Depsang Plain Area
Early last year, the Indian Army (IA) had concluded that the number of transgressions in the preceding months had been much more all along Sikkim and eastern Ladakh. Around March 2020 there was a paper by the IA’s Military Intelligence Directorate forecasting that the activity-level of China along the LAC is likely to remain as per the trend line. But it was later revised as the events elsewhere did not support this conclusion and it mentioned that “we have to be prepared for an adverse situation, which can be created by China along the LAC and the IA’s on-site formations have to be sensitised”. In early April 2020, the Directorate General of Military Intelligence and the Directorate General of Military Operations issued advisories to the IA’s HQ Northern Command.
Panggong Tso Area
Every year, the PLAGF goes to the Tibetan plateau for summertime military training, and these training areas are all along the G-219 Highway, which is around 200km from the LAC at its closest. From G-219, there are axial/radial roads to the LAC. The IA had picked up movement right up to G-219, and “blobs” of PLAGF positions were visible. Other countries, including the US, had also shared overhead satellite recce imagery with India. For the PLAGF troops to move up to the LAC or the launchpads is a matter of less than 24 hours in some cases, or 36 hours and that is precisely what happened at that point in time. The IA was monitoring where the PLAGF formations were sitting. After that, they came forward. Now that is at the strategic-level, their intent, that they wanted to do this, that was a gap. Had India known that they are going to do this, then obviously the IA would have also mobilised earlier.
Chushul & Spanggur Gap Areas
The PLAGF’s mobilisation along the G-219 was the same as previous years. If somebody is coming across and the IA sees a build-up, then the IA’s reserve formations too should have moved for forward deployment. The gap in being prepared for such action was at the lower level. Even during the height of the standoff last year, the PLAGF was not organised” for combat except in the Panggong Tso region where there was some deployment on the north bank and in the Kailash range and with its strength, the PLAGF was actually trying to intimidate. India had told her IA formations on the ground that the FOL (Fuel, Oil and Lubricant) dumps all along the Shyok Valley roads, they had to be dug down and other infrastructure built, so if tomorrow any firing starts, you can’t be caught in the open. There was talk initially that one reason why China diverted its forces to the LAC in the region last year was India’s building of its infrastructure with the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road. Yet China has never raised the road issue during any of the military-level talks.
PLAGF Deployments at Hot Springs
At Patrolling Point (PP) 15 and PP-17A in Hot Springs and Gogra Post, China “had agreed earlier” to pull back its troops but “later refused to vacate”. In the recent talks, China said that India “should be happy with what has been achieved”. At PP-15 and PP-17A, the current presence of PLA-BDR troops is of “Platoon-strength”, down from the “Company strength” earlier—an IA Platoon comprises 30-32 soldiers while a Company consists of 100-120 personnel. China has since then been attempting to make the Kugrang Tsangpo River as the new LAC at PP-15 and PP-17A in the Hot Springs sector.
Gogra & Hot Springs Areas
At Panggong Tso, though there is temporary suspension of patrolling by the two sides between Finger-4 and Finger-8 on the north bank, India has not been able to reach Finger-8, which it says marks the LAC, since the past three years (i.e. 2017) before the start of the standoff.
IA Deployments North & West of Panggong Tso Lake
The situation at the Depsang Plains pre-dates the standoff. IA and ITBP units have not been able to access their traditional patrolling limits since August 2013. But nothing happened there during the current crisis. In Depsang, the PLA-BDR units have been coming across and blocking Indian patrols at a number of these patrol points. PLA-BDR troops come every day in their Dongfeng 4 x 4 vehicles, and just block that passage. Consequently, India is not on a solid footing as far as the alignment (of the LAC) is concerned in Depsang. Starting from 2013, China built tracks, had better connectivity, so the PLA-BDR has been blocking the movements of the IA and ITBP.
IA Deployments East of Chushul
It was in 2008 that the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap Valley, which remains inaccessible until end-March. After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across the Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers, leaving only 45 days for effective patrolling by India. No human beings inhabit there. Local Ladakh Scouts personnel manned the posts there, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area had been lax. Trig Heights also known as Trade Junction, which connected Ladakh with Tibet in earlier days, is an area where PLA-BDR patrols began frequenting since June, July and August 2009. The PLA-BDR made 26 sorties in June, including two incursions by helicopters, and 21 in July. In August, PLA-BDR patrols entered into the India-controlled territory 26 times and walked away with petrol and kerosene meant for the IA and ITBP jawans. Back in 2008, the PLA-BDR troops had made 223 incursion attempts and left tell-tale signs. Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August—its BDR personnel usually spent a few hours before crossing back. But, during the 21-day Depsang standoff in April 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA-BDR set up remote camps 19km inside India-claimed territory. By August 2013, India lost 640 sq km due to “area denial” set by such PLA-BDR patrolling. PLA-BDR soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakhi Nallah near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO). Change in the river course was cited as another reason for the loss of 500-1,500 metres of land annually. In September 2015 the BLA-BDR erected a watch-tower in that area, but this was later destroyed by the IA.
IA Mortar Pits South of Chushul
Bottleneck or Y-Junction, the place where PLA-BDR troops have been obstructing IA/ITBP patrols since May 2015, is less than 30km to the south of DBO ALG and around 7km east of Burtse town. Bottleneck derives its name from a rocky outcrop that prevents vehicular movement across the Depsang Plain. By stalling Indian patrols at Bottleneck, PLA-BDR troops have been denying India access to five of the PPs: PP-10, PP-11, PP-11A, PP-12 and PP-13. These PPs lie on an arc of around 20km from Rakhi Nallah to Jiwan Nallah, on a line marked as the LoP or Limit of Patrolling, which lies 18km to the west of the LAC. This is the same place where the PLA-BDR had pitched tents after an ingress in April 2013. The standoff had then lasted three weeks before status quo ante was restored. In April 2020, aggressive patrolling by the ITBP had managed to push back the PLA-BDR troops back by at least 9km before they settled down at the present location, which is nearly 18 km inside India-claimed territory in the Depsang Plains. The PLA-BDR incursion was detected by the ITBP on the intervening night of April 15 and 16, which sent its Quick Reaction Team that not only prevented the PLA-BDR personnel from further ingressing in the area, but also pushed them back across the Rakhi Nallah. The situation would have further worsened if the ITBP personnel, deployed at an altitude of 17,000 feet ASL, had not moved in quickly.
IA Gunpits South of Chushul
PP-15 and PP-17A are two of the 65 patrolling points in Ladakh along the LAC. (Some of these 65 also have an additional Alpha PPs, which are further ahead from the original PPs. So PP-17A is different from, but close to, PP-17.) PP-15 is located in an area known as the Hot Springs, while PP-17A is near an area called the Gogra post. Both of these are close to the Chang Chenmo River in the Galwan sub-sector of the LAC in eastern Ladakh. While Hot Springs is just north of the Chang Chenmo river, Gogra Post is east of the point where the river takes a hairpin-bend coming southeast from Galwan Valley and turning southwest. The area lies close to Kongka La Pass, one of the main passes, which, according to China marks the boundary between India and China. India’s claim of the international boundary lies significantly east, as it includes the entire Aksai Chin area as well. During the official negotiations on the boundary between India and China in 1960, Yang Kung-su, who was the Tibet Bureau of Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Foreign Office, had stated that the Western Sector of the boundary “is divided into two portions, with Kongka La Pass as the dividing point” and the portion “north of Kongka La Pass is the boundary between Sinkiang (now Xinjiang) and Ladakh, and the portion south of it is that between Tibet and Ladakh”. Thus, Hot Springs and Gogra Post are close to the boundary between two of the most historically disturbed provinces of China. Both PP-15 and PP-17A are in an area where India and China largely agree on the alignment of the LAC, which comes southeast from the Galwan Valley, turns down at Konga La and moves towards Ann Pass before reaching the north bank of Panggong Tso. China has a manned observation post of the PLA-BDR a few km east of Kongka La, while IA and ITBP posts lie southwest of it. However, according to the official history of the 1962 war between India and China, the region is not identified as a major “launchpad” from where an offensive can be launched by either side.
IA Gunpits at Phobrang
The official history notes that the PLAGF had “succeeded in eliminating possible launch-pads for any offensive against G-219 by eliminating the DBO, Chushul and Demchok positions. It said that it “all the more strengthens the contention that the IA should have attempted to retain at least one jump-off point: Chushul”. But the history notes that Hot Springs was an important post even during the 1962 conflict. In October 1962 there was a Company-strength IA presence at the Galwan Post, while three other posts—Hot Springs, Nallah Junction and Patrol Base—had strengths of a Platoon each. Hot Spring also served as the Company HQ, and was shelled by the PLAGF on October 21. PLAGF troops had wanted to get behind Hot Spring, but were resisted at the Nallah Junction.
IA Ammo Warehouses at Tangtse
As two of the four initial friction-points during the recent standoff, disengagement of troops from PP-15 and PP-17A had started in June 2020, during the initial rounds of discussion. Both sides had agreed to disengage from PP-14 (Galwan Valley), PP-15 and PP-17A after the third round of meeting of the senior military commanders last June, following the Galwan Valley clashes. However, though China pulled back its troops from PP-14, it did not complete the disengagement from PP-15 and PP-17A.
IA SS-BSM Storage & Launch-Pads at Stakna