together with oceanographic survey vessels and nuclear submarines in this area. In July 2013, Beijing claimed that the US and Japan had jointly established ‘very large underwater monitoring systems’ at the northern and southern ends of Taiwan. One of these stretched from Yonaguni to the Senkaku Islands (about 150km), while the other covered the Bashi Channel down to The Philippines. Thus, this US-Japan undersea trip-wire around the PLAN presently extends across the Tsushima Strait between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, and from Japan’s southern main island of Kyushu down past Taiwan to The Philippines. The curve of the hook stretches across the Java Sea from Kalimantan to Java, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from the northern tip of Sumatra along the eastern side of India’s Andaman and Nicobar island chain. Real-time information-sharing between the US and Japan joins the undersea defence line-up, effectively drawing a tight arc around Southeast Asia, from the Andaman Sea to Japan.

China’s Undersea Trip-Wire
The PLAN’s seabed-based surveillance network, developed jointly by Ukraine and China since 1996, has been under installation along China's territorial waters since 2012, with work expected to be completed later this year. The seabed-based component of this network comprises arrays of hydrophones and magnetic anomaly detectors spaced along undersea cables laid at the axis of deep sound-channels roughly normal to the direction that the arrays are to listen. This capability is next paired with maritime reconnaissance/ASW aircraft assets to establish a multi-tier ASW network. The first naval bases to be covered by this network were the PLAN’s submarine bases in four sites: the Bohai shipyard at Huludao on the Bohai Sea where all nuclear-powered submarines are built; the North Sea Fleet’s Xiaopingdao naval refit base near Dalian where the SSBNs are fitted out for SLBM test-firings from the Bohai Sea across China into Delingha in the Qinghai desert and the desert of Lop Nor in Xinjiang; the North Sea Fleet’s base at Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) approximately 18km east of Qingdao in Shandong Province; and the South Sea Fleet’s bases at Longpo and Yulin at Yalong Bay near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island.
As far back as 2001, a researcher at the PLAN’s Institute 715 had published a survey of ocean surveillance technologies that included a detailed discussion of the US SOSUS programme. Later, one of the most detailed discussions of China’s seabed-based surveillance networks appeared in the journal Shandong Sciencein 2010. However, Shandong was apparently not the only coastal area pushing forward with R & D on seabed-based sensors. Further down south and located near Shanghai at the mouth of large Hangzhou Bay, an ‘East Sea Ocean Floor Observation Test Station’, also known as the Xiaoqushan Station, was discussed extensively by Chinese researchers in an article appearing in Science Bulletin in 2011. Focussing on the collection of a variety of oceanographic information—tidal and current data, for example—experimentation with sonars is presently ongoing at this station with a wireless data-collection system that was commissioned into service in April 2009. Another analysis by several PLAN researchers in late 2012 discussed this station and military applications for its seabed-based sensors, alongside civilian uses, including environmental protection, navigation, and disaster prevention. The analysis compared different configurations for seabed-based sensor networks, including linear, circular, and tree-type designs, and also evaluating their respective cost, security and reliability implications. It also mentioned the Xiaoqushan Station as the basis for a larger ‘East Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network’ that will be completed by 2016. The analysis also mentioned undersea mobile sensor stations, as well as fixed seabed sensors.

In early 2013, China Science Daily’s March 26 edition opted to go public with the system by publishing a feature with the banner headline: “Here They Are Quietly Listening to the Ocean: The Whole Story of the Building of Our Country’s First Deep Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network Base”. According to this article, R & D efforts had commenced in 1996 and an initial prototype of the seabed-based sensor system was tested back in 2005 in the waters surrounding the PLAN’s base at Qingdao in Shandong Province. An additional site was selected for the Longpo naval base, and work formally commenced there in April 2009. Initial set-up was completed in 2010. The undersea-sensor system has since been integrated with a larger surveillance network that also has airborne and space-based components. Two articles appearing in mid-2013 in the technical journal Ship Electronic Engineering, confirmed that this network was now at an active deployment stage. One article discussed the technical challenge of energy supply by proposing a low-power ‘sleep-wake mode’, and mentioned the interesting additional problem that a country’s undersea sensors are subject to being captured by an adversary. Another article discussed the importance of advances in ‘burst communications’ for enhancing the military value of the seabed-based sensor network. A mid-2012 analysis in the naval magazine Modern Ships unequivocally confirmed the existence of PLAN’s network of seabed-based sensors. The cover-story of a second quasi-official naval journal, Naval & Merchant Ships from mid-2013, similarly showed an acute PLAN sensitivity to its perceived vulnerability to Western and Japanese submarines. The central concern shown there was protecting the PLAN’s SSBNs, while the main threat vector mentioned was the USN.
Moreover, it put forward a plausible theory of limited war in the nuclear age: “Limited war theory does not permit the enemy country to become a target. But to win the war one must defeat the enemy’s military forces so that the SSBN can become the ideal target.” The article asserted that the range of PLAN’s SLBMs (the JL-2 SLBM on the Type 094 Jin-class SSBN has a range of 7,400km)must be extended “so that one-way passage to the patrol area is shortened to 5-10 days.” At present, all PLAN-operated submarines are evaluated to be highly vulnerable to detection from “US warships employing active sonar as well as US Navy SSNs lurking near Chinese harbours.” To address this dire situation, the seabed-based surveillance system is deemed critical: “Among the various ASW elements, the seabed-based surveillance system is the foundation and heart, offering advanced warning for the sortie of ASW aircraft and light warship escorts.” The article continued: “The hardest part of ASW is early detection. If China can only find the targets, PLAN’s ASW forces can then apply pressure against the activities of US submarines, limiting their intelligence and attack capabilities.” While this article discusses other critical ASW elements—even highlighting the role of aircraft carriers, for example—a clear focus and conclusion of this analysis is the priority to deploy seabed-based surveillance systems. It envisioned a sequential process: “In order for China to build a relatively tight ASW network, we must first [outside of all major fleet bases] construct fixed seabed sonar arrays for continuous surveillance and control of sea areas close to ports.” The analysis further advocates that after building a network proximate to its naval bases, the PLAN should deploy seabed-based sonar arrays to the west of Okinawa, to the east of Taiwan, and into the Luzon Strait.” Nor should China’s ambitions for undersea surveillance be restricted to the “near seas,” according to this analysis, as it suggested that more distant areas, such as the Bay of Bengal, may be appropriate sites for future Chinese seabed-based sonar arrays “in order to support ASW operations in those sea areas.”

Growing Tentacles
The PLAN presently has an estimated 60 double-hulled submarines, of which 51 are diesel-electric SSKs (two Type 877EKM, ten Type 636, 13 Type 039 Song-class, four S-20/Type 041A Yuan-class, four S-20/Type 041B Yuan-class and 18 Type 035 Ming-class) and eight (four Type 091 Han-class and four Type 093 Shang-class) are nuclear-powered SSNs. In addition, there’s one Type 092 Xia-class and two Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs, with five more of the latter due for delivery in future. Also due for procurement in future are 15 single-hulled SSKs (most likely Russia’s Amur 1650-class) powered by indigenously-developed Stirling Engine air-independent propulsion systems. The number of PLAN submarine sorties has approximately quadrupled over the last seven years, with an average of 12 patrols being conducted each year between 2008 and 2015, following on from six in 2007, two 2006 none in 2005. In the Indian Ocean region (IOR), the PLAN has so far carried out three submarine patrols (all accompanied by Type 925/Type 926 submarine tenders), with the submarines being kept its vessels out at sea for 95 days during each patrol. 
The PLAN’s first SSN patrol within the IOR lasted from December 3, 2013 till February 12, 2014. One Type 093 Shang-class boat left Longpo its bastion at Yulin on December 3. Ten days later, on December 13, the SSN reached the Gulf of Aden via the Ombai Wetar Strait near Indonesia. It remained on patrol in the area for nearly two months. Next to follow was the Type 039 Song-class SSK ‘Great Wall 0329’, which later docked at the China-funded Colombo International Container Terminal in Sri Lanka from September 7 to 14, 2014 along with the Type 925-class tender 861 Changxingdao. This was followed by a patrol of a Type 091 SSN from December 13, 2014 to February 14, 2015. Next came a S-20/Type 041A Yuan-class SSK that docked at Pakistan’s Karachi port in late May 2015, and was accompanied by a Type 925 Dajiang-class submarine tender. From this, it can be deduced that in the years to come, the PLAN will continue with this practice of launching at the very least two annual long-distance patrols—one each by an SSN and SSK—into the IOR. Entry while remaining submerged into the IOR from either the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean will be made through either the Lombok Strait or the Ombai Wetar Straits astride Indonesia. 
During future hostilities with either the US or India, the most likely destinations of PLAN’s SSNs within the IOR will be the area around Diego Garcia and the Chagos Trench. Diego Garcia is part of the Chagos Archipelago, situated on the southernmost part of the Chagos-Laccadive Ridge. To the east lies the Chagos Trench, a 400 mile-long underwater canyon that ranges in depth from less than 1,000 metres to more than 5,000 metres, and the most likely area where the IN’s SSBNs will be lurking during operational patrols.
All vessels, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. Innocent passage requires a vessel to conduct continuous and expeditious transit in a manner that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the archipelagic state.For a submarine, innocent passage means transiting on the surface, as is the case with the Malacca Strait.But the Lombok Strait astride Indonesia is not considered archipelagic waters, rather it is part of an Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL) that carves a path from Lombok in southwest Indian Ocean, through the Flores Sea, the Makassar Strait, the Sulawesi and Celebes Seas and on to the Pacific Ocean. It is like this because Indonesia desires sovereignty within the archipelago beyond the normal 12nm territorial water limit, which can be granted in relation to archipelagic states in certain circumstances, provided the ASLs are designated. For a submarine, normal passage means transiting submerged. The other interesting thing about ASLs is that, unlike innocent passage through archipelagic waters, which can be suspended temporarily on a non-discriminatory basis, this is not the case for ASLs.Any PLAN submarine can legally transit Lombok dived. If it chooses to loiter illegally and then gets caught, it can feign normal passage. 
Unlike the Sunda Strait—which forms part of a separate ASL, but is realistically too shallow for dived passage by all but the most daring/lucky of submarine operators—the Lombok Strait is relatively deep (varying between 800 and 1,000 metres). At the southern end of the Strait, where the channel is divided by the Island of Nusa Penida, a shallow sill is located. Depths rise to between 200 and 250 metres in the channel to the east of Nusa Penida.The sill is of huge importance to the oceanographic behaviour in the Strait, particularly since the Lombok Sea serves as one of two outlets (the other being the Timor Passage) for a great body of warm water that flows from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean—the so called Indonesian Throughflow.This sill, coupled with the Throughflow and tidal flow, results in relatively large current flows, typically from north to south, but is sometimes reversed. Current flows near the sill can reach 3.5 metres per second during spring tide periods. In the deeper water to the north of the sill it slows to between 0.2 to 0.5 metres. It must be noted, however, that current velocities vary as a function of depth. The upper 100 metres carry 50% of the total water transport through the Lombok Strait. Current velocities are, therefore, maximum at the surface with a sharp decrease from 75 to 300 metres.These currents are a quite significant for submarine operations, particularly diesel-electric SSKs, which must conserve battery life or that cannot take advantage of the deeper areas where the current is minimal.They also create interesting and complicated acoustic conditions for sonar on account of the varying temperature and salinity gradients across the current-related layers.

Other Expo Updates
The Arjun Mk.2 MBT prototype displayed at DEFEXPO 2016 hosted a new commander‘s panoramic sight developed by BEL. 
The earlier Arjun Mk.1A prototype had sported the ELBIT Systems-supplied COAPS panoramic sight.
Efforts also continue to achieve weight reductions not just for the Arjun Mk.2, but also for the T-72M1 and T-90 merdium battle tanks.
For supplying four LPHs to the Indian Navy, the competition is between the team of Fincantieri of Italy and Mazagon Docks Ltd on one hand, and Larsen & Toubro teamed up with Navantia of Spain.
Will upload several more slides in the coming days. 

Italy's Cruel Judicial Farce & India's Pathetic Politicians

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Whenever there emerges a cocktail made up of a notoriously trigger-happy bunch of Italian state prosecutors, pathetic Indian politicians—both those in power and those voted out of power—so full of unconscionable behavior, a cabal of unscrupulous Italian citizens masquerading as product marketers, and hyper-ventilating Indian broadcast TV channels, the end-result can only be mayhem and obfuscation, with the truth nowhere in sight. On February 14, 2013 India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) had produced a document that—had anyone bothered to read it—most notably the Italian magistrates—they would have indisputably cleared all Indian citizens of any wrongdoing by removing the motive for corruption. 
All that the three-year trials process in Italy has produced so far is the indictment and sentencing of  Giuseppe Orsi, former CEO Finmeccanica; and Bruno Spagnolini, CEO of AgustaWestland. No material evidence to date has come to light about any direct or indirect money-trail that leads to any Indian official or politician, nor of any wrongdoing done by anyone from either the MoD or the Indian Air Force (IAF). Worse, the material evidence gathered from the alleged middlemen—Guido Ralph Haschke, Carlo Gerosa and James Christian Michel—clearly show them to be groping in the dark and being totally unaware of how exactly the MoD’s procurement-related decision-making process works. For, had they have had even the slightest idea about who had the final say in selecting the VVIP helicopters, they would have clearly mentioned the post of Director of the Special Protection Group (SPG) as being the key and most critical stakeholder of the VVIP helicopter selection process. Yet, nowhere is the SPG’s Director mentioned in any piece of paper containing the handwritten notations of these alleged middlemen. Nor is there any material evidence of any money laundering exercise involving any financial institution.  
It was in August 1999 that the IAF, which is responsible for carrying out VVIP communication taskings, had proposed the replacement of its then Mi-8T VVIP helicopters of its Air HQ Communication Squadrondue to severe operational constraints, such as the Mi-8T’s inability of to operate at night and in adverse weather, inability to operate safely at places in elevations beyond 2,000 metres, and the approaching end of their total technical service lives (TTSL). Consequently, a global Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued in March 2002 to which four OEMs—AgustaWestland, Eurocopter SA, Rosoboronexport State Corp and Sikorsky Helicopters—responded. The IAF’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) subsequently shortlisted three helicopters and accordingly competitive flight evaluations were conducted. Since AgustaWestland’s AW-101 was not certified for operating at an altitude of 6,000 metres, it did not participate in the flight evaluations. Russia’s Mi-172 could not comply with 7 mandatory Operational Requirements (OR). After flight evaluations, only Eurocopter’s EC-225 was found suitable for acquisition. On November 19, 2003 a meeting was taken by Brajesh Mishra, the then Principal Secretary-cum-National Security Adviser (NSA) to the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on this subject. In this meeting, Mishra had observed that his main concern was that the framing of the mandatory ORs had led India effectively into a single vendor situation. It was also noted that very rarely have India’s Presidents or Prime Ministers have made visits to places involving flying at an altitude beyond 4,500 metres. In the meeting it was therefore decided to make the mandatory OR for an operational altitude 4,500 metres. The higher flying ceiling of 6,000 metres, and the mandated internal cabin height of 1.8 metres could be made desirable ORs. Later, a letter dated December 22, 2003 from Mishra to the then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of the IAF, ACM Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy, stating that it was unfortunate that neither PMO nor the Special Protection Group (SPG) was consulted while framing these mandatory ORs. Mishra suggested that the CAS and the Defence Secretary may jointly review the matter to draw up realistic mandatory ORs satisfying operational, security and convenience requirements of VVIPs, and also set in motion a fast-track process for selection and acquisition of the replacement helicopters. In pursuance of this directive, the ORs were deliberated at length between IAF, NSA, SPG and MoD between March, 2005 to September, 2006 and the indicated changes were incorporated. No ambiguity is thus possible: the decision to lower the service ceiling requirement was official and above-board. It was taken during a meeting chaired by the PM’s Principal Secretary-cum-NSA, was followed up in writing with the IAF’s CAS, and was reviewed by the then-Defence Secretary. Subsequently, the revised ORs were deliberated at length for 18 months by the involved SPG and IAF authorities before becoming effective, and were all included in the final RFP document. The acceptance of necessity (AON) for the procurement of 12 VVIP helicopters was accorded by the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) under the ‘Buy’ category with 30% industrial offsets on January 3, 2006.
Next, the RFP was issued to six OEMs on September 27, 2006. Three OEMs—Sikorsky (S-92), AgustaWestland (AW-101) and Rosoboronexport (Mi-172 ) responded to the RFP. Rosoboronexport did not submit the mandated earnest money deposit and the Integrity Pact, along with the Technical and Commercial Proposals (TCP). It had been made clear to Rosoboronexport in February 2007 that this was a global tender and hence every contractual clause would apply to all vendors without exception. As no Integrity Pact and earnest money deposit were received from Rosoboronexport, the Mi-172’s TCP was not accepted. Subsequently, a team comprising officials of the IAF and SPG carried out Field Evaluation Trials (FET) of the AW-101 in the UK and of the S-92 in the US from January 16, 2008 till February 19, 2008. The FET team submitted its report in April 2008 and recommended the AW-101 for service induction. The IAF’s own internal Staff Evaluation Report (SER) concluded that the S-92 was non-compliant with respect to four staff qualitative requirements (SQR)m these being the absence of a missile approach warning system (MAWS), service ceiling of 4.5km, deficient drift-down altitude, and deficient hover-out-of-ground-effect parameters. In addition, the AW-101, unlike the S-92, featured a high tail-boom since it would allow the VVIP’s motorised vehicles to come right next to the rear-ramp and not expose the protected persons to a threat from anyone in the vicinity. The SER thus assessed AW-101 to be fully compliant with all SQRs. 
The Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) constituted by the MoD on August 6, 2008 found that the FETs, compliance to SQRs and selection of the competing OEMs were all done according to the prescribed/mandated procedures. A Contract Negotiations Committee (CNC) was subsequently constituted and it carried out negotiations with AgustaWestland between September 19, 2008 and January 21, 2009. While the CNC was progressing with negotiations, the IAF recommended the inclusion of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS-II) and Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) as additional fitments for all 12 AW-101s, while the SPG recommended the inclusion of integral MEDEVAC systems for 8 of the 12 VVIP helicopters. These additional equipment were considered to be essential for safe and effective operation of the helicopters in the VVIP transportation role. The CNC, thereafter, recommended contract signature at a negotiated fixed-price of €556.262 million ($827 million), or Rs.3,550 crore. The draft contract was next submitted for approval by the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) and was approved by the CCNS on January 18, 2010. Consequently, the MoD inked the contract with AgustaWestland for 12 AW-101s each powered by three Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca RTM-322 engines on February 8, 2010. 
The AW-101 procurement contract included specific contractual provisions against bribery and the use of undue influence. Article 22 of the contract dealt with penalty for use of undue influence. This clause entitled the ‘Buyer’ to cancel the contract with the ‘Seller’ and recover from it the amount of any loss arising from such cancellations. Article 23 of the contract dealing with agents and agency commission required the ‘Seller’ to confirm and declare that it had not engaged any individual or firm, whether Indian or foreign, whosoever, to intercede, facilitate or in any way to recommend to the Government of India or any of its functionaries, whether officially or unofficially, to award of the contract to the ‘Seller’ nor had any amount been paid, promised or intended to be paid to any such individual or firm in respect of any such intercession, facilitation or recommendation. This clause further entitled the ‘Buyer’ to consider cancellation of the contract without any entitlement or compensation to the ‘Seller’ who shall be liable to refund all payments made by the ‘Buyer’ in terms of the contract along with interest. In addition to the above contractual provisions, Agusta Westland had signed an Integrity Pact with the Government of India. The validity of this Integrity Pact is from the date of its signing and extends up to five years or the complete execution of the contract, whichever is later. Under the Integrity Pact, the ‘Seller’ OEM committed itself to take all measures necessary to prevent corrupt practices, unfair means and illegal activities during any stage of the bid or during any pre-contract or post-contract stage. Any breach of the provisions of the Integrity Pact entitled the ‘Buyer’ to take actions against the ‘Seller’ which included forfeiture of the earnest money, performance bond, cancellation of the contract without giving any compensation, recovery of all the sums already paid with interest, cancellation of any other contracts with the bidder, and to debar the bidder from entering into any bid from the Government of India for a minimum period of five years, which may be extended. 
By July 2012 IAF pilots began AW-101-related flying conversion training in the UK, and the first AW-101 arrived at the Palam air base on December 20, 2012 while the second was delivered on December 22 and the third on December 24, 2012. Earlier, in October 2012, the MoD’s Defence Secretary wrote to the Ministry of External Affairs’ )MEA) Secretary (West) to take up the matter of alleged corrupt practices related the the AW-101 procurement contract with the UK in view of the alleged involvement of a British citizen (James Christian Michel), and the fact that the contract was signed with UK-based AgustaWestland. In November 2012, the MEA’s Secretary (West) replied to Defence Secretary, stating that “the UK authorities (i.e. the UK Serious Fraud Office https://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/) were waiting for the results of the Italian investigation in order to ascertain whether there are further actions to take”. 
However, by late 2013 Indian Defence Minister Arackaparambil Kurien Antony single-handedly took the decision to first block progress-payments to AgustaWestland, then to cancel the contract, and finally to sue for payment of the surety and performance bonds that the company had placed in escrow, on the basis of unproven allegations. In doing so, Antony ignored a fundamental legal and moral principle: that the accused is innocent until proven guilty. This is unconscionable behavior for a Union Cabinet Minister in “the world’s largest democracy,” and can only be explained by motives other that a constitutional duty to his mission. The reality is that Antony, as the upcoming general election neared, even wanted to put AgustaWestland and Finmeccanica, its corporate parent, on the government’s blacklist, until he was blocked by the Government of India’s Solicitor-General. By January 2014, the MoD had cancelled the €566 million contract, as well as encashed €228 million of AgustaWestland’s €278 million performance bond, which dented the OEM’s cash position and that of its holding company Finmeccanica. All of this for no other reason than an Indian minister’s overwhelming pre-occupation with his political future.
So, what are the results of the Italian investigative efforts thus far? Firstly, they have only ended up insulting the institution of the IAF. Secondly, they have denied the much-needed replacement VVIP helicopters that are not only required for flying India’s President, Vice-President and Prime Minister, but are also meant for use by the country’s National Command Authority (NCA) in times of emergencies. In addition, such helicopters are also required to be put at the disposal of visiting foreign Heads of State/Government. Imagine such an official guest refusing to fly on-board a Mi-17IV or Mi-17V-5—both of which generally shunned by civilian VVIPs across the globe due to their deficient flight-safety features.   
Here is what India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) says about the Mi-17 family of helicopters: “The MGB drives the hydraulic pumps. Hydraulic power is required for the flying controls. The hydraulic system has OM-15 hydraulic oil. Hydraulic System has a main and standby system. Both systems have independent tanks, pumps, accumulators and pipelines. However, both the pipelines feed only a single booster, which in turn moves the control surfaces. There are a total of 4 boosters in the system. One critical weakness in the system is that if there is a leakage in the booster, there is a possibility of the entire oil from both the main and the standby systems leaking out. The emergency procedure for a total hydraulic failure is to have both pilots flying the aircraft in unison to a landing. The Mi 17V-5, which is a military version of the Mi-17, is being flown by the IAF and Border Security Force. As per the Flight Manual of this aircraft, the crew is to abandon the aircraft in case of total hydraulic failure. In case they cannot, then they have to resort to flying by both pilots to land immediately. Therefore, the procedure given in the Mi-17’s Flight Manual for total hydraulic does not inspire confidence in the pilots. All of them feel that this aircraft cannot be flown with a total hydraulic failure. They feel that this aircraft cannot even be taxied on ground with total hydraulic failure.”

And finally, to add insult to injury, Italian state prosecutors will be the only characters in this sorry story to escape unscathed. 

So, if all those pathetic politicians (both of the ruling national coalition and those of the UPA-1/2 coalitions) in Lutyens’ Delhi are indeed serious about seeking the truth while ensuring that the prestige of the IAF and the survivability of India’s NCA are assured, then they better take heed of how Taiwan had overcome a similar crisis in the not-too-distant past. The details of this case are as follows:

On August 31, 1991 France and Taiwan signed the ‘Bravo Contract’ to supply six Lafayette-class guided-missile frigates (FFG) for a total of US$2.5 billion. The buyer of the FFGs was the Plans Office of the Republic of China Navy (RoCN), acting on behalf Taiwan. The FFGs were to be built by DCNS. Shortly thereafter, the authorities in Taiwan accused the French state-owned ELF Aquitaine of having paid bribes through Thomson CSF (now THALES Group) to persuade both French government and RoCN authorities to approve the contract and launched an investigation. Taiwan initiated arbitration proceedings against DCNI during the second half of 2010. The case was eventually heard by the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration. The court found that THALES Group had violated the anti-corruption terms of the contract and was therefore liable to repay all bribes, plus associated interest and legal fees. THALES appealed, and the decision was upheld by the Paris Court of Appeal, ordering THALES Group to pay compensation to Taiwan in the amount of €630 million (US$913 million). The French government and THALES Group announced the payment of the fine, with the French government paying approximately 72.54%, or around €457 million, and THALES Group the remainder.


http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/06/09/france-thales-sa-agree-to-pay-630-euros-in-frigate-case/

The Rebuttals
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) had submitted a report on the acquisition of helicopters for Very Very Important Persons (VVIPs) on August 13, 2013. The audit sought to examine the process of acquisition of VVIP helicopters and its compliance with the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), the prescribed procedure for procurement in the defence services. The report can be read here:


Key findings and recommendations of the CAG in this report were obviously derived by officials who were not domain experts. The findings/recommendations are detailed below as are their rebuttals:

Claim: The initial Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the Ministry of Defence in 2002 mandated an altitude requirement of 6,000 metres. Only one helicopter, the EC-225 of Eurocopter met this requirement. The EH-101 helicopter (later renamed AW-101) of AgustaWestland did not meet this requirement.
Fact: That’s because that RFP was based on specifications that favoured only the EC-225 and the Mi-172. In fact, the MoD had in 1999 estimated that the total acquisition cost of eight VVIP transportation helicopters would be no more than Rs.793 crore, and this figure pertained to only the Mi-172 helicopter that did not contain any customer-specified equipment. The MoD had obtained such cost estimations from Pawan Hans Ltd, which had by then been operating the Mi-172.  
Claim: However, the first RFP was cancelled due to the emergence of a single-vendor situation. In the revised RFP in 2006, the altitude requirement was reduced to 4,500 metres, and a cabin height requirement of 1.8 metres was introduced, making the AW-101 eligible, and the EC 225 ineligible.The lowering of the altitude requirement was against the ORs of the procured helicopters, especially in many areas of the north and north east of India. In addition, the single-vendor situation remained even after lowering the altitude requirement, because of which the AW-101 of AgustaWestland was selected.
Fact: Totally untrue. At a meeting of the PMO on November 19, 2003, it was Brajesh Mishra who, acting upon the advice of the SPG, directed that the desired VVIP helicopter’s service ceiling be reduced from 6,000 metres (18,000 feet) to 4,500 metres or 14, 000 feet; that the internal cabin be of the stand-up type, meaning a height increase from 1.4 metres to 1.8 metres; and an increase in the number of VVIP helicopters from 8 to 12. Thus, 3 (THREE) different deviations were sought from the PMO, and NOT from IAF HQ. A letter to this effect was later drafted by Brajesh Mishra from the PMO and this letter was dated December 22, 2003 and it was addressed to both IAF HQ and to the SPG’s Director. As a result of this, from that day itself, the EC-225 got disqualified since its cabin height was only 1.45 metres. Insterad, from then on, three contenders remained in the fray, i.e. the Mi-172, the S-92 and the AW-101, with the latter two having cabin heights of 1.82 metres.
Claim: The revised SQRs in 2006 made competition more restrictive instead of making the procurement procedures more broad-based to increase competition. The fresh RFP with revised SQRs was issued to only 6 vendors as opposed to 11 in 2002.
Fact: This is spectacularly ridiculous. Can anyone in the CAG or in this world ever explain how a competitive evaluation process involving 12 contenders can guarantee a far better deal than a competitive evaluation process involving 6 contenders? Can even a single such precedence be sited from anywhere else in this world?
Claim: The Field Evaluation Trial (FET) of the AW-101 was conducted on representative helicopters and not the actual helicopter. The AW-101 was still at the development stage at the time of the FET.
Fact: Totally wrong. The AW-101, known earlier as the EH-101, has been available as a fully developed and flight-certified helicopter since the 1990s. Furthermore, never in the history of aviation has any aircraft or helicopter been developed from scratch as a VVIP platform. Every VVIP helicopter flying today makes use of a platform that was originally developed for either military/military utility usage and that has been customised through customer-specified fitments. Similarly, when the Indian Navy wanted to evaluate the contenders for its LRMR/ASW platform requirements, it had to evaluate representative candidates like the Airbus A319MPA and the Boeing P-8A Poseidon.  
Claim: Although the 2006 RFP had laid down the necessity of carrying out the field evaluations in India, they were conducted abroad. The recommendation and assurance given by the IAF Chief (October 2007) to conduct evaluation trials abroad lacked justification.
Fact: Necessity, yes; compulsory, no. Deviations from this requirement have always been allowed over the past 16 years. For i9nstance, field evaluations of VVIP transport aircraft like the Boeing BBJ and Embraer EMB-135BJ Legacy were all conducted abroad in the previous decade.  
Claim: Given the low utilisation levels of the existing fleet of helicopters, the MoD was not justified in procuring four additional helicopters for VVIPs.
Fact: The existing Mi-8Ts had approached the end of their TTSLs by 2005 itself and therefore could be used only sparingly. Instead, most VVIP flying between 2005 and now has been done on board the IAF’s Mi-17-IVs, 40 of which were bought early in the previous decade.
Claim: The cost benchmarked by the Contract Negotiation Committee was much higher than the offered price, allowing no room for negotiation.Hence, it provided no realistic basis for obtaining an assurance about a reasonable cost procurement of AW -101.
Fact: The MoD’s benchmarked cost was Rs.4,877.5 crore while AgustaWestland’s offer-price was Rs.3,966 crore, meaning the former figure was 22.80% higher. The final negotiated figure was Rs. 3,550 crore. Therefore, to claim that there was no room for negotiations on the price issue is blatantly false. Usually, the benchmarked cost has a 20% mark-up in order to factor in various variables, such as the customisation of the platform (through the incorporation of special fitments) and the quantum of spares-support required for a finite period of time, like for a single year or for a three-year period.

Other Slanderous Claims
The Milan Appellate Court’s judgment concerning Indian citizens, which relies almost entirely on the testimony of Guido Haschke, blandly states: “Ultimately, there are no elements of certainty to affirm this beyond any reasonable doubt that the reduction in the operating height was made contrary to the public (duty), and then (Air Chief) Marshal Tyagi carried out specific acts contrary to his duty; it remains, anyway, the wrongfulness of his conduct, for having offered to cooperate with AW in an economic operation which prohibited all forms of mediation, and for having received a large compensation in relation to its institutional activity.”
Now, either Italian state prosecutors and court judges are spectacularly insane, or they are loathe to do their homework. For instance, the date on which written directives to revise the QRs were issued from the Indian PMO to IAF HQ was December 22, 2003 and at that time the IAF’s CAS was ACM Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy. ACM Shashindra Pal Tyagi took over as the 20th CAS of the IAF only on December 31, 2004, and had retired on March 31, 2007. The competitive evaluations of the two shortlisted contenders were done during the tenure of ACM Fali H Major, while contract signature for Contract No. HQ/S96062/6/ASR was done when ACM P V Naik was the CAS. Furthermore, if at all the Italian state prosecutors and the presiding Judge of the Milan Appellate Court were to have done their homework on how exactly the decision-making process works for military procurements, they surely wouldn’t have targetted S P Tyagi. All they had to do was study this document:


It is evident from this document that the primary decision-makers on all technical aspects of production evaluations/shortlisting within IAF HQ are the VCAS and DCAS Branches, and not the office of the CAS. The bulk of the work is done by the concerned Project Director who reports to the DCAS Branch and the final call is taken by the VCAS Branch. The only job then left for the CAS is to ENDORSE the recommendations and conclusions. He does not have the authority to either revise or reverse anything at this stage.  
Then we have utterly false canards being spread by the TIMESNow broadcast TV channel, such as ZAPPA being a code-word. In reality, Zappa is the surname of Giorgio Zappa, the former CEO of Finmeccanica. Similarly, this Channel has since claimed that AgustaWestland International Ltd (AWIL) is not an OEM. In reality, AWIL is indeed the OEM whose helicopter manufacturing facilities are located in Yeovil,Somerset in the United Kingdom, where the IAF’s first three already-delivered AW-101s were built. And just like AWIL, the Italy-based helicopter manufacturing subsidiary of Finmeccanica SpA is known as AgustaWestland SpA, while the facility based in The Netherlands is known as Agusta Westland NV, Netherlands. 

The false canards being spread by TIMESNow can be viewed here:



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ7VL7Gh1j0

That's Airpower For You!

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Elephant Walks in South Korea During 
EX Beverly Herd 16-01
Now, what follows below is what one does not get to see, since they are all the end-products of 
BLACK PROJECTS.
In the late 1970s, the USAF initiated the Compass Cope R & D project to develop a tactical, survivable reconnaissance UAV. The mission envisioned for the aircraft would seem familiar today, for are nearly identical to that of the Northrop Grumman-developed Global Hawk UAV, and in many ways the two aircraft are similar. Boeing beat out Teledyne Ryan for the Compass Cope contract, only to have the project terminated soon after the competition ended in 1979. Around the time that Compass Cope was cancelled, the USAF had several aerospace companies study an Advanced Remotely Piloted Vehicle (ARPV). This would a mid-sized RPV with limited stealthy features and missions, including reconnaissance, EW, and precision-strike. Soon after the contractor studies were complete, the USAF ended the project. Beginning in 1978, Northrop Grumman began to study how to apply low observables experience gained from the Have Blue (and later Tacit Blue) projects to a number of roles, ranging from cruise missile carriers to loitering reconnaissance platforms. A number of older studies of flying-wing and span-loader aircraft were dusted off and scale-models were tested on indoor ranges to determine if any aircraft configurations had any ‘natural’ stealth qualities. 
The Have Blue project had left a very bad taste in Northrop Grumman’s mouth and it had nothing new lined up to keep money coming in, and Lockheed Martin’s XST had beaten its design by a considerable margin—largely due to Lockheed Martin’s experience with materials from the Oxcartproject and the ECHO 1.0 software package. Northrop Grumman had little experience with the kind of computing required to predict RCS (ironically, Northrop Grumman’s employees started most of the world’s major computer and semiconductor companies, such as IBM) so they had to make do with trial-and-error and commercial radar absorbent materials. At DARPA’s request, Northrop Grumman in 1978 began studying a stealthy radar-carrying platform under the Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft Experimental (BSAX) project. At the same time, Northrop Grumman was working on its own to develop new projects that would be of interest to the US Dept of Defense. One of these was Tacit Rainbow--a loitering anti-radiation missile. Another concept was the Tactical High Altitude Penetrator, or THAP. Northrop Grumman had been looking at flying-wing span-loader aircraft for military use with great interest in the late 1970s. Recent advances in materials and flight-control technology made an advanced span-loader more possible than ever. Missions ranging from super heavylift transports and aerial refuelling tankers to intercontinental bombers were studied. A separate group at Palos Verdes investigated the span-loader as a stealthy platform. A great deal of indoor RCS work was done on span-loader scale-models in the late 1970s. In June 1991, AW & ST reported that this was the TR-3A Black Manta—a classified tactical reconnasissance aircraft supporting the F-117A force with laser target designation and bomb damage assessment. The article also identified the TR-3A as an outgrowth of the THAP concept, but it carried not a bay full of reconnaissance gear, but rather an internal weapons bay holding a Paveway-2 laser guided bomb, which in essence made it a manned Covert Survivable In-weather Recon/Strike (CSIRS) platform. 
The TR-3A is obviously optimized for high-altitude (50,000 feet and above) loitering over denied areas--like hanging out over a ‘SAM City’. This would suggest a reconnaissance role. Precision-strike aircraft are designed to get in and out fast to minimize exposure to enemy air-defences. Reconnaissance aircraft typically go one of two ways: fast in and out, like the SR-71; or long time over target to keep an eye on movements of the target and collect more targetting data. Anything that has to hang inside hostile airspace will be designed with stealth in mind. The TR-3A was thus optimized for low-observables (using off-the-shelf technology, no less) and it cruised at the uppermost reaches of the threat envelopes of SAMs. Only a few SAM systems can reliably hit something above 50,000 feet. But even those systems are only marginally effective at that altitude. And the small amount of radar energy reaching up there does not exactly help the SAM hit its target. So the chances of bringing down a TR-3A at mission altitude are pretty slim. Reportedly in 1983, an industrial consortium of General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas received a contract from the USAF to produce 30 airframes under the name ‘Tactical Survivable Aircraft’. There are a number of missions that can be assigned to the TR-3A in wartime. For one, it could simply be a system for attacking the same targets as an F-117A, though from high altitudes. This would be similar to a tactical version of the B-2B attacking SAM sites as they turn on, or casing down mobile targets like C4I faculties and land-mobile tactical ballistic missile/cruise missile launchers.
Back in 1986, there was speculation among US military pilots and industry insiders that a new secret aircraft was being developed having the mysterious designation F-19. The rumours were partially substantiated by leaks within the aerospace industry, and a US$9.95 scale-model was produced by Testors Model Corp, which incidentally became the biggest selling plastic model kit of all time. At the very least, the USAF added to the confusion by skipping a designation between the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, and the Northrop F-20 Tigershark. This left a gap for an aircraft that may have held the designation F-19. It was said that the F-19 was a low-observable stealth aircraft that was being developed by Lockheed Skunk Works. However, when the F-117 Nighthawk was finally revealed to the public on November 10, 1988 rumoirs of the mysterious F-19 disappeared. It was assumed that the F-19 was in fact the F-117. Subsequent research indicated that this assumption was fundamentally incorrect, and that there really was an F-19. In 1979, a retired SR-71 pilot was flying a Learjet north of what is commonly referred to as Area 51. After breaking through a group of clouds, the pilot noticed a very strange-looking aircraft just ahead and to his lower left position (he had been shadowing the craft for approximately 10 minutes). The aircraft measured approximately 65 feet in length. It was completely black in colour, and had a flattened football or rounded-diamond shape, and appeared slightly more elongated in the front half. The X-15-like cockpit was a fully enclosed blister that tapered back towards the aft end of the craft. There were two forward-facing triangular windows on either side of a wedge shaped splitter pillar. 
The internally-mounted engines were fed by two NACA air-intake ducts slightly aft and to either side of the cockpit. There were also two additional air-intakes on the lower surface of the aircraft. The craft featured what looked like trapezoidal shaped or trap-door exhaust ports near the aft end. There were control surfaces on the leading and trailing edges. The most unique feature however, was a very unusual dorsal and ventral tail arrangement. The vertical stabiliser looked very similar in appearance to that of the old B-17 Flying Fortress, but with an identical stabiliser on the bottom. The lower ventral fin retracted sideways and up, to allow clearance for landing. This particular craft had afterburner capability.
All of the evidence indicates that this was a twin-engined hybrid propulsion design aircraft. It would appear that this particular aircraft, built in 1976, was a proof-of-concept (first generation) design for what was to be commonly referred to as the Aurora. The pilot was quite startled after seeing this aircraft, and contacted air traffic control (ATC) at Nellis AFB to ask: “why did you not advise me of the other traffic in my vicinity?” At this point, there was a short pause, and then ATC responded by saying: “because there is no traffic in your vicinity, Sir.” Next, the Learjet pilot responded by saying: “the hell there isn't! I’ve got an all-black, diamond-shaped, no wings, single-seat, twin-engined aircraft with ventral and dorsal vertical stabilisers, flying 100 feet out in my 11 o’clock position right now! I’m looking out my windscreen at it as we speak.” After a pause of 10 seconds or so, the Learjet pilot saw the pilot of this other aircraft look out of his right windscreen, register an expression of extreme surprise, then abruptly bank away while simultaneously lighting up the afterburners, and disappearing into a cloud bank. After a pause of 20 seconds or so, a different voice came over the radio, (a much harsher sounding voice) which directed the Learjet pilot to vector south where he would be landing at Nellis AFB. The pilot complied, and was told to taxi to the end of the runway, shut down his engines, and to not depart his aircraft. At this point, the pilot was met by USAF security personnel, and was interrogated for the next 18 hours about his encounter with the mysterious ‘black jet’.
In 1974, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated a programme known as Project Harvey (named after the 6 feet 3 1/2 inches tall invisible white rabbit from the play of the same name). The ultimate goal was to develop a combat aircraft with as low a RCS as possible. Five aerospace OEMs were contracted US$1 million each to give it their best shot. Surprisingly, Lockheed Martin wasn’t among them. It was only an accidental tip-off that allowed Lockheed Martin’s Ben Rich to lobby for inclusion. Rich had been an engineer on the secret U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft R & D projects and had by then advanced to become Lockheed Martin’s successor to the famous Lawrence Kelly Johnson as Director of the Skunk Works. The ‘Skunk Works’ is the official alias for the Advanced Developmental Projects Division that is responsible for all of Lockheed Martin’s highly secret advanced development projects. It was formed in 1943 to build the US’ first turbojet-powered combat aircraft, the P-80, and numerous other projects that belong to the shadowy world of military operations.
By the time Rich had gotten wind of Project Harvey, there was no money left for another developmental contract. So Lockheed Martin was offered a shot-for-a-dollar. But Rich wanted in and wisely turned down the token dollar. He knew that any new technologies developed with company funds would then be proprietary. Lockheed Martin was famous for building small fleets of extremely advanced aircraft-often used for highly secretive missions. During World War-2, it had built the P-80. Subsequently, Lockheed Martin skipped the Mach-1 era altogether and jumped right to fielding the first US-origin combat aircraft capable of speeds in excess of Mach 2, the F-104 Star Fighter. Along the way came the high-flying U-2, the higher-flying SR-71, the hypersonic D-21 drone (which would ride piggyback on an SR-71 until released), and other things not yet named. In Rich’s own words, the unsung hero of Lockheed Martin’s effort was an anonymous staff mathematician and electrical engineer named Denys Overholser. Overholser and his mentor, another mathematician named Bill Schroeder, had discussed the possibilities of utilising some of the equations associated with optical scattering (how electromagnetic waves bounce off variously shaped objects) on this project. Both had the rather odd hobby of reading obscure USSR-origin mathematics papers and had made the ultimate ‘nerd's nerd’ discovery. They had stumbled across a paper published in Moscow a decade earlier titled ‘Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction’. It had been written by Pyotr Ufimtsev, the Soviet Union’s chief scientist at the Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering and the last in a long line of scientists developing a long series of wave-equations originally derived centuries ago by the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell.
The US intelligence community had helped translate this research paper and brought it to the West. The paper was in no way classified or related to weapons development at all. It was purely theoretical math. Years later, Ufimtsev immigrated to the US to teach at the University of California, Los Angeles, and only then discovered his inadvertent contribution to the development of stealthy aircraft. The equations that Ufimtsev had developed made the reflections of radio waves off hard surfaces predictable. Not invisible, transparent, or tactical in any way-just predictable. The problem for Lockheed Martin was that the calculations were so ferociously difficult that the most advanced supercomputers in the world at that time could only compute results for flat surfaces. Any attempt to perform the calculations for the curved surfaces you would find on a conventional aircraft--well, those machines would still be grinding away toward a solution today. Schroeder recognised how these equations could be applied to Lockheed Martin’s current project. The solution was not even to attempt to design an aircraft with any curved surfaces, but to build one with dozens, or perhaps hundreds, of individual flat triangular and rectangular plates. Then the challenge was to compute the reflection from each and every flat surface before adding them all together to build a picture of the aircraft’s total radar signature. Once you knew where every bit of radar reflection was coming from, you could then reorient those individual plates so that the reflection would go off in a direction away from the radar looking at it. This process became known as ‘faceting’. And that became the real secret--not to absorb all the RF emissions or make the aircraft somehow transparent, but to make the aircraft’s signature predictable. That predictability could then be used to shape a tactically useful aircraft. The aircraft would also be covered in thin sheets of radar-absorbing materials (RAM), but the bulk of the stealth effect was achieved by its shape.
Traditionally, a single engineering specialty will take the lead during the design of a new aircraft. An aerodynamicist may be in charge of pushing through a new wing or fuselage shape, as happened with the early delta wings and area-ruled fuselages of the ‘Century Series’ of interceptors. Sometimes it may be the powerplant guy: “Here’s the engine we’re going to use, build us an aircraft for it.” This is how the P-80 came about. Occasionally it may be the armaments people-- the A-10 Warthog is fundamentally a massive 30mm Gatling cannon with an aircraft  built around it. In this particular case, this was the first time the lead was owned by an electrical engineer. The computing programme designed by Overholser’s team to make these calculations was called Echo- 1. Armed with that tool, the first test subject, the Hopeless Diamond, was built. It was described as a diamond for obvious reasons and ‘hopeless’ for its aerodynamic qualities (or rather, its complete lack thereof). Early radar testing of the Hopeless Diamond turned out to be staggeringly successful. The White Sands experimental radar range near Holloman AFB was used. 
When the radar was fired-up for the initial testing, the only thing that showed up was the reflection of the pole on which the full-scale test-model was supposed to be mounted. Assuming that the model had fallen off the pole, the radar operators sent technicians downrange to fix the problem. To their surprise, the ten-foot model was still in place. To test the model at all, Lockheed Martin then had to design an invisible ‘stealthy pole’ to mount the model utilising the same technology as the proposed combat aircraft. The results were once again astounding, and incredulous USAF officials were called in to witness and verify the data. The first opportunity to impress these officials almost resulted in embarrassment. When the radars were turned on, the reflections, while still very small by aircraft standards, were orders of magnitude larger than what the USAF officials had been led to expect. They could still clearly see a small radar return from where the model was mounted. 
While the Lockheed Martin engineers were trying to explain this discrepancy, a radio call came in from a technician downrange. He reported that a bird was perched on the ten-foot model. The quick reply was an order to blow the horn of the pickup truck the guy was sitting in. As the startled bird flew away, the radar reflection on the test scope disappeared. The very idea that a combat aircraft could be made so invisible as to hide behind a bird was an opportunity that couldn’t be passed up. Everything associated with the programme became classified at the highest levels. The programme was consequently transferred from DARPA to the USAF’s Special Projects Office. The word ‘stealth’ was forbidden to be mentioned in any unclassified document. And in April 1976, the Ford Administration gave Lockheed Martin the go-ahead for a full-scale aircraft. The Skunk Works was officially in the stealthly, low-observable flying platform business.
In 1974, when DARPA was becoming more and more interested in the idea that an aircraft, or a remotely-piloted vehicle, could be almost totally invisible to hostile RF-based sensors, the consequent competition led to the emergence of the Lockheed Martin-developed F-117 Nighthawk. But this is the story about the loser. After fielding some secondary studies regarding the possibility of a combat aircraft that could pass completely unseen by enemy radars, the XST (eXperimental Survivable Tactical) project was formally launched and DARPA went searching for OEMs to pursue the project’s goals. What DARPA was looking for in particular from the initial phase of the project was to answer two primary questions: 1) What were the signature limits that an aircraft would have to meet to be undetectable at an operational range from enemy sensors? 2) What could each aerospace OEM bring to the table when it came to designing and building an aircraft with the signature-levels established in question one?
Five major aerospace OEMs were approached to take part in the competition to build a scale-model concept that would demonstrate a substantial reduction in radar cross-section for a manned tactical air vehicle. Originally, Lockheed Martin was not even one of these companies. Word got around that the shadowy project was in the launch phase, and legendary Lockheed Skunk Works engineer Ben Rich went and persuaded the powers-that-be at the Pentagon to give him and his Skunk Works team a shot. He wanted in so badly that and he proposed competing for free, while all the other competitors would receive a paying contract for their R & D work. Nowadays, it is almost unbelievable to think that Lockheed Martin was not even on the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) list for the XST competition, but then again, the mid-1970s were a low time for Lockheed Martin. Having not produced a combat aircraft for more than a decade, their commercial aircraft division was also in deep public turmoil. The company was facing a possible fire-sale, after which its bones would be picked apart piece by piece. Still, what many in the DoD did not know was that the Skunk Works built the first stealthy aircraft, the A-12 Oxcart and SR-71 Blackbirds, although its low-observable features were still highly classified at that time. After starting with a half dozen competitors, the XST competition was narrowed down to consist of the aforementioned Lockheed Martin Skunk Works team, a Northrop Grumman team and a McDonnell Douglas team that would later also drop out of the competition. Skunk Works, being accustomed to working on highly classified projects, had every element of the XST team working together openly. Powerplant, flight controls, low-observables, aerodynamics and so on, were all at the same collaborative design table. Northrop Grumman , on the other hand, had built an almost firewall-like divide between the highly classified low-observable folks and the less sensitive aircraft systems and design folks. This mistake would result in a very inefficient design process that would cost them later on in the competition, and would once again uphold the management structure of Kelly Johnson as superior to all others in the classified aircraft development business.
As noted above, Team Skunk Works used a fairly obscure research paper from a Soviet scientist named Pyotr Ufimtsev to build a then cutting-edge computer programme called ‘ECHO-1’ that could predict effects of radar waves on an object. This resulted in the famed ‘Hopeless Diamond’ design, which was shaped like a rough-cut gem, and was fully faceted to reflect radar waves away from the transmitter/receiver from almost every direction with great efficiency. When it came to its radar signature, the ephemeral ‘Hopeless Diamond’ was downright exciting. But when it came to its aerodynamics, it was a messy conundrum to say the least. Which was something that Kelly Johnson, Ben Rich’s boss, was not too excited about. Meanwhile, the Northrop Grumman team had been working closely with Hughes Radar Systems Group since early on for its XST contender. Hughes, the gold standard purveyor of US-origin military sensors at the time, gave Northrop Grumman a deep theoretical understanding of how radars and infra-red sensors detect targets, and what shapes were hard to detect under various conditions. With this in mind, and without Lockheed’s novel ECHO-1 computer-based radar cross-section modelling programme, Northrop Grumman’s design moved forward, albeit clumsily. The aforementioned intense compartmentalization at Northrop Grumman, between the highly classified low-observables team, the aircraft systems team, and the airframe design team, was proving to be almost impossible to work through. Some individuals who were active in Northrop Grumman’s XST R & D effort at the time have since described this unsatisfactory arrangement as like trying to build the most advanced aircraft design in the world via playing a game of telephone. Nonetheless, leveraging their work with Hughes, the team began experimenting with different shapes and configurations, and in a learn-as-you-go creative process, a design began to materialise. DARPA, by this time having realised the promise of low-observables technology, had upgraded the project from a theoretical design study to one that would provide a flyable prototype. With this in mind, the name of the project changed to eXperimental Survivable Testbed. A winner-take-all “pole off” showdown, in which scale-models of both manufacturers unique designs would be evaluated mounted on a pole at a radar cross-section measurement range, was set for the summer of 1975. Only the winner would get the chance to see their exotic design take flight as a real-life technology demonstrator. Lockheed Martin’s ‘Hopeless Diamond’ was tweaked a bit to better resemble a plausible aircraft. The whole design was still made up of a series of flat panels, or diamond-like facets, but its rear trailing edge would be notched in instead of shaped like one-half of a diamond. It would also feature more highly swept wings, its inlets would be mounted behind both sides of the cockpit and the aircraft’s exhaust would exit through slits in the upper rear trailing edge of the fuselage to mask its infra-red signature. Northrop Grumman’s design looked more like a plausible flying machine, with the cockpit set far forward and a large air inlet, covered by a fine mesh grill, was set high atop the fuselage. It did not feature a complex array of facets like Lockheed Martin’s entry, rather it used smooth, broad surfaces and finely rounded edges to reflect radar energy, as well as a diamond-delta like wing platform. The aircraft’s exhausts were mounted deeply inward of the trailing edge, shrouded between the inward canted vertical tails. Both designs were very impressive, to say the least, having achieved massive reductions in overall RCS returns as well as dampening their theoretical infra-red signature to a large degree. Northrop Grumman, not having the luxury of Lockheed Martin’s ECHO-1 programme, and being handicapped by a fragmented design team, concentrated on making the aircraft as invisible as possible from its front and rear quadrants. Their thinking was that the most risk for a penetrating attack aircraft is posed when it is approaching and leaving the target area, so this is where their signature reduction goals were focussed. The Northrop Grumman team accomplished this goal very well, but when the aircraft design was viewed by radar from the side hemisphere, the aircraft’s RCS return spiked higher than Skunk Works’ Hopeless Diamond-based competitor. The Northrop Grumman XST’s less competitive side-on radar signature seemed to be more of a result of the stiff compartmentalisation within the Northrop Grumman design team than just the design philosophy alone, and it is possible that with some tweaks the Northrop Grumman XST offer would have featured a lower overall RCS than the Lockheed Martin contender. Northrop Grumman’s XST design was also already optimised to have a lower RCS over a broader range of radar frequencies. Additionally, the argument was made that Northrop Grumman’s design would have provided better aerodynamic performance and airframe adaptability, as well as lower overall production risk than Lockheed Martin’s wildly faceted design. In other words, there have been multiple voices, not just from within the Northrop Grumman camp, that think that the Northrop Grumman XST would have been a better choice than Lockheed Martin’s design, especially considering how immature the designs, and their team’s accompanying low-observable knowledge bases really were at the time. Still, regardless of these opinions, Lockheed Martin’s design best met the particular design goals laid out by the Pentagon, as such, there was no denying Lockheed Martin won the pole off. Interestingly, years after the XST competition concluded, Northrop Grumman’s non-faceted design philosophy seems much more ahead of its time than Lockheed Martin’s faceted approach, especially when you consider that second- and third-generation stealthy aircraft and unmanned systems have much more in common with Northrop Grumman’s XST design than Lockheed Martin’s XST design.
Still, both teams had solid manufacturing capabilities, competitive cost estimates, and aggressive timelines, so all things being fairly equal, Northrop Grumman’s slightly less stealthy pole model gave DARPA something to hang their final decision on, and the Skunk Works design was chosen for flight testing. This action would result in the ‘Have Blue’ technology demonstrators, then the ‘Senior Trend’ project, which resulted in the YF-117 and eventually the famous F-117 Nighthawk as we know it today. The loss from the XST competition did not mean the end for Northrop Grumman when it comes to low-observable aircraft. Quite the contrary, in fact. The team regrouped and learned from its mistakes over the next few years, and eventually fielded the absolutely game-changing platform known as the Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft Experimental, otherwise known as the ‘Tacit Blue’ technology demonstrator. This aircraft, aptly nicknamed ‘The Whale’, paved the way for Northrop Grumman to win the contract for developing the B-2 Spirit bomber, build the YF-23 Advanced Tactical Fighter contender, and even the Global Hawk and X-47B unmanned aircraft testbeds as we know them today. Strangely, the Tacit Blue concept would also indirectly lead to the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel, and the General Atomics Avenger UAV. In fact, the rumoured Northrop Grumman RQ-180 is supposedly the final implementation of the concept that ‘Tacit Blue’ proved more than 30 years ago. Seeing how close the XST decision was, and taking into account just how handicapped Northrop Grumman was by having two compartmentalised teams working on one integrated aircraft, as well as not having the help of the groundbreaking ECHO-1 computer modelling programme, one has to wonder just how successful its stealthy aircraft could have been with more time to mature. 
The UK’s Ministry of Defence would have you believe that nothing untoward occurred at Boscombe Down, Wiltshire, on the night of September 26, 1994. But something sinister did happen at the airfield that night. The fact that the incident involved the US’ most highly-classified black project aircraft helps to explain the scale (and to some extent the subtlety) of the disinformation campaign which ensured. The story had begun to unfold on that windswept night as the aircraft began its takeoff run along Runway 23. Whatever happened in the few seconds following application of takeoff power was sufficiently catastrophic for the two-man USAF aircrew to abort departure immediately. Military controllers at the London Air Traffic Control Centre (LATCC) were alerted either directly or indirectly to the fact that a serious incident had occurred, and that the runway was blocked. Later that night, the stranded aircraft was seen by at least one witness near the eastern end of Boscombe Down’s Runway 23. A tarpaulin-covered frame had already been erected above the aircraft’s forward section, around which were a number of emergency-response vehicles. The rear section appeared unnaturally elevated by virtue of an apparent nose-wheel collapse, the only clearly definable characteristic being inward canting twin fins. Early the next day, one of four British Army Air Corps Agusta A-109 helicopters transited to Boscombe Down from Bournemouth-Hurn. All four A-109s were then exclusively operated by the Special Air Service (SAS), which has a base at Poole, near Hurn. Is it possible that a covert sealing-off operation was set in motion? It has also been suggested that at least one RAF Chinook was scrambled from Odiham to Boscombe Down late that night for just that purpose. The sighting was followed that same evening by a separate sighting of a grey USAF C-5 Galaxy on the ground at Boscombe Down. The aircraft had been monitored on airband radio as it cancelled its flight-plan to the USAF European HQ at Ramstein in Germany, and requested a diversion to Boscombe Down. On arrival, the C-5 parked on the ramp outside the DRA/DTEO hangar. It is likely that the incident aircraft was normally housed in one of Boscombe’s hardened air shelters (HAS). However, in the aftermath of the incident the first priority would have been to move the aircraft under cover to a place where the C-5 could undertake a loading or unloading procedure with minimum risk. With the taxiways leading to the shelters unable to accommodate an aircraft as large as the C-5, the most logical option would indeed have been to move the aircraft to the DRA/DTEO hangar. Despite these precautions, an unidentifiable tarpaulin-covered object was seen to be loaded into the C-5. This flight-plan (evidence of which has since disappeared) used a non-standard callsign of Lanc 18, but more noteworthy was its destination which was listed as KPMD. This is the ICAO airfield designator for Palmdale, California, better known as Air Force Plant 42 and home to the assembly lines of both the Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems and Integration Division. The Boscombe Down incident aircraft is designated as the ASTRA, was originally referred to as AV-6 (Air Vehicle Six, its construction number), and was allocated USAF serial 90-2414. It routinely used frequencies in the 500 to 510 mHz range (highly unusual and beyond the tuning range of standard UHF scanner radios) and was operating with the callsign Blackbuck 11. It had been operating in tandem with at least one other aircraft. ASTRA is an acronym standing for Advanced Stealth Technology Reconnaissance Aircraft. The prime contractor was Northrop, with McDonnell Douglas (MDC) involvement, and the aircraft is directly related to the YF-23 (unsuccessful ATF contender). No doubt most controversial of all, the ASTRA is believed to be the Mach 5+ hypersonic tactical reconnaissance aircraft, most commonly referred to until now as Aurora. This, along with its YF-23 lineage, will be a major surprise to those who either denied the existence of a manned hypersonic project, or assumed it to be a product of Lockheed Skunk Works. Lockheed Martin has consistently denied involvement in a hypersonic project but in June 1991, Northrop Grumman had quietly set up its own version of the ‘Skunk Works’, called the Advanced Technology and Design Center, to pursue what it acknowledged to be both manned and unmanned ‘black project’ developments. It also began testing a distributed-exhaust/pressurised wing concept. The technology was said to be related to at least one US Dept of Defense ‘black aircraft’ project. It may be that the ASTRA is actually the project involved (rather than a special forces transport type as suggested), given that the concept involves using bleed-air from the engines and pumping it through the wings’ upper surfaces, and given that the YF-23 had bleed-air doors in the wing upper surface near the leading-edge wing-root, the purpose of which was claimed to be suction removal of the boundary layer from the underwing air intake.
The first evidence of flights by hypersonic vehicles emerged in 1989, with eyewitness reports of the characteristic ‘doughnuts on a rope’ contrails produced by the pulsing motion of a PDWE, which detonated the fuel in the jetpipe and expelled some of the gases created through inlets at the forward end of the pipe. At this early stage in flight-testing there were probably no more than two prototypes in the programme, with 1987 fiscal serials corresponding to the original project go-ahead. In February 1985 (just after Tacit Blue was grounded), there was an inadvertent leak in the US federal budget regarding Aurora funding, which showed US$80 million being requested for FY 1986, rising to a massive US$2.2 billion in 1987, the same year in which the YF-23 prototypes were funded. If the ASTRA was nested in Aurora, or indeed came to be the new name used when Aurora’s cover had been blown, then the funding request is consistent with the funding of one or two prototypes in 1987, which would not have been completed and flown until 1989. The greater proportion of hypersonic aircraft activity took place after February 1992, with night sightings of unusual activity at Beale AFB, and loud anomalous noises described as similar to sustained artillery firing, likely to have been caused by ground runnings of the PDWE. The aircraft were only present at Beale AFB for a matter of months, probably for pre-operational familiarisation. In addition, it is known that a security policeman at Beale AFB reported seeing a YF-23-like aircraft hangared there (in one of the SR-71 sheds) in nearly 1992. There was apparently little attempt to disguise the aircraft's presence, because it was surrounded by personnel wearing blue MDC overalls. The YF-23 prototypes themselves had ceased flying in late December 1990, pending the ATF contract award in April 1991.
In August 1989, Chris Gibson, a Scottish oil-exploration engineer and, at the time, a member of the British Royal Observer Corps (ROC), was working on the oil rig Galveston Key in the North Sea when he noticed an aircraft in the shape of a pure isoceles triangle refuelling from a USAF KC-135 Stratotanker alongside two USAF F-111s. The unknown aircraft, cruising in a formation northward through Air-to-Air Refuelling Area (AARA) 6A, is what people have come to believe, was the mysterious AV-6 Astra, which used to use the RAF airbase at Machrihanish, Strathclyde—with its three-mile-long runway—as a staging post for Mach 4, 200,000 feet-high dashes home across the North Sea. The aircraft has also been spotted across the US, in Norway and the Netherlands, often to the accompaniment of a deafening sonic boom and its characteristic ‘donuts-on-a-string’ contrail. Below, Chris Gibson explains precisely what happened, as well as giving an insight into himself.
“I welcome any questions on my North Sea sighting, as I am of the opinion that too much is taken at face value in the black aircraft snark hunt. I think that the snark hunt has degenerated into an exercise in regurgitating the same old stories with little or no new research being done. A bit about me. I work as a drilling technologist for a major oil field service company. I hold an Honours degree in geology, with some engineering, geophysics and chemistry thrown in. I also did a post graduate course in systems analysis, I was a member of the ROC for 13 years and was a member of the ROC’s aicraft recognition team for 12 of those years. In this field I was considered to be an expert and produced an aircraft recognition manual for the ROC. Some will obviously know the sighting story, but I will fill you in on what happened from my point of view. I was working in the indefatigable field on the jack-up rig ‘Galvestion Key’ in August 1989. My colleague, Graeme Winton, went out on deck but returned immediately. He told me to “have a look at this.” We went outside and Graeme pointed skywards. I had been at university with Graeme and he knew of my interest in aircraft. As far as Graeme was concerned it was a formation of aircraft and he reckoned I’d be interested. I looked up, saw the tanker and the F-111s, but was amazed to see the triangle. I am trained in instant recognition, but this triangle had me stopped dead. My first thought was that it was another F-111, but there was no gaps, it was too long and it didn’t look like one. My next thought was that it was an F-117, as the highly swept planform of the F-117 had just been made public. Again the triangle was too long and had no gaps. After considering and rejecting a Mirage IV, I was totally out of ideas. Here was an aircraft, flying over head, not too high and not particularly fast. A recognition gift and I was clueless. This was a new experience. Graeme asked me what was going on. I watched as the formation flew overhead and told him that the big one was a KC-135 Stratotanker, the two on the left were F-111s and that I didn’t know what the fourth aircraft was. Graeme said “I thought you were an expert?” I said “I am.” To which Graeme replied “Some expert.” It was obvious to me that this aircraft was something ‘dodgy’. I watched the formation for a minute or two and went back inside with Graeme. At the time I was writing the aircraft recognition manual and had a Danish Luftmelderkorpset Flykendingsbog in my briefcase. This is probably the best aircraft recognition book ever produced. I looked through it, but nothing matched. I then sketched what I had seen and sent this to Peter Edwards, who was a Group Officer in the ROC and was also on the recognition team. We discussed what to do about it but decided that if it was reported through official channels, it would be at best rubbished, at worst lead to trouble. Having signed the Official Secrets Act I didn’t want to jeopardise my position in the recognition team, so I kept my mouth shut. I told other members of the recognition team in the hope that they could shed some light on the subject. On returning home I had a look through my book collection. The only aircraft which came close to matching what I had seen was a Handley Page HP-115. It was not one of them. Whether this aircraft was a Aurora is debatable—my background precludes jumping to conclusions based on a single piece of evidence. I wrote to Bill Sweetman (Stealth expert) after being sent an illustration from Janes Defense Weekly, which matched what I had seen.” 
In an article titled: ‘Sightings and Engineers’ Dreams Taking to Skies as Black Aircraft’, written by Bill Scott, and published in Aviation Week & Space Technology on December 24, 1990, on page 42, paragraph 2 speaks of “well choreographed show-and-tell sessions given to selected members of the US Congress and key government officials”. At one such ‘dog and pony’ show held at Norton AFB on November 12, 1988, the second-generation ‘Aurora’ aircraft was put on display. This exhibit of various classified aircraft was arranged to garner further financial backing for special access or ‘black’ programmes. The second-generation Aurora looked very similar in appearance to the F-19, with the exception of the pilot and tail assembly. It also featured eight air-intakes instead of the four used on the manned F-19 version. A clear lineage of this specific aircraft type can now be identified.
Regarding the propulsion system used on the aircraft shown at Norton AFB, it featured hundreds of tiny fuel ejector holes located just aft of a ridge that ran laterally across the widest part of the aircraft. Looking from the side, it resembled a flattened football shape with a distinctive raised ridge or high-point that tapered back to the aft end. As for the external appearance, it looked like the entire aircraft was composed of black space shuttle heat-resistant tiles, which showed signs of scorched heat thermal erosion, due to the exotic propulsion system. The concept being, conventional turbofans would propel the craft to approximately Mach 3. At this point, the eight NACA ducts would close, providing for a smooth aerodynamic surface. Next, the craft would switch propulsion systems by turning off the turbofanss, and begin spraying a highly modified slush hydrogen fuel directly at the raised portion of the craft. By now, the craft, travelling in excess of Mach 3, would begin to glow in a very dull red colour at the leading edges and mid-section. Airflow over the vehicle at supersonic speeds caused a ‘wake separation’ to occur at the slight lateral ridge, and fuel injected into this superheated, highly compressed air-stream spontaneously combusted, expanding between the tapered ‘after-body’ of the craft, and the supersonic shock wave which separated at the ridge.
The TR-3B triangle-shaped nuclear-powered aerospace platform, built in the mid-1980s by Lockheed Martin and Teledyne Ryan, was developed under the Aurora programme—a top-secret, multi-tier developmental roadmap for advanced aerospace vehicles. The TR-3B’s outer coating is reactive to electrical stimulation and can change colour, reflectiveness, and radar absorptiveness. This is also the first US vehicle to use quasi-crystals in the vehicle’s skin. This polymer skin, when used in conjunction with the TR-3B’s ECM suite, can make the vehicle look like a small aircraft or a flying cylinder or even tricking radars into falsely detecting a variety of aircraft, no aircraft, or several aircraft at various locations. A circular, mercury-based plasma-filled accelerator ring called the Magnetic Field Disrupter (MFD) surrounds the rotatable crew compartment and is far ahead of any imaginable technology. The plasma is pressurized at 250,000 atmospheres at a temperature of 150 degrees Kelvin, and accelerated to 50,000 RPM to create a super-conductive plasma with the resulting gravity disruption. Sandia National Labs and Lawrence Livermore Labs co-developed the MFD, which generates a magnetic-vortex field that disrupts or neutralises the effects of gravity on mass within proximity by 89%. This is not anti-gravity, for anti-gravity provides a repulsive force that can be used for propulsion. The MFD creates a disruption of the Earth’s gravitational field upon the mass within the circular accelerator. The mass of the circular accelerator—and all mass within the accelerator, such as the crew capsule and the nuclear reactor—are reduced by almost 90%. This causes the effect of making a vehicle extremely light and able to outperform and outmanoeuvre (horizontally and vertically) any aircraft yet constructed. Except, of course, those ‘Unconventional Flying Objects’ (UFO) not of Earthly origin. The TR-3B’s aerodynamic performance is limited only the stresses that its human aircrew can endure. Which is a lot, really, considering along with the 89% reduction in mass, the G forces are also reduced by 89%. The TR-3B’s aircrew can therefore comfortably sustain up to 40Gs which, when reduced by 89%, will be about 4.2 Gs. 
By using electromagnetic forces to contain rotating systems, it is possible for the masses to reach relativistic velocities. Thus, a comparatively small amount of matter, if dense enough and moving fast enough, can produce usable gravitational effects. The requirement for a dense material moving at relativistic speeds would explain the use of Mercury plasma (heavy ions). If the plasma really spins at 50,000 RPM and the Mercury ions are also moving in a tight pitched spiral, then the individual ions would be moving probably hundreds, perhaps thousands of times faster than the bulk plasma spin, in order to execute their ‘screw thread’ motions. It is quite conceivable that the ions could be accelerated to relativistic speeds in this manner. For this to happen, it is necessary to strip the free electrons from the plasma, making a positively charged plasma, since the free electrons would tend to counter-rotate and reduce the efficiency of the MFD. One of Dr Albert Einstein’s postulates of general relativity (GR) says that gravitational mass and inertial mass are equivalent. This is consistent with claims of the inertial mass within the mercury-based plasma ring also being reduced by 89%. This also explains why the TR-3B is triange-shaped. Since it still requires conventional thrusters for propulsion, the thrusters would need to be located outside of the ‘mass reduction zone’ or else the mass of the thrusters reaction material would also be reduced, making them terribly inefficient. Since it requires a minimum of three legs to have a stable stool, it follows that one would need a minimum of three thrusters to have a stable aerospace platform. Three thrusters, located outside of the plasma ring, plus appropriate structural support, would naturally lead to a triangular shape for the vehicle. 
The nuclear reactor heats the liquid hydrogen and injects liquid oxygen in the supersonic thruster nozzles (developed by Rockwell), so that the hydrogen burns concurrently in the liquid oxygen afterburner. This multi-mode propulsion system can operate in the atmosphere, with thrust being provided by the nuclear reactor, in the upper atmosphere, with hydrogen propulsion; and in orbit, with the combined hydrogen/oxygen propulsion. Directional propulsion is thus provided by the three multi-mode thrusters mounted at each bottom corner of the triangular platform. The TR-3B is a sub-Mach 9 vehicle until it reaches altitudes above 100,000 feet. It is 600 feet across, which would make it similar in size to an aircraft carrier. At least three prototypes were built, each measuring about 60 metres across, and the operational model is about 180 metres (600 feet) across. The TR-3B can thus be used as a reconnaissance platform with an indefinite loiter time. 

That's Airpower For You!-2

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Thanks to India’s present-day crop of ruling politicians being afflicted with an incurable strand of the hand-foot-and-mouth disease, the Indian Navy (IN) now is being made to pay a heavy price in terms of capability losses at a time when the tempo of its annual exercises with its international partners is steadily increasing.  
Selex Galileo till October 2012 was hopeful of winning a contract for participating in the ‘deep-upgrade and service life-extension’ of the IN’s AgustaWestland Sea King Mk.42B and Kamov Ka-28PL ASW helicopters. Along with Rosoboronexport, it had earlier submitted an industrial participation proposal for the mid-life upgrade of 10 Kamov Ka-28PL anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. Selex Galileo had proposed to install the ATOS-LW combat management system on the Ka-28PL with Selex ES’ Osprey AESA-MMR, which is a low probability of intercept (LPI) radar with high gain and low sidelobes. Field evaluation trials (FET) of the Ka-28PL with ATOS-LW system were concluded successfully. Selex Galileo was also selected—following exhaustive and thorough evaluations on a global scale being conducted by the IN—to supply the Osprey for 14 Sea King Mk42B helicopters which were to be upgraded as multi-role platforms for use as both over-the-horizon target acquisition and airborne early warning. In addition to this, Selex Galileo had in 2012 signed a contract with the IN to supply ESM suites for six Tu-142M LRMR/ASW aircraft.
Leonardo-Finmeccanica’s UK-based Selex ES subsidiary has developed the X-band Osprey, an AESA-MMR that electronically scans 360 degrees without using a “spinning” slotted-array antenna. It is the world’s first lightweight e-scan system with no moving parts. The first Osprey has already flown on the first of 16 AW-101 Merlin helicopters destined for SAR duties with the Royal Norwegian Air Force. The Osprey has secured two more customers in the US for fixed-wing applications, starting with Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8C Fire Scout VTOL UAV. The Osprey’s programmable signals processor (PSP) also incorporates algorithms from the Vixen air-to-air and PicoSAR air-to-ground AESA-based radars. It is easier to mount, having air-cooling and no pressurised waveguides. On the Norwegian AW-101, three antennae are separately located in the nose and on either side of the helicopter. Space requirements are minimal, and with no need for a belly-mounted radome, the helicopter’s ground clearance is maximised for challenging rescue landings on rough terrain. The antenna distribution is via a multi-array interface, while the radar’s other two black boxes are the receiver/exciter and the PSP. Two- and four-antenna configurations are also possible. Each antenna weighs 11.3kg and contains 256 Gallium Arsenide transmit/receive modules. Each antenna provides 120-degree coverage. The radar feeds are handled by a centralised set of processing boxes, which can manage up to four radar panels (although only three are needed to provide 360-degree coverage). Besides the functional and performance improvements offered by AESA technology, perhaps the key advantage of Osprey is that its arrays can be mounted higher on an aircraft's fuselage than traditional mechanically-scanned radars. This is particularly advantageous for use on helicopters where mechanical radars normally have to be mounted on the underside of the fuselage in order to be able to rotate to provide 360-degree coverage. This puts the radar in harm’s way in case of a hard landing and also puts major size limitations on the size of the array due to ground clearance restrictions. Using multiple fixed arrays sidesteps this issue, while the lack of moving parts greatly improves reliability and dramatically reduces maintenance requirements.
Meanwhile, the charts below clearly illustrate the sheer amount of cooperative R & D work that goes into the development of AESA-MMR technologies, from which various civil and military families of AESA-MMRs are developed for surface-to-air, air-to-air and air-to-surface applications, thereby ensuring economies of scale and guaranteeting the total R & D project amortisation costs.
Adoption of a piecemeal approach like that of the Defence Research & Development Organisation’s  (DRDO) Bengaluru-based Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) will not get anyone anywhere and will only lead to the utter wastage of the Indian taxpayer’s money. For instance, one cannot focus exclusively on developing AESA-MMRs like the AESAR-FCR while at the same time trying to develop the XtraVision (XV)-2004 naval MMR with slotted-array antenna.
It will also be interesting to see how exactly the Indian Air Force (IAF) succeeds in obtaining financial allocations for in-country product-support activities concerning the NO-36 Byelka AESA-MMR of the FGFA, the IAI/ELTA Systems ELM-2052 AESA-MMR for the Tejas Mk.2 light MRCA (the Ruskies too are offering Phazatron JSC's ZHUK-AE FGA-35 AESA-MMR for this platform) and the THALES-supplied RBE-2 AESA-MMR for the Rafale M-MRCA. 
For, till to date, no air force in the world has ever attempted to accomplish a feat that calls for the procurement of three different types of AESA-MMRs from three different OEMs for three different types of MRCAs. Well, it actually ought to be four if one includes the AESA-MMR version of the RLSU-30MK NO-11M ‘Bars’ that is destined for the Super Su-30MKI.
Meanwhile, the IAF is close to deciding on the type of air-mobile rapid intervention/light strike vehicles that are required for the Garud special operations forces. About 80 such vehicles, armed with 12.7mm heavy machine-guns and lightweight ATGMs (like the laser-guided LAHAT), are required for undertaking combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) operations inside hostile territory during wartime.
The IAF has shortlisted Polaris Defense MRZR-4 ultra-light ATV and Oshkosh Defense S-ATV, both of which can be carried underslung by either the Mi-17V-5 or the CH-47F Chinook. For CSAR operations, the IAF, depending on the mission profile, intends to use both the armed Mi-17V-5s and unarmed CH-47Fs, while the armed Rudra helicopter-gunships—64 of which are being procured by the IAF—will be acting as escorting pathfinders.
But there is a crucial difference between the Rudra for the Indian Army and that for the IAF. The former are to be armed with medium-range ATGMs, while the latter are not. In addition, as the slides below illustrate, the former have the DRDO-developed and BEL-built Tarang narrow-band radar warning receivers (RWR), while the latter have SaabTech-supplied wide-band RWRs. However, both variants have the same SaabTech-supplied MAWS sensors and laser warning receivers.
In another development, RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems has commenced deliveries of 8,356 Spike-SR shoulder-fired ATGMs to the Indian Army’s SF (Para), Navy’s MARCOS and the IAF’s Garud SOF formations. Originally fitted with a tandem high-explosive anti-tank warhead to defeat armoured vehicles equipped with explosive reactive armour, the Spike-SR now comes with a new penetration blast-fragmentation warhead with a delay function. This has been designed for use in urban operations, with the high-explosive fragmentation warhead penetrating the bunker or structure before detonating with lethal blast effect. The standard Spike-SR had a maximum range of 1km, but this has since been increased to 1.5km to provide the operator with greater standoff capability. The Spike-SR weighs only 9.8kg, and the missile is fitted with an uncooled imaging infra-red seeker and auto-tracker, and thus operates in the fire-and-forget mode. Once fired, the launcher and its associated day sighting system are discarded. 
To Be Concluded

DRDO-Developed, BDL-Built Varunastra HWT Handed Over To Indian Navy For Service-Induction

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It was in the late 1980s that the DRDO’s Vizag-based Naval Science and Technological Laboratory (NSTL) initiated R & D work on developing three types of torpedoes: a lightweight torpedo, a heavyweight electric torpedo, and a heavyweight thermal torpedo. 
The first, known as Torpedo Advanced Light (TAL), was meant to be a 220kg torpedo capable of being launched from warships and helicopters, have a top speed of 33 Knots in both deep and shallow waters, incorporate a self-homing guidance system, and was to be powered by electric batteries which would last for six minutes. It was only in 1998 that the TAL’s technical trials began, while user-trials commenced only by 2007. The IN began service-inducting the BDL-built TALs in 2011.  
It was on December 24, 2008 that the NSTL had stated that the ‘Varunastra’ heavyweight electric torpedo being developed by it will be ready for service-entry by 2009. The Varunastra, weighing 1.5 tonnes, having a length of 7.6 metres and a 40km-range, was meant to be launched from shipborne twin-tube launchers already developed indigenously by Larsen & Toubro. However, it was only on September 26, 2013 that the NSTL stated that it had completed the creation of state-of-the-art facilities required for the design, testing and prototype production of heavyweight torpedoes like the Varunastra, meaning user-trials of the Varunastra were then still two years away. The initial order for 63 Varunastras will be fulfilled by Bharat Dynamics Ltd.
The NSTL-developed Shakti thermal torpedo runs on monopropellant fuel, which can burn without oxygen and so is useful in underwater operations. Under development since 1996, the NSTL took nearly seven years to develop the engine and fuel for Shakti. The monopropellant fuel can generate 400kW of power and enable the Shakti to move at faster speeds (almost double that of an electric torpedo) and at depths of up to 600 metres. Technical trials of the Shakti are still underway in shallow waters, and user-trials won’t commence till 2016 at best.
CMS-Torpedo/ASCM Compatibility Package Of Type 877EKM SSK
CMS-Torpedo/ASCM Compatibility Package Of Class 209/Type 1500 SSK
CMS-Torpedo/ASCM Compatibility Package Of CM-2000 Scorpene SSK
CMS-Torpedo Compatibility Package Of 
S-2/Arihant SSBN
India-Origin ASW Upgrade Package Offered For Vietnam People’s Navy’s Three 
Project 159 ASW Corvettes

Hard Reality Versus Popular Perceptions Of Reality

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Conventional narratives would have us believe that the US has, historically, been opposed to India acquiring nuclear WMDs for strategic deterrence, that the had from 1947 till 1999 had wholeheartedly supported Pakistan, etc etc. Now, for perhaps the first time, such myths have been dispelled through the contents of the autobiography of former Indian career diplomat Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra. 
The autobiography candidly explains the naivety of India’s foreign policy perceptions, as well as the duplicitous role of the United Kingdom, which along with France and Portugal were the principal advisers of the US when it came to formulating and shaping US foreign policy for East, South and Central Asia. 
Rasgotra also for the very first time reveals that contrary to popular perception, the US since the late 1950s began to look up to India as the only stabilising factor in both South and Southeast Asia, and by April 1961, even went to the extent of offering India all possible help for developing nuclear WMDs for strategic deterrence. Consider the following:
Rasgotra’s revelations had earlier been backed-up by disclosures from the US, following the declassification of several documents dealing with US-India covert cooperation in several areas, including nuclear WMD R & D activities. Prior to May 1974, the US never objected to obtaining any type of hardware that would end up in unsafeguarded nuclear R & D facilities of India’s Department of Atomic Energy.
Rasgotra has also explained how the US had forewarned India in March 1965 about Pakistan’s forthcoming OP Grand Slam.
And India never shied away from returning the favour. For instance, when the Indian Army had proposed the public showcasing of its war booties (including the then state-of-the-art M-48 Patton tanks) after the 1965 war, the US requested India not to go ahead with this plan, since this would have terribly embarrassed it.
And contrary to popular perceptions of that time, the overwhelming public opinion in the US in mid-1971 was in favour of India militarily liberating East Pakistan and heralding the birth of Bangladesh without any further delay.

High-Altitude Manoeuvre Warfare: Perpetuating Unparalleled Feats

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India’s armed forces, that have since October 1947 frequently been tasked to achieve the impossible, have never failed to deliver, often going way above and beyond the call of duty by using the institutional genius of improvisation. It is due to this that the Indian Army (IA), ably supported by the Indian Air Force (IAF) enjoys the enviable and as-yet unmatched reputation of being the world’s only army to deploy and successfully employ armoured vehicles at forbidding altitudes (from 12,000 feet till 16,000 feet ASL). The following slides explain all this with great clarity, especially during the conflicts of 1947 and 1962, plus contingency deployments in 1987 and 2008.   
It was in the last quarter of 1986 that the IA, under OP KARTOOS, temporarily had six T-72M1s airlifted to Leh along with a regiment of BMP-2 ICVs for deployment in Chushul Finger Area and Spanggur Gap. Since the conduct of OP KARTOOS, the IA’s Karu-based 3 ‘Trishul’ Division had until 2012 just one mechanised infantry regiment—1 Guards—with 52 BMP-2s. This regiment used to carry out regular manoeuvre warfare exercises in the Wari La region in Pangong, which is located at an altitude of 16,600 feet ASL. The IAF too has built a makeshift airstrip in Mud Village near Pangong.
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) posturing to test Indian control of the strategic Finger Area in northern Sikkim in 2008 prompted the IA in early 2009 to deploy T-72M1s and BMP-2s strengthen defensive positions. In fact, the highest gallantry award to a Border Roads Organisation (BRO) personnel was conferred upon a dozer operator, Zalim Singh, who had cleared a strategic road near Theing village. He was decorated with a Bar to Shaurya Chakra—for clearing a path for the armoured and mechanised infantry regiments. While the IA had introduced the BMP-2s in the northern Sikkim plateau in the late 1980s, the T-72M1s were deployed after repeated PLA transgressions throughout 2008 in the Finger Area, a 1km stretch of land in the northern tip of Sikkim that overlooks a valley called the Sora Funnel, and which is considered a strong defensive position. The T-72M1s were inducted after a monumental effort by the BRO to widen roads, construct tracks and strengthen bridges leading to northern Sikkim. The T-72M1 regiment was taken up the high plateau by truck-pulled trailers. This followed a discovery by the IA of the alignment of a new East-West road then being built by Beijing would pass thorough the Finger Area. Construction by China of this road was halted after New Delhi lodged a diplomatic complaint.
Looking To The Future

(to be concluded)

Manohar Parrikar Made To Bite The Bullet, Stopped From Defending The Indefensible

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Following my sustained awareness campaign that no one else in India had bothered to undertake against the spectacularly outrageous public posture of India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar concerning the legally untenable blanket-blacklisting of Italy’s Leonardo Finmeccanica conglomerate (see: http://trishul-trident.blogspot.in/2016/06/thats-airpower-for-you-2.htm), the Indian Prime Minister’s Office has now decisively intervened and overruled the blanket-blacklisting norm and has thus cleared the decks for the commencing the long-overdue ‘deep-upgrade and service life-extension’ of the IN’s AgustaWestland Sea King Mk.42B and Kamov Ka-28PL shipborne ASW helicopters.
The Indian Navy (IN) had begun the process of undertaking the ‘deep-upgrade and service life-extension’ of its Sea King Mk.42Bs and Kamov Ka-28PLs in 2008, and responses to its RFPs were opened in October 2012. It then emerged that Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp, representing Russian Helicopters’ Bashkiria-based Kumertau Aviation Production Enterprise (located between the Volga River and Ural Mountains) had won the bid after teaming up with Leonardo Finmeccanica subsidiaries Selex Galileo and Selex ES. Along with Rosoboronexport, Selex Galileo had submitted an industrial participation proposal for the mid-life upgrade of 10 Ka-28PLs, only four of which remain flightworthy as of now. Selex Galileo had proposed to install the ATOS-LW combat management system, along with Selex ES’ Osprey AESA-MMR, which is a low probability of intercept (LPI) radar with high gain and low sidelobes. Field evaluation trials (FET) of the Ka-28PL with ATOS-LW system were concluded successfully. Selex Galileo was also selected—following exhaustive and thorough evaluations on a global scale being conducted by the IN—to supply the Osprey for 14 Sea King Mk42Bs (only six of which are flightworthy as of now), which were to be upgraded as multi-role platforms for use as both over-the-horizon target acquisition and airborne early warning. 
Now, instead of directly procuring the hardware from Leonardo Finmeccanica’s Selex Galileo and Selex ES subsidiaries and supplying them to Kumertau Aviation Production Enterprise as customer-furnished equipment (CFE), the IN has appointed Rosoboronexport State Corp as the sole prime contractor for executing the contract, meaning Rosoboronexport State Corp will directly procure all the mission sensors and mission management systems from Selex Galileo and Selex ES and also do all systems installation/work work. A similar arrangement is now being worked out between Lockheed Martin (which as the owner of Sikorsky Helicopters is also the IPR holder of all Sikrosky-designed helicopters of the Sea King family) and the Ministry of Defence, under which Lockheed Martin will procure the required hardware from Selex Galileo and Selex ES for systems integration, following which it will undertake systems installation in India in cooperation with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
Leonardo-Finmeccanica’s UK-based Selex ES subsidiary has developed the X-band Osprey, an AESA-MMR that electronically scans 360 degrees without using a “spinning” slotted-array antenna. It is the world’s first lightweight e-scan system with no moving parts. The Osprey’s programmable signals processor (PSP) also incorporates algorithms from the Vixen air-to-air and PicoSAR air-to-ground AESA-based radars. It is easier to mount, having air-cooling and no pressurised waveguides. 
On the Norwegian AW-101, three antennae are separately located in the nose and on either side of the helicopter. Space requirements are minimal, and with no need for a belly-mounted radome, the helicopter’s ground clearance is maximised for challenging rescue landings on rough terrain. The antenna distribution is via a multi-array interface, while the radar’s other two black boxes are the receiver/exciter and the PSP. Two- and four-antenna configurations are also possible. Each antenna weighs 11.3kg and contains 256 Gallium Arsenide transmit/receive modules. Each antenna provides 120-degree coverage. The radar feeds are handled by a centralised set of processing boxes, which can manage up to four radar panels (although only three are needed to provide 360-degree coverage). Besides the functional and performance improvements offered by AESA technology, perhaps the key advantage of Osprey is that its arrays can be mounted higher on an aircraft's fuselage than traditional mechanically-scanned radars. 
This is particularly advantageous for use on helicopters where mechanical radars normally have to be mounted on the underside of the fuselage in order to be able to rotate to provide 360-degree coverage. This puts the radar in harm’s way in case of a hard landing and also puts major size limitations on the size of the array due to ground clearance restrictions. Using multiple fixed arrays sidesteps this issue, while the lack of moving parts greatly improves reliability and dramatically reduces maintenance requirements.
In another significant development, the MoD by mid-June had been convinced by Rosoboronexport State Corp that the total life-cycle costs of a fleet of 12 IL-78MKI-90 aerial refuelling tankers and 18 upgraded and refurbished IL-76MD-90 transport aircraft will be far less than those of 10 Airbus A330-220 multi-role tanker transports (MRTT), in addition to ensuring quicker deliveries.
Consequently, the MoD has now scrapped plans for procuring the 10 A330-220 MRTTs, and instead, by this October is expected to ink a contract with Rosoboronexport under which the IAF’s existing six IL-78MKI aerial refuelling tankers will be upgraded and refurbished to IL-78MKI-90 MRTT standard, another six of the IAF’s existing IL-76MD transport aircraft will be converted into IL-78MKI-90 MRTTs, while the remaining 18 IL-76MDs will be upgraded to IL-76MD-90 standard.
The upgrade component will include re-engining with PS-90A turbofans, and incorporation of glass cockpit avionics. 
The entire upgrade/refurbishment work will be undertaken by CJSC ‘Aviastar-SP (Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex), located on the left bank of Volga River in Russia’s Ulyanovsk region.
Airborne Battlefield Reconnaissance Assets Of PLA Deployed From TAR
The PLAAF earlier this month began using one of its SAR-equipped Tu-154M platform to monitor developments in the demilitarised area in Barahoti pastures in Chamoli district of Uttarakhand. The PLA Army on the other hand used a Z-9EC helicopter equipped with a gimballed optronic sensor for intruding into Indian airspace in the same area. 
PLA Rapid Intervention Craft At 
Pangong-Tso Lake
Since many of you have heard about them, but have never seen them, below is a collage of these RICs, whose photos were taken in 2014 during a routine tactical recon mission.

High-Altitude Manoeuvre Warfare: Perpetuating Unparalleled Feats-2

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Since 1982, the modus operandi of China’s military incursions in both Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh has been to scare Indian herdsmen into abandoning grazing land and then to construct permanent military structures like helipads. It is such actions that led to two specific politico-military events: the Thandrong Incident, followed by the Sumdorong Chu Incident, which are now collectively known in diplomatic circles as the Wangdung Affair. Though no official records of these events/affairs have been de-classified as yet by the Govt. of India, only THREE (03) near-authentic recollections that have been published so far in India, and they are being detailed for the very first time below: 
(to be concluded)

NORINCO-Built Medium/Main Battle Tanks Explained & How They Stack Up Against India's India's T-72CIA Medium Battle Tanks

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There exists considerable confusion about the design lineage and technologies of medium and main battle tanks developed and produced over the years by NORINCO of China.  The slides below will help clear several confused narratives that have been circulating over the past two decades. Point to be noted is that so far, no one in China has been able to develop water-cooled diesel engines for armoured vehicles that generate more than 780hp. The consequent reliance on air-cooled diesel engines of Ukrainian origin makes it virtually impossible for any NORINCO-built medium/heavy battle tank to be used for high-altitude manoeuvre warfare anywhere within the area of operations of Tibet Military District, especially in eastern Ladakh and Aksai Chin.

Type 85 Medium Battle Tank
Type 90II Al Khalid Medium Battle Tank
Type 90II VT-1A Medium Battle Tank
Type-96A Medium Battle Tank
Type-99A Medium Battle Tank
Type-99B Main Battle Tank
ZTQ-105 Medium Battle Tank

The IA’s OP-PLANs
India’s military posture against China in Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh is to maintain full strategic defence with minor tactical offensive capabilities. Given the politico-operational compulsions, difficult terrain, and the PLA’s track record, it is clear that the Indian Army (IA) was, until the previous decade, was doing an onerous task. For instance, Sikkim has an area of approximately 8,000sqkm, measuring 113km north to south, and 64km from east to west with heights rising up to 28,000 feet. Militarily, the state is divided into north and east Sikkim. Due to a central massif, north Sikkim is further divided into the Muguthang Valley in the west, the Kerang Plateau in the east, and north-east Sikkim. The Lachung, Lachen and Muguthang Valleys in north Sikkim prevent any lateral movement. 
Of the 14 passes along the 206km-long Sikkim-TAR border, six are all-weather, implying that these are open throughout the year. Three each of these passes are in north and east Sikkim, these being Kongra La, Bomcho La, Sese La, Nathu La (at 14,438 feet in east Sikkim), Batang La and Doka La. Unlike the passes in north-east and east Sikkim, the passes on the watershed border in north Sikkim are fairly wide and motorable. Being windswept, they remain relatively free from snow and are open throughout the year. The watershed and the adjoining Tibetan Plateau are devoid of any cover. 
The terrain in north and north-east Sikkim is more difficult, rugged and formidable, with the altitude rising suddenly and steeply (one can travel from 5,000 feet to 14,000 feet in just about 60km) than east Sikkim, where surface communications are better developed due to its proximity to the northern West  Bengal plains. India’s 435km-long border with Nepal includes a 125km border between Nepal and Sikkim, of which about 50km is most inhospitable. Consequently, the only available area with existing land and air transportation networks that can host armoured/mechanised/tactical aviation/UAV assets is northern West Bengal, from where they can be swiftly deployed  to bolster the IA’s positions opposite Bhutan’s Dolam Plateau. Any PLA move into Dolam means that India’s border with China gets distorted at Sikkim’s tri-junction with Bhutan. It also means that the PLA moves a few kilometres south from where they originally were. It brings them closer to northern West Bengal’s Siliguri Corridor. China has always laid claim to Dolam. On the east the Dolam Plateau is skirted by the Amo Chhu stream that flows north-south from the Chumbi Valley to Bhutan and then enters West Bengal at Jaldhaka where the state government has a hydel project. The tri-junction is roughly equidistant from the two Indian Army posts at Doka La (bordering Bhutan) and Batang La (bordering China). Dokala overlooks Dolam, which is at a lower altitude. The Dolam Valley is a largely-barren 20 sq km plateau that is ideal for armourted manoeuvre warfare, just like the terrain in eastern Ladakh.
In Ladakh, the IA has since mid-1999 witnessed persistent PLA transgressions-in-strength at the Depsang Bulge, Trig Heights, Spanggur Gap and Chip Chap Valley in northeastern Ladakh. During wartime, the PLA’s probable intention would be to enter from the south of the Karakoram Range and cross the Shyok River from the east. The PLA has also moved motorised forces into Charding Nalla since 2009 and they could eventually threaten the Manali-Leh route. 
China thus is estimated to want to push Indian control to the left of Shyok River in the north and left of the Indus River in the east, possibly to establish both rivers as natural boundaries. In Chushul, the aim is to reach Luking to take control of the entire Pangong Tso Lake. This three-pronged strategy would make India defenceless both in the Indus Valley and the Nubra Valley.
In mid-2009, India’s Ministry of Defence approved the IA’s plans for raising three independent armoured brigades (each inclusive of two tank regiments with T-72 Combat Improved Ajeya medium tanks and one mechanised infantry regiment with BMP-2K Sarath ICVs). While each tank regiment has since early 2014 been equipped with 58 T-72CIAs, the mechanised infantry regiments each possess 70 BMP-2Ks. Of these three new Independent Armoured Brigades, one is located in Ladakh (under the Leh-HQed XIV Corps), another in Uttarakhand and the third in Kalimpong under the XXXIII ‘Trishakti’ Corps  that is HQed in Sukna near the city of Siliguri. The Brigade in Ladakh is responsible for the protection of passes like Lanak La, Kongka La, Rezang La, Chang La and Jara La. In Uttarakhand, the Brigade is responsible for securing the passes in Mana, Niti, Kungri Bingri, Darma, and Lipulekh. In Sikkim, the third Brigade is responsible for securing the Dolam Plateau. These formations are being supplemented by a string of Advance Landing Grounds (ALG) capable of accommodating the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) C-130H-30 Super Hercules transport aircraft, newly-built Army Aviation Corps bases capable of housing LUHs and Rudra helicopter-gunships, plus a string of rear-area MALE-UAV air bases operated and owned by the IA. 
Also, new border roads/bridges and railway lines are being built not just for facilitating the movement of armoured/mechanised formations (transported mostly by wheeled transporters), but also field artillery howitzers like the soon-to-be-acquired LW-155/M-777 ultralightweight howitzers that will be used for providing indirect fire-support for 99 Mountain Brigade, which is part of the 6 Mountain Division, the formation that is in charge of protecting India’s borders in Uttarakhand with China. For securing the Shipki pass in Himachal Pradesh, an existing mechanised infantry battalion has been deployed there and will come under IX Corps, headquartered at Yol in Himachal Pradesh.
The IA’s independent armoured brigades in Ladakh, northern West Bengal and Uttarkhand will thus be supported in wartime by not just ISTR assets like MALE-UAVs (numbering more than 50), but also by at least 45 Rudra helicopter gunships armed with PGMs like the HELINA, an equal number of LUHs, and 145 LW-155/M-777 UFHs, with air-maintenance of rear-area logistics networks being provided by the IAF’s C-130H-30s, CH-47F Chinooks and Mi-17V-5s. 
For localised air-defence, both the IA and IAF have since 2011 deployed their respective stocks of manportable air-defence radars to forward locations along the Sino-Indian LAC to keep track of the PLA’s routine airspace transgressions—something that should have been done as far back as 2008. While the IAF’s DRDO-developed and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL)-built S-band Aslesha three-dimensional radars have been deployed at Nyoma, Chushul and Fukche, the Army-specific Bharani manportable radars have been deployed at Demchok and Pangong Tso in Ladakh, as well as at two locations in Uttarakhand and Sikkim. 
The Aslesha, which weighs 250kg, uses low-probability-of-intercept frequencies to look out for terrain-hugging tactical UAVs and helicopters over mountainous terrain out to 50km. The IAF has to date ordered 21 of them, and first deliveries took place in January 2008. On the other hand, the Bharani is a two-dimensional L-band gapfiller system now in series-production for the Army. It has a range of 40km and can track up to 100 airborne targets. To date, 16 Bharanis—meant to be used in conjunction with SHORADS like the SpyDer-SR—have been delivered.
For theatre-wide deep surveillance across the LAC, the IAF already possesses EL/M-2060P pod-mounted synthetic aperture radars, as well as the first two of 11 Bombardier 5000 jets equipped with belly-mounted SAR sensors and ELINT sensors—all of which have given the IAF far superior ISTR capabilities when compared to those available to the PLAAF.

New Tank EX Avatar?
(to be concluded)

Assessing Latest PLAAF Air-Defence Activities In TAR

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This year’s series of annual PLAAF exercises within that portion of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in Tibet Military District (TMD) that faces the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC), which commenced in late March 20016 and are still continuing, have witnessed significant accretions, with the most notable among them being the introduction of a solitary KJ-500 turboprop-powered airborne early warning and control (AEW & C) platform, plus the deployment of LY-80 MR-SAMs in place of the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs.
It may be recalled that the PLAAF has since 2010 been deploying Su-27SK/Su-27UBK/J-11A heavy-MRCAs belonging to the Shizuishan-based 6thAir Division’s 16th Air Regiment, and J-10As from the Mengzi-based 44th Air Division’s 131st Air Regiment (based in Luliang) out to the dual-use airports at Lhasa Gonggar (facing Sikkim and northern West Bengal) and Ngari (facing Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir) twice every year during summertime and wintertime for two-week-long deployment periods.
These used to be accompanied by corresponding deployments of the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs of the PLAAF’s Chengdu-based 11th Anti-Air Artillery Brigade (Unit 95607), which has three Regiments--21st, 22nd and 23rd--are equipped with the HQ-64/LY-60D E-SHORADS, and HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D MR-SAMs. The latter were deployed at fixed launch-sites located at Lhasa Gonggar and the dual-use Shigatse Airport.
Since late 2012, the 651st Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, based atNyingchi, began taking over from the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1Ds of the 11th Anti-Air Artillery Brigade’s 22nd Regiment. The 651st comprises a Regiment of LY-80 70km-range MR-SAMs (containing 16 TELs each loaded with six MR-SAM vertical launch-cells), a Regiment of 18 tracked PGZ-04As (each armed with four FN-6 VSHORADS launchers missiles and four 25mm cannons), a Regiment of FM-90 SHORADS, and a composite battalion that has 108 FN-6 VSHORADS/MANPADS launchers, 24 Type 73 towed 37mm anti-aircraft guns and 18 towed twin 35mm PG-99 ‘Giant Bow’ anti-aircraft guns. 
Also included are LIMAN ground-based jammers, JY-27A VHF-band anti-PGM volume-search radars as part of the LY-80 MR-SAM Regiment, YLC-18 S-band 3-D acquisition radars for the FM-90s (now replacing the older LSS-1/Type 120 L-band 2-D low-altitude acquisition radars), YLC-6 S-band 2-D low-level air-defence radars for the FN-6 VSHORADS/MANPADS launchers, Type 73 anti-aircraft guns and 18 PG-99 ‘Giant Bow’ anti-aircraft guns.
As for airspace surveillance radars, there is one JL-3D-90A L-band 3-D airspace surveillance radar operated by the PLAAF at the Ganba La radar station southwest of Lhasa, plus another one north of Shigatse Airport. These are joined by three Army-operated YLC-2V 3-D S-band acquisition radars located around Ngari Airport, Qamdo Bangda Airport, and at PLA SIGINT Stations north of Bum La.
The PLAAF’s Air-Defence Reporting Centre for monitoring TAR’s air-defence identification zone (ADIZ) is located at Ganba La.
In future, the PLAAF will also begin making use of dual-use airports immediately north of Arunachal Pradesh, these being Qamdo and Linzhi.
Going hand-in-hand with these developments are increasing efforts by both the PLAAF and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to undertake joint air campaigns that since 2011 have been rehearsed under the ‘Shaheen’ series of joint exercises. It may be recalled that the ‘Shaheen’ series of bi-annual exercises commenced in 2011 when, for the first time ever as part of EX Shaheen-I, a PLAAF contingent with four Su-27UBKs from the 8th Flight Academy (also known as ‘Blue Army Aggressors’) deployed to Rafiqui air base in Shorkot, Pakistan. 
This exercise, lasting for over two weeks starting March 11, saw the PAF fielding its Mirage VEFs and F-7PGs executing various various air-to-air and air-to-ground combat scenarios. The PLAAF’s 8th Flight Academy operates Su-27UBKs and Su-30MKKs that simulate enemy air force tactics during dissimilar air combat training exercises. The PLAAF possesses three such ‘Blue Army Aggressor’ squadrons (the first of which was raised in June 1987), with the other two flying J-10A M-MRCAs and J-7E light interceptors. All three squadrons operate under the PLAAF’s Canzhou-based Flight Test and Training Base in Hebei province.
The second joint air exercise—EX Shaheen-II—was conducted between September 3 and 22, 2013 at Hotan air base in the Hetian Prefecture of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. For this, the PAF flew in its F-7PGs and Mirage-IIIEPs. This was for the first time in the PLAAF’s history that a foreign air force had conducted a joint exercise inside China’s airspace.Participating PLAAF assets included J-10As of the Hotan-based 109thBrigade, JH-7As of the Urumqi-based 37thAir Division Division’s 110th Brigade, J-8Fs from the Hotan-based 109th Brigade, and Su-27SKs and Su-27UBKs from the Korla-based 111th Brigade.
The third such bilateral air exercise—EX Shaheen-III—was held at the PAF’s Rafiqui air base in the northeastern province of Punjab between May 5 and 28, 2014. The PLAAF sent four J-10A/B M-MRCAs along with a detachment of air-defence controllers and ground-support crew, while the PAF deployed up to eight of its JF-17s and Mirage-VEFs. EX Shaheen-IV was conducted at the Yinchuan air base in the Southern Command (previously part of Langzhou MR) between September 12 and October 4, 2015. During these exercises, three different types of frontline combat aircraft from each of the two air forces were fielded—this being a first. In addition, the PLAAF for the very first time deployed one of its KJ-200 turboprop-powered AEW & C platforms, while for the PAF this was the first time that it went for air exercises outside China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (which falls under the Lanzhou Military Region).
The PLAAF’s combat aircraft assets taking part in the exercises included J-11A heavy-MRCAs and Su-27UBKs belonging to the Shizuishan-based 6thAir Division’s 16th Air Regiment, J-10As from the Mengzi-based 44th Air Division’s 131st Air Regiment (based in Luliang) and a detachment of JH-7A bombers from the Urumqi-based 37th Air Division Division’s 110th Brigade. The PAF sent two JF-17 Thunder light-MRCAs, two Mirage-IIIEP tactical interdictors and two F-7PG light interceptors, which were accompanied by an IL-78MKP aerial refuelling tanker.
EX Shaheen-VI began on April 9, 2016 and lasted till April 30. During this exercise, the PAF for the first time deployed its ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle AEW & C platforms (from which the KJ-500 is derived) for airborne battle management missions. 

Homegrown LUH Takes To The Skies

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Yesterday, as Pakistan’s armed forces were celebrating their 51st ‘Youm-e-Difaa’ (National Defence Day), the Ministry of Defence-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) conducted the 15-minute-long maiden flight of its homegrown, multi-role, 3.15-tonne, single-engined Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), 440 of which are required for the three armed services of India (125 for the Air Force, 259 for the Army and 56 for the Navy) over the following decade.
Yesterday’s LUH maiden flight was the culmination of seven years of R & D, this being indicative of a longer-than envisaged R & D period for the prototype. The MoD, it may be recalled, had sanctioned Rs. 376 crores for developing the LUH and HAL’s Rotary Wing Research & Design Centre (RWR & DC) began working on this project in February 2009. The MoD had then specified a target date for each of the LUH’ R & D milestones: building a full-scale mock-up; the design freeze; maiden flight; and attainment of Initial Operational Clearance (IOC). Back then, HAL had promised to freeze the LUH’s design by late 2010; conduct the maiden flight of the first prototype by 2012; obtain the certificate of airworthiness and IOC clearance by 2014, and begin delivery of series-production models by 2015.
But, as expected, none of those targetted milestones were met. The LUH’s design was frozen in only 2013 and its sole full-scale mock-up for evaluation and assessment was ready only by February 2015. Only after that did work begin on building a ground test vehicle (GTV) for design validation and testing of all dynamic systems, and the three projected flying prototypes for flight-tests and airworthiness certification. As of now, the revised milestones call for the flight-tests and airworthiness certification processes to be completed by 2019 at best, with IOC being targetted for 2021. All-in-all, therefore, a delay of six (06) years.
Such delayed attainment of the specified R & D milestones have been witnessed in case of the homegrown, 5.8-tonne light combat helicopter (LCH), work on which had begun at HAL’s RWR & DC way back  on October 3, 2006 when the MoD sanctioned a sum of Rs.376.67 crores for HAL to design and develop the LCH over a 24-month period. Powered by twin Ardiden 1H (1,200shp TM333-2C2 Shakti) engines, the first LCH prototype—TD-1—completed its first ground-run on February 4, 2010 and its maiden flight was logged on March 29, 2010. 
Exactly a year later, the Indian Air Force (IAF) placed a production indent with HAL for procuring 64 LCHs.  Three months later, the LCH’s second prototype, TD-2, made its maiden flight on June 28, 2011.  The third prototype—TD-3—made its maiden flight on November 12, 2014, while the fourth and last prototype—TD-4—took to the skies on December 1, 2015.
The LCH was originally targetted in 2006 to achieve its IOC by 2013, but as of now, it has yet to complete its weapons-firing trials (due to delayed availability of the DRDO-developed HELINA IIR-guided ATGM) and its self-protection sensor suite (comprising radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers and missile approach warning system) has yet to be integrated with the airframe. IOC attainment now is not expected before the end of 2018. The estimated delay in milestone attainment is six (06) years as well.  
The LUH, powered by a single 750kW Turbomeca Ardiden 1U engine along with a HAL-developed main gearbox and a Turbomeca-designed transmission, will have a maximum all-up-weight of 3,150Kg, have a range of 350Km and service ceiling 6.5Km (21,300 feet), and a seating capacity of six passengers plus two pilots. The LUH, being multi-purpose, will carry out various roles such as armed reconnaissance, troop transport, CASEVAC, ferrying underslung cargo, search-and-rescue, and flying training.
Just like the 5.5-tonne Dhruv ALH and LCH, the LUH will contain an avionics suite developed by HALBIT Avionics Pvt Ltd (HALBIT), which was created in May 2007 by Israel’s Elbit Systems, HAL and MerlinHawk Associates Pvt Ltd. The suite will include an: integrated AMLCD-based glass cockpit, a chin-mounted ‘Compass’ lightweight FLIR turret licence-assembled by the MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd, a HAL-developed multi-bandwidth software-defined radio, and the Colour ANVIS NVG night vision goggle. The self-protection sensor suite, supplied by Sweden’s SaabTech (and identical to those installed on the LCH and the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunship version of the Dhruv Mk.4 ALH), will be installed and integrated by HALBIT.
In addition, several force-multiplier options are on the table for incorporation, since a low-flying LUH will be especially vulnerable to threats such as difficult terrain, enemy fire and the intersection of utility wires in the flight path, and will therefore often be required to operate in a Degraded Visual Environment (DVE), adding to the already heavy workload and leaving flight crews to rely on NVGs to accomplish their mission. Factors limiting the pilots’ FOV include: complete darkness, poor weather conditions, brownouts, whiteouts and sandstorms. 
To overcome such shortcomings and limitations, Elbit Systems’ BrightNite solution is now available. BrightNite enables utility helicopters of all types to successfully perform DVE missions in more than 90% of night-flying situations, providing them with piloting capabilities of attack helicopters.
Lightweight and compact, BrightNite is a multi-spectral end-to-end panoramic piloting solution that delivers the essential data directly to both eyes of the pilot, enabling intuitive flight in a head-up, eyes-out orientation in pitch dark and other DVE conditions. For helicopters like the Rudra and LUH, this unique solution comprises a FLIR turret and highly sensitive Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) sensors that present an ultra-wide field-of-regard intuitive image to a display system that projects into the ANVIS helmet-mounted NVG. The display is overlaid by a synthetic layer that follows the contours of the landscape and a third layer of 3-D conformal symbology, which displays hazards, mission-conformal symbology and tactical data. Multiple crew-members can simultaneously scan the entire field-of-regard, using a single sensor and the synthetic world, thereby enabling them to fly in common line-of-sight.
Like the Dhruv/Rudra and the LCH, the LUH too adheres to the following FAR/MILSPEC standards:
* US Army Aeronautical Design Standard-33E (ADS-33E)
* Flaw-Tolerant Rotor System: FAR/JAR 29.571, AM 29-28
* Crashworthy Fuel System: FAR/JAR 29.952, AM 29-35
* Flaw-Tolerant Drive Train with Over-Torque Certification: FAR/JAR 29.952, AM 29-28
* Turbine Burst Protection: FAR/JAR 29.901, AM 29-36
* Composite Spar Main & Tail Rotor Blades with lightning strike protection: FAR/JAR 1309(h), AM 29-40
* Engine Compartment Fire Protection: FAR/JAR 29.1193
* Redundant Hydraulics & Flaw Tolerant Flight Controls: FAR/JAR 29.571, AM 29-28
* Aircraft-Wide Bird Strike Protection: FAR/JAR 29.631, AM 29-40
* Crashworthiness Standard: NATO’s MIL-STD-1290
* Crashworthy Seats conforming to MIL-STD-1472B
* Cockpit Instrumentation Lighting Conforming to MIL-STD-85762A
* Avionics Databus: MIL-STD-1553B or ARINC-429
* Autopilot Accuracy: MIL-F-9490D
* Embedded MIL-STD-188-141B ALE Link Protection
* Embedded MIL-STD-188-110B data modem
When operating as an armed aeroscout platform for battlespace surveillance, the LUH will be armed with twin rocket pods housing 2.75-inch rockets supplied by Belgium’s FZ, and four Mistral ATAM air-to-air missiles from MBDA.
Series-production of the LUH will be undertaken at a greenfield facility set up by HAL at BiderehallaKaval, Gubbi Taluk, Tumakuru, about 70km from Bengaluru. The foundation stone for this facility was laid on January 3, 2016 by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 
For radically improving the LUH’s hot-and-high operating parameters and enhancing flight safety, an option that could well be utilised in future under the auspices of the US-India Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), under which HAL will be required to form an industrial partnership with US-based AVX Aircraft Company for incorporating the latter’s patented modification kit into the LUH’s airframe.
With its unique blend of co-axial rotors and dual ducted-fans, the AVX  kit offers greater aerodynamic and fuel efficiency, speed, range, payload, improved hover-out-of-ground effect (HOGE), and the ability to operate in hotter temperatures and at higher altitudes than any of today’s conventional light helicopters. It also reduces brown-out conditions in the landing configuration since, thanks to the ducted-fans, the helicopter can use a 5-degree nose-down or even-level approach to the landing zone. This increases flight safety by giving the pilot a greatly improved view of the landing zone.

A Done Deal At Long Last

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As the slides above clearly show, yesterday’s inter-governmental contract signing ceremony involved India’s Ministry of Defence and its French counterpart’s Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), and not with any OEM. 
That ‘creature/entity’ marked above with the red-arrow is a ‘desi’ bandabaaz’ from the TOI GROUP called Srinjoy, who is well-known for consistently spreading falsities and disinformation, like the non-inking of CISMOA and BECA foundational agreements by India has led to the IAF and IN receiving ‘inferior C-130J-30s and P-8Is. The question that begs asking is why such ‘bandalbaazes’ are allowed to be in close proximity of any visiting VVIP delegation—clearly a clear-cut violation of established diplomatic security protocols—instead of being kept away at a safe distance as is the universal practice all over the world.

Gloves Are Finally Off Against Those Irreconcilable, Compulsively Sulking Negativists!

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Since last year, the Indian Army has been monitoring the following launch-pads used by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate its ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments into Jammu & Kashmir: from Bhimber Gali towards Shopian and Anantnag; from Lipa towards Baramula; from Jura towards Sopore; from Athmuqam towards Kupwara; from Dudhnial, Tejian, Shardi, Rattapani and Kel towards Machhal; and from Saonar and Sardari towards Kupwara and Sopore. 
The base camps or sanctuaries for the ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments are located further into the rear within PoK and Khyber Paktunkhwa, as shown in the slide below.
Finally, eight launch-pads spread over a linear 250km frontage and located at Lipa, Kel and Rattapani were chosen for targetted, surgical destruction lasting 7 hours (inclusive of cross ingress/egress) by the Indian Army’s 4 SF (Para) and 9 SF (Para) Battalions. 
(Above) Launch-Pads Destroyed at Athmuqam, Dudhnial, Chalhana and Leepa

However, for retaining the element of surprise and initiative, an elaborate deception plan involving the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF) was required. For, to be factored in was the high state of the operational readiness at that time of both the Pakistan Army (PA) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) throughout the LoC. Following the meeting of India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) on September 21, and another meeting between the Indian PM and the two armed services chiefs on September 24, a deception plan jointly prepared by the IA’s Udhampur-based HQ Northern Command and the IAF’s Delhi-based HQ Western Command was put into effect. 
Both the IA and IAF decided to lull ther adversary into assuming that a powerful AirLand attack would be launched at a few locations in southern PoK, namely in the Bhimber sector’s areas like Tatta Pani/Hot Springs area. While the IA decided upon unleashing field artillery fire-assaults against Samahni, Bandala and Tatta Pani, the IAF commenced a series of supporting helicopter movements. 
For starters, by September 24 night, the IAF began ferrying out four Mi-35P attack helicopters belonging to the Pathankot-based 125 ‘Gladiators’ Sqn Sqn (the other Sqn—104 ‘Pioneer Rotarians is at Suratgarh) and making them land at selected locations like Poonch, Rajouri, Bhimber Gali and Krishna Ghati along with in-ptheatre Mi-17V-5s. All these movements were carried out non-stop for the following four days in full view of the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms that were flying out of Kamra and keeping an eye on almost all air-movements inside both northern Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.  
Shortly after dusk on Sptember 28, the IA’s light field artillery and mortar strikes at locations inside PoK, like Bandala, Samahni and Tatta Pani, from locations like Mankote, Balnoi and Nangi Tekri in the Krishna Ghati sector, and from Richhmar Gali in Tangdhar sector. 
The real insertion by foot of the IA’s SF (Para), however, took place in the Lipa, Shardi and Rattapani bulges (i.e. areas where Pakistan-controlled territory juts into J & K). Known as the JAW-HEAD tactic, this meant that the IA gave the impression of hitting the enemy’s jaws but in reality was aiming for the forehead in a totally surprising move. 
The bulges were carefully selected so as to present favourable topography for the attacking forces. For, throughout the LoC where IA and PA observation posts and bunkers are located face-to-face, extensive anti-personnel minefields are laid to cover the frontal and flank (left and right) approaches, but the rear area is devoid of any mines so as to facilitate friendly movements. Consequently, a raiding party beginning its ingress into enemy territory from the baselines of any bulge can stealthily sneak in through the rear and attack from the least expected direction. Thus, the IA’s SF (Para) detachments had to penetrate up to a depth of only 700 metres from the LoC but, if calculated from the frontal tip of a bulge, the targetted launch-pads would appear to be up to 3km inside PoK.
Due to this common-sensical mission-planning, the SF (Para) detachments had not need for shoulder-fired LAWs like Carl Gustavs. Only NVDs and weapons like Instalaza C-90 LAW, IWI-built Tavor TAR-21 assault rifles fitted with T-40 40mm single-shot underbarrel grenade launchers (UBGL) supplied by Turkish Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK, or Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corp) were used with devastating effect.
The diversionary laying of light field artillery and mortar strikes at locations inside PoK, like Bandala, Samahni and Tatta Pani sent the PA into a tizzy and it has yet to recover from this common-sensical shock-and-awe tactics.

Pakistan ISPR’s Counter-Narrative
When news of the IA’s cross-LoC raids reached the PA’s GHQ in Rawalpindi by 4.30am on January 29, it was wrongly assumed by GHQ that these raids took place only in the PA’s Bhimber and Tatta Pani sectors inside PoK, this being an indication of the successes of the IA’s and IAF’s diversionary tactics. Within the hour, the Pakistani Prime Minister and the PA’s Chief of the Army Staff were told about these raids as well, following which it was decided to contact US Secretary of State John Kerry. In the US, the matter was referred by Kerry to US NSA Dr Susan Rice, who in turn contacted her Indian counterpart Ajit Doval and sought clarifications. Upon receiving the necessary details, clarifications and assurances (that were repeated later in the day at a press-conference by the IA’s DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh), Dr Rice reverted back to Islamabad with the India-supplied updates.
The GHQ then went into a huddle to decide its next course of action. Retaliatory cross-LoC raids were immediately ruled out, since if they were to be conducted, then the PA would have been required to admit that a cross-LoC raid had been mounted by the IA, which in turn would have meant that there indeed were unacknowledged sanctuaries within PoK for accommodating both terrorists and irregular active combatants from proscribed ‘tanzeems’. Consequently, the GHQ decided on an elaborate counter-narrative based on outright denial. 
This then led to the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) organising a press-trip to only those two sectors (Bhimber and Tatta Pani) where the IA had resorted to only cross-LoC shelling.    
On October 1, the press-corps from Islamabad was helilifted first to the Bhimber helipad and from there another Mi-171 ferried the press-corps first to Baghsar, and then to Mandhole village in the PA’s Tatta Pani sector, where it was revealed that the IA’s Sepoy Chandu Babulal Chavan of 37 Rashtriya Rifles was being kept under detention at the Garrison HQ at Nakyal.
So what comes next? It will be logical to assume that before the onset of winter, the Pakistan Army (PA) will try its level-best to facilitate the infiltration of several ‘sarkari jihadis’ into the Kashmir Valley through multiple infiltration routes along the LoC and even through the ‘Working Boundary’ or WB (i.e. Pakistan’s international border with Jammu that includes the Chicken’s Neck area and which India insists is part of the International Boundary or IB and therefore should not be referred to as the WB) under the cover of deliberate field artillery skirmishes. India, on the other hand, by officially stating that it considers the whole of PoK as an integral part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K), has therefore declared that she will regard any Pakistani support/facilitation for armed insurrection by its ‘sarkari jihadis’ inside J & K who have been launched from their sanctuaries inside PoK as a direct and deliberate act-of-war. Consequently, India therefore has signalled her determination to not only target such sanctuaries through repetitive, preventive cross-LoC special operations, but more significantly, has for all intents and purposes declared her intent to climb the escalatory ladder both horizontally (by expanding the lateral frontage required for offensive ground operations) and vertically by bringing in offensive airpower (like the Jaguar IS armed with CBU-105 SFW) to target all PA field artillery gun emplacement sites, regardless of whether they are located within PoK or to the west of the WB in the northeaster portion of Pakistan’s Punjab state.
This explains the PA’s initiation of mortar fire against Nowshera's Salal and Baba Khor areas Akhnoor's Pallanwalla area and in the Balnoie area of Mendhar sector on September 27, followed by the Sabzian area in Poonch on September 28, 2016. Concurrently, India on September 27started the process of evacuating nearly 1,000 villages in the six border districts of Punjab state that are within 10km of the India-Pakistan international boundary (around the Shakargarh Salient)—these being  the districts of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Fazilka and Ferozepur. In addition, as a defensive measure the Indian Army (IA) has begun laying anti-tank mines along the Shakargarh Salient and has also begun deploying medium field artillery regiments on both flanks of the Uri-Poonch Bulge as well as around the Shakargarh Salient and Chicken’s Neck area. Through this action, India is signalling that while it has no intention of unleashing its Strike Corps through the IB, she retains the option of unleashing the unrestricted use of her offensive airpower and the IA’s combined armoured and mechanised warfare formations (integrated battle groups) ably supported by field artillery fire-assaults inside both PoK and the Chicken’s Neck area in order to compel the PA to acknowledge that there’s no such thing as a WB and thus its sanctity should be accepted and respected in the same way as the IB.    
To further drive home this point, the Indian Air Force (IAF), barely a week after concluding its annual ‘Talon’ series of air exercises (which are normally held at the same time as the Pakistan Air Force’s annual Highmark series of annual air exercises), activated all 18 of the principal and subordinate air bases of the Western Air Command and Southwestern Air Command on September 26, and began a four-day wargaming exercise that included synchronised air dominance, battlefield air-interdiction and tactical air-interdiction sorties being flown in support of areas of responsibility of the IA’s Southwestern Command (HQed Jaipur, Rajasthan), Western Command (HQed Chandimandir, Chandigarh) and Northern Command (HQed in Udhampur, J & K). Incidentally, the Pakistan Air Force’s EX Highmark had concluded on September 24. 

IB, WB, LoC Explained
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The State of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) has 734km of LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to Punjab belt running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts.The International Boundary (IB) between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The Working Boundary (WB) spans 202km, the Line of Control (LoC) spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the AGPL— from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the west bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot), which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that is known in India as the International Boundary (IB), while Pakistan refers to it as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement (the so-called standstill agreement) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan. Given the fact that India maintains a near-foolproof anti-infiltration grid along the LoC, Pakistan has since mid-2013 focussed its terrorist infiltration efforts along the WB.Shakargarh bulge (which is Pakistani territory) is running adjoining the IB, is 45km x 45km, and is held by the PA. The bulge joins Indian territory with a 40km distance in between both countries and touches India’s National Highway-1, which is the lifeline of the entire Kashmir Valley. If PA troops manage to get effectively operational in three to four days at the tip of the bulge, the NH-1 could be cut of totally, rendering the entire north of India paralysed, as all supplies and winter stocking in the Valley is done by this route, for Indian troops.
On paper, to the north, those PA battle formations that are LoC-specific and Chicken’s Neck-specific are the Mangla-based I Corps that comprises the Gujranwala-based 6 Armoured Division, Kharian-based 17 Infantry Division and the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division also in Kharian; and the Rawalpindi-based X Corps that includes the Gilgit-based Force Command Northern Areas, Murree-based 12 Infantry Division, Mangla-based 19 Infantry Division and the Jhelum-based 23 Infantry Division, Formations allocated for operations along the Shakargarh Salient are the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps comprising the Sialkot-based 8 Infantry Division and 15 Infantry Division; and the Multan-based II Corps made up of the Multan-based 1 Armoured Division, and the Okara-based 14 Infantry Division and 40 Infantry Division. Thus far, no significant forward deployments of any of these formations have taken place.
Down south, the battle formations arrayed against Rajasthan include the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps with its 26 Mechanised Division and 35 Infantry Division; and the Karachi-based V Corps with its Pano Aqil-based 16 Infantry Division, Hyderabad-based 18 Infantry Division and Malir-based 25 Mechanised Division. So far, only some elements of the 25 and 26 Mechanised Divisions have been deployed opposite an area stretching from Jaisalmer to Fort Abbas and the PA has begun flying relentless sorties of its Shahpar (CH-3) tactical UAVs that were acquired from China’s CATIC in 2012. This is probably a precautionary measure aimed at monitoring the IA’s upcoming Division-level armoured/mechanised infantry exercises that are annually held during wintertime.

The PA, however, is most unlikely to attempt any form of escalation along either the LoC or the WB since it presently has a deployment ratio of 54.6%, while the resting and re-equipping ratio is 12.7%, and the remaining 33% is undergoing the training cycle. This trend will continue for at least another four years, since the defunct Durand Line too became active from mid-2014. It may be recalled that since March 2002, the PA has been forced by elements that later on went on to become the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by 2006 to wage a three-front war against the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan (which also included Chechan and Uighur militants; against the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in the sensitive Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK (formerly NWFP) and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA; and, against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Swat Valley of KPK. The TTP’s cadre base is more than 20,000 tribesmen and the Abdullah Mehsud group from the Alizai clan of the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan commands about 5,000 fighters. Other militant groups within the TTP include Maulvi Nazir from the Kaka Khel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Waziri tribe (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur from the Ibrahim Khel clan of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe (North Waziristan), the Haqqani network using manpower from the Mezi sub-tribe of the Zadran tribe (North Waziristan), Mangal Bagh (Khyber), TNSM (Swat, Dir, Malakand), and Faqir Mohammad (Bajaur).

Some 35% of PA troops (about 180,000 out of an end-strength of approximately 550,000 active-duty personnel and another 500,000 reservists) were engaged in LIC campaigns since 2007 till 2014 and are still literally bogged down throughout the entire 27,200 square kilometres of FATA. Formations fully committed to on-LIC operations include the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division and 17 Ubfantry vDivision from Mangla-based I Corps in Swat, 19 Infantry Division from X Corps in northern Swat (based out of Jhelum), 7 Infantry Division from Rawalpindi-based X Corps in North Waziristan (based out of Mardan), 9 Infantry Division from Peshawar-based XI Corps in South Waziristan (based out of Kohat), 14 Division from Multan-based II Corps, Jhelum-based 23 Division of the X Corps, and 40 Infantry Division. The Gujranwala-based XXX Corps and the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps lent one brigade each. In all, there are approximately 17 infantry brigades or 45 infantry battalions, and 58 Frontier Corps (FC) wings now engaged in LIC operations. By mid-2011, 1,83,400 troops had a westward deployment orientation, while another 10,000 are now abroad on UN-related peacekeeping missions.

The five defensive holding Corps of the PA against the IB are: XXXI Corps (Bahawalpur) that has 18 Brigades of which six are to guard the border and now one of its Divisions and two Brigades out of these are in FATA; XXX Corps (Gujranwala) has four (14, 10, 54, 104) of out of its nine Brigades employed in FATA; X Corps (Rawalpindi) has a total 17 Brigades of which 13 Brigades should be deployed against the IB but now one of its of Divisions and five (1, 7, 26, 28, 333) Brigades are in FATA; V Corps (Karachi) has six out of its 10 Brigades for the IB of which one (105) is in FATA; and IV Corps (Lahore) has 17 Brigades out of which eight should be facing the IB but three of them (22, 105, 106) are in FATA. Given such an extensive deployment along the Durand Line in accordance with the PA’s ‘seize and hold’ force posture, the PA today is in no position to mount any credible offensive AirLand campaign against its Indian counterpart, and this will remain the ground reality at least till 2020. It is also therefore no wonder that the PA has between 2009 and 2013 been able to conduct only four field exercises under the Azm-E-Nau (New Resolve) series, with the last one being just a table-top exercise.
(To Be Concluded)
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