Inference: Whenever two neighbouring countries, when negotiating the delineation (on maps) and demarcation (on ground) of the mutually-applicable international boundaries (IB), resort to previous international treaties and historical paperwork relating to customary laws and traditions, this is not the case with Mainland China and India because, while the latter has documentation of the McMahon and Johnson-Ardagh Lines, the former has no such corresponding historical treaties or maps in its possession, since all such documentation was transferred from the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government in 1949 from Nanking (Nanjing) to Taiwan, where they today are preserved in a hardened underground tunnel complex located underneath the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall at Taipei’s Zhongzheng District. And without such documentation, China finds it impossible to agree on any legal parameter that is required for delineating and demarcating any IB and hence always insists that such documentation be superceded by a “political settlement”. It is for this reason that Mainland China will NEVER agree to negotiate the delineation and demarcation of not just the LAC, but even a legally-binding IB.
How Tibetan Ineptitude Reduced Pandit Nehru's Policy Options On Tibet
Inference: While popular perception dictates that India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru needs to be repeatedly excoriated for his government’s nonchalance in the face of stealthy military incursions by Mainland China into eastern Ladakh throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and for the disastrous and misguided “forward policy”, which constituted the actual casus belli for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962, little-known historical factoids instead prove that it was the sheer ineptitude of the Tibetan government between 1949 and 1950 that forced Pandit Nehru to compromise with Mainland China throughout the 1950s.
(To Be Concluded)