Re-Engineered Meteor BVRAAM On The Works For IAF

February 28, 2020, 5:58 pm

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If any new-generation BVRAAM is to become a ‘game-changer’, then it has to have vastly improved kinematic capability compared with that of existing BVRAAMs. This requires substantial increases in two key parameters: ‘F-Pole’, i.e. the distance between the BVRAAM-launching MRCA and its target when the BVRAAM hits; and a ‘no-escape zone’, the range within which the BVRAAM can be fired and the target, no matter how it manoeuvres, cannot escape. When an existing BVRAAM the like AIM-120D AMRAAM, MICA or R-77/RVV-AE is fired at a target, it delivers the same amount of thrust over a certain period regardless of the tactical scenario. If the target can be reached without the rocket motor burning out, or shortly after it does so, the BVRAAM will have a high-energy state during its terminal attack phase. This will allow it to manoeuvre very hard, easily countering a targeted combat aircraft trying to evade the incoming BVRAAM. If the target is farther away, the BVRAAM will usually climb to a high altitude while its rocket motor is burning and then coast on its built-up energy with gravity on its side until it reaches the terminal phase of its flight (its final attack run. If the target is not too far away, and the BVRAAM is still above it, it will dive down on the target in an attempt to maximize its ability to make hard manoeuvres. The longer the shot, the less energy the BVRAAM will have for its critical terminal phase of flight.

Whereas the AMRAAM’s rocket motor burns for seconds, then the missile coasts, a Meteor-type BVRAAM is under ramjet thrust for its complete flight. Consequently, the latter’s average velocity is higher and the Meteor arrives with the energy to out-manoeuvre its target. Thus, both the F-Pole and the no-escape zone are increased. Instead of burning off all its fuel right after launch it can throttle its engine back during cruise, thus saving fuel. As it approaches its target it can throttle up, eventually making its terminal attack while at its highest possible energy state, around Mach 4.5, even when fired over long ranges. Not only does this mean the Meteor will have more energy to manoeuvre during the endgame of the engagement, but this capability also drastically increases the size of the no-escape zone. Basically, the Meteor has a far greater ability to chase and catch enemy combat aircraft over long ranges.

The Meteor’s data-link also has two-way capability, so the pilot could re-target the BVRAAM while it is already on its way. The pilot can also see the Meteor’s fuel-burn rate, kinematic energy and tracking state in real-time. This is essential for making quick decisions as to whether or not to fire another BVRAAM at the target or to run away if it is properly tracking toward the target or has obtained its own lock. The Meteor will be able to get those crucial mid-course guidance updates not just from the MRCA that fired it, but from “third party” sources as well. These can include other MRCAs, airborne early warning & control (AEW & C) platforms, and land and sea-based radar and electronic surveillance systems that provide their own situational awareness data to the missile-firing MRCA via data-link. Thus, with many assets contributing to a common tactical network “picture” via common data-link waveform and language, it provides information that anyone, including the Meteor-armed BVRAAM and the Meteor itself, can exploit.

While the above-mentioned reasons are precisely why the Indian Air Force (IAF) has ordered the MBDA-developed Meteor BVRAAMs for its 36 Rafale M-MRCAs, the operational requirement for such ramjet-powered BVRAAMs is for 2,500 units. And there’s another catch: the Meteor BVRAAM should be compatible with the mission avionics of all types of MRCAs that are in service with the IAF. This, in turn, represents a systems integration challenge, but there is a solution, nevertheless. This involves, on one hand the installation of indigenous mission computer, stores management system and pylon interface avionics (all using the MIL-STD-1760 digital databus) on MRCAs like the Tejas Mk.1, Tejas Mk.1A, Super Su-30MKI and MiG-29UPG, while on the other the Meteor’s MBDA-developed Ku-band active seeker and a module of its rear-mounted two-way data-link can be replaced by corresponding India-supplied avionics and sensors that are used by the indigenously-developed Astra-1 BVRAAM. This way, the MMRs of Russia- and Israel-origin can seamlessly be integrated with the Meteor BVRAAM, since India will first have the avionics and sensors integrated with the Israel-origin and Russia-origin MMRs at the Israel-based and Russia-based avionics integration test-rigs and then supply them to MBDA for installation inside the Meteor airframes.

Engineering studies to this effect were jointly undertaken by MBDA and India’s Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) back in 2016, when the DRDO began its own in-house conceptual studies on develop a solid-fuel ducted rocket (SFDR)-powered BVRAAM. It then emerged that a suitably-modified Meteor BVRAAM containing DRDO-developed avionics was indeed possible to both develop and integrate with the Russia-/Israel-supplied AESA-MMRs, while at the same time not violating the IPRs of the MMR-supplying foreign OEMs. In fact, MBDA is already well into such a re-engineering programme for Japan, with whom the UK first began holding exploratory talks in 2014 on the prospects of a Meteor BVRAAM fitted with an AESA-based Ka-band millimetric frequency seeker that was developed by Mitsubishi Electric Co (MELCO) in the previous decade for the indigenously developed AAM-4B (Type-99) BVRAAM. Later, in January 2017 the Cooperative Research Project on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM) commenced. If all goes well, then such a BVRAAM will begin flight-tests in 2023.

In India too, R & D work began in 2016 for developing AESA-based X-band and Ku-band active seekers for both the XR-SAM long-range surface-to-air missile and the SFDR-powered Astra-2 BVRAAM, with Hyderabad-based Astra Microwave already having developed two types of such seekers, with work now underway on developing their Ka-band successors that too will be compatible with the Meteor BVRAAM. The Ka-band seeker with an active phased-array antenna (with 20km-range) and a secondary X-band passive channel will replace existing Ku-band seekers (with 6km-range) and provide higher resolution and countermeasures resistance. Such seekers can effortlessly work across multiple frequencies simultaneously, which makes them not only better at finding objects, but are also more difficult to detect. In addition, electronically steered antenna beams also offer other improvements: it is possible to perform an adaptive antenna beam-forming based on antenna sub-group transmit (Tx) and receive (Rx) channels or even adjusting all the single antenna transceiver elements. This put us into a position to use algorithms of super resolution in order to recognise and localise jammer sources while concurrently conducting target acquisition and tracking.

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Revisiting Mountain Warfare & Learning From Past Experiences

March 19, 2020, 1:24 pm

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Saga Of 7 Guards Battalion

Centrifugal Multi-Directional Attack Concept

MSC Origins

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Punitive, Targetted Medium Field Artillery Fire-Assaults With PGMs

April 10, 2020, 4:09 pm

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The Indian Army (IA) on April 10, 2020 carried out its fifth punitive, targetted medium field artillery fire-assault (between last October and to date) against Pakistan Army (PA) field artillery and related administrative firm bases located across the LoC at Dudhnial in the Neelum Valley (34 41 58.21 N, 74 09 25.31 E) of the Keran sector.

This fire-assault was to avenge the deaths of five 4 Para-SF soldiers of the IA who were involved in an extremely close-quarter combat (under OP Rangduri Behak) with five heavily-armed Pakistani terrorists (who also were killed in the process) in the Keran sector on April 7. IA HQ, along with Lt Gen Yogesh Kumar Joshi General Officer-Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of HQ Northern Command and Lt Gen B S Raju, GOC of the XV ‘Chinar’ Corps, had taken a very serious note of such losses suffered by the IA and thereafter it was decided to commence in a calibrated escalation of fire-assaults involving the usage of the newly-inducted M-777 ultralightweight 155mm/39-cal field howitzers and M982 Excalibur GPS-guided 155mm projectiles.

PA’s Administrative Base in Dudhnial

PA’s Field Artillery Base in Dudhnial

The IA conducted its first targetted medium field artillery fire-assault with the M-777/M982 Excalibur combination on October 20, 2019 in the Tangdhar sector of Kupwara district along the LoC by pounding areas in Pakistan’s Nauseri sector of Muzaffarabad district and its adjoining Jura sector in the Neelum Valley. While four terrorist launch-pads in the Neelum Valley were hit, launch-pads in Jura, Athamuqam and Kundalshahi were also decimated in the fire-assaults in the wee hours.

PA Gunpits at Sharda Peeth

This was followed by another similar fire-assault on December 4 in which four terrorist launch-pads were destroyed at Athmuqam in the neelum valley. The third fire-assault was carried out on December 26, 2019 in the Uri/Haji Pir sector to retaliate against the PA’s shelling of Baramulla’s Uri and Bandipora’s Gurez sectors in Jammu & Kashmir Union Territory. The fourth fire-assault took place in the Tangdhar and Poonch sectors on February 24 and 25, 2020.

IA’s Panzgam Field Artillery Base in Kupwara

IA’s Field Artillery Base at Keran

IA’s Field Artillery Base North of Tangdhar

The PA, however, is unlikely to cease its infiltration attempts anytime soon, since the bulk of its manpower deployments within PoK comprise irregular combatants. Pakistan’s ground forces deployment in what it calls AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan (together making up PoK) is 150,000 troops, but of this, only 22% belong to the PA and these comprise personnel serving with the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), plus other Regiments hailing from Pakistan's Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan provinces.

The bulk of the combatants include the 60,000-strong Mujahid Force and the 40,000-strong Jaanbaaz Force that are not officially part of the PA’s ORBAT, but they nevertheless come under the command of the PA’s Rawalpindi HQed X Corps. Both the Mujahid Force and the Jaanbaaz Force exist as irregular combatants and owe allegiance to the ‘Azad Kashmir Regiment’, which has 32 Infantry Battalions distributed among 8 Brigades.

The 1 AK Brigade is located in Muzaffarabad, the 2 AK Brigade in Rawalakot, the 3 AK Brigade in Kotli (has an area of responsibility located opposite to the Rajouri, Poonch, Naushera and Sunderbani sectors), the 4 AK Brigade in Bandli, the 5 AK Brigade in Dhani, the 6 AK Brigade in Bagh, the 7 AK Brigade in Bhimber, and the 32 AK Brigade in Kel. The Mujahid Force comprises the 640, 641, 647, 652, 654, 655, 815, 834, 841, and 886 Battalions of the Pakistan Army. The 656 Battalion is the Mujahid Force Training Centre at Bhimber.

The Gilgit-based HQ Force Commander Gilgit-Baltistan (FCGB) has under its command four Infantry Brigades—32 AK in Kel, 62 in Skardu, 80 in Minimarg, and 323 at Dansum. Back in 1999, the NLI had comprised of 14 Battalions (from 1 to 14). Since then, three more Battalions--15, 16 and 17 NLI—were raised. Of these, the 3, 4, 5 and 7 Battalions took part in the intrusions across the Batalik-Chorbat La-Turtuk sectors back in 1999. Elements of the 12 NLI occupied Tiger Hill and the Mushkoh Valley, while the 6 and 11 NLI were spread across the Drass-Tololing-Kaksar sectors. A 1993 study of the PA had showed the recruitment to the NLI from Gilgit to be at 55%, from Baltistan 35% and from other regions 10%. The ethnic composition of the NLI Battalions shows that they consist of 18% Sunnis, 49% Shias, 23% are Ismailees and 10% are Noor Bakshis.

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First VT-4/MBT-3000 Shipment Bound For Karachi

April 22, 2020, 7:09 pm

≫ Next: PLAGF High-Altitude Plateau Warfare Exercises in TAR & ORBAT Of TMD

≪ Previous: Punitive, Targetted Medium Field Artillery Fire-Assaults With PGMs

Back on March 22, 2020, when the Sindh provincial government imposed a 14-day lockdown throughout the province, the Pakistan Army’s (PA) Rawalpindi-based General Headquarters (GHQ) was perturbed, since it then was expecting the lockdown to end by April 2. However, matters came to a head on April 8, 2020, when Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah decided to tighten the lockdown regime and extend its duration till the first week of May in the province to prevent local transmission of the COVID-19 virus.

A pensive PA now, through its ‘selected’ federal government in Islamabad, began tightening the screws so that by the end of the first week of May, a ‘relaxed’ lockdown could prevail in and around Karachi Port Trust. And why so? Because the first tranche of 24 VT-4/MBT-3000 main battle tanks (MBT) is due to arrive at Karachi by sea by May 10 from Guangzhou, southern China, and require unloading.

Developed by the state-owned China North Industries Group Corp (NORINCO) and series-produced by the Inner Mongolia First Machinery Group Co Ltd, a subsidiary of NORINCO, the VT-4/MBT-3000 was unveilled at the EUROSATORY International Defence Exhibition in June 2012.

In August 2012, NORINCO hosted diplomats, military officials and military-industrial contractors from 44 countries at its proving grounds in Baotau for a mobility-cum-firepower demonstration of the VT-4/MBT-3000. Two years later, at the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition 2014 in Zhuhai, NORINCO showed for the first time a full-scale prototype.

In January 2018, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) conducted in-country mobility-cum-firepower evaluations of the VT-4 at its Cavalry Centre at Adisorn military camp, in Saraburi. Following this, the RTA procured an initial 28 VT-4s in 2016, with an option to order an additional 10 units. The RTA plans to purchase a total of 49 VT-4s in three tranches. The order for the first tranche of 28 VT-4s were delivered in October 2017 and 26 of them were accepted for service in January 2018 with the RTA’s 3rd Cavalry Division in Khon Kaen Province, while the remaining two are operational with the RTA’s Cavalry Centre at Adisorn Military camp in Saraburi, and the Army Armoury Hall. The purchase of a second batch of ten VT-4s costing $58 million was authorised in April 2017.

The PA conducted in-country mobility-cum-firepower trials of the VT-4 between June and December 2018 at its field firing ranges located at the Tilla Jogian Field Firing Range in Jhelum, northern Punjab, and at the Khudai Rang Field Firing Range in Muzaffargarh, central Punjab, following which in July 2019 a contract was inked with NORINCO for the procurement of up to 550 VT-4s and 50 W-753 ARRVs on a fast-track basis.

The main reasons for procuring the VT-4s and not the 48-tonne Al Khalid MBTs (licence-built Type-90II/MBT-2000 developed by NORINCO) were, first, the Al Khalid’s 1,200hp Ukraine-origin KMDB 6TD-2 air-cooled diesel engines (similar to the 1,000hp 6TD diesel engines powering the PA’s 320 46-tonne T-80UD MBTs acquired in the latter half of the 1990s) that broke down whenever the MBT was engaged in fording water obstacles; and second, Pakistan’s state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) has been unsuccessful in procuring high-quality steel from the bankrupt Pakistan Steel Mills. Consequently, the PA has, between 2004 and 2017, been able to procure only 415 licence-built Al-Khalid MBTs, while the VS-21 ARRVs have been procured off-the-shelf from NORINCO.

In addition to Pakistan, NORINCO also exported 44 MBT-2000s (known also as the VT-1A) and three VS-21 ARRVs to the Bangladesh Army in 2011–2013, totally valued at US$162 million.

The VT-4/MBT-3000 is claimed by NORINCO to be powered by a 1,300hp water-cooled diesel, whose full-scale mock-up was first displayed in November 2018. However, this engine has not yet entered series-production and consequently all VT-4/MBT-3000 units meant for export continue to be powered by 900hp NORINCO-made water-cooled diesel engines.

In mid-April 2020, the Inner Mongolia First Machinery Group Co Ltd rolled out the first 24 VT-4s for the PA, following which they were transported by rail to Guangzhou for shipment by sea.

The PA will deploy its VT-4s with the Gujranwala-based 6 Armoured Division, whose principal area of operations include the Ravi-Chenab corridor of the plains of western Punjab (inclusive of the Shakargarh Bulge, the Chicken’s Neck area and the Chammb-Jaurian axis). And like the India Army, the PA too has created Integrated Armoured Battle groups (IABG), comprising the Kharian-based 8 IABG under I Corps, Gujranwala-based 19 IABG under XXX Corps, Chunian-based 3 IABG under IV Corps, Bahawalpur-based 10 IABG under XXXI Corps, Multan-based 14 IABG under II Corps, Hyderabad-based 2 IABG under V Corps, and the 12 and 42 IABGs. These formations were formalised and operationalised between 2013 and 2018 (under the so-called “new concept of warfighting”, or NCWF) as a conventional response to the Indian Army’s Cold Start conventional warfighting doctrine.

This by itself negates all earlier assertions of the Pakistani National Command Authority’s Strategic Plans Division SPD) that had stated that “the Pakistanis see no role for nuclear weapons than to deter India from waging a conventional war”, meaning full-scale high-intensity limited conventional war under a nuclear overhang is well and truly possible across both the Working Boundary and the Line of Control (LoC), if not across the International Boundary.

When it comes to combat-support hardware like combat bridging systems procured by the PA from NORINCO, they are of the multi-span 75-metre long-type (like the Indian Army's Sarvatra), as shown below.

This indicates that just as it was the case in both 1965 and 1971, when the PA crossed the Munnawar Tawi River (where the Indian Army had in 1971 demolished the Mandiala Bridge) while trying to advance towards Jaurian and Akhnoor, in a future round of armed hostilities, the PA will yet again make all-out efforts to repeat history.

Pakistan Army Field Firing Ranges

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PLAGF High-Altitude Plateau Warfare Exercises in TAR & ORBAT Of TMD

May 10, 2020, 6:47 pm

≫ Next: What Has PLAGF Learnt From Dogra Gen Zorawar Singh's Conquests of Western Tibet

≪ Previous: First VT-4/MBT-3000 Shipment Bound For Karachi

The physical brawl and stone-pelting between the patrolling parties of the Indian Army (IA) and PLA Ground Forces’ (PLAGF) Border Defence Regiment (BDR) at an altitude of more than 5,000 metres in the Naku La sector in north Sikkim on May 9, 2020 afternoon (which was triggered after IA soldiers blocked an “aggressive” PLA-BDR patrol party in the area ahead of Muguthang) is most likely attributable to a jittery PLA-BDR being over-anxious to find out whether or not the IA was monitoring a PLAGF mechanised infantry exercise that has been underway for the past one week at the Gamba Country further up north.

This exercise, by all means a routine one, is being conducted to ensure the operational synchronisation of all elements of combined-arms manoeuvre warfare in various portions of the Tibetan Plateau. In Gamba, this involves the deployment for the very first time of the ZTQ-105/Type 15 main battle tanks (MBT) whose export designation is the VT-5, the PCL-181 (SH-15 being its export designation) 155mm/52-cal mounted gun system (MGS) and the Type 04A tracked ICV. Deliveries of all three type of weapon systems to the Tibet Military District (TMD) had commenced in late 2017 and their first combined-arms exercises were conducted since late December last year at the Seni-Nagqu Training Base.

The 35-tonne NORINCO ZTQ-105/Type 15 MBT, powered by a 780hp diesel engine (a clone of the USSR-era V46-6 engine), comes armed with a 105mm rifled-bore cannon. It was publicly unveilled at last year’s October 1 parade commemorating the 70^th anniversary of the PLA. In terms of vectronics, it incorporates almost all that is to be found on the heavier VT-4/MBT-3000 MBT.

The 25-tonne, air-mobile PCL-181 MGS started entering service in the Western Theatre Command’s TMD back in 2017 and has since also entered service with the artillery brigades of the PLAGF’s 71st, 72nd (9th Artillery Brigade, or Unit-73031) and 77th Group Armies. It uses a 6 x 6 wheeled Shaanxi truck chassis with an armoured cabin at the front (that also houses the digital ballistics computer and communications radios) and the AH-2 155mm/52-cal howitzer mounted at the rear. The howitzer has a powered traverse of 25 degrees left and right and powered elevation from 0-degree to 67.5 degrees. The howitzer is protected against firing of small arms and artillery shell splinters. The armoured cab also has two large bulletproof windows at the front and there are two doors on each side. The truck chassis is powered by a 400hp diesel engine with a 15.68hp/tonne power-to-weight ratio.

The PCL-181 can fire all NATO-standard 155mm ammunition and it uses a semi-automatic loading system. The barrel is fitted with a double-baffle muzzle-brake and when travelling, the barrel is held in position by a clamp, located to the immediate rear of the cab, which is operated by remote control. When the PCL-181 is deployed in the firing position, two large spades are lowered at the rear to provide a stable firing platform. For this, the truck chassis is fitted with a hydro-pneumatic suspension system. The PCL-181 has a minimum firing range of 20km and 53km with a rocket-assisted artillery projectiles. The entire MGS is operated by a crew of five. On each side of the truck chassis, there are storage boxes containing charges and ammunition, elevation and traverse are hydraulic with manual controls being provided as a back-up. Maximum rate of fire is up to six rounds per minute.

PLAGF ORBAT Of Tibet Military District

15 Engineer Brigade(located at Dazi, Lhasa) or Unit-77619, comprising the 308 Field Artillery Regiment, Lhasa; (Unit-77611), 16 Vehicle Regiment, Lhasa; Communications Battalion, Lhasa; and Special Operations Division, Lhasa (Unit-77606).

52 Mountain Brigade (located at Bayi village, Linzhi County) or Unit-77675, comprising an Artillery Regiment (located at Nixi, Bayi village, Linzhi County) or Unit-77678; 1^st Battalion (Bujiu village, Linzhi County); 2^ndBattalion (Yongjiu village, Linzhi County); 3^rd Battalion (Yongjiu village, Linzhi County); and the 4^th Battalion (Bujiu village, Linzhi County).

53 Mountain Brigade (Linzhi City, Milin County) or Unit-77680, comprising an Artillery Regiment (Jiage village, Linzhi City, Milin County) or Unit-77683; 1^stBattalion (Wolong village, Linzhi City, Milin County); 2^nd Battalion (Gangga village, Linzhi County); 3^rd Battalion (Linzhi County); and the 4^th Battalion (Wolong village, Linzhi City, Milin County).

54 Armoured Brigade (Lhasa City, Duilongdeqing County) or Unit-77625, comprising an Artillery Regiment operating PCL-09 22.5-ton 122mm motorised howitzers (now converted to the PCL-181 MGS), three Mechanised Infantry Battalions equipped with ZBD-04 tracked infantry combat vehicles (ICV); Medium Battle Tank Battalion using Type-96As (now converted to the VT-5 ZTQ-105 Type 15 MBT; and a Chemical Warfare Battalion.

The 308th Independent Artillery Brigade, armed with PCL-181 155mm 52-cal motorised howitzers, which was raised in the latter half of 2017 at Linzhi.

The 651 Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade at Bayi Nyingchi. Since late 2012, this Brigade began taking over responsibilities from the HQ-12 ADK-12 KS-1D medium-range surface-to-air missiles of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) 11th Anti-Air Artillery Brigade’s 22nd Regiment. The 651st today comprises a regiment of LY-80E 70km-range MR-SAMs (containing 16 TELs each loaded with six MR-SAM vertical launch-cells), a Regiment of 18 tracked PGZ-04As (each armed with four FN-6 VSHORADS launchers missiles and four 25mm cannons), a Regiment of FM-90 SHORADS, and a composite Battalion that has 108 FN-6 VSHORADS/MANPADS launchers, 24 Type 73 towed 37mm anti-aircraft guns and 18 towed twin 35mm PG-99 ‘Giant Bow’ anti-aircraft guns. Also included are LIMAN ground-based jammers, JY-27A VHF-band anti-PGM volume-search radars as part of the LY-80E MR-SAM regiment, YLC-18 S-band 3-D acquisition radars for the FM-90s (now replacing the older LSS-1/Type 120 L-band 2-D low-altitude acquisition radars), and YLC-6 S-band 2-D low-level air-defence radars for the FN-6s, Type 73s and PG-99s. For airspace surveillance, there are three Army-operated YLC-2V 3-D S-band acquisition radars. This Brigade stayed put at its peacetime location throughout the standoff period.

Supplementing the above-mentioned formations were the following Border Defence Regiments of Military Sub-Districts under TMD:

* 1^stBorder Defence Regiment (Shannan City, Longzi County) Unit-77629: China-India LAC and China-Bhutan Border.

* 2^ndBorder Defence Regiment (Shannan City, Cuona County) Unit-77635: China-India LAC and China-Bhutan Border.

* 3^rdBorder Defence Regiment (Shigatse City, Tingri County) Unit-77639: China-India LAC and China Nepal Border.

* 4^thBorder Defence Regiment (Chayu, Linzhi), Unit-77643: China-India LAC.

* 5^thBorder Defence Regiment (Shigatse City, Saga County) Unit 77646: China -Nepal Border.

* 6^thBorder Defence Regiment (Shigatse City, Yadong County) Unit-77649: China-India LAC and China Bhutan Border. (Nathu La outpost is the first outpost of South West, Zhangniangshe Outpost of the 6th Border Defense Regiment is the Yunzhong Outpost).

*1^stIndependent Battalion (Shigatse City, Gyantse County) Unit-77655: China-India LAC and China-Bhutan Border.

* 2^ndIndependent Battalion (Shigatse City, Gangba County) Unit-77656:China-India LAC. (Chaguola Outpost). Khamba Dzong (Gamba County for the Chinese) is not located close to Arunachal Pradesh, which is bordered by the Prefectures of Shannan and Nyingchi, but near the strategic Chumbi Valley—and the Siliguri Corridor.

* 3^rdIndependent Battalion (Beibeng village, Linzhi City, Medog County); Medog Garrison, Mofan.

* 4^thIndependent Battalion (Nanyi Township, Linzhi City, Milin County): China-India LAC.

* 5^thIndependent Battalion (Shannan City, Luoza County): China-Bhutan Border.

* 6^thIndependent BattalionUnit-77659: China-India LAC.

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What Has PLAGF Learnt From Dogra Gen Zorawar Singh's Conquests of Western Tibet

May 17, 2020, 6:22 pm

≫ Next: Galwan Valley Standoff & Future Trends In PLA Transgressions

≪ Previous: PLAGF High-Altitude Plateau Warfare Exercises in TAR & ORBAT Of TMD

As I will explain in another thread on the imperatives for waging high-altitude plateau warfare, for waging such warfare, one will firstly have to overfly mountains and reach the plateaux in TAR both on the eastern & western fronts. Secondly, for any Corps-sized offensive expeditionary force to achieve success, it will have to be launched along 3 separate vectors, i.e. one from Depsang Plain in Ladakh towards Rutog; the second from Uttarkhand via the Lipulekh Pass towards the Ngari/Kailash Mansarovar area; and third, from Tashigang in Himachal Pradesh towards Kailash Mansarovar via Gartok, until they converge at a point (see map above). And this point of convergence must first be secured as a safe bridgehead by an air-mobile brigade.

So, what one needs to achieve success are: an air-mobile brigade, a mechanised division, and a light infantry division. And all thesde should have integral combat engineering, EW support, air-defence artillery cover & a seamless battlefield logistics process. Consequently, by doing the math, we can safely conclude that what is required for a successful ground offensive on high-altitude plateaux are heavylift helicopters, more heavilift helicopters and medium-lift helicopters in large numbers; plus STOL transport aircraft like C-130J-30s--all backed up by favourable tactical air superiority. Attack helicopters will not be of much use at such forbidding heights and this also explains why the PLAGF has not yet deployed its Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters in TAR.

Like India, China too has conducted deep studies into the offensive ground campaigns of Gen Zorawar Singh and has correctly assessed that the only worthwhile offensive by the IA can be staged only from eastern Ladakh/eastern Himachal Pradesh and northeast Uttarkhand. And that is also the reason why last December the IAF stated that more ALGs will be coming up in Uttarkhand to add to the one at Dharasu. And that is also why the IA’s 14 RAPIDS has since been converted into a mountain division & has been relocated to Himachal Pradesh, this being done in order to strength the IA’s positions in the LAC running along Himachal Pradesh, which can be brought to play to forestall any PLAGF mischief there in case the IA were to launch a high-intensity offensive in the west along the LoC into PoK.

And all these together explain why the PLAGF’s helicopters routinely violate Indian airspace in Uttarkhanmd and Himachal Pradesh (to monitor IA deployment patterns there along the LAC); and why China, with Nepal’s assistance, is anxious to deny India the road transportation route via the Lipulekh Pass towards the Kailash/Mansarovar area in TAR.

In Ladakh, India has since mid-1999 witnessed persistent PLA transgressions-in-strength at the Depsang Bulge, Trig Heights, Spanggur Gap and Chip Chap Valley in northeastern Ladakh. During wartime, the PLA’s most probable intention would be to enter from the south of the Karakoram Range and cross the Shyok River from the east. The PLAGF has also moved motorised forces into Charding Nalla since 2009 and these could eventually threaten the Manali-Leh route. China thus is estimated to want to push Indian control to the left of Shyok River in the north and left of the Indus River in the east, possibly to establish both rivers as natural boundaries. In Chushul, the aim is to reach Luking to take control of the entire Panggong Tso Lake. This three-pronged strategy would make India defenceless both in the Indus Valley and the Nubra Valley.

Since 1986, China has taken land in the Skakjung area in the Demchok-Kuyul sector in eastern Ladakh. By 2011, it had moved to the Chip Chap area in northeastern Ladakh. Unlike the lowlands in eastern Ladakh, the Chip Chap Valley is extremely cold and inhospitable. Until end-March, it remains inaccessible, and after mid-May, water-streams impede vehicles moving across the Shyok River. This leaves only 45 days for effective patrolling by the IA and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). For China, accessibility to Chip Chap is easier. No human beings inhabit the area. No one else except the Indian Army and ITBP have a presence there. China’s probable intention would be to enter from the south of the Karakoram Range and cross the Shyok River from the east. That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra Valley vulnerable, possibly impacting supply-lines and even India’s hold over the Siachen Glacier. It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok and Chang Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin soda-plains and its Ali region. The only provocation from the Indian side has so far been the opening of advanced landing grounds (ALG) at Daulat Beg Oldie, Fukche and Nyoma. In eastern Ladakh, the 45km-long Skakjung area is the only winter pasture land for the nomads of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul and Loma villages. This area sustains 80,000 sheep/goats and 4,000 yak/ ponies during winter. They consume over 75,000 quintals of tama or dry forage, worth Rs.10 crore annually. China’s advance there intensified after 1986, causing huge scarcity of surface grass, even starvation for Indian livestock. Since 1993, the modus operandi of China’s military incursions has been to scare Indian herdsmen into abandoning grazing land and then to construct permanent structures. Until the mid-1980s, the boundary lay at Kegu Naro—a day-long march from Dumchele, where India had maintained a forward post till 1962. In the absence of Indian activities, Chinese traders arrived in Dumchele in the early 1980s and China gradually constructed permanent roads, buildings and military posts there. The prominent grazing spots lost to China include Nagtsang (1984), Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992). The last bit of Skakjung was taken in December 2008.

China’s assertion in Ladakh grew after it built infrastructure in its Ngari prefecture to develop Kailash-Manasarovar into a tourist complex to attract affluent local and international tourists. Ngari’s rapid development was a precursor of things to come. China has thus been applying the Sino-India Guiding Principle of 2005 to consolidate its position, for it knows that only 0.6% of the Ladakh region is inhabited. The PLA has always used nomadism as an instrument for incursion. The migration of Changpa nomads on specific routes has been a key component of China’s national security, something India never understood till 2010. The imposition of multiple restrictions by Indian civil administration authorities in Ladakh has led to a massive shrinking of pastureland and the de-nomadisation of Changthang Ladakh, adversely impacting national security. China wants to push Indian control to the left of Shyok River in the north and left of the Indus River in the east, possibly to establish both rivers as natural boundaries. In Chushul, the aim is to reach Luking to take control of the entire Panggong Tso Lake. The three-pronged strategy would make India defenceless both in the Indus Valley and the Nubra Valley. As of today, the issue is not reclaiming 38,000 sq km of Aksai Chin lost to China in 1962, but retaining the territory lying inside the Indian portion of the LAC.

PLA reconnaissance incursions into India-administered territory—by land, sea and air—increased after 2005, with as many as 233 violations in 2008 and more than 500 transgressions from 2010 to 2012. The incursions increased after a series of exercises were carried out in 2004 and 2005 by the PLA’s then Lanzhou Military Region (now absorbed into the WTC), in which the PLA had theorised that India was capable of launching a limited attack on the western portion of Aksai Chin from Sub Sector North (SSN). In August 2009 alone there were 26 incursions in Ladakh, when the first noise was made about PLA troops painting rocks red in the Chumur region. Chumur, near Thankung post, where the maximum number of airspace violations by the PLA Army Aviation helicopters have taken place, is 70km from the LAC near Panggong-Tso Lake. A PLA patrol painted China on the rocks near Charding-Nilung Nala in Demchok in Ladakh on July 8, 2012. Such events continued with further intrusions by China in the Trig Heights and Panggong-Tso Lake. In April 2013, the Depsang incident took place which, by the PLA’s own admission, was in retaliation of the Indian Army’s construction of a single watchtower along the LAC in Chumur, a remote village on the Ladakh-Himachal Pradesh border, which is claimed by China as its own territory and which has been frequented by PLA helicopter incursions almost every year. Chumur represents a deep vulnerability for the PLA as it is the only area across the LAC to which the PLA does not have direct access. On July 16, 2013, 50 PLA soldiers riding on horses and ponies crossed over into Chumur and staked claims to the territory and only went back after a banner drill with the ITBP troops. This had been preceded by two PLA helicopters violating Indian airspace over Chumur on July 11.

How IA’s Mechanised Forces Got Inducted Into Ladakh

This saga was already detailed before by Ret’d Lt Gen H S Panag here:

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/02/10/the-road-to-ladakh

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/02/17/the-trials-in-ladakh

It was in the last quarter of 1986 that the Indian Army, under OP KARTOOS, temporarily had six T-72M1s airlifted to Leh along with a Regiment of BMP-2 ICVs for deployment in Chushul, Finger Area and Spanggur Gap. Since the conduct of OP KARTOOS, the IA’s Karu-based 3 ‘Trishul’ Division had until 2012 just one mechanised infantry regiment—1 Guards—with 52 BMP-2 ICVs. This Regiment used to carry out regular manoeuvre warfare exercises in the Wari La region in Pangong, which is located at an altitude of 16,600 feet ASL. The IAF too had built a makeshift airstrip in Mud Village near Panggong Tso.

The then Indian Army Chief of the Army Staff’s (COAS Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji) words—“Go to Ladakh and make history!”—were ringing in Col H S Panag’s ears as he left the conference. The burden of expectations had been placed on his shoulders and on his unit, 1 Mechanised Infantry Regiment (1 Madras Battalion). The Battalion already had an illustrious history of 212 years, but tradition and history are a continuum. It had participated in every war fought before and after Independence, it was the first to be mechanised and it was to be the first to be inducted into the High Altitude Area (HAA) of Ladakh. With these thoughts, Col Panag got down to the task of planning the induction. 1 MECH INF was to take over the 20 BMP-2s of the ad hoc mechanised force already in Ladakh. The Regiment had to induct 32 BMP-2s and three armoured recovery vehicles (ARV). The two Armoured Squadrons had to induct 14 T-72M1s and one ARV each. It required 49 sorties of IL-76MD transport aircraft (one sortie could carry two BMP-2s or one T-72M1/ARV). While the IAF had practiced carriage of medium battle tanks in plains, but landing at Leh Airport—located at 10,300 feet and surrounded by high hills—presented technical difficulties. The IAF rose to the occasion and the entire equipment was safely landed at Leh by the end of Jun 1988. Col Panag went to Ambala to oversee the airlift and also flew to Leh a number of times. He took over the Regiment in the first week of July and the Regiment was to induct by road from Jammu in the end of July 1988. This was a formidable challenge as the Regiment’s drivers had never driven in the mountains. The Regiment had a 120-vehicle convoy and on the first day, the inexperienced drivers created chaos on Highway NH-1A. The problem was solved by slowing down the speed to 30kph and Col Panag himself drove at the head of the convoy. The 800km journey to Ladakh is notorious for accidents. All units inducting into Ladakh generally meet with one or two unfortunate mishaps. However, precautions ensured that the Regiment arrived in Leh after five days’ journey, without any mishap. The Regiment less one Company temporarily settled down at Karu, 40km from Leh. One Company was to be located 120km to the East at Tangtse for deployment in Chushul Sector, which was another 100km to the East. The move of this Company by road over the 17,500 feet Chang La Pass was a great confidence builder. The BMP-2 is a unique ICV and could maintain the same average speed as heavy wheeled vehicles. Within a week, the Regiment selected the new administrative base for mechanised forces at Stakna, close to Karu. Within two months, the accommodation for the troops and sheds for the equipment were constructed: 50 troops barracks and 15 sheds for T-72M1s and BMP-2s, along with offices and messes were built in record time (two months). Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw was on a visit to Ladakh at the time and on Col Panag’s request, he inaugurated the Officers Mess and had lunch with the Regiment. As preparation, the Regiment went over all terrain and operational reports from the last 40 years, since 1947 and also studied the history of the region. Col Panag paid special attention to the campaigns of the great General Zorawar Singh, from 1834 till 1841, when he had captured a vast tract of Tibet, right up to Mansarovar Lake. In fact, he was cremated at Taklakot, near the lake in 1841. The War of 1962 was also analysed in detail, particularly the employment of the six AMX-13 light tanks that had been flown into Chushul in November 1962. The Regiment also had the benefit of the experience of the ad hoc mechanised force, which was in Ladakh since the end of 1986. The following challenges were before:

•Physical fitness and well-being of troops in HAA

•Reconnaissance of the operational area

•Evolving the offensive and defensive operational role

•Technical maintenance of the equipment in the extreme climate

•Validating the performance of the T-72M1s and BMP-2s

•Validating the operational role in field exercises

•Test exercise of the Combat Group by higher HQ.

There is a popular Army saying in Ladakh that goes like this: “In the land of the Lama, do not be a Gama (a famous wrestler).” It implies one should not compromise with the laid-down norms of survival in HAA. But soldiers must also be extremely fit to fight in this terrain. Without proper acclimatisation, there is the risk of High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema, which can be fatal. It is one of the many reasons for non-battle casualties that take place in Ladakh every year. During the Regiment’s two-year stay in Ladakh, it did not suffer any climate, fire or vehicle accident casualty during its tenure. This was because of education, adherence to norms, strict supervision and personal example. Just this achievement alone made the Regiment famous in Northern Command. The terrain of Eastern Ladakh is unique and there is no other place like this in the world. Up to Leh and 150km beyond, the terrain is extremely rugged with narrow valleys and surrounding hill ranges varying from 15,000 feet to 23,000 feet. Beyond this the valleys become broader, the base height rises to 15,000 feet and the surrounding hills and ranges become more gradual and only 3,000 feet higher than the valleys. After reconnaissance, the hill features can be negotiated by wheeled vehicles and for tracked vehicles it is a cake-walk. In fact, Major Shaitan Singh, PVC, had constructed a jeep-able track from his base at Tara Post (named after his wife) at 15,000 feet to Rechin La (at 17,000 feet), which is about 1km from Rezang La. During his reconnaissance, Col Panag drove up this road. His was the first vehicle to do so since 1962! For the Army, terrain is the most important factor in battle. For the mechanised forces, this is even more true as they must negotiate the same with 41-tonne T-72M1s and 15-tonne BMP-2s. In Eastern Ladakh, the Regiment had to not only know the valleys, but also the surrounding mountain ranges to assist the infantry units during operations. The terrain is so vast that on a full reconnaissance trip, the vehicles logged 800km. All surrounding hill-features were climbed on foot. The Regiment also climbed all infantry posts and visited all relevant LAC areas. Helicopter reconnaissance was also undertaken. In three months, the Regiment was the master of the terrain.

The Ladakh Range is extremely rugged. One had only three roads across it via Khardung La, Chang La and along the Indus River at Loma. The mountain ranges (including the Ladakh Range) are aligned in the north-west to south-east direction and the rivers run from south-east to north-west between them. This gives a peculiar configuration to the valleys and the LAC. Thus, if the Ladakh Range is crossed from Demchok and Koyul area to enter the Hanle Valley, the entire Indus Valley east of Loma is bypassed. Consequently, a road was planned from Hanle to Koyul-Demchok via the Photi La, and it was very difficult to construct. During reconnaissance and from past data, it was discovered that 10km south-east of Photi La was another pass called Bozardin La, which was relatively gradual. Riding on a hunch, Col Panag explored this virgin area and took numerous ‘S’ loops to take his Nissan Jonga to the top of the pass. There was no other vehicle with him. Taking a risk of being stranded, he gradually lowered his Jonga towards Koyul Valley. After a four-hour struggle, he reached Koyul and was on the Indus Valley. No one—including the BRO and the Col’s superiors–believed this. He proved the point after a week by taking heavier vehicles over it. Eventually, the BRO took 10 years to construct the Photi La road, but cutting a road via Bozardin La took only one year. This, of course, happened years later, but in 1988, 1 MECH INF was the first to take vehicles from Hanle over the Ladakh Range into the Indus Valley—another first! The main defences were based on the Ladakh Range and its offshoots, and the Panggong Range, west of Panggong Tso Lake. This left nearly 100km of valleys and plateaus up to the LAC unmanned. These were selectively held to delay the enemy. The Chushul Sector was more compact and there, the main defences were between 5km to 8km from the LAC. The LAC ran along the Kailash Range, which is not held either by the Indian Army or the PLA. Both sides had plans to pre-empt the other to occupy the Kailash Range in the event of war. Any reader would logically question as to why the Indian Army was not manning the LAC right up to the front, like the LoC against Pakistan. Firstly, the LAC is not active. No shot has been fired in anger since 1967. Leaving aside approximately 10 areas of differing perceptions, there is no contest from China. The LAC is selectively manned by ITBP and at places, by regular troops. Secondly, the terrain configuration offers no defensible features in the valleys. Thirdly, if the entire area was to be manned like the LoC, the Indian Army would require four additional Mountain Divisions, which is not cost-effective. Fourthly, if the enemy occupies the valleys, he would be ‘shelled out’ by field/rocket artillery and the IAF. Lastly, the mechanised forces with their mobility are tailor-made for the role of dominating valleys. In 1988, the PLA did not have the strategic airlift to land medium battle tanks or ICVs in the vicinity of the LAC. The PLA formations were located in Central Tibet, 1,000km away. Depending upon the Indian Army’s strategy, this gave 1 MECH INF a window of opportunity to pre-emptively secure the areas on or across the LAC or conduct deeper offensive operations. Mechanised forces were tailor-made for this role. Ladakh thus remains India’s best bet for offensive operations as it is an extension of the Tibetan Plateau. The role of mechanised forces in offensive operations was, as part of overall offensive plans, to pre-emptively capture the tactical features/passes on or across the LAC. Also, as per the strategic situation in conjunction with special operations forces/ air-mobile Forces, the aim was to capture areas dominating the strategic Xinjiang-Tibet Road (NH-219), which runs parallel to the LAC, 100km to the East. This was based on the strategic situation as prevailing in 1988, which remains viable till today. More so, when the Indian Army has a Mountain Strike Corps and a much larger mechanised forces of up to a Combat Command (grouping based on an Armoured Brigade with one/two Armoured Regiments and one/two Mechanised Infantry Battalions). In addition, India has much higher capability for heliborne/airborne operations. The role in defensive operations was to dominate the valleys ahead of and around the main defences, denying the PLA any freedom of action to deploy his field artillery assets and for logistics build-up. As a result, the PLA would be forced to the higher ridges on either side of the valleys. This is a classic covering-force action. Since the distances are vast, it is a prerequisite for the enemy to seize tactical control of the valleys. Securing the tactical feature on and across the LAC is part of this role. Even the PLA’s mechanised forces spearheading his offensive are at a disadvantage as the valley funnel makes him a sitting duck for India’s mechanised forces and the IAF.

The offensive and defensive roles were validated in a series of war games. T-72M1s and BMP-2s were moved to the various areas to validate their performance. The BMP-2s also crossed the Panggong Tso Lake to validate the amphibious capability. Terrain similar to the operational area in the rear areas was utilised to conduct the field exercises. I MECH INF also took part in the exercises of the infantry formations. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for technical maintenance and preservation of the equipment in extreme cold temperatures were evolved. The Russia-origin T-72M1s and BMP-2s were tailor-made for cold temperatures as long as the correct procedures were followed. At extreme cold temperatures, special oils and lubricants have to be used. The equipment must be stored in sheds during peacetime. Before starting the T-72M1s and BMP-2s, pre-heaters were used to raise the oil-pressure. If this was not done, the diesel engines would wear out (particularly accessories like the air-compressor). The ad hoc mechanised force was following the practice normal for wheeled vehicles of starting the engines every night for 1.5 hours to 2 hours, to prevent the oil and lubes and the coolant from congealing/freezing and keeping the batteries charged. While even in wheeled vehicles this is a wrong practice—tailor-made oils/coolants and batteries for sub-zero temperatures are available and pre-heaters thin the congealed oil—but for T-72M1s and BMP-2s, it was a disaster as engine life is measured in hours and not kilometres. Engine life of the 20 BMP-2s of the ad hoc force had been considerably reduced and a large number of compressors had packed up. Col Panag refused to accept the logic advanced and did a detailed study. He found that pre-heaters were not being used. In fact, drivers were not aware that they existed. Thus, the oil-pressure never reached the requisite levels and was not adequately thinned to pass through narrow tubes leading to the various components. Also, the basic starting method in T-72M1s and BMP-2s is the ‘air start’ or ‘air-cum-battery start’—the air stored in a cylinder fires the engine and in the latter case, there is also an electric spark. In emergencies, when the air-cylinder is empty, a battery start with fully charged batteries is undertaken. It was found that the air-bottles were leaking due to worn-out stoppers. The batteries at minus 20 degrees Celsius are reduced to 20% capability. Air-bottles are filled by the compressors when the engines are running. Hence, with empty air-bottles and weak batteries, the T-72M1s and BMP-2s would not start. Thus the night static-running was being undertaken to charge the batteries and fill up the air-bottles! In a nutshell, for the want of air-cylinder stoppers and charged batteries, the engines and other parts costing lakhs of Rupees were being run down. The issue was eventually resolved by simply repairing/replacing the air-cylinder stoppers to keep the air-bottle full and removing the batteries, which were kept in heated rooms on trickle charge, using generators. Also, the use of pre-heaters for 2 hours before a attempting a start was enforced. One faced no problem thereafter. All the equipment remained battleworthy. So strict Col Panag was on this issue that in winters, before a start was attempted, the driver had to personally confirm to him that the SOP had been followed! In end-1988, 1 MECH INF conducted its first field-firing and the performance of the T-72M1s and BMP-2s was validated with live fire and manoeuvre exercises on the ranges. All guns and machine guns were re-calibrated/zeroed for HAA area as they tend to fire higher. The first-generation Malyutka ATGMs of the BMP-1 ICVs posed a peculiar problem due to the altitude. Since it is manually guided, it tended to take off high into the sky. A drill was evolved to take a ‘down’ correction with the joystick to correct the same. Second-generation Konkurs ATGMs of the BMP-2, which have automatic guidance, posed no problem. The passive night-vision devices, which work on the principle of enhancing the ambient light, gave the Regiment double the distance due to higher ambient light in HAA even on moonless nights. This was a force-multiplier. The awesome firepower of the Combat Group—which consisted of 28 125mm 2A46 tank cannons, 42 73mm cannons of BMP-1s, 10 30mm cannons of BMP-2s, 104 12.7mm machine guns of the tanks and BMPs and 52 ATGM launchers apart from the infantry weapons of the Mechanised Battalion—was demonstrated to the Division. The firepower of the Combat Group was more than the combined firepower of the entire Division in terms of direct-firing weapons. This was done to inspire confidence in all troops. The crowning achievement was the test exercise attended by the GOC-in-C Northern Command, GOC XV Corps and GOC 3 Infantry Division, who was testing 1 MECH INF. The Regiment came out of the test exercise with flying colours. GOC-in-C Northern Command said: “The Combat Group has made history. The foundation for the employment of larger mechanised formations, which will give us the desired offensive capability, has been laid!” The Indian Army had to wait for another 28 years before the induction of Combat Command in 2016 to get the enhanced capability. Though the ideal eventual requirement is of two Combat Commands and two Motorised Infantry Divisions! Such a force would give India the “retributive capability” a major power should have.

Captain B H Liddell Hart, the famous military historia, had once said: “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get the old one out.” Having stopped the static-run of medium battle tanks and ICVs in 1988, Col Panag next wrote a detailed SOP for maintenance and preservation of tanks and BMPs in HAA and sent it to all concerned, including a copy to all Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Armoured Regiments. In January 2000, Brig Panag was Brigade Commander in Batalik and came to know that the old practices had restarted. He spoke to the XV Corps Commander—who dug out his SOP—to stop it. In 2005, as Corps Commander, Lt Gen Panag visited Ladakh and found that the old practices had commenced again. Once again, he got it stopped. In 2007, when he became GOC-in-C Northern Command, to Lt Gen Panag’s horror he found that it had recommenced due to change of units and the SOP being buried under files. Once again, he got fresh SOPs written to enforce the same. In 2016, a Combat Command was inducted into Ladakh. During his visit to XIV Corps, a now retired Lt Gen Panag briefed the staff in detail.

Though the Indian Army had deployed 30 T-72Ms in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in eastern Ladakh, bordering China. The field commanders thought such MBTs were of no use in the mountains as the PLA was then not even patrolling the disputed LAC. The MBTs were dismantled and moved to Leh, and flown to the mainland in IL-76MD ‘Gajraj’ transport aircraft. In mid-2009 a decision was taken to introduce six T-72CIA A-equipped Regiments (58 tanks per regiment, including reserves), equipped with 348 tanks. In addition, three new Mechanised Infantry Battalions with 180 BMP-2s were to be raised. Thus, the Ladakh-based XIV Corps was to be allocated an Armoured Brigade to cover the flat approaches from Tibet towards India’s crucial defences at Chushul. In addition, one Regiment was to be located on the flat, 17,000-feet-high Kerang Plateau in northern Sikkim. In 2014, HQ Northern Command started the hunt for a Brigade (army formation with close to 4,000 troops) which could be deployed at altitudes higher than 15,000 feet. It soon realised that the 81 Brigade, aka the Bakarwal Brigade, could be sent to the Daulat Beg Oldie sector with an Armoured Regiment. Combined, they could defend a possible armoured invasion by the PLA, launched through NH-218. IAF Boeing C-17A Globemaster-IIs took off with T-72CIAs from the Chandigarh air base. The C-17As, which can haul 77 tonnes each, were bound for Leh. The Hindon-based C-17As were used to send the tanks and ICVs to Leh, from where they were sent to Daulat Beg Oldie and other areas in eastern Ladakh. Around 100 T-72CIAs were sent for equipping the the 85 Armoured Regiment at Nyoma and 4 Horse at Thangtse. With these in Daulat Beg Oldie and the Depsang Plain, the Indian Army can now cross the Demchok Funnel (where the Indus River enters India from Tibet) and intercept NH-218 in case of hostilities. 81 Brigade is presently headquartered at Durbuk—14,000 feet above sea level—near Daulat Beg Oldie and en route to the disputed Panggong Tso Lake. Under 81 Brigade, three Infantry Battalions (with close to 900 troops each) have been deployed in the area. This is in addition to the 114 and 70 Brigades, which are part of the 3 Infantry Division. The Siachen Brigade was formerly under 3 Infantry Division. But, now the Division has been relieved of its responsibilities in the Siachen Glacier and has been asked to focus on the LAC with China. The Siachen Brigade is now under the Leh-based XIV Corps.

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Galwan Valley Standoff & Future Trends In PLA Transgressions

May 23, 2020, 6:25 pm

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There were 1,025 transgressions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between 2016 and 2018. There were 273 transgressions in 2016, 426 in 2017 and 326 in 2018. The first four months of 2020 witnessed 170 Chinese transgressions across the LAC, including 130 in Ladakh. There were only 110 such transgressions in Ladakh during the same period in 2019. Nearly one-third of PLA-BDR transgressions in the western sector of the LAC happen in the Panggong Tso Lake. According to official data, Panggong Tso, the 135km-long lake, one-third of which is controlled by India, recorded 25% of the total number of PLA-BDR transgressions in the last five years across the LAC. Trig Heights recorded 22% while Burtse/Depsang Bulge accounted for 19% of all transgressions. Incidentally, the site at Galwan River saw only six PLA-BDR transgressions during the same period. While there was no transgression in 2019, four were recorded in 2017, and one each in 2018 and 2016. At Panggong Tso, transgressions by the PLA-BDR almost doubled from a five-year low of 72 in 2018 to 142 in 2019. These transgressions occurred both in the waters of the lake, and along its northern banks. There were 112 transgressions in 2017, the year the two countries were locked in a tense 73-day faceoff at Doklam on the Sikkim-Bhutan border. It was 164 and 77 in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

Although India and China share a boundary that stretches 3,488km from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, official data shows that 80% of the transgressions by China across the LAC since 2015 have taken place in four locations—three of them in eastern Ladakh in the western sector. Along with Panggong Tso, Trig Heights and Burtse have witnessed two-thirds of the total transgressions across the LAC. New areas of PLA-BDR forays into India-controlled territory came up in 2019—the Doletango area opposite Dumchele suddenly saw 54 PLA-BDR transgressions in 2019, after having recorded only three transgressions in the past four years. In the eastern sector, the highest number of transgressions by the PLA-BDR—14.5% of the total–was recorded in Dichu Area/Madan Ridge area. Transgressions recorded in other areas in the eastern sector were very low, including Naku La in Sikkim, which saw two PLA-BDR transgressions each in 2018 and 2019.

In early May 2020 Indian Army (along with Indo-Tibetan Border Police) and PLA-BDR troops exchanged blows on two occasions, once near Panggong Tso Lake in eastern Ladakh and in the Naku La sector in Sikkim. In both incidents, personnel from both sides suffered injuries. There was also movement of PLA-BDR troops to eastern Ladakh after India began constructing a road in the Galwan River area. There was no transgression by PLA-BDR patrols in this area in the past two years. The site of the ongoing road construction is near the confluence of Shyok and Galwan rivers, some 200km north of Panggong Tso Lake. The PLA-BDR is objecting to the construction of a new road that branches off the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road along the river-bank towards the LAC. The DSDBO road connecting Daulat Beg Oldie, at the base of the Karakoram Pass, with Shyok and Darbuk, was completed a year ago and provides India greatly improved connectivity. The 255km-long road, which had to be realigned after the initial alignment was found unsuitable, runs along the Shyok and Tangtse rivers.

At Panggong Tso, the PLA-BDR has deployed additional rapid interception craft (RIC) on the lake and stopped the movement of IA and ITBP soldiers beyond Finger 2 on the northern bank of the lake. The mountains there jut forward in major spurs, which the IA calls Fingers. India claims that the LAC is co-terminus with Finger 8, while China claims that the LAC passes through Finger 2. The area between the two differing perceptions is the territory which both opposing patrols try to dominate through regular patrolling. The IA and ITBP physically control the area up to Finger 4. The number of PLA-BDR RICs has gone up three times—it had earlier been using only three boats. The IA also has a similar number of RICs to dominate the 45km-long western portion of the lake, which is under Indian control.

Since the IA and ITBP physically control the area up to Finger 4, this was regarded as a “provocative move” by the PLA-BDR following the “disengagement” after a physical altercation between troops of both sides near Finger 5 on the night of May 5-6, 2020. The PLA-BDR has been objecting to construction of a vehicle track by India in the same area. While PLA-BDR soldiers patrol the area in light vehicles on a motorable road built in 1999, when India was busy with OP Vijay in northern J & K, IA and ITBP soldiers patrol on foot till their perception of the LAC. The China-built road in that area is rather narrow and has very few turning points. So, when Indian patrols challenge the PLA-BDR patrols and ask them to go back from our area, the latter physically cannot turn their vehicles and it leads to more acrimony.

In addition to the above, there is a situation on the LAC in the Hot Springs sector, which is an ITBP sector. An IA Company had moved closer to PP-14 and PP-15 in 2015 after a minor incident, but this has always been a settled area between India and China. Thus, it is worth considering if China’s posture there is linked to the incidents at Panggong Tso, just as the Depsang standoff of April 2013 in northeastern Ladakh was linked to a consequent standoff at Chumar in southern Ladakh in September 2014. However, some IA officers maintain that the incidents in Panggong Tso are “typical LAC activity witnessed during summer months” when “some new units have been inducted” and “operational familiarisation and occupation of winter-vacated posts” take place. Consequently, incidents are “localised” in nature due to “different perception of the LAC by the two sides”.

The only location (in the central sector of the LAC) to record significant PLA-BDR transgressions is Barahoti in Uttarkhand, which recorded 21 transgressions in 2019 and 30 in 2018. Such transgressions will increase on both land and in the air in the years to come, not just in Uttarkhand, but also in Himachal Pradesh, in order to minutely monitor the IA’s and Indian Air Force’s (IAF) growing presence in these two Indian states as they gear up for undertaking offensive joint high-altitude plateau warfare operations. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has since 2011 been using one of its four SAR-equipped Tu-154M platforms to monitor developments in the demilitarised area in Barahoti pastures in Chamoli district of Uttarkhand, while the PLAGF, regularly uses Z-9EC helicopters equipped with a gimballed optronic sensors for transgressing into India-controlled airspace in the same area. Such actions will now also take place in Tashigang inside Himachal Pradesh.

Ongoing Standoff At Galwan Valley Showing PLA-BDR Dispositions

Ongoing Standoff At Galwan Valley Showing IA-ITBP Dispositions

Areas Where PLA-BDR Patrols Transgress Into Ladakh

Trig Heights near Chip Chap River: 35 22 22.14 N, 78 2 15.74 E & Burtse in Depsang Bulge: 35 18 9.89 N, 78° 0 44.17 E

Galwan Valley: 34 46 10.37 N, 78 12 44.45 E

Gogra Hot Springs: 34 18 29.96 N, 78 58 53.01 E

Panggong Tso Lake: 33 43 14.99 N, 78 45 49.33 E

Spanggur Gap: 33 33 51.12 N, 78 46 53.13 E

Demchok: 32 41 51.43 N, 79 27 28.74 E

Chumur: 32 37 55.60 N, 78 36 4.56 E

Opposing Road Connectivity Networks Along LAC

Source: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/OccasionalPaper_42b.pdf

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China-India Boundary Dispute: How It All Began

June 5, 2020, 6:00 pm

≫ Next: Tibet Military District's Ongoing Combined-Arms Exercises

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Inference: Whenever two neighbouring countries, when negotiating the delineation (on maps) and demarcation (on ground) of the mutually-applicable international boundaries (IB), resort to previous international treaties and historical paperwork relating to customary laws and traditions, this is not the case with Mainland China and India because, while the latter has documentation of the McMahon and Johnson-Ardagh Lines, the former has no such corresponding historical treaties or maps in its possession, since all such documentation was transferred from the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government in 1949 from Nanking (Nanjing) to Taiwan, where they today are preserved in a hardened underground tunnel complex located underneath the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall at Taipei’s Zhongzheng District. And without such documentation, China finds it impossible to agree on any legal parameter that is required for delineating and demarcating any IB and hence always insists that such documentation be superceded by a “political settlement”. It is for this reason that Mainland China will NEVER agree to negotiate the delineation and demarcation of not just the LAC, but even a legally-binding IB.

How Tibetan Ineptitude Reduced Pandit Nehru's Policy Options On Tibet

Inference: While popular perception dictates that India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru needs to be repeatedly excoriated for his government’s nonchalance in the face of stealthy military incursions by Mainland China into eastern Ladakh throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and for the disastrous and misguided “forward policy”, which constituted the actual casus belli for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962, little-known historical factoids instead prove that it was the sheer ineptitude of the Tibetan government between 1949 and 1950 that forced Pandit Nehru to compromise with Mainland China throughout the 1950s.

(To Be Concluded)

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Tibet Military District's Ongoing Combined-Arms Exercises

June 20, 2020, 4:51 pm

≫ Next: How Successive Cartographic Errors have Led To Present-Day Politico-Military Quagmires

≪ Previous: China-India Boundary Dispute: How It All Began

The exercises currently underway are being staged out of the PLAGF Training Base located at Lhari (30 38 18.28 N, 93 13 50.60 E) and the live-firing range is to the south of the Nyenchen Tanglha mountain range north of Arunachal Pradesh (30 35 42.88 N, 93 20 56.81 E).

The participating Z-10 attack helicopters and Mi-17V-5 utility helicopters are operating out of Nyingchi Heli Base (29 33 39.99 N, 94 28 15.67 E).

And here are the video-clips of the on-going exercises:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoOp-pRmrsI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_YS8Kfd_Fs

Meanwhile, the Indian Navy's P-8I LRMR/ASW platforms have since June 20 been keeping track of a build-up of PLA-BDR and PLAGF forces along eastern Himachal Pradesh in the areas shown below.

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How Successive Cartographic Errors have Led To Present-Day Politico-Military Quagmires

June 21, 2020, 12:31 pm

≫ Next: Horizontal Escalation Through Vertical Envelopment: Possible Options

≪ Previous: Tibet Military District's Ongoing Combined-Arms Exercises

By November 1947, India had the the tools and historic treaties necessary for beginning the process of delineating and demarcating her territorial boundaries. These included the McMahon Line to the east, the map of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu & Kashmir (as defined by the Johnson-Ardagh Line of 1897) and the Treaty of Chushul of 1842 (according to which the Maharaja of J & K was referred to as Shriman Inder Mahinder Rajrajeswar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu & Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipati, meaning he was not just the ruler of J & K, but also of the areas of eastern Ladakh, including Aksai Chin as well as the territory he controlled inside Tibet such as Minser estate, which comprised a cluster of villages located 296km deep inside Tibet at the foot of the holy Mount Kailash on the bank of Manasarovar Lake). Yet, despite this, the first definitive map of India that was unveilled by India in 1954 showed a trunciated J & K (by not showing the territories inside Tibet and a unilateral redrawing of J & K’s northern borders by coming down south to the Karakoram mountain range, thereby losing the Trans-Karakoram Tract), instead of the Kuen Lun mountain range further north as defined by the Johnson-Ardagh Line.

Surprisingly, the latest political map of India issued last October perpetuates the same mistakes.

The historical background of the boundaries of J & K (inclusive of Ladakh) is given below.

Notwithstanding the political boundaries of India as prevailing in 1954, further confusion was caused by India when the Indian Army was instructed from 1959 onward to create a string of 60 manned forward posts, whose locations defined the furthest extent to which Indian administrative and military prevailed all over Ladakh (inclusive of Aksai Chin) and this in turn became what is today known as the Line of Actual Control, or LAC. Thus, as the following historical factoids reveal, the LAC was neither a perception nor a concept as has since been referred to by several former Indian military officials and former career diplomats since 1993. In fact, it has always been drawn on navigational maps issued to both the Indian Army and Indian Air Force since the late 1950s, but such maps have never been published or shown in the public domain for unknown reasons.

And between October and November 1962, the LAC became a line drawn with the blood of martyred Indian Army soldiers (as the battle accounts below reveal) who not only fought to the last man in those 60 forward posts, but their mortal remains were also cremated on-site in those battlefields. Consequently, to refer to any violation of the LAC as a ‘transgression’ only serves to dishonour all those who made the supreme sacrifice for India by going way above and beyond their respective calls of duty.

Which now brings us to the PIB Statement issued on June 20, 2020, which raises additional questions.

(To Be Concluded)

↧

Horizontal Escalation Through Vertical Envelopment: Possible Options

July 2, 2020, 4:27 pm

≫ Next: PLA's New Heliports & Helicopters, Dual-Use Airports & Naval Updates

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Oltinthang, Siari & Fraono

Goma & Gyari

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PLA's New Heliports & Helicopters, Dual-Use Airports & Naval Updates

July 5, 2020, 1:44 pm

≫ Next: Construction Of KKH-2 Being Expedited

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Construction has begun on two heliports meant for air-maintenance of the PLAGF’s on-site garrisons in the Hot Springs and Panggong Tso Lake areas. Located north of Hot Springs (34 26 40.2 N, 78 55 23.0 E) and 155km east of Panggong Tso Lake (32 29 49.1 N, 80 04 19.2 E) they will be similar in design to the heliports that were built in the 2017-2018 period in the North Doklam area in the eastern sector.

The 76th Aviation Brigade of the PLA Army conducted a daylight tactical penetration exercise on June 22, 2020 in the Kunlun mountain range in southern Xinjiang. This Aviation Brigade has eight Groups, with 12 helicopters in each Group.Helicopters in use are the Mi-171E and Z-8G utility helicopters, and the Z-9WZ and the ZW-10 attack helicopters.

The Aviation Brigade is headquartered at Xinjiang’s Wujiaqu Heli-Base (44 06 46 N, 087 27 41 E), under which come the forward bases comprising the Shule/Baren Heli-Base (39 23 46 N, 076 11 26 E), Shuimogoucun Heli-Base (43 48 59.14 N, 87 41 17.20 E), Tashkurgan Heli-Base (37 43 33.27 N, 75 15 21.98 E) and the latest Pishan County Heli-Base in Hotan Prefecture (36 20 42.1 N, 78 01 57.7 E).

In addition, under the Tibet Military District (TMD) Lhasa in Tibet has the Liuwuxiang Heli-Base (29 35 25 N, 091 01 14 E) that was commissioned in 2017, the Shiquanhe Heli-Base at Ngari (32 29 45.69 N, 80 4 15.46 E), the Nyingchi Heli-Base above Arunachal Pradesh, and Shigatse Airport too has a heli-base that was built in 2017.

New-generation variants of the Z-8 (the Z-8G and Z-8L) have a total takeoff weight of 13 tonnes. Changhe Aircraft Industry Group’s (CAIG) Z-8L ‘Gaoyuan’ (Plateau) heavylift helicopter, earlier designated as the Z-18, is a heavily modified version of the Harbin Z-8, CAIG’s derivative of the Aérospatiale SA.321 Super Frelon. The Z-8L flew for the first time in 2014. Powered by three domestic WZ-6C turboshaft engines, it has a maximum takeoff weight of 13.8 tonnes and can carry 30 troops, or five tonnes of cargo for up to 1,000km.

The Z-8L’s design has replaced the Super Frelon’s distinctive boat-hull lower fuselage with a tail ramp and has added a small terrain-following radar in the radome. In addition, the much longer external sponsons are configured as fuel tanks, as well as mounting the aft undercarriage. The internal width of the load area has been increased from 1.8 metres to 2.4 metres. Some Z-8Ls are fitted with a SATCOM fairing on the tailboom, aft of the engine exhausts. “We have completed flight training, and the next step is to focus on the integration with land forces,” said PLA Army’s 83rd Army Air Assault Brigade commander Song Zhipeng. The Z-8L has to date performed flight-tests reaching as high as 29,500 feet.

The twin-engined Z-20 medium-lift helicopter now being built at the Harbin Aircraft Industry Group (HAIG) is a multi-purpose platform that is also China’s first helicopter to use an indigenously developed fly-by-wire flight-control system (FBW-FCS). The Z-20 also features a streamlined aerodynamic structure and new anti-icing technology. In November 2017 the Z-20 in PLA Air Force (PLAAF) colours completed its high-altitude flight-tests at Xiahe airfield (flying up to 4,000 metres, or 13,200 feet) in Gansu province. The Z-20’s requirement dates back to the 1980s, when China was seeking a medium utility helicopter for operations in its mountainous western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. The PLAAF eventually imported 24 Sikorsky S-70C-2s powered by General Electric T700-701A engines. Since then, the S-70’s performance in such regions has been unmatched, even with the later acquisition by China of Mil Mi-17V5s from Russia. Development of the Z-20 began in 2006, and the maiden flight took place on December 23, 2013.

Although the Z-20 bears a close external resemblance to the S-70, the Z-20 incorporates novel features like the FBW-FCS, five main rotor blades, and a more angular tail–to-fuselage joint airframe, all of whoch contributes to more lift, greater cabin capacity and higher endurance. In addition, a new fairing installed aft of the engine exhausts and another on the tail spine, are housings for the BeiDou (Big Dipper) satellite navigation system’s receiver antennae. Powerplant for the Z-20 is the domestically-developed WZ-10 turboshaft engine, providing 2,145shp of power. The Z-20 will be a key air-mobility and projection platform for the PLA, while its Z-20F will provide the PLA Navy with a much-needed shipborne multi-role naval helicopter.

Meanwhile, Beijing has begun building what is perhaps TAR’s first dedicated air base at the site of the old Damxung Airport in the Damxung County of Lhasa. Built in 1955, the Damxung Airport was the world’s highest airport at that time. The site is located at 30 28 59.59 N, 91 4 42.78 E.

In addition, work has begun on constructing the Lhunze Airport in Lhoka (Shannan Prefecture), north of the Upper Subansiri and Tawang districts of Arunachal Pradesh. The site is at 28 24 9.83 N, 92 28 12.56 E. Another airport is coming up at Purang (30 17 44.30 N, 81 9 20.48 E) near the trijunction Nepal-Tibet-India, north of India’s Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand state. And yet another airport is to be built between the Tingri and Lhatse counties, north of Zangmu, the border post with Nepal.

Also expected to be built is an underground, hardened ammunition storage facility in Aksai Chin’s existing logistics support facility at Tianshuihai (34 44 42.91 N, 80 9 4.92 E), which will resemble the Xinjiang Military District’s ammunition storage facility at Urumqi: (43 46 27.40 N, 87 31 46.29 E).

Naval Updates

China State Shipbuilding Trading Co Ltd (CSTC) will in late August 2020 launch the first of four 4,200-tonne Type 054AP guided-missile frigates (FFG) for the Pakistan Navy at the Shanghai-based Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard. Deliveries will take place between 2010 and 2023. CSTC started work on the first two FFGs in 2018, while the construction of the third and fourth FFGs commenced in November 2019. The PN had ordered the Type 054AP FFGs in two equal batches, with the first order placed in 2017, and the second in the summer of 2018.

At Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard the first Type 055 guided-missile destroyer (DDG) for the PLA Navy (PLAN)—101 Nanchang—has completed its sea trails and now awaits commissioning, while the second DDG—102 Lhasa—is currently undergoing sea-trials. The fifth such DDG—103 Anshan—is now undergoing outfitting, while the seventh DDG—104—is now undergoing outfitting at Dalian Shipyard, where the third DDG--105 Dalian—is now undergoing sea-trials. The fourth Type 055 DDG—106 Yanan is being outfitted at Dalian along with the sixth DDG—107 Zunyi. The eighth DDG—108—is now undergoing sectional hull-assembly. The Type 052D DDGs now at Jiangnan Shipyard include the 122 Tangshan, 132 Suzhou), while another five built by this shipyard are now undergoing sea-trials.

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Construction Of KKH-2 Being Expedited

July 11, 2020, 2:22 pm

≫ Next: PLAGF's Gameplan In East China Sea

≪ Previous: PLA's New Heliports & Helicopters, Dual-Use Airports & Naval Updates

China has begun constructing a far wider highway (the second Karakoram Highway, or KKH-2) that will enter from a point west of the Shaksgam Valley into Gilgit via the Mintaka Pass: (36 59 36.10 N, 74 51 29.83 E), where there is already an existing PLA-BDR Garrison Base (37 9 25.71 N, 74 39 32.06 E) and a Customs CIQ facility is now being built there as well. This highway will be connected via bypass roads to the Sost Dryport (36 41 27.68 N, 74 49 30.00 E) and the projected Moqpondass SEZ (35 45 53.76 N, 74 38 27.56 E)—both in Gilgit.

It is now confirmed that the KKH-2 will be 50 metres wide and will be an all-weather transportation route. This follows the visit of a high-level delegation from China to Hunza, Gilgit and Baltistan in July 2016 to meet local stakeholders in the districts of Chilas, Skardu and Gilgit, and conferring with the administration and members of civil society to assess and determine the challenges in these regions bordering China. Initially, an alternative route to the existing Karakoram Highway (KKH-1) was proposed—this being the Yarkand to Skardu route through the Mustagh Pass. This route was then projected to be linked to the Neelum Valley through Shuntar Pass, thus bypassing Chilas and Indus-Kohistan for passage through a relatively more peaceful area. However, both China and Pakistan have now agreed that KKH-2 will now enter PoK from the Pamir Plateau inside Xinjiang via the Mintaka Pass and then proceed into Hunza. It will thus be located further to the west of the existing KKH-1.

Presently, it is physically impossible to maintain year-long connectivity between China and Pakistan through KKH-1, which links Kashghar in Xinjiang with Gilgit and Abbottabad through the Khunjerab Pass. Today, the KKH-1 is functional for five months a year at best because of adverse weather. The Kunjerab Pass through which KKH-1 traverses, is closed between November 30 and May 1 every year due to heavy snowfall. When opened, due to inhospitable terrain, the actual immigration happens 130km away at Tashkurgan in Xinjiang, China, and 75km away at Sost in Pakistan. A landslide and flooding in 2010 blocked the KKH-1 for more than one year. China and Pakistan subsequently discussed the possibility of building a parallel highway that featured extensive tunnels that cut through the Khunjerab Pass, rendering landslides irrelevant, but still making it highly vulnerable to earthquakes. Therefore, this idea of extensive tunnelling seemed fanciful-and expensive, estimated by Pakistan to cost more than US$11 billion.

The KKH-1 presently runs approximately 1,300km (915 miles) from Kashgar, following the valley of the Chez River, the Khunjerab Pass (at an elevation of 4,693 metres or 15,397 feet), Hunza (known as the original Shangri-La) for 310km along the Indus River-Valley, and along the (Gilgit and) Kunhar Rivers to Islamabad in the Chillas District of Pakistan. Roughly 494km of it lies in Chinese territory, while the remaining 806km traverse through the highest mountains in PoK. An extension of the KKH-1 meets the Grand Trunk Road at Raikot, west of Hassanabdal in Pakistan. On June 30, 2006, an MoU was signed between the Pakistan Highway Administration and China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to rebuild and upgrade the KKH-1. According to SASAC, the KKH-1’s width is being expanded from 10 metres to 30 metres (33 feet to 98 feet), and its transport capacity is being increased three times its current capacity. In addition, the upgraded KKH-1 has been designed to particularly accommodate heavy-laden vehicles in extreme weather conditions.

On January 4, 2010, the KKH-1 was closed in the Hunza Valley, eliminating road-traffic to China except by small boats. A massive landslide 15km (9.3 miles) upstream from Hunza’s capital of Karimabad created the potentially unstable Attabad Lake, which reached 22km (14 miles) in length and over 100 metres (330 feet) in depth by the first week of June 2010 when it finally began flowing over the landslide dam. Eventually, a new 24km route along the southeastern side of the Lake was completed in 2015 and opened to the public on September 14, 2015. The route comprises five tunnels and several bridges. The longest tunnel is 3,360 metres in length, followed by 2,736 metres, 435 metres, 410 metres and 195 metres. The Attabad Tunnel was completed on September 14, 2015.

Had the intent been to ensure all-weather, year-long road connectivity between China and Pakistan, then logically the Khunjerab Pass should have been discarded as an option, and instead focus should have been laid on five other passes of the Karakoram mountain range. These include the Mintaka Pass at over 4,700 metres above sea level just west of Khunjerab, which was used by travellers on the ancient Silk Route; the Shimshal Pass at 4,735 metres that leads to the Shimshal Braldu River Valley; the Kilik Pass (elevation 4,827 metres or 15,837 feet), 30km to the west of Mintaka Pass, which is a high mountain pass between Gilgit-Baltistan and Xinjiang; the eastern or ‘Old’ Mustagh Pass (altitude of about 5,422 metres); or the 5,600 metre-high ‘New’ Mustagh Pass.

China has also built feeder roads eastward through the Shaksgam Valley (part of the Trans-Karakoram Tract) linking Gilgit with Hotan, which is an important military HQ of the PLA, situated at the cross-section of the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway (NH-219) The highway starts from Yecheng, a city in southern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, passes by Gar County in Tibet and reaches Shiquanhe Town located in Ngari Prefecture of Tibet and the Hotan-Golmud Highway (NH-315). The Hotan-Golmud Highway links Xinjiang to Qinghai province and central China. It reduces the distance between Gilgit and Golmud to almost half, while bypassing the 428km-long Urumqi-Kashgar Highway.

↧

PLAGF's Gameplan In East China Sea

July 15, 2020, 6:45 pm

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In January 2019, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Academy of Military Science’s Deputy Director Rear Admiral Luo Yuan had proposed that the PLA seriously consider sinking two of the US Navy’s aircraft carriers. This would, according to the Rear Admiral, resolve the dispute surrounding both the East and South China Seas by sending a message to Washington regarding the dangers of militarily provoking Beijing in East Asia.

Rear Admiral Luo had then referred to “five cornerstones” of possible US weaknesses, noting: “What the US fears the most is taking casualties.” Referring to the PLA’s high-end anti-ship missile capabilities, he noted that sinking at least two US Navy-operated aircraft carriers would lead to losses of several thousand US servicemen—a cost no US government would be willing to tolerate. Rear Admiral Yuan indicated that China’s growing and formidable arsenal of new anti-ship missiles, which are designed to and capable of bypassing a full carrier strike group’s defences, would be able to cause considerable damage to hostile warships in the East or South China Seas. “We’ll see how frightened America is,” he had said. Elaborating on the reasons for his proposition, Rear Admiral Luo said that China had to “use its strength to attack the enemy’s shortcomings. Attack wherever the enemy is afraid of being hit. Wherever the enemy is weak, just focus on developing (an advantage).”

Eighteen months later, as the US Navy’s two carrier battle groups, centred around the aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan, have been conducting military exercises in the contested waterways of the South China Sea since early this month, the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) two aircraft carriers—Liaoning CV-16 and Shandong CV-17—are both holed up at Dazhu Shan, 30km southwest of Qingdao in Shandong province, and in Dalian—while the PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF) are reportedly gearing up for invading the Taiwan-owned Pratas/Dongsha Islands (20 41 11.12 N, 116 47 17.00 E), which comprise one island, two coral reefs and two banks, and are located about 170 nautical miles (310km) southeast of Hongkong SAR.

And entrusted with this tasking is the former Nanjing Military Region—which on February 1, 2016 was re-organised as the Eastern Theatre Command, and which commands amphibious mechanised units that are now subordinate to the PLAGF’s 71 (in Zuzhou, Jiangsu province), 72 (Huzhou, Zhejiang province) and 73 (Xiamen, Fujian province) Group Armies (GA). Each of the GAs is made up of six Brigades.

And maintaining a daily vigil along the eastern and southern coastlines of China is a Northrop Grumman E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) of the USAF, which has been flying daily from July 12 out of Okinawa, Japan.

Within the PLA, it is the PLAGF’s amphibious assault forces that are tasked to invade and occupy “big island” targets, with the PLA Marines being tasked to invade and occupy the smaller shoals and reefs. The PLAGF’s amphibious assault forces will deploy from vessels like the PLAN’s six Type 071 landing platform docks (LPD), Large Landing Ship Tanks (LST) and Zubr hovercraft; as well as PLAGF-owned LSM craft. They will also take advantage of high-speed mobility offered by Z-8 heavylift helicopters (and escorted by WZ-10 attack helicopters) and in the form of Combined-Arms Air-Assault Battalions, conduct reconnaissance, small-scale raids, infiltrations, and special operations attacks (against the entrenched Taiwanese coastal defences comprising both field artillery assets and anti-ship missile Batteries) through vertical envelopment. In terms of island-landing operations, the PLAGF forces will play the role of a first-attack force that operates inside hostile or contested territory, with the Mechanised Combined Arms Amphibious Brigades providing the main external attack force.

The PLA’s amphibious landing operations concepts are focussed primarily on “attack on main targets” (zhongdian daji), “three-dimensional landing” (liti denglu), and “deep strike” (zongshen). The focus is on landing from multiple sites and launching mobile raids—and this is a mode of operations that takes advantage of high-speed seaborne and airborne transport platforms to conduct raids over all types of terrain and at multiple sites.

Still, conducting a simultaneous airborne and seaborne invasion is easier said than done, and speed and the consequent tempo of operations will of absolute essence. Therefore, to reduce mobilisation time, the PLAN has sited its Zubr hovercraft base directly to the west of Pratas/Dongsha at Zhanjiang, while a PHL-03 long-range MBRL Regiment has been positioned to the south on Hainan Island (for being ferried to Pratas/Dongsha on short notice).

In addition, at Danzhou on Hainan Island, the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF) has created a new storage facility (under Base 62) for housing the 624 Brigade’s DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which are armed with EMP-generating warheads and are meant for launch in the direction of any inbound carrier battle group, so as to deny them their network-centric war-waging capabilities.

In addition, the PLAN has inducted into service up to two mobile landing platforms (MLP) for ferrying heavier warloads. At a July 10, 2015 ceremony at the PLAN’s Zhanjiang Naval Base in Guangdong province, the 868 Donghaidao, a 50,000-tonne displacement MLP with a giant staging platform installed at its waterline, was commissioned into service. This MLP can accommodate a wide variety of hovercraft, helicopters, fast-attack craft and armoured fighting vehicles. This MLP was launched by Huangpu Wenchong Shipyard and is a 33-metre by 120-metre submergible platform that is large enough to carry up to three Type 726 hovercraft.

Possible Retaliatory A2AD Options

To neutralise the seaborne threats from both the PLAN and PLAGF, Taiwan’s republic of China Navy (RoCN) in the 1990s itself developed and procured the homegrown 400km-range Hsiung Feng-III (Brave Wind) supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, which can be launched from both warships and land-based wheeled TELs.

However, no air-launched variant of this missile was developed. Instead, the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) opted for the 200km-range, turbofan-powered Wan Chien (Ten Thousands Swords) standoff air-launched cruise missile (similar to the Raytheon AGM-154A JSOW), which was declared fully operational in August 2018.

Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, on the other hand, completed the development and testing of its air-launched ASM-3ER supersonic anti-ship missile in 2018, following which it has been under series-production for Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Under development since 2003, the ASM-3 is designed for launch from Mitsubishi F-2 M-MRCAs. The 200km-range ASM-3 has a top speed of Mach 3 and a 900kg warhead.

Eventually, the JASDF will service-induct three different types of modern anti-ship missiles: the Raytheon-Kongsberg subsonic sea-skimming Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for the F-35 JSFs, the subsonic 800km-range Lockheed Martin AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) for the upgraded F-15J/DJ H-MRCAs, and the ASM-3ER for the F-02 M-MRCAs.

Looking to the future, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has started developing a hypersonic multi-role missile for attacking both warships and ground-based targets. Development work began last year and is due for completion by 2030. ATLA is currently in the development phase of the scramjet engine along with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which won the contract for prototype engine R & D. The missile will be powered by a dual-mode scramjet engine (DMSJ), a combination of ramjet and scramjet (supersonic combustion ramjet) engines, to fly at a wide range of speeds, including hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 or even Mach 15. The scramjet engine is expected to have high engine efficiency in a wide range of speeds because the air inhaled from the intake is compressed and combusted at supersonic speed when the missile is flying at Mach 5 or higher. That means that the scramjet engine would be needed accelerate the missile to hypersonic speeds to operate, and that would require acceleration by a rocket booster. However, a large rocket booster would be required to accelerate to hypersonic speeds, which would increase the overall length of the missile, including the booster.

Therefore, ATLA plans to combine the capabilities of the ramjet engine, which operates efficiently in the Mach 3 to 5 speed range, with the scramjet engine (DMSJ) being used to reduce the proportion of the rocket booster. In this way, the rocket booster only needs to accelerate the missile to supersonic speed, and from there, the ramjet engine accelerates the missile to hypersonic speed, which then activates the scramjet engine to cruise. ATLA is now working with Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) to realise the DMSJ. According to the ATLA, the hypersonic missile can cruise at high altitudes at hypersonic speeds while manoeuvring, making it difficult for hostile air-defence systems to intercept it. Both RF and IIR seekers will be used to identify targets, and its warhead will of the high-density explosively formed penetrator-type (EFP) for penetrating hardened targets.

Rise Of The Supersonics

It may well sound surprising, but it is a reality that the Indo-Pacific region today plays host to the largest number and types of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), be they air-launched, sea-launched or ground-launched. The former USSR was the first to induct such missiles into service in the Far East, with the 4.5-tonne Raduga P-270 Moskit being fielded since 1981. This 120km-range ASCM had a speed of Mach 2.2 and carried a 300kg warhead. It was only in the late 1990s that this missile was exported to China.

This was followed by the 3-tonne NPO Mashinostroyeniya-developed P-800 Oniks/Yakhont in 1987. It had a speed of Mach 2.5, range of 600km and carried a 300kg warhead.

In early 2011, eight such missiles were delivered to the Indonesian Navy, while the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) in 2013 procured from Russia two Batteries of the K-340P Bastion-P land-based coastal defence systems that came along with 40 Yakhont ASCMs for its 681 and 682 Brigades, and EXTRA projectiles from Israel Aerospace Industries for its 685 Brigade. The 150km-range EXTRA has a CEP of 10 metres. Vietnam occupies about 24 islands and reefs in the Spratlys, including islands close to China’s reclaimed bases on Subi Reef and Gaven Reef.

The second country to introduce supersonic ASCMs into service in the early 1980s was China’s 1.85-tonne YJ-1/C-10—manufactured by the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp (CASIC)—that had a 300kg warhead, a 50km range and a top speed of Mach 2. This was followed by the 3.4-tonne HY-3/C-301 with 180km-range, a 500kg warhead and Mach 2 speed. Both types of ASCMs used liquid ramjets and were used only for coastal defence.

India became the third country to field supersonic ASCMs since the year 2000 onwards when her navy first procured the 1,951kg Novator 3M54TE Club warship-/submarine-launched missiles from Russia that has a 220km-range, 200kg warhead and a top speed of Mach 3. Following next in 2003 was the 3-tonne BrahMos-1 with a 300kg warhead and a speed of Mach 2.8.

Next was Taiwan, which in 2007 began using the 1.5-tonne Hsiung Feng-3 ‘Brave Wind’ ASCM, which was developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). The missile used a solid fuel main booster with two side-by-side solid-propellant jettisonable strap-on rocket boosters for initial acceleration, and a liquid-fuelled ramjet for sustained cruise. Its maximum range is 200km, while its speed is Mach 2.5 when armed with a 120kg warhead.

The first supersonic ASCM using integral solid-propellant ramjet propulsion that is now entering service in the Far East/East Asia is Japan’s 900kg Mitsubishi ASM-3, which has a 200km-range and a top speed of Mach 3.

The second such supersonic ASCM to enter service was the YJ-18 (a clone of the 3M54TE), which has a 537km-range when armed with a 300kg warhead. The YJ-18’s turbojet engine is capable of flying at a cruise speed of Mach 0.8 for about 180km and after that point the warhead section separates and a solid rocket engine ignites allowing a top speed of Mach 3 for about 40km.

Another such ASCM now being developed is the HD-1A by its developer Guangdong Hongda Mining Company.

China’s 2.5-tonne liquid-fuelled YJ-12/CM-302 ‘Eagle Strike’ missile, which has a 400km-range, a 205kg warhead and a top speed of Mach 4.

↧

About Minfield Breeching Solutions & Ship-Launch Systems

July 20, 2020, 2:21 pm

≫ Next: From NAG to HELINA/Dhruvastra To SANT

≪ Previous: PLAGF's Gameplan In East China Sea

Pearson Engineering’s business with India began in December 2013 following a visit by the DRDO’s Combat vehicle R & D establishment to the former’s engineering and manufacturing facilities. Thereafter, working in partnership with the MoD-owned, Bengaluru-based Bharat Earth Moving Ltd (BEML) based, Pearson Engineering had emerged as the winner during IA trials for the selection of a surface mine clearance system‎ (SMCS) for ICVs.

The IA first installed such systems on its BMP-2 ICVs and later on Pearson’s minefield breeching systems like track-width and full-width mine-ploughs also emerged as winners for fitment on the IA’s T-72CIA, T-90S and Arjun Mk.1A MBTs. The first such contract between the Indian MoD and BEML was signed in March 2016 for the delivery of 41 complete sets, with first deliveries commencing later that year.

Ship-Launch System For DRDO

The SLS, which was publicly displayed for the very first time at the DEFEXPO-2018 exposition two year ago, is a universal system capable of housing cannister-encased missiles meant for vertical launch, such as the AAD endo-atmospheric interceptor missile, Nirbhay land-attack cruise missile, and the BrahMos-NG supersonic anti-ship/land attack cruise missile.

The SLS is thus indicative of the DRDO’s plans for developing warship-based, cannistered-encased vertically-launched variants of such missiles in response to the Indian Navy’s future requirements.

The slide above also indicates that the land-mobile TEL-based variant of the SLS is now being developed for the projected Akash-2 MR-SAM now under development. The diagram shows six cannister-encased Akash-2 MR-SAMs being carried by the TEL.

Spinoffs From RF Seeker R & D

The last two decades have seen the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based Research Centre Imarat (RCI) develop a range of active X-band and Ku-band RF seekers for diverse applications, ranging from those for the Astra family of BVRAAMs to those for cruise missiles like the BrahMos-1.

In addition, the development of Ka-band active seekers has been taken up for futuristic applications on the projected PDV exo-atmospheric interceptor vehicle and the XR-SAM. The private-sector Kalyani Group too has begun developing Ku-band active seekers and plans to further expand this product portfolio.

Strangely, however, the DRDO has not yet made any effort to develop a medium-range high-subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that can be launched from the air, from warships and from submarines. Since the terminal homing active seekers operating in the X-, Ku- and Ka-bands are scalable, it should not be impossible for the DRDO to develop an advanced version of the MBDA-developed Sea Eagle anti-ship cruise missile (in air-launched, submarine-launched, warship-launched and ground-launched versions), which was acquired by the Indian Navy in the mid-1980s in an air-launched configuration. The last of the Sea Eagles got decommissioned only earlier this decade.

Incidentally, there are presently two companies in India that have developed a family of turbojet engines required for powering such high-subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles.

One of them is the Kalyani Group, while the other is the subsidiary of PBS Aerospace of the Czech Republic, whose details can be found here:

https://www.pbsindia.com/

https://www.pbsindia.com/news-events/news/aerospace-engines-for-india-interview

↧

From NAG to HELINA/Dhruvastra To SANT

July 22, 2020, 5:57 pm

≫ Next: Why China Will Never Demarcate/Delineate The LAC With India

≪ Previous: About Minfield Breeching Solutions & Ship-Launch Systems

The first two consecutive test-firings in lofted top-attack mode of the definitive version of the third-generation HELINA anti-armour guided-missile on July 15 and 16 at the DRDO’s ITR at Balasore has finally kicked off the process of integrating the missile with the ‘Dhruvastra’ weapons-control systems on-board the Rudra WSI (Dhruva Mk.4) helicopter-gunships (78 for the Indian Army Aviation Corps or AAC, distributed among 7 Squadrons, and 16 for the Indian Air Force or IAF) and Light Combat Helicopter or LCH (97 for the AAC and 65 for the IAF).

The 7km-range HELINA’s developmental effort began back in 2012 after it was discovered that the 4km-range NAG anti-armour guided-missile will not be suitable (from a flight-safety standpoint) in a helicopter-launched configuration. In the initial round of test-firings in late 2016 and mid-2017, the HELINA’s imaging infra-red (IIR) seeker, which was derived from that of the NAG failed to acquire and engage ground-based moving and stationary targets beyond a range of 5km.

This led to the IIR seeker’s sensitivity being subjected to further improvements aimed at achieving mission effectiveness out to the specified range of 7km during both daytime and at night.

A series of user-assisted firing trials lasting eight months will kick off by the year’s end for validating the HELINA/Dhruvastra combination’s performance during both winter-time and summer-time over different kinds of terrain and at different operating altitudes. Following this, by late 2021 the Rudras and LCHs will start receiving the series-production HELINA/Dhruvastra combinations.

It may be recalled that the first Rudra prototype made its maiden flight in August 2007. After a series of flight and weapons trials lasting almost six years, the 5.5-tonne Rudra achieved Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) in February 2013. The first two Rudras were officially handed over to the AAC during the Aero India 2013 expo at Yelahanka, Bengaluru. Since then, it has taken almost another eight years for the Rudra to emerge as a fully weaponised helicopter-gunship for delivering immediate air-support to the Indian Army.

The 5.8-tonne LCH’s development began at HAL’s RWR & DC Division way back on October 3, 2006 when the Ministry of Defence (MoD) sanctioned a sum of Rs.376.67 crores for HAL to design and develop the LCH over a 24-month period. Powered by twin Ardiden 1H (1,200shp TM333-2C2 Shakti) engines, the first LCH prototype—TD-1—completed its first ground-run on February 4, 2010 and its maiden flight was logged on March 29, 2010. Exactly a year later, the IAF placed a production indent with HAL for procuring 65 LCHs, including 10 LSP models. Three months later, the LCH’s second prototype, TD-2, made its maiden flight on June 28, 2011. The third prototype—TD-3—made its maiden flight on November 12, 2014, while the fourth and last prototype—TD-4—took to the skies on December 1, 2015.

The LCH was originally targetted in 2006 to achieve its IOC by 2013, but as of now, it has yet to complete its weapons-firing trials (due to delayed availability of the HELINA), while its self-protection sensor suite (comprising radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers and missile approach warning system) has yet to be integrated with the airframe. IOC attainment now is not expected before the end of 2021.

It is also expected that the IA, which has to date ordered 443 Bharat Dynamics Ltd-built third-generation NAGs along with 13 OFB Medak-built NAMICA-2 tracked missile launchers, will decide against ordering additional NAGs and will instead opt for the longer-range HELINA for its follow-on NAMICAs.

Also under development is a DRDO-developed fire-and-forget millimetre-wave (MMW) W-band seeker for a 12km-range version of the HELINA, called SANT. However, the R & D cycle of this missile is unlikely to be completed by 2021 at the very latest.

Total orders for the HELINA for both the IA and IAF are expected to exceed 8,500 units, while for the SANT the requirement is for 4,000 units.

↧

Why China Will Never Demarcate/Delineate The LAC With India

July 30, 2020, 6:15 pm

≫ Next: A Truly Bizarre List

≪ Previous: From NAG to HELINA/Dhruvastra To SANT

Simply because Beijing till this day does not possess any historical documentation required for proving its territorial claims based on traditional and customary practices of the past, as disclosed below.

China Began Violating The 1954 Panchsheel Treaty From 1955

Tibetan Ficklemindedness & Its Govt-in-Exile’s Ambivalence On The Status Of Tawang

India’s Unstated Territorial Claims Inside TAR

(To Be Concluded)

↧

A Truly Bizarre List

August 9, 2020, 7:28 pm

≫ Next: Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea

≪ Previous: Why China Will Never Demarcate/Delineate The LAC With India

The Indian Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) ‘Embargo List of Defence Weapons/Platforms’ that was released on August 9, 2020, is one of the most bizarre types of documentation ever to emerge from the MoD. After browsing through it, one does not know whether to laugh or cry, or whether the drafters of such documentation are both beyond hope and beyond despair. It is being claimed that the decision to impose an embargo on 101 imported items between 2020 and 2024, and the creation of a separate budget for domestic capital procurement of nearly Rs.52,000 crore for the current financial year will provide a major boost to the indigenous military-industrial sector. It is also being claimed that this would open up new avenues for the India’s home-grown military-industrial sector as contracts worth Rs.400,000 crore would be given to equipment manufacturers within the next seven years. Of these, items worth almost Rs,130,000 crore each are likely for the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force, while items worth almost Rs.140,000 crore are expected by the Indian Navy. Incidentally, almost 260 schemes of such items were imported by the three armed services at an approximate cost of Rs.3.5 lakh crore between April 2015 and August 2020. But as they say, the devil always lurks within the detail, and hence let us highlight the details for each of the 101 items:

1. 120mm FSAPDS Mk.2 Ammunition.

What about the 120mm HESH and thermobaric projectiles, plus the cannon-launched guided-missile (CLGM?

2. 7.62 x 51 Sniper Rifle.

Will that be the OFB-developed product, or will the requirement be met by competitive evaluations of offers from various vendors that are offering not homegrown, but licence-built solutions developed abroad?

3. Tracked Self Propelled (SP) Gun (155mm x 52-cal).

Exactly what is the percentage of indigenous material content of the Hanwha/Larsen & Toubro K-9 Vajra 155mm/52-cal tracked SPH?

4. Towed Artillery Gun (155mm x 52-cal).

Exactly what is the percentage of indigenous material content of the ATAGS 155mm/52-cal towed howitzer that has been designed by the DRDO?

5. Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (Land variant).

If this is the QR-SAM,what then is the percentage of indigenous material content? Will the complete weapon system be produced entirely by Bharat Dynamics Ltd and Bharat Electronics Ltd?

6. Shipborne Cruise Missiles.

Will these comprise only BrahMos-1 and BrahMos-NG missiles? What about those missiles that are to be launched by shipborne NMRHs and NLUHs?

7. Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) (Pinaka Variant).

What will be the import content of the terminal guidance component of the 124mm rockets?

8. Simulators Presenting Smart Ranges And Multi-Function Targets.

9. Battalion Support Weapons Simulators.

10. Container-based Simulators for Live-Fire Training.

11. Tailor-made Simulators for Counter Insurgency (CI)/Counter Terrorism (CT) Training.

12. Force-on-Force Live Tactical Simulators/Infantry Weapon.

13. Tank Simulators (driving, as well as, crew gunnery).

All of the above have been procured from local OEMs since the previous decade and none of them are being imported anymore.

14. 155mm/39-cal Ultra-Light Howitzer.

Which is the system being referred to here? The M777 towed UFH, or the Mounted Gun System (MGS) variant?

15. Successor of Flycatcher & Upgraded Super Fledermaus (USFM)/Air Defence Fire Control Radar (ADFCR).

The ADFCR is in any case an integral component of the QR-SAM system.

16. Component-Level Repair Facility for Tank T-90S.

Why was this not indigenised even 19 years after the service-induction of the T-90S MBTs?

17. Shipborne Close-in Weapon System.

The AK-630M CIWS has been licence-built by OFB for the past 15 years, but its Vympel MR-123) fire-control radars and control consoles (developed by the Tula-based KBP Instrument Design Bureau continue to be imported from Russia’s JSC Tulamashzavod.

18. Bullet Proof Jackets.

19. Ballistic Helmets.

Are the Boron-based raw materials used by these two items also being sourced locally? Or do they continue being imported from China?

20. Guided-Missile Destroyers (DDG).

Exactly what is the percentage of import content in material terms on board each of the Project 15, Project 15A and Project 15B DDGs? Have their armaments suite and propulsion systems been indigenised?

21. Multi-Purpose Vessel.

23. Next Generation Missile Vessel.

24. Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft.

25. Water Jet Fast Attack Craft.

26. Ammunition Barges.

27. 50-ton Bollard-Pull Tugs.

28. Survey Vessels.

29. Floating Dock.

30. Diving Support Vessels.

31. Pollution Control Vessels.

Why are guided-missile frigates, new-generation corvettes, Landing Platform Docks (LPD) and GRP-hulled minehunters (MCMV) missing from this list? Is it because they will be imported, like the two Project 1135.6 Batch-3 FFGs from Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and another two to be licence-built by Goa Shipyard Ltd? Has the MoD shelved the procurement of NGCs, LPDs and MCMVs?

32. Anti-Submarine Rocket Launchers.

These are the Larsen & Toubro-built equivalents of the RBU-6000 launchers that have been in production since the previous decade itself.

33. Shipborne Medium-Range Gun.

Both 76/62 SRGM and 127mm naval guns continue to be imported from Italy’s OTOBreda and BAE Systems, and no R & D work is underway anywhere in India for coming up with indigenous solutions.

34. Torpedo Tube Launcher for Lightweight Torpedoes.

In case the MoD is unaware, Larsen & Toubro has already designed and developed 533mm (21-inch) tube-launchers for heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for both warships and submarines that are already operational with the Indian Navy.

35. Magneto-Rheological Anti Vibration Mounts.

36. All variants of Depth Charges.

37. Shipborne Sonar System for Large Ships.

38. Hull-Mounted Submarine Sonar.

These are the HUMSA and USHUS family of sonar suites. But what about heli-borne low-frequency dunking sonars like the MIHIR LFDS? Has the Indian Navy rejected it?

39. Short Range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft.

These are the HAL-built Dornier Do-228 STOL turboprops.

40. Anti-Submarine Rocket.

What about the Varunastra autonomous 533mm HWT? Why is it missing from the list?

41. Chaff Rockets.

42. Chaff Rocket Launcher.

This refers to the DRDO-developed and OFB-built Kavach.

43. Integrated Ship’s Bridge System.

Which types of warships to date have been equipped with integrated bridge systems and related marine navigation radars and ECDIS digital navigation chart display systems? Presently, both of the latter two are bei8ng imported.

44. Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk.IA-Enhanced Indigenised Content.

Critical systems like its F404-GE-IN20 turbofan, TARGO HMDS, EL/M-2052 AESA-MMR and EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod will be fully imported from abroad.

45. Light Combat Helicopters.

The presently available weapons suite of the LCH, comprising the THL-20 cannon from France’s NEXTER Systems, and 70mm unguided rockets from THALES Belgium, are all imported. In addition, all the resins that are co-cured into composites-based structures inside autoclaves, continue to be i8mported by HAL for the ALH, LCH, LUH and the Tejas family of L-MRCAs.

46. General Purpose Pre-Fragmentation Bombs between 250-500Kg.

These are all licence-built by OFB and belong to Russia’s OFAB family of bombs.

47. Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) for Transport Aircraft.

What about RWRs for combat aircraft and helicopters?

48. Ground-Based Mobile ELINT System.

These were developed for the Samyukta and Him Shakti projects of the Indian Army (under Project SAMISHTI) and Project HIMRAJ of the IAF.

49. Transport Aircraft (Light).

This refers to the Dornier Do-228 STOL transport, whose Honeywell TPE331 turboshaft engines and Hartzell four-bladed propellers continue to be imported. The glass cockpit cockpit avionics suite of the HAL-upgraded Do-228 comes from US-based Genesys Aerosystems.

50. GSAT-6 Satellite Terminals.

51. Aerial Delivery Systems for Transport Aircraft.

52. Digital Tropo-Scatter/LOS Communication System.

53. Low-Level Transportable Radar.

54. High-Power Radar (HPR).

What about medium-power radars (MPR) like the Army ADTCR, which has been developed for as a successor to the existing Indian Doppler Radar (INDRA) and P-19 radars? Will their imports continue? If so, then what is the future of the Arudhra & Ashwini S-band AESA MPRs?

55. CBRN Detection & Monitoring System.

56. CBRN Decontamination & Protection System.

57. Parachute Tactical Assault (PTA) G2.

58. Dragunov Upgrade System.

59. PKMG Upgrade System.

60. Simulators for A Vehicles/B Vehicles.

61. Simulators for Towed and Self-Propelled Guns of Air Defence.

62. Simulators for Correction of Fire by Observers.

63. Military trucks of 4 x 4 and above variants: 12 x 12, 10 x 10, 8 x 8, 6 x 6.

All these were indigenised way back in the previous decade itself and have already been service-inducted.

64. Fixed-Wing Mini-UAVs.

A joint venture between India’s Cyient and Israel’s BlueBird Aero Systems is already providing SpyLite mini-UAVs to the Indian Army, while the only mini-UAV to be supplied by an Indian company is the Aquilon from TATA Advanced Systems Ltd. However, most of the UAVs being proposed by TATA have been designed by a Slovenian OEM.

65. 500-Ton Self-Propelled Water Barges.

66. Software Defined Radio (TAC) for IN.

What about SDRs for the Indian Air Force and Indian Army? The latter has already begun importing SDRs from RAFAEL of Israel.

67. Next-Generation Maritime Mobile Coastal Battery (Long-Range).

This will be the BrahMos-1.

68. Advance Landing Ground Communication Terminals (ALGCT) for ALGs.

This is coming from Bharat Electronics Ltd.

69. Field Artillery Tractor (FAT) 6 x 6 for Medium Guns.

This is coming from Ashok Leyland. But are their engines and gearboxes imported?

70. Wheeled Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV).

The DRDO-TATA-developed Kestrel is still in the process of being refined to suit the terrain and weather conditions of the North East and Ladakh, with work expected to be completed only by 2024.

71. Light Machine Gun.

This is the 7.62 x 51 solution developed by OFB with linked ammunition feed.

72. 125mm FSAPDS.

This refers to the Russian 3BM42 round licence-built by OFB.

73. Assault Rifle 7.62 x 39.

This is the AK-203 SLR.

74. 30mm Ammunition for Infantry Fighting Systems.

75. Mine Fragmentation.

76. Mine Anti-tank.

77. Mine Anti-Personnel Blast.

78. Multipurpose Grenade.

These have been under production by OFB for the past few decades.

79. Inertial Navigation System for Ship Application.

Which foreign OEM is supplying the ring-laser gyros for the INS? Till to date, all RLG-INS requirements have been met through imports, i.e. SAFRAN’s SIGMA-95N for all combat aircraft, SIGMA-30 for the Pinaka-1/-2 MBRLs, SIGMA-40 for warships and submarines, and TAMAM of Israel’s RLG-INS for the BrahMos-1/BrahMos-A and Nirbhay cruise missiles.

80. Conventional Submarines.

Does this mean that the SSKs to be acquired under Project 75I will be of as homegrown design? Or will the design be imported and the SSKs be licence-built?

81. 40mm UBGL (Under Barrel Grenade Launcher).

These have already been under series-production by OFB since the previous decade.

82. Lightweight Rocket Launcher.

83. 155mm Artillery Ammunition.

These have already been under series-production by OFB since the previous decade. But the OFB has yet to produce 155mm cargo rounds.

84. EW Systems.

Only for warships (like the Shakti, Nayan and Tushar) and airborne platforms (Sarvadhari, Sarang, Sarakshi and Nikash) and the D-29 EW suite for the IAF’s MiG-29UPGs. For all the rest, imports are still ongoing.

85. Material Handling Crane 2.5 to 7.5 Tons (Vehicle Mounted).

86. GRAD BM-21 Rocket.

87. 30MM HEI/HET.

88. Astra Mk.1 BVRAAM.

89. EW Suit for Mi-17V5.

90. Communication Satellite GSAT-7C.

91. Satellite GSAT-7R.

For several critical components, imports continue.

92. Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA).

Its engines, propellers and glass cockpit avionics suite will be of imported origin.

93. Expendable Aerial Targets.

Imports of Banshee family of aerial targets continue till this day and will continue.

94. Small Jet Engines with 120kgf thrust.

While the GTRE-developed MANIK turbofan has yet to see the light of day, the Kalyani Group has decided to enter the fray and offer alternate solutions.

95 Light Low-Level Lightweight Radar (LLLWR).

This refers to the Bharani and Aslesha family of radars.

96. Close-in Weapon System (Land based).

This refers to a foreign design that will be licence-built in-country by the chosen winner of a competitive evaluations process now underway.

97. 23mm ZU Ammunition.

98. 30mm VOG-17.

Such ammunition has been required in large numbers since the mid-1980s, but for mysterious, they were never licence-produced by the OFB.

99. Electronic Fuses for Artillery Ammunition.

By nomination, BEL was selected to licence-assemble such fuses that originated from REUTECH of South Africa and RESHEF of Israel.

100. Bi-Modular Charge System (BMCS).

HEMRL has already indigenised such BMCS modules, but series-production in large numbers is still awaited from OFB’s Nalanda-based factory.

101. Long-Range Land-Attack Cruise Missile.

This variant of the Nirbhay cruise missile still awaits the definitive turbofan.

Significantly, the list does not include items like the HAL-developed single-engined LUH, wire-guided version of the Varunastra HWT, night-vision devices, the DRDO-developed MPATGM, the Bharat Dynamics Ltd-developed AMOGHA-3 ATGM, the NAG and HELINA anti-armour guided-missiles, the Bharat-52 155mm/52-cal MGS, PG-HSLD, SAAW, NG-LGB, heavyweight MBT, MALE-UAV, the TAL lightweight torpedo, etc etc.

The most glaring omission, however, is in the arena of habitat-/survivability-related hardware/gear required for usage in high-altitude mountainous terrain and high-altitude plateaux—which can only be developed India and nowhere else since India and Pakistan are the only two countries whose armies are deployed in such areas. Between 1984 and 2018, the MoD spent more than Rs.7,500 crore in procuring special clothing and mountaineering equipment for soldiers posted in high-altitude areas. Presently, High Altitude Visibility Clothing Extreme Cold Climate (HAVC-ECC) accounts for the majority share, with 44% of the total share of requirements that comprise bulletproof jackets, CBRN suits, and fire-retardant apparel. Around 55 items are issued under the Super High Altitude (SHA) clothing category and these in turn are divided into two categories: Category-1 for personal use (20 items) and Category-2' for general-purpose items (35 items). Of these, 22 are one-time issue items, such as a down-jacket or sleeping bag, issued to an individual soldier and not recycled thereafter. Of these, nine items are imported. The balance 33 are unit-issued items, such as special tents and ice axes and of these, 11 items are imported. Interestingly, these are mostly made in China, although they are supplied by around a dozen foreign firms located in the US, Switzerland, Italy, Finland, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Norway and the UK. The HAVC-ECC equipment comprises 55 items like jacket and windcheater, waist coat, trousers, glacier cap, rappelling gloves and glacier gloves, rucksack, special socks, thermal insoles, snow goggles and High-Altitude Pulmonary Oedema (HAPO) bag for soldiers deployed in Siachen, Drass, Kargil, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. These in turn are divided into two categories--the first lot for those deployed in the range of 9,000 feet to 12,000 feet, and the second category for those guarding the border beyond the heights of 12,000 feet.

Typical characteristics of high-altitude clothing are: Hydrophilic-Waterproof and moisture-resistant, usage of breathable membrane made of Poly Utherane, Abrasion resistance, and Maintenance of high integrity. The gear typically weighs 10kg. The material used for such clothing is typically a hydrophilic polyurethane coating or PTFE coating, or Gore-Tex coating or Sympatex coating. The hydrophilic properties are obtained by coatings of laminates or micro-porous. The inner-jacket is usually made of fleece, while the rest of the items is 100% polyester. Specifications of such products include: jackets that are 2.4kg in weight and made of fleece and polyester, having waterproof coatings and a thermal vest; trousers usually 1.2kg in weight again made of 100% polyester. However, most of the HAVC-ECC clothing being used by Indian Army do not meet the above-mentioned characteristics and are rather cumbersome, since the jackets and trousers in use are very bulky, thereby restricting the freedom of movement of the troops making use of equipment like radio sets, and making the carriage of personnel loads difficult. These bulky suits have to be worn to withstand extreme cold, but they affect operations like long-range patrolling in knee-deep snow, as soldiers get bogged down by the weight of their equipment, including rucksacks carrying sleeping bags, rations and ammunition. Moreover, soldiers have to remove the entire suit after returning to their bases, thereby making the process cumbersome and time-consuming. Further, it does not offer weather-proofing from rain and snow. The snow-boots being made of rubber do not offer good grip in slush or snow. In addition there is the lack of air-circulation in the feet.

India has been importing HAVC-ECC clothing since the early 1980s in large numbers at high costs year after year. Presently, about 50% of the requirements are met through imports. As per official data, India spends around Rs.800 crore annually in imports of Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS) and mountaineering kits. Items that are imported include woolen socks, rucksacks and sleeping bags. These include 'outer shell parka” and the `fibre-pile pant' from Finland (Rs 14,174 each), Swiss down-jacket from Black Diamond Company (Rs.9,093), Italian MP Scarpa boots (Rs.6,990) and French boot cramp-ons (Rs.6,990). Other basic gear like ice-axes, shovels, boot cramp-ons, Stromeyer tents and the like are also being imported. The Swiss gear helps troops in weather conditions where the temperature falls below -50 degrees Celsius. The clothing provided is three-layered ECWCS and costs Rs.35,000 each. The Indian Army bought around 42,000 suits for troops stationed in Siachen, Kargil, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Ladakh in 2018. The annual requirement of HAVC-ECC clothing and equipment is around 27,000 sets and is expected to increase to 38,229 sets. Further, the Inhdian Army maintains a reserve for another year's requirement. Thus, the average shortfall of items is about 10% every year, which is replenished from the reserves.

A CAG report that covered the period from 2015-16 to 2017-18, bought out facts that the troops deployed at high-altitude areas are given old versions of face-masks, jackets and sleeping bags. Citing an example, the CAG report mentioned that the stock level of 'Goggle All-Terrain' an ECC & E item used to protect soldiers from visionary ailments at high altitudes was critically low. So much so that when demand was raised for 750 snow-goggles for the issue to a unit of soldiers on its arrival in a high-altitude area, they simply could not be provided for. As of June 2016, June 2017 and June 2018, the total stock of ‘Goggles All-Terrain’ ranged from just 5.6% to 16.07% against the total authorisation, rendering the stock critically low due to poor supply. To be noted is that it takes around Rs.1 lakh to clothe a single soldier for the Siachen heights, the world’s highest battlefield, which ranges from 16,000 feet to 22,000-feet. In the personal kit, the soldiers have been provided with multi-layered extreme winter clothing worth Rs.28,000 each along with a special sleeping bag that costs around Rs.13,000. The down-jacket and the special gloves together costs around Rs.14,000, while the multipurpose shoes cost around Rs.12,500. The equipment provided to the troops includes an oxygen cylinder that costs around Rs.50,000 per piece.

The Indian Army first mooted the idea of indigenous production of the high-altitude clothing and equipment around 12 years ago. It is aiming at saving nearly Rs.300 crore annually by indigenous production of these items which are, at present, sourced from countries like the US, Australia, Canada and Switzerland. It is estimated that by procuring India-produced clothing gear, the country will be able to save around Rs.2.5 crore every six months. However, till date most of the items are being imported and are facing requirement deficiencies even for basic high-altitude clothing items of regular use where no high-end technology is warranted. One of the major reasons for this state of affairs is that the OFB is not able to meet the total requirements and also the products developed by the DRDO are mostly sub-standard and of course, non-involvement of the private sector. Though few private-sector entities like TATA Advanced Materials Ltd, Shri Lakhsmi, Shiva Texyarn, National Textile Corporation, Sara Sae, Key Tent, Sabre Safety Ltd and Cotsyn Defence have started production of such clothing, these are still in the pilot phases of user-evaluations. Under the ‘Make in India’ initiative, there is thus a strong need to to locally develop and produce HAVC-ECC gear like snow goggles, ice axe, boots, thermal insoles, avalanche victim detectors, rock pitons, and sleeping bags.

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Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea

August 18, 2020, 6:48 pm

≫ Next: Increasing Sub-Conventional Threats Systematically Blunting India’s Conventional Deterrence

≪ Previous: A Truly Bizarre List

Since mid-May, following a series of behind-the-scenes parleys and deliberations, a variety of steps have been taken toward the adoption of a multinational sea-control strategy that aims at nullifying China’s irrational assertiveness within both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). For instance, in their first virtual Summit-level meeting held in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia and India on June 4, 2020 elevated their bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) and signed seven key accords, including a mutual logistics support agreement that is expected to enable the two countries to access each other’s military bases, including Australia’s Christmas Island, located south of Indonesia’s Island of Java.

This was followed a month later by a three-day official visit to India (from July 26 to 28) of Indonesia’s Defence Minister Gen (Ret’d) Prabowo Subianto during which he and his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh discussed various ways and means of strengthening the military-to-military and military-industrial ties between the two maritime neighbours.

In particular, India expressed her intention to financially and materially assist Indonesia in transforming the existing naval and air bases at Sabang Island (located northeast of Banda Aceh in Sumatra) into fully operational installations and in return secure access for Indian Navy seaborne and airborne assets to such installations. Indonesia also evinced interest in procuring India-developed integrated platform management systems, combat management systems and hull-mounted sonar suites for a family of shallow-water multi-purpose vessels developed by its state-owned, Surabaya-based shipbuilder PT PAL.

But, as the saying goes, the best is yet to come. And this event will take place between mid-September and end just before Indian Air Force Day (October 8) and will comprise a series of joint services exercises taking place in the Andaman Sea, with a strong emphasis being laid on sea-control being exercised through anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime-strike operations (with both IAF Jaguar IMs armed with AGM-84A Harpoon ASCMs and Su-30MKIs armed with BrahMos-A ASCMs), and the enforcement of maritime exclusion zones (MEZ).

Moreover, apart from the Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Air Force (IAF), the US Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) too are likely to be invited to take part in these exercises, with the US Navy contributing about four warships from its Yokosuka-based 7th Fleet, and the JMSDF despatching a Kawasaki P-1 LRMR-ASW platform.

Details of this multinational naval exercise will be firmed up during the three-day naval commanders’ biannual conference in New Delhi (from August 19 till 21), which will also be the first naval commanders’ conference since the institution of Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

And as a curtain-raiser event, three B-2 Spirit stealthy bombers recently deployed from the USAF’s 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the southern Indian Ocean to support the US Pacific Air Forces’ Bomber Task Force missions. They arrived on August 12 at Diego Garcia on Wednesday after a 29-hour sortie.

The last time a B-2 task force had deployed to the INDOPACOM region was in January 2019, when three B-2s and about 200 airmen deployed to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. Those B-2s were from Whiteman’s 393rd Bomb Squadron, and flew 27 sorties for a total of 171 hours. Their local and long-duration missions included practicing hot-pit refuelling and sorties with the USAF Hawaii Air National Guard’s F-22 Raptors.

The B-2s are always deployed overseas along with their B2SS Extra Large Deployable Aircraft Hangar System, which is a transportable semi-rigid dome structure designed to be rapidly deployed, assembled and made ready to support maintenance on B-2s at forward operating locations. Measuring 250-feet wide by 60-feet high, the structure provides a 1.1 million cubic foot environment that is air conditioned, fully environmentally isolated against chemical and biological attack, and also features a single 10-ton clamshell retractable door.

The last time the B-2s had been deployed to Diego Garcia was on October 6, 2001, when two B-2s took off from Whiteman to fly 36 hours across the Pacific Ocean and up the Indian Ocean into Afghanistan. They struck targets throughout Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Rockwell B-1B Lancer and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers flying out of Diego Garcia, and then returned to the same island, making the entire trip over 40 hours. At Diego Garcia, the B-2 crews exited their aircraft, with engines running, and a fresh crew climbed on board to pilot the aircraft on their 30-hour return-flight to Missouri. By the end of the first three nights, six B-2s flew more than 420 hours, accomplished over 36 aerial refuellings, and returned to Whiteman with no incidents.

The ongoing B-2 deployment in Diego Garcia is aimed at sending a clear message to China about the vulnerabilities of its sea lanes of communications (SLOC) in the Andaman Sea, which falls within the ambit of both the IOR and the INDOPACOM region. In particular, it dashes all hopes about China overcoming its ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by establishing an overland oil/gas supply pipeline via Myanmar for its hinterland-located petrochemical processing infrastructure in the Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, which in turn are designed to provide the great bulk of the POL requirements of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Western, Southern and Eastern Theatre Commands in case a naval blocade is imposed against all the coastal cities of southern and eastern China.

The PLAAF, on its part, has since 2017 built new high-altitude radar stations housing the Type 609 UHF-band airspace surveillance radars at a location north-east of Walong, another near Ruili, and yet another in southern Yunnan close to the China-Laos international border.

It may be recalled that the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) built and operates the Myanmar–China oil pipeline, which bypasses the sea route via the Malacca Strait. This pipeline and a companion natural-gas pipeline transport hydrocarbons from the Bay of Bengal across Myanmar to southwestern China. The gas and oil pipelines run in parallel and start near Kyaukphyu, run through Mandalay, Lashio, and Muse in Myanmar before entering China at the border city of Ruili in Yunnan province. The gas pipeline, the maximum capacity of which is 12 billion cubic metres/year, carries natural gas from Myanmar’s offshore A-1 and A-3 blocks.

This pipeline runs further from Kunming to Guizhou and Guangxi in China and is 2,806km-long in total. The oil pipeline, the maximum capacity of which is 0.24 million bbl/year, transports crude oil carried by tankers from the Middle East. Therefore, a large oil-import port and storage tanks have also been built as an input point of this oil pipeline. The port can receive vessels up to 300,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT) and has storage capacity of 1.2 million cubic metres. This pipeline, which eventually terminates in Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province, has a total length of 771km. The total estimated project costs are US$1.04 billion for the gas pipeline and $1.5 billion for the oil pipeline. Construction of the Myanmar–China oil pipeline and gas pipeline started in June 2010. In June 2013, CNPC announced that the Myanmar section of the gas pipeline was complete and ready for testing while the oil pipeline was 94% complete. In January 2015, Myanmar officially opened a deep-sea port off its western coast and started trial operations. To be exact, the port and storage tanks are located on the Madae Island. There are 12 storage tanks at the port and the capacity of each tank is 100,000 cubic metres. Myanmar receives $13 million per year and a toll fee of the pipeline (US$1/tonne) from CNPC.

In March 2003, PetroChina and the Sichuan Provincial government agreed to jointly develop a petrochemical complex near Chengdu centred on a cracker producing 800,000tpa (tons per annum) of ethylene. By 2004, PetroChina had completed a feasibility study and an environmental impact assessment report. The project received final approval in 2005. Ground-breaking on the complex took place in the first quarter of 2006 and the construction was completed in December 2012. The petrochemical complex was commissioned in January 2014. The facilities are situated on the outskirts of Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China. Along with the 800,000tpa of ethylene, the complex produces 450,000tpa of polypropylene (PP), 600,000tpa of paraxylene (PX), 380,000tpa of monoethylene glycol (MEG) and 50,000tpa of ethylene oxide (EO) PetroChina Sichuan Petrochemical Company (PSP) is owned by PetroChina, which has a 51% stake and Chengdu Petrochemicals, which owns the remaining 49%.

The projected upgradation of the IN’s and IAF’s existing air bases at Great Nicobar and Car Nicobar islands, coupled with a parallel upgradation being undertaken at Sabang and Christmas Island, will enable the IN’s P-8I LRMR/ASW platforms and the Royal Australian Air Force’s P-8A Poseidon LRMR/ASW platforms to function in a networked manner for wide-area surveillance stretching from the Ombai-Wetar Strait off Timor Leste all the way westwards via the Lombok and Sunda Straits, all of which are used by the PLA Navy when deploying from the South China Sea into the IOR.

In another development, Israel’s Elbit Systems on August 17 was awarded a contract valued at approximately $27 million by the IN to supply an EHUD rangeless air-to-air combat training system, to be operated from the IN’s shore-based naval air stations along India’s eastern and western seaboards as well as on board aircraft carriers. Product deliveries will be performed over a two-year period, to be followed by three years of availability-based maintenance.

The EHUD ACMI system offers advanced air-to-air combat training capabilities, including features such as real-time hit notification and removal, real-time electronic warfare and air-to-air weapons delivery, simulation and advanced debriefing. The system supports an unlimited number of live networked participants, through Elbit Systems’ data-link protocol that also allows interoperability with existing EHUD ACMI systems operated by the IAF (the first two were procured in the late 1990s while an $18 million contract was inked in December 2010 for two additional systems).

However, the IN continues to be devoid of its three cadet training vessels and five naval offshore patrol vessels (NOPV), which were contracted for eight years ago from the Surat-based ABG Shipyard and Pipavav-based Reliance Naval and Engineering Ltd, respectively. Both shipbuilders have filed for bankruptsy.

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Increasing Sub-Conventional Threats Systematically Blunting India’s Conventional Deterrence

August 30, 2020, 6:27 pm

≫ Next: From Establishment 22 To Special Frontier Force: The Phantom Warriors

≪ Previous: Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea

Ever since the Indian Army (IA) completed fencing of the 550km-stretch of the Line of Actual Control (LoC) fencing in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir Union Territory on September 30, 2004, terrorist infiltrations across the LoC had been reduced to single-digit levels per annum till 2012. Since then, the bulk of the infiltrations into both J & K UT and northern Punjab have taken place within the Ravi-Chenab corridor, especially along the India-Pakistan Working Boundary (WB) and the Chicken’s Neck area in particular, and along the riverine stretches of the India-Pakistan international boundary or IB (around the Shakargarh Bulge/Salient)—these being the districts of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Fazilka and Ferozepur.

It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The J & K UT has 734km of LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and the UT of Ladakh from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to Punjab running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts. The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the west bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot), which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that is known in India as the IB, while Pakistan refers to it as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement (the so-called standstill agreement of August 15, 1947) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan. The Shakargarh Bulge/Salient (which is Pakistani territory) and runs along the IB, is 45km x 45km in size. The bulge joins Indian territory with a 40km distance in between both countries and touches India’s National Highway-1, which is the lifeline of the entire Kashmir Valley. If Pakistan Army (PA) troops manage to get operational in three to four days at the tip of this Bulge/Salient, the NH-1 could be cut of totally, rendering the entire north of India paralysed, as all supplies and winter stocking in the Valley is done by this route, for Indian troops.

Chicken’s Neck is the name given to the territory lying between the two branches of the River Chenab and it is a dagger-shaped salient in J & K that allows the PA an easy access to the bridge at Akhnoor in Jammu, as well as to the Chhamb-Jaurian sector. Measuring about 170 sq km, it is bound by the River Chenab in the west, and by the River Chandra Bhaga, or Ghag Nala in the east. Ferries in Saidpur, Gondal, Majwal and Gangwal areas connect it with the Sialkot sector. Being an open area in the plains, it is excellent for the conduct of swift, offensive manoeuvre warfare by the IA. However, for Pakistan, this area is indefensible by conventional means, as it is surrounded by India from three sides and back in December 1971, was captured by the IA’s 26 Infantry Division within a 48-hour period.

Thus far, since May 2008, three distinct patterns have been noticed with regard to the ways and means employed for covert infiltrations by groups of Pakistani ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists into northern Punjab, the Jammu plains and the Kashmir Valley: infiltration through riverine terrain and along the courses of the rivers and rivulets (nallahs) flowing through Punjab and Jammu; infiltration through underground tunnels dug beneath the WB; and the increasing use of China-made hexaCopters flying over the IB in both northern Punjab and southern Jammu for ferrying in weapons, explosives and narcotics stockpiles.

Infiltration Through Riverine Terrain

Though a large portion of the India-Pakistan border on the 553km Gurdaspur-Jammu sector is fenced, there are several gaps caused by the Ravi River and season rivulets that cut into the IB and WB. Gurdaspur shares a long, zig-zagging border with Pakistan. It is easy to infiltrate from this stretch as compared to the heavily-mined, fenced and guarded LoC. A dense fog in winters makes border surveillance an added challenge. As the border terrain is broken and forested, the rivulet beds provide an ideal cover for terrorists who can sneak in and reach the busy NH-44 highway that snakes along the border. This enables terrorists to hijack vehicles and mount rapid strikes. There are many gaps in the fencing on this stretch because of rivers flowing in and out of India. For example, the Ujjh River enters and exits many times on this stretch. Some of the gaps are as wide as 30 feet. It is not difficult to cross this stretch as the rivers are shallow (with water reaching just above the knee) and large parts of the riverbed are dry. In addition, large gaps due to monsoon floods disrupt the availability of the electrified fencing, which runs along the IB and WB in Punjab and Jammu. Hundreds of metres of fence come down every year and the Sarkanda grass, which springs up after the rains provides infiltrators plenty of cover. In Jammu, the entire Kathua district is profusely drained by numerous ephemeral and small perennial streams, which originate from northern mountainous region and are flowing in a southwestern direction. The perennial River Ravi that is a sub-basin to Indus River along with its tributaries viz Ujjh, Tarnah, Sewa and Bein drains the district. Apart from the major drainage systems, there are a number of seasonal streams (khads) traversing the whole district. They carry huge loads of boulders, pebbles, sand and silt during monsoon. They also generate flash floods immediately after rains, causing extensive damage downstream.

Instances of terror-attacks staged after riverine infiltrations included the terror-attack on the family quarters in the cantonment at Kali Mandi in Samba on May 11, 2008 in which left six people, including a photojournalist, two army jawans and two women dead; the September 26, 2013 terror-attack at 6.45am by a three-man JeM ‘Fidayeen’ squad of the Jaish-e-Mohammad’s (JeM) Shohada Brigade on the Hiranagar Police Station barely 7km from the WB, after the terrorists had commandeered a truck and took to the Pathankot-Jammu Highway and then they opened fire in Samba town against the IA’s 16 Cavalry Regiment in the Mesar area of the Samba-based 168 Infantry Brigade; the attack by a six-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad on December 5, 2014 on the IA’s 12 Brigade HQ at Mohura, Uri; an attack by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team on March 20, 2015 on Rajbagh Police Station police in Jammu’s Kathua district, with the recoveries including two AK-47 SLRs (one of them fitted with UBGL), two daggers; 13 hand-grenades; one China-made Star pistol, two UBGL rounds, 12 AK magazines, and one water-floating bag (used for infiltrating via riverine areas after crawling through an 80-metre-long tunnel under farmlands to cross the WB; a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team striking for the second time in as many days on March 21, 2015 on an IA camp in the Meshwara area of Samba around 5:50am; the July 27, 2015 attack by three ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on a bus and then attacking the Dina Nagar Police Station in Punjab’s Gurdaspur district; the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on January 2, 2016 at the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Pathankot air base in Punjab’s Pathankot dfistrict; the attack on September 18, 2016 by four JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on the IA’s 12 Brigade in Uri sector on September 18, 2016 in which 19 IA soldiers (15 from 6 Bihar Battalion and three from 10 Dogra battalion) lost their lives; the attack on November 26, 2016 by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists (four local Kashmiri JeM members, namely Mohd. Ashiq Baba alias Mohd. Ashaq, Syed Munir-Ul-Hassan Qadri, Tariq Ahmad Dar and Ashraf Hamid Khandey, had facilitated a group of three heavily armed Pakistani terrorists—Khalid alias Abu Hissam, Numan and Aadil--and transported them from the WB in the Samba-Kathua sector to Hotel Jagdamba in Jammu and subsequently to Nagrota in their vehicles) on the IA’s 166 Medium Regiment at Nagrota; and the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ Terrorists on February 10, 2018 on the sprawling camp of the 36 Brigade of the IA’s Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry before dawn at Sunjwan in Jammu.

Of these, irrefutable forensic evidence of JeM-perpetrated terror-attacks has been garnered from only the July 27, 2015 and January 2, 2016 terror-attacks. Regarding the former, data shared by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) under the auspices of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) has revealed that the ‘Fidayeen’ unit had been stationed in the town of Gharota (in Shakargarh), facing Bamiyal. Forensic analysis by the FBI of the Garmin GPS navigation locator device used by the terrorists showed that the device was first fed with data on July 21, 2015 at Sargodha, a town 94km from Faisalabad. The data also showed that the terrorists had departed from a safe-house on the fringes of Gharota. On the intervening night of July 26 and 27, they penetrated the IB near Alowal where the Ravi River makes a series of sweeping bends and then, travelling due east, they crossed a tributary of the Ravi River and reached Bamiyal town. From there, they caught an early morning bus that took them to the NH-1A highway, which links Punjab with J & K and on to Hiranagar, passing several Punjab State Police checkpoints along the way and eventually arrived at Dinanagar town, which is just 12km from the IB, 25km from Jammu and 235km from Chandigarh. Dinanagar is also on the 1,526km-long NH-15 that connects Pathankot in the north and Samakhiali in Gujarat. The retrieved pre-programmed GPS waypoint navigation data revealed that the terrorists had three targets. The first was the Dinanagar-Pathankot railway track on which five IEDs were subsequently found strapped. Dinanagar Police Station, where the encounters took place resulting in the terrorists being killed, was the second on the hit list. The terrorists were expected to eventually proceed to the high-profile targets of bungalows of the District Magistrate and the SP in the Civil Lines area of the town for what could have been a deadly climax. India had approached the FBI to help identify the Night Vision Device (NVD) used by the three terrorists.

The JeM terrorists who struck at the air base in Pathankot in the early hours of January 2, 2016 had entered the defence installation during the afternoon of January 1 and had spoken in Multani dialect, commonly used in the districts of Multan, Lodhran and Bahawalpur in southern Punjab region of Pakistan. Items recovered included a China-made wireless set similar to the one recovered from Rajbagh Police Station on March 21, 2015, and US Army-issued binoculars. The FBI supplied the cellphone call details of two numbers: 92-3017775253 and 92-3000597212. One of the first calls made by the terrorists to 92-3000597212 was at 9.12pm on December 31, 2015 from a location near the air base. In all, the FBI handed over evidence, comprising more than 1,000 pages of chats and conversations between the JeM’s handler Kashif Jaan and the four ‘Fidayeen’ who were eventually killed (identified as Nasir Hussain from Punjab, Abu Bakar from Gujranwala and Umar Farooq and Abdul Qayum from Sindh). The documents also included Kashif Jaan’s conversations with other Pakistan-based JeM office-bearers, apart from other exchanges over a period of time. Apart from chats on WhatsApp and other platforms, Jaan was using a Facebook account connected to the same mobile number that the attackers had called from Pathankot after abducting Punjab police SP Salwinder Singh. The terrorists had also called another number in Pakistan connected to a Facebook account of ‘Mulla Daadullah’. These accounts, operated by Jaan, were accessed before and around the time of the terror-attack using IP addresses of Pakistan-based telecommunications service-providers (Telenor and Pakistan TeleCommunications Company Ltd). These Facebook pages also contained jihadi material and videos and comments condemning the arrest of JeM cadres in Pakistan. The terrorists had also called numbers connected to Al-Rahmat Trust—the JeM’s financial arm.

Infiltrations Via Tunnels Dug Beneath WB

As far as infiltrations using tunnels dug beneath the WB go, the first such tunnel was uncovered on July 28, 2012 by the Border Security Force (BSF), which was constructed about 25 feet deep in the Samba sector. It was detected after an area caved-in near the border fencing. It had been dug out between two sides along the WB on India’s Chillayari BoP and Pakistan’s Lumberiyal BoP. It had air-supply through a 2-inch pipe. The tunnel was discovered accidentally by a farmer of Chachwal village on the evening of July 27 while working in his fields, when he saw the land sunk at three straight points due to monsoon rains. A joint team of the Geological Survey of India (GSI) and BSF later unearthed a total length of about 540 metres of the tunnel dug into the Indian side from the Zero Line (where the boundary pillars lie) and reportedly found its exit point about 500 metres short of Chechwal. On May 2014, the BSF found a caved-in portion of another tunnel in Chillyari border belt in Samba district, which was found 23 metres inside Indian territory. On August 2014, a tunnel, which was approximately 130 to 150 metres in length along the WB and had originated on the Pakistan side, was discovered in Jammu’s Pallanwala sector. On March 4, 2016, a 10 feet-deep tunnel was found concealed by elephant grass (Sarkanda) in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector near Allah Mai De Kothey BoP. On February 13, 2017, a tunnel dug underneath the WB was discovered in the Ramgarh sector. On September 30, 2017, the BSF unearthed a 14-feet-long tunnel in the Arnia sector of Jammu. The unfinished tunnel approximately had a length of 14 metres, height of three feet and two-and-a-half-feet width on the slope of bank at Dhamalla nulla (stream) ahead of the border fence. Items recovered from the location included a US-made compass, two magazines, 60 rounds of ammunition, a hand-grenade, and other items and most of these items were carrying the marking of Pakistan. On July 13, 2018, a 30-metre-long tunnel was uncovered BSF in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector of Jammu district. The tunnel was approximately 10 feet below the ground and had a length of 30 metres. Five JeM operatives, including the perpetrators of the February 14, 2019 Pulwama terror-attack, had crossed over to India in April 2018 using this tunnel. On August 27, 2020, the BSF detected the latest trans-border tunnel in the Samba sector’s Basantar area. The approximately 20 feet-long and three-four feet wide tunnel was 25 feet underground. Pakistan-made sandbags with Shakargarh/Karachi written were also found at the mouth of the tunnel to hide it. The place of opening of the tunnel was around 170 metres from the WB towards the Indian side in the field of a local farmer. A BSF patrol had detected the tunnel 50 metres from the border fence on the Indian side. The nearest Pakistani BoP is about 400 metres from the tunnel.

Terror-attacks staged by ‘Fidayeens’ who had entered India through such tunnels included the attack by two terrorists on October 3, 2016 on two adjoining camps of the IA’s 46 Rashtriya Rifles and the BSF’s 40 Battalion at Baramulla, following which a A GPS navigation locator and a compass were recovered from the slain terrorists; an attack on April 27, 2017 by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against an IA garrison at Panjgaon of Chowkibal in Kupwara district; an attack on August 26, 2017 by a three-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against the District Police Lines in Pulwama district; an attack on the Lethpora CRPF camp in South Kashmir’s Pampore village in Pulwama district on December 30, 2017, in which four JeM terrorists—two of them Pakistanis—were killed during the 36-hour-long gunfight along with locals Manzoor Ahmad Baba, and Fardeen Ahmad Khanday; the attack on a BSF camp outside Srinagar Airport on July 13, 2018 (a similar attempt by three JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists was thwarted by the security forces on October 3, 2017; the August 2018 attack by three JeM Fidayeen members on the J & K Police Station in Pulwama.

These terror-squads were all transported to the hinterland of J & K UT by local facilitators using their own vehicles. However, quite a few of them were successfully intercepted as well. For instance, on September 13, 2018three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ who had crossed the WB via Tarnah Nallah and were picked up in Samba were killed in an encounter in Reasi district a day after they fired on a Police party and escaped. After several hours of gunfire, the three men were neutralised. The forces attempted to capture the third terrorist alive, but he was killed too. Truck driver Riaz Ahmed of Pulwama district and his helper Mohmmad Iqbal of Budgam, who were arrested when the three terrorists were intercepted at the Domail-Jhajjar Kotli highway belt, later admitted that they had helped the JeM five times in the past when it came to smuggling Fidayeen squads inside trucks. A cordon-and-search operation (CASO) to track down the JeM terrorists was launched in the Jhajjar-Kotli forest belt in Reasi district after the firefight with the Police. It was late on the night of September 12 when an informant informed the local Military Intelligence (MI) unit that the terrorists were possibly inside a house in Tirthi village. The two to three houses that are part of Ward No.6 in Tirthi belong to people from a minority community. What raised suspicion was the crying and unusual noises coming from the houses. The local MI unit assessed the input and advised contacting a nearby security forces (SF) column, which issued the CASO. The SF team nearest the house was contacted and shown a path to the exact two-three houses. Once the security team crossed a narrow nallah and started moving towards the houses, terrorists from one of the houses started firing at the SF party. It was later discovered that the terrorists who were on the move forcefully took refuge in a house owned by Ishwar Dass, a former serviceman in Ward No.5 of Jhajjar Kotli. The terrorists came at around 8pm demanding clothes to change from their combat dress. They also demanded food and water and left around 9.10pm. They soon moved to another residence in Ward No.6. According to MI, a group of four to five terrorists had infiltrated past the Lam-based Battalion of the IA’s 80 Infantry Brigade in Naushera on the night of September 2. The group travelled in a vehicle till the outskirts of Naushera. On September 4, 2018 they were sighted by some school students at Langar, after which a search operation was launched by J & K Police and the IA. Once the terrorists were detected, they ran out of options and cancelled their plan to head towards Naushera city. In order to avoid being detected, they moved along Jambhir Nallah and reached Bareri. Five days before the encounter they were spotted and another search operation was swiftly launched following inputs of suspicious movement in Bareri. It is most likely that the group had considered travelling to Lamberi in a vehicle. On September 9, 2018 the group was reported to be in Lamberi and was waiting for the guide to take them up to Mohar. The exact location of the group was reported by human intelligence (HUMINT) and another search operation was launched. During the search, the group got split into two sub-groups. One of these sub-groups comprising two terrorists with a cellphone was able to escape the cordon, leaving behind a sub-group of three that had no cellphone, but radio sets. The cordon was lifted by the evening of September 10. Security forces put up stops at roads leading towards Kalakot and Naushera. An urgent assessment was conducted as it was suspected that by this time the group had started moving towards Nihari Tawi River. However, it is believed that the group of three had left the place by then. Based on an intercept received, it was assessed that the sub-group would have boarded a vehicle for Jammu. Another intercept suggests that they were instructed to move towards the IA’s 10 Infantry Division HQ. After reaching Jammu on January 12 morning, the group boarded a civil truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476 and paid Rs.20,000 to the driver to ferry the armed men ahead. The group was next sighted at a Dhaba. The truck was subsequently intercepted at a ‘Nakka’ near Jhajjar Kotli, which finally led to the terrorists’ being slain. But the J & K Police gave another assessment. According to it, the infiltration took place on the night of September 11 between Kathua and Samba. The terrorists reached the National Highway near Chal Dayala and were picked up by a truck. On September 12 at about 8am in the morning a J & K Police party signalled a truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476, which was on its way from Jammu to Srinagar, to stop. The three terrorists who were boarding the truck opened fire. The truck driver was the brother to one of the dead terrorists and was an OGW himself. The truck took them ahead as a new bus driver and conductor took over the vehicle near the Bann Toll Plaza. Then they stopped at Jhajjar-Kotli to have breakfast when a J & K Police cop came to check the truck as part of a routine practice. The terrorists panicked, opened fire and fled the spot. Security forces then used drones and helicopters during the operation to track the three JeM terrorists who were between the ages of 18 and 22 years.

On September 12, 2019 four AK-56 and two AK-47 rifles along with six magazines and 180 live rounds were seized after the J & K Police intercepted a truck at 8am on the Jammu-Pathankot Highway near the Punjab-J & K border in Lakhanpur and arrested three residents (who belong to Pulwama and Budgam districts) of J & K. The truck was on its way to Kashmir from Bamiyal.

On January 31, 2020 three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ had entered from the WB in Hiragnagar in Kathua district 56km east of Jammu and were on their way to the Kashmir Valley by hiding inside an L-shaped cavity of a truck (JK-03F-1478) laden with goods. They were caught at the Bann Toll Plaza at Nagrota and were carrying one Colt M-4 carbine, AK-47 assault rifles, armour-piercing steel core ammunition, IEDs, grenades, pistols, satellite phone, wireless communication system, and a GPS navigation locator. The J & K Police nabbed Sameer Ahmed Dar alive from the encounter site. He is the cousin of the February 2019 Pulwama suicide-bomber Adil Dar. He had managed to establish links with the JeM on WhatsApp by using a virtual private network (VPN) that allows users to circumvent internet censorship to secure connections to the sites an individual wishes to access. It was through WhatsApp that Sameer was directed by the JeM in Pakistan. Sameer is a Master in Geology from Kashmir University. On receipt of the message from JeM, Sameer took his two aides in a truck to Basantar Nallah in Samba sector on the intervening night of January 30-31. He waited at a pre-decided pick-up point and moved towards the Valley after receiving the three JeM terrorists. In December 2019 Sameer had transported a group of three JeM terrorists. An OGW, Shoaib Wani from Karimabad in Pulwama had received those terrorists. One of the three was killed in Pari Tral area of Awantipora along with Qari Yasir. His truck was used to do a legal business transaction like transporting fruits. In December, the truck went to Delhi carrying an apple consignment and on return carried back pomegranates. As soon as Sameer entered Punjab, he used his WhatsApp freely. This is when the GPS coordinates were shared. In December, with no access to the internet, the plotting was done in Punjab. On return, the terror module would use Google Maps. On dropping the consignment of pomegranates, Sameer picked up large packets of wall-putty. This was used to camouflage the presence of the JeM terrorists inside the cavity of the truck. Towards January-end, the same modus operandi was used. The truck went to Jaipur in Rajasthan and on return, came near the WB.

Infiltrations By HexaCopters

The usage of HexaCopters began last year following the Khalistan Zindabad Force’s (KZF) Pakistan-based chief Ranjeet Singh alias Neeta and his Germany-based associate Gurmeet Singh alias Bagga conducting nearly a dozen supply sorties. On March 11, 2019 the BSF shot down a HexaCopter in the Fazilka sector. One drone was recovered on August 13, 2019 and it was a crashed HexaCopter carrying 21kg payload in Mohawa village of Amritsar district—a mere 1.5km from the IB. The drone model U10 KV100-U, and it had been designed and manufactured by China-based T Motors. The airframe of the drone was called TAROT 680 PRO. Four brick-sized batteries (model Tattu-Made in China) were also found installed in the Hexacopter. Another HexaCopter (out of three) was seized in the burnt condition in September from Jhabal town in Tarn Taran. They were used for ferrying in five AK-47s (along with 16 magazines and 472 rounds of ammunition), four China-made .30 bore ‘Star’ Pistols (along with eight magazines and 72 rounds of ammunition), nine hand-grenades, five Thuraya satellite phones along with their ancillary equipment, two cellphones, two wireless sets and FICN with face-value of Rs.10 lakh—all of which were air-dropped in Rajoke. Between September 9 and 16, 2019 HexaCopters were used for ferrying almost 100kg of arms and ammunition into Punjab. The foreign handlers, Gurmeet Bagga of Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), and his terrorist associates based in Pakistan, including KZF chief Ranjeet Singh Neeta, who were handling the Indian Punjab-based Akashdeep terror module, had informed Akashdeep and his associates about the crashing of this drone inside Indian territory. They had also shared the coordinates of the crash landing site and further directed Akashdeep to go to the crash site and destroy the drone by burning lest the Punjab Police came to know about it.

On September 22, 2019, the Punjab State Police successfully wound-up the India-based module of this operation, which was active in the Husseiniwallah, Tarn Taran, Ajnala, Fazilka and Khem Karan areas of Punjab. The HexaCopters with 10kg payloads had been flown for almost 7km from their launch-pads at a height of 2,000 feet to deliver their payloads. On both October 7 and 8, 2019 a HexaCopter originating from Pakistan was detected flying over two villages in the Hussainiwala area of Punjab. On October 10, 2019, HexaCopters were cited in two locations in Punjab. The first sighting was reported in Hazarasingh Wala village at 7:20am and later in Tendiwala village at 10:10pm. On January 27, 2020, a HexaCopter flown from Pakistan was shot down by the BSF in Arnia sector, while on June 20, 2020, BSF troops shot down a HexaCopter carrying one M-4 carbine, two loaded magazines (60 rounds), and seven China-irigin hand-grenades near the WB in Jammu’s Kathua district. The HexaCopter was spotted hovering in the vicinity of BoP Pansar around 5.10am by a BSF patrol party, which then shot it down 250 metres inside Indian territory.

One of the major India-based narco-terrorism modules, headed by former IA Naik Rahul Chauhan, was involved in carting 75kg of pure heroin and at least seven pistols between November and December 2019. The module, operating from the Jat Regiment Centre in Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly, was busted on January 9, 2020. According to Chauhan’s interrogation report, a Pakistani national named Waqar got in touch with him when he was running surveillance drones for the IA in the Naushera sector in July-August 2019. Chauhan was later contacted by another source, identified as Choudhary, over a WhatsApp call from a Germany-based number, and a meeting was set up with Choudhary’s associate in Ambala. During interrogation, Chauhan admitted to operating drones from the border villages of Dhanoa Khurd and Mulaekot to pick up heroin and pistols from Pakistan. He used three drones purchased from Chandini Chowk (Delhi), Ghaziabad and Pune, and made cross-border sorties at the height of 1,200 feet on November 27 and 30, and then on December 8, 9 and 17, 2019. These sorties were made from border villages between 3am and 4am to avoid detection, and the distance covered from the launch area to the pick-up point in Pakistan was between 2.2km and 2.8km, with flying times generally between 14 and 18 minutes. Data gathered from the captured drones showed that the last flight on December 19 was 26 minutes, 54 seconds long. Further investigation revealed that the money used to buy the drones was provided by convicted drug smuggler Lakhwinder Singh (in Amristar Jail since September 2019), and his associates Ajaypal and Dharminder.

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