Back in the decade of the 1990s, it was the combination of India’s financial crisis in mid-1991, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) on December 25, 1991, that was responsible for the ouster of Afghanistan’s then President Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai (49) on April 15, 1992. Fast forward to today, one is looking at a vastly different geo-political and geo-economic landscape. India’s foreign exchange reservesincreased by US$889 million to a lifetime high of US$621.464 billion in the week ended August 6, 2021, while both Russia and Iran along with India have already outlined their grand ambitions about realising the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal transportation corridor for the purpose of promoting transportation cooperation among its member-states. This corridor connects India Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, and is then connected to Saint Petersburg and Northern Europe via Russia. The INSTC project was originally decided between India, Iran and Russia in the year 2000 in St Petersburg, and subsequently included 11 other Central Asian and West Asian countries: Azerbaijan Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman and Syria, with Bulgaria as an observer. It envisions a 7,200km-long multi-mode network of shipping, railway and road routes for transporting freight, aimed at reducing the carriage cost between India and Russia by about 30% and bringing down the transit time from 40 days by more than half. In addition, India wants Iran’s Chabahar Port to be included in the INSTC, and expand INSTC membership by including Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (which has welcomed this offer).
Consequently, it stands to reason that Russia, India, Iran and the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan not only develop strategic convergence, but also quickly move towards strategic coherence for the sake of decisively dealing with the on-going internal turmoil in Afghanistan. The following chain of events in chronological order explains what has been transpiring over the past two months.
Mid-July 2021:The National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA) is created in the Panjshir river-valley with the support of Ahmad Massoud, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Muhammad Nur.
Translation: First firm indication of the imminent collapse of Afghanistan’s national unity government led by President Ashraf Ghani.
July 28, 2021:Speaking in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe where he met his counterpart Sherali Mirzo, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that Russia will bolster Tajikistan’s military with weapons, equipment and training amid a “deteriorating” situation in neighbouring Afghanistan. He added that Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will hold joint military drills next week near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.
Translation: Russia did not buy all the assurances given by both the Taliban and Pakistan about the Taliban’s non-interference in the affairs of its immediate neighbouring countries.
August 17, 2021:Tao days after the bloodless takeover of Kabul by the Taliban, Afghan First Vice-President Amrullah Saleh—citing provisions of Afghanistan’s Constitution—declared himself the Acting President of Afghanistan from his base of operations in the Panjshir river-valley, and said that he would continue military operations against the Taliban from there.
Translation: First signalling by the NRFA to the international community about respecting and adhering to international laws and conventions, which clearly dictate that any new Afghan government that comes into existence through military coercion must not be internationally recognised.
August 17, 2021:Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi chaired a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS), which was attended by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, and India's Ambassador to Afghanistan Rudrendra Tandon, who returned to India on the same day.
Translation: India’s policy and posture WRT the new ground realities in Afghanistan are still in the evolutionary stages and hence a ‘wait-n-watch’ posture was adopted for the time-being.
August 24, 2021:The Kremlin stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the situation in Afghanistan in a phone-call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Both expressed the intention to enhance cooperation to counter the dissemination of “terrorist ideology” and the drug threat emanating from Afghanistan, and also agreed to establish a permanent channel for bilateral consultations on developments in Afghanistan.
Translation: By then, extensive parleys had been held by New Delhi, Teheran and Moscow regarding the future courses of action, especially on the need to militarily and financially support the NRFA, while also standing by for providing humanitarian assistance to an Afghanistan that had by then undergoing both economic and financial meltdown.
August 30, 2021:India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar welcomes the Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, Dr. Anwar Gargash, at Hyderabad House, New Delhi.
Translation: For the first time, the subject of the UAE Air Force’s A330 MRTTs providing aerial refuelling support to the Indian Air Force’s C-17A Globemaster-III transport aircraft while overflying Iraqi airspace (since Iran had refused such overflight permission for IAF aircraft) and en route to Ayni air base in Tajikistan was broached. The UAE agreed to provide such support.
September 3, 2021:China expressed its willingness to extend its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) into Afghanistan, saying that the “Taliban believes” that the initiative is good for development and prosperity in the war-ravaged country and the broader region.
Translation: Clearly sniffing a malicious Sino-Pakistan agenda, Moscow, Teheran and New Delhi agreed that this was clearly a move by China to make the INSTC irrelevant and consequently, began devising politico-military options aimed at ejecting the Taliban through military force throughout northeastern and northwestern Afghanistan.
September 4, 2021:Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General Lt Gen Faiz Hameed arrived at Kabul’s Serena Hotel.
Translation: He had a two-fold agenda: 1) Compelling the Taliban to officially extend support to the BRI and CPEC. 2) As a carrot, offer the Taliban the benefit of offensive airpower against the NRFA forces holed up throughout the Panjshir river-valley.
September 5, 2021:Both the Pakistan Army (PA) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) activated two static air-defence sites for housing both LY-80E LOMADS and FM-90A SHORADS in Rawalkot and Kotli near the LoC in PoJK. At the same time, the forward air bases at Dalbandin and Shamsi were also activated that day.
Translation: These were pre-emptive precautionary measures aimed at deterring the IAF’s Rafale M-MRCAs and Su-30MKIs from interfering with the PA’s air-to-ground strikes, which were planned for execution on the following day. While Dalbandin was used to ferry members of the Quetta Shura to Kandahar, Shamsi has been/is being used as the ammunition storage warehouse for the Taliban combatants.
September 6, 2021:National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan's leader Ahmad Massoud claimed in the early hours that Pakistani armed drones were launching precision-guided munitions in the Panjshir river-valley and helping the Taliban to crush the armed resistance. Later that day, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Saeed Khatibzadeh stated: "We would like to inform our friends, and those who might make the strategic error of entering Afghanistan with different intentions, that Afghanistan is not a country which accepts the enemy or an aggressor on its soil. I strongly warn that all red lines and obligations under international law must be observed. Iran is closely following developments in Afghanistan. Iran considers inter-Afghan talks as the only solution to Afghanistan problem."In the afternoon, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said that the group “desires to join the CPEC”. Mujahid also confirmed an upcoming meeting between Lt Gen Faiz Hameed and Taliban senior leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. After sunset, PM Modi chaired a three-hour meeting of the CCNS in which Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, EAM S Jaishankar, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Bipin Rawat and NSA Ajit Doval. The agenda for discussion was the ongoing situation in Afghanistan and India's future course of action in this regard.
Translation: A synchronised military option involving India and Russia was formally given the go-ahead, with the Indian Army and IAF being given the green-light for expediting their respective taskings.
September 7, 2021:Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Gen Nikolay Patrushev began a two-day visit to India on September 7, 2021 to hold extensive talks with NSA Ajit Doval on the situation in Afghanistan, following its military takeover by the Taliban. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said that Patrushev is expected to call on PM Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. Patrushev is visiting India at the invitation of NSA Doval for high-level India-Russia inter-governmental consultations on Afghanistan.
Translation: Finishing touches were given to the joint Russia-India effort to militarily shore up the NRFA while concurrently finalising details of an announcement regarding the formal recognition to the Afghan government led by Acting President Amrullah Saleh, while denying recognition to any Taliban-instituted interim government for as long as the Taliban’s leaders remain sanctioned by the UNSC.
Translation: Such funds will be utilised for procuring weapons from Russia, Serbia and Bulgaria for use by the NRFA, and for storage at Ayni air base in Tajikistan and possibly Termez Airport in Uzbekistan. In addition, Russia, India and Iran will financially contribute towards the MRO requirements of all those Afghan Air Force Mi-17s and Mi-25s that had escaped to Termez Airport in Uzbekistan, and towards the upkeep of the Afghan special operations force personnel who were trained by the US and the UK for conducting irregular warfare against the Taliban since 2007 and the bulk of whom have either joined the NRFA or were evacuated by air by the US and UK between August 16 and 31. It may be recalled that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had begun raising and fully funding four Counter-Terrorist Pursuit Teams, institutionalised with the acronym CTPT, since 2007. By 2010, this force numbered 3,000. Their mission was to hunt and kill “terrorists.” In 2015, the CIA helped its Afghan counterpart, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), to take command and control of these units for targetting combatants aligned with the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (IS-WK) who were active in the Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan. The four units numbered NDS-01, NDS-02, NDS-03 and NDS-04, with each having a regional area of operation: NDS-01 operated in the Central Region, NDS-02 in the Eastern Region, NDS-03 in the Southern Region, and NDS-04 in the North. All of them existed in a regulative twilight zone and each of the four units had 1,200 combatants. The UK on the other hand raised two units since late 2001—Unit 333 and Unit 444.
Meanwhile, matters are clearly not going well at all for China’s PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF) along the LAC. This has prompted a frustrated President Xi Jinping, 68, to appoint Gen Wang Haijiang, 58, as the new Commander of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command (WTC). He had earlier served as Commander of the Tibet Military District (TMD) since December 2019. Earlier, he also served in a number of positions, including Deputy Commander South Xinjiang Military District. Gen Wang is the fourth commander to head the WTC since the eastern Ladakh standoff began in May 2020. Xi in July 2021 had promoted Gen Xu Qiling, 59, to head the PLA’s WTC. Gen Xu was the third General to head the WTC after the Ladakh tensions began in May 2020. Earlier Gen Zhang Xudong was appointed on December 19, 2020 to head the WTC, replacing 65-year-old Gen Zhao Zongqi who retired from the PLA. In fact, a deeply worried Xi, who is also Chairman of the Central Military Commission, visited Lhasa on July 22 and 23 after a gap of ten years (he had visited Tibet as Vice-President in 2011) to find out for himself why the Tibetan natives were not joining the PLAGF’s combat branches in larger numbers, choosing instead to opt for recruitment in the People’s Armed Police and non-combat military branches like the Medical Corps. While in Lhasa, Xi met the PLA’s top brass of TMD as well as their Chengdu-based WTC leadership, both of whom have not even succeeded in hiring local Tibetan porters.