Over the past 12 months, several new permanent structures have been constructed and commissioned by the PLAAF, PLAGF and PLARF throughout the South Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts, the most notable of which are highlighted below.
New Underground Facilities for TBM Storage in South Xinjiang
New Permanent PLA-BDR Garrison Quarters in Depsang Plain
PLAGF Tactical Observation & EW Post in Depsang Plains
TMD's New Underground Facilities South of Demchok
TMD's New Underground Facilities for TBM Storage at Zanda, Opposite Himachal Pradesh & Uttarakhand
Civilian Heliport & Logistics Warehouses in Lhasa
PLAGF 85 Air-Defence Brigade MR-SAM & SHORADS Training Centre at Lhasa
PLAGF 85 Field Artillery Brigade Training Areas in LhasaPLAGF Changda Combat Engineering Training Area in Lhasa
PLAGF MBT Training Area & Heliport in Lhasa
TMD's 15 Engineer Brigade at Lhasa
PLAGF Motor-Pool in Lhasa
PLAGF Motor-Pool Training GroundsTMD's New UAS Air Base at Tsolung, Lhasa The logistics infrastructure accretions at Gyantse, Shannan, Tsetang, Bangda and Linzhi are dedicated for the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh sectors and are detailed below.
PLAAF LR-SAM Site at Gyantse
PLAGF Logistics Depot at GyantsePLAGF Underground Facility for TBM Storage at Gyantse TMD's New Underground Facility & PLAGF Motor-Pool Facility at ShannanTMD's New Underground Facility & Technical Support Facility in TsetangTMD's New Underground Facility for TBM Storage at Tsetang Underground Facilities for TBM Storage & LR-SAM Site at Bangda
Linzhi Armaments Depots & LR-SAM Site
The PLAGF has also constructed a number of new facilities to the northeast and east of Sikkim, as detailed below.
PLAGF Armaments Storage Base East of Jelep LaPLAGF Gunpits East of Lachung
PLAGF Gunpits in Chakung
PLAGF Helipads in Chakung PLAGF Gunpits near Nathu La
PLAGF Logistics Warehouse at Dromo
Composition of PLAGF High-Mobility Light Mechanised Infantry Brigade
Analysis of the varied kinds of electronic force-multipliers fielded by the PLAGF since 2017 (shown below) indicates that the PLAGF remains worried about the tactical air interdiction capabilities of its adversaries, especially with the usage of standoff air-launched precision-guided munitions (PGM) that are likely to be used against static and mobile SAM sites/networks of both the PLAGF and PLAAF.
PLAGF Mi-171 with Battlefield Surveillance Radar
PLAGF Battlefield GPS Jammer for SAM BatteryPLAGF Battlefield Surveillance RadarPLAGF Battlefield Surveillance Sensors on Wheeled & Tracked Armoured Vehicles
PLAGF Mast-Mounted Battlefield Surveillance Sensors The field artillery and fire-support systems fielded by the PLAGF (shown below) are all meant for providing immediate fire-support for advancing Battalion-sized PLAGF ground formations and are all armoured for protection from aerial straffing. The PLAGF believes in being self-sufficient in direct fire-support requirements, given the PLAAF’s inability to provide immediate air-support. This has been the case since 1962 and was also visible during the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, when China refrained from using the PLAAF and thereby kept such conflicts limited in nature, just so that it would not provoke the then-USSR into taking any military action against China.
PLAGF 130mm MBRL on Dongfeng EQ-2050 For Minefield-Clearing
ZTL-11 Assault AFV
PHZ-11 122mm Tracked MBRL
PCL-161 122mm MGS
PLZ-07A Tracked 122mm SPH
PLL-09 122mm Wheeled SPHPTL-02 120mm MortarPGZ-07 35mm SPAAGQSL-92 4 x 4 with HJ-9 ATGM The construction of new underground storage facilities at Bangda, Gyantse, Shannan, South Xinjiang, Tsetang and Zanda for tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) indicates that the PLAAF, which has been unable to procure fourth-generation deep-strike interdictor aircraft, will continue to rely on the PLARF’s arsenal of DF-15B and DF-16 TBMs for targetting those forward and principal air bases and ALGs of the Indian Air Force that are likely to be used in the event of any future limited high-intensity conventional war between China and India.
Also, the PLAAF has not yet qualified on its J-10B/C M-MRCAs and J-111/J-14 H-MRCAs all those home-grown air-launched standoff PGMs that it had procured in the previous decade for its second-generation JH-7A deep-interdictor combat aircraft.
Thus, the PLAGF’s vulnerabilities are three-fold: 1) the military hardware developed by China’s domestic military-industrial complex remains unproven in battlefields and consequently is of questionable quality. 2) The bulk of the PLAGF’s human resources come from compulsory military conscription and consequently professionalism/combat proficiency of its combat arms remains highly questionable. 3) The PLAGF’s combat integration with the PLAAF remains minimal and consequently the former remains highly vulnerable to hostile tactical air interdiction and deep air-strikes.
