Since last year, the Indian Army has been monitoring the following launch-pads used by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate its ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments into Jammu & Kashmir: from Bhimber Gali towards Shopian and Anantnag; from Lipa towards Baramula; from Jura towards Sopore; from Athmuqam towards Kupwara; from Dudhnial, Tejian, Shardi, Rattapani and Kel towards Machhal; and from Saonar and Sardari towards Kupwara and Sopore.
The base camps or sanctuaries for the ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments are located further into the rear within PoK and Khyber Paktunkhwa, as shown in the slide below.
(Above) Launch-Pads Destroyed at Athmuqam, Dudhnial, Chalhana and Leepa
However, for retaining the element of surprise and initiative, an elaborate deception plan involving the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF) was required. For, to be factored in was the high state of the operational readiness at that time of both the Pakistan Army (PA) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) throughout the LoC. Following the meeting of India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) on September 21, and another meeting between the Indian PM and the two armed services chiefs on September 24, a deception plan jointly prepared by the IA’s Udhampur-based HQ Northern Command and the IAF’s Delhi-based HQ Western Command was put into effect.
Pakistan ISPR’s Counter-Narrative
When news of the IA’s cross-LoC raids reached the PA’s GHQ in Rawalpindi by 4.30am on January 29, it was wrongly assumed by GHQ that these raids took place only in the PA’s Bhimber and Tatta Pani sectors inside PoK, this being an indication of the successes of the IA’s and IAF’s diversionary tactics. Within the hour, the Pakistani Prime Minister and the PA’s Chief of the Army Staff were told about these raids as well, following which it was decided to contact US Secretary of State John Kerry. In the US, the matter was referred by Kerry to US NSA Dr Susan Rice, who in turn contacted her Indian counterpart Ajit Doval and sought clarifications. Upon receiving the necessary details, clarifications and assurances (that were repeated later in the day at a press-conference by the IA’s DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh), Dr Rice reverted back to Islamabad with the India-supplied updates.
The GHQ then went into a huddle to decide its next course of action. Retaliatory cross-LoC raids were immediately ruled out, since if they were to be conducted, then the PA would have been required to admit that a cross-LoC raid had been mounted by the IA, which in turn would have meant that there indeed were unacknowledged sanctuaries within PoK for accommodating both terrorists and irregular active combatants from proscribed ‘tanzeems’. Consequently, the GHQ decided on an elaborate counter-narrative based on outright denial.
This then led to the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) organising a press-trip to only those two sectors (Bhimber and Tatta Pani) where the IA had resorted to only cross-LoC shelling.
On October 1, the press-corps from Islamabad was helilifted first to the Bhimber helipad and from there another Mi-171 ferried the press-corps first to Baghsar, and then to Mandhole village in the PA’s Tatta Pani sector, where it was revealed that the IA’s Sepoy Chandu Babulal Chavan of 37 Rashtriya Rifles was being kept under detention at the Garrison HQ at Nakyal.
So what comes next? It will be logical to assume that before the onset of winter, the Pakistan Army (PA) will try its level-best to facilitate the infiltration of several ‘sarkari jihadis’ into the Kashmir Valley through multiple infiltration routes along the LoC and even through the ‘Working Boundary’ or WB (i.e. Pakistan’s international border with Jammu that includes the Chicken’s Neck area and which India insists is part of the International Boundary or IB and therefore should not be referred to as the WB) under the cover of deliberate field artillery skirmishes. India, on the other hand, by officially stating that it considers the whole of PoK as an integral part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K), has therefore declared that she will regard any Pakistani support/facilitation for armed insurrection by its ‘sarkari jihadis’ inside J & K who have been launched from their sanctuaries inside PoK as a direct and deliberate act-of-war. Consequently, India therefore has signalled her determination to not only target such sanctuaries through repetitive, preventive cross-LoC special operations, but more significantly, has for all intents and purposes declared her intent to climb the escalatory ladder both horizontally (by expanding the lateral frontage required for offensive ground operations) and vertically by bringing in offensive airpower (like the Jaguar IS armed with CBU-105 SFW) to target all PA field artillery gun emplacement sites, regardless of whether they are located within PoK or to the west of the WB in the northeaster portion of Pakistan’s Punjab state.
This explains the PA’s initiation of mortar fire against Nowshera's Salal and Baba Khor areas Akhnoor's Pallanwalla area and in the Balnoie area of Mendhar sector on September 27, followed by the Sabzian area in Poonch on September 28, 2016. Concurrently, India on September 27started the process of evacuating nearly 1,000 villages in the six border districts of Punjab state that are within 10km of the India-Pakistan international boundary (around the Shakargarh Salient)—these being the districts of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Fazilka and Ferozepur. In addition, as a defensive measure the Indian Army (IA) has begun laying anti-tank mines along the Shakargarh Salient and has also begun deploying medium field artillery regiments on both flanks of the Uri-Poonch Bulge as well as around the Shakargarh Salient and Chicken’s Neck area. Through this action, India is signalling that while it has no intention of unleashing its Strike Corps through the IB, she retains the option of unleashing the unrestricted use of her offensive airpower and the IA’s combined armoured and mechanised warfare formations (integrated battle groups) ably supported by field artillery fire-assaults inside both PoK and the Chicken’s Neck area in order to compel the PA to acknowledge that there’s no such thing as a WB and thus its sanctity should be accepted and respected in the same way as the IB.
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To further drive home this point, the Indian Air Force (IAF), barely a week after concluding its annual ‘Talon’ series of air exercises (which are normally held at the same time as the Pakistan Air Force’s annual Highmark series of annual air exercises), activated all 18 of the principal and subordinate air bases of the Western Air Command and Southwestern Air Command on September 26, and began a four-day wargaming exercise that included synchronised air dominance, battlefield air-interdiction and tactical air-interdiction sorties being flown in support of areas of responsibility of the IA’s Southwestern Command (HQed Jaipur, Rajasthan), Western Command (HQed Chandimandir, Chandigarh) and Northern Command (HQed in Udhampur, J & K). Incidentally, the Pakistan Air Force’s EX Highmark had concluded on September 24.
IB, WB, LoC Explained
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The State of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) has 734km of LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to Punjab belt running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts.The International Boundary (IB) between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The Working Boundary (WB) spans 202km, the Line of Control (LoC) spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the AGPL— from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the west bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot), which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that is known in India as the International Boundary (IB), while Pakistan refers to it as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement (the so-called standstill agreement) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan. Given the fact that India maintains a near-foolproof anti-infiltration grid along the LoC, Pakistan has since mid-2013 focussed its terrorist infiltration efforts along the WB.Shakargarh bulge (which is Pakistani territory) is running adjoining the IB, is 45km x 45km, and is held by the PA. The bulge joins Indian territory with a 40km distance in between both countries and touches India’s National Highway-1, which is the lifeline of the entire Kashmir Valley. If PA troops manage to get effectively operational in three to four days at the tip of the bulge, the NH-1 could be cut of totally, rendering the entire north of India paralysed, as all supplies and winter stocking in the Valley is done by this route, for Indian troops.
On paper, to the north, those PA battle formations that are LoC-specific and Chicken’s Neck-specific are the Mangla-based I Corps that comprises the Gujranwala-based 6 Armoured Division, Kharian-based 17 Infantry Division and the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division also in Kharian; and the Rawalpindi-based X Corps that includes the Gilgit-based Force Command Northern Areas, Murree-based 12 Infantry Division, Mangla-based 19 Infantry Division and the Jhelum-based 23 Infantry Division, Formations allocated for operations along the Shakargarh Salient are the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps comprising the Sialkot-based 8 Infantry Division and 15 Infantry Division; and the Multan-based II Corps made up of the Multan-based 1 Armoured Division, and the Okara-based 14 Infantry Division and 40 Infantry Division. Thus far, no significant forward deployments of any of these formations have taken place.
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Down south, the battle formations arrayed against Rajasthan include the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps with its 26 Mechanised Division and 35 Infantry Division; and the Karachi-based V Corps with its Pano Aqil-based 16 Infantry Division, Hyderabad-based 18 Infantry Division and Malir-based 25 Mechanised Division. So far, only some elements of the 25 and 26 Mechanised Divisions have been deployed opposite an area stretching from Jaisalmer to Fort Abbas and the PA has begun flying relentless sorties of its Shahpar (CH-3) tactical UAVs that were acquired from China’s CATIC in 2012. This is probably a precautionary measure aimed at monitoring the IA’s upcoming Division-level armoured/mechanised infantry exercises that are annually held during wintertime.
The PA, however, is most unlikely to attempt any form of escalation along either the LoC or the WB since it presently has a deployment ratio of 54.6%, while the resting and re-equipping ratio is 12.7%, and the remaining 33% is undergoing the training cycle. This trend will continue for at least another four years, since the defunct Durand Line too became active from mid-2014. It may be recalled that since March 2002, the PA has been forced by elements that later on went on to become the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by 2006 to wage a three-front war against the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan (which also included Chechan and Uighur militants; against the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in the sensitive Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK (formerly NWFP) and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA; and, against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Swat Valley of KPK. The TTP’s cadre base is more than 20,000 tribesmen and the Abdullah Mehsud group from the Alizai clan of the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan commands about 5,000 fighters. Other militant groups within the TTP include Maulvi Nazir from the Kaka Khel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Waziri tribe (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur from the Ibrahim Khel clan of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe (North Waziristan), the Haqqani network using manpower from the Mezi sub-tribe of the Zadran tribe (North Waziristan), Mangal Bagh (Khyber), TNSM (Swat, Dir, Malakand), and Faqir Mohammad (Bajaur).
Some 35% of PA troops (about 180,000 out of an end-strength of approximately 550,000 active-duty personnel and another 500,000 reservists) were engaged in LIC campaigns since 2007 till 2014 and are still literally bogged down throughout the entire 27,200 square kilometres of FATA. Formations fully committed to on-LIC operations include the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division and 17 Ubfantry vDivision from Mangla-based I Corps in Swat, 19 Infantry Division from X Corps in northern Swat (based out of Jhelum), 7 Infantry Division from Rawalpindi-based X Corps in North Waziristan (based out of Mardan), 9 Infantry Division from Peshawar-based XI Corps in South Waziristan (based out of Kohat), 14 Division from Multan-based II Corps, Jhelum-based 23 Division of the X Corps, and 40 Infantry Division. The Gujranwala-based XXX Corps and the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps lent one brigade each. In all, there are approximately 17 infantry brigades or 45 infantry battalions, and 58 Frontier Corps (FC) wings now engaged in LIC operations. By mid-2011, 1,83,400 troops had a westward deployment orientation, while another 10,000 are now abroad on UN-related peacekeeping missions.
The five defensive holding Corps of the PA against the IB are: XXXI Corps (Bahawalpur) that has 18 Brigades of which six are to guard the border and now one of its Divisions and two Brigades out of these are in FATA; XXX Corps (Gujranwala) has four (14, 10, 54, 104) of out of its nine Brigades employed in FATA; X Corps (Rawalpindi) has a total 17 Brigades of which 13 Brigades should be deployed against the IB but now one of its of Divisions and five (1, 7, 26, 28, 333) Brigades are in FATA; V Corps (Karachi) has six out of its 10 Brigades for the IB of which one (105) is in FATA; and IV Corps (Lahore) has 17 Brigades out of which eight should be facing the IB but three of them (22, 105, 106) are in FATA. Given such an extensive deployment along the Durand Line in accordance with the PA’s ‘seize and hold’ force posture, the PA today is in no position to mount any credible offensive AirLand campaign against its Indian counterpart, and this will remain the ground reality at least till 2020. It is also therefore no wonder that the PA has between 2009 and 2013 been able to conduct only four field exercises under the Azm-E-Nau (New Resolve) series, with the last one being just a table-top exercise.
(To Be Concluded)