If anyone wants to go deep into why the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) fleet of multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) was sub-optimally utilised on the morning of February 27, 2019 over the skies of Jammu & Kashmir, then the following details need to be taken into account.
To improve the beyond-visual-range (BVR) capability of its MiG-21bis light-MRCAs, the IAF in 1995 selected the Phazotron NIIR-developed Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode monopulse pulse-Doppler radar, which was to be fitted on to each of the 125 MiG-21bis at a cost of US$840,000 (Rs.2.89 crore) per unit. The Kopyo was to be used in both the air-defence and ground-attack role for guiding air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground precision-guided weapons. A CAG audit noticed conducted in November 2009 revealed that since its induction, the performance of the Kopyo had not been satisfactory due to various inadequacies in the air-to-ground range (AGR) mode. One of the reasons for the poor performance was the software, which was still under development/modification as of July 2009. The IAF stated in November 2010 that specialists from Phazotron NIIR were sent in November 2010 to India to load new applications software to resolve the inaccuracies in AGR mode. However, there was no improvement in the AGR mode further.
The audit also noticed from the report submitted by the IAF’s South-Western Air Command in December 2010 that missile integration checks were successfully completed only in December 2010. India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated in November 2012 that AGR mode did remain inconsistent and inaccurate, but the BVR capability of an aircraft pertains to its capability to fire air-to-air missiles. The error in accuracy of AGR mode thus affected the delivery of air-to-ground weapons only and did not affect the BVR capability of the upgraded MiG-21 Bison fleet. The MoD also stated that further trials did not result in any significant inputs that could improve the AGR mode further. The MoD’s contention was in conflict with its reply on sub optimal performance of radar sub-assemblies and non-integration check of Vympel R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs till July 2009, which affected the MiG-21 Bison’s BVR capability during this period and expiry of life of several R-77s in December 2010.
The self-protection jammer (SPJ) is a critical electronic warfare (EW) equipment of any combat aircraft that contributes to the success of a mission. The MoD in February 1996 had procured 92 EL/L-8222 SPJ pods (82 for the IAF and 10 for the Indian Navy) from Israel Aerospace Industries’ ELTA Systems. Out of the 82 pods, 50 costing Rs.152 crore were for the MiG-21 Bisons, which were to be delivered between December 1997 and July 1999. However, these were actually delivered between August 2000 and December 2004. It was observed in February 2011 that during series upgradation, all the 125 MiG-21bis were modified for carriage of SPJ pods. However, only 50 SPJ pods were procured. A case was initiated by IAF HQ in July 2005 to procure an additional 36 SPJ pods for the MiG-21 Bisons to cater to 70% of the MiG-21 Bison fleet and the approval of the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) was obtained in January 2006. However, the proposal for procurement of additional SPJ pods was not processed in view of the limited residual life of the aircraft. Thus, only 43% of the MiG-21 Bison fleet was equipped with SPJ pods, leaving the remaining aircraft vulnerable to detection by hostile airborne multi-mode radars, thereby affecting the operational capability of IAF.
What also remains unexplained is why were multi-purpose SPJ pods (that can also accommodate guided-missiles and precision-guided weapons under them) available from OEMs like SaabTech of Sweden and TERMA of Denmark were never considered for procurement. Such fitments, interestingly, were available since the mid-1990s for light-MRCAs like Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen.
As per the contract of March 1996, there was a provision for Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) for manufacture and repair/overhaul of the MiG-21 Bisons and their sub-systems by the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). However, ToT could not materialise in spite of the IAF’s efforts, as well as those of MoD and HAL. Hence, IAF HQ directed HAL in May 2003 not to pursue the ToT for manufacture of the aggregates and suggested to establish diagnostic and repair/overhaul facilities for the Kopyo radars and other sub-systems of the MiG-21 Bison on a fast-track basis by January 2008. A CAG audit observed in April 2010 that though the repair facilities for Kopyo had been established by August 2008, these facilities by March 2009 needed further instrumentation for diagnosis and testing at an additional estimated cost of Rs.4.50 crore by HAL. Further, the full complement of training on repair of LRUs of the Kopyo could not be imparted by the OEM specialists due to non-availability of sufficient population of Cat ‘D’ repairable items, since most of the repairable items had been sent to Phazotron NIIR for repairs. Hence, additional training was required to be imparted to HAL personnel by deputation from Phazotron NIIR at an estimated cost of Rs.1.80 crore.
The audit also observed by April 2010 that repair and overhaul facilities for the Kopyo set up by HAL strictly fell under the category of second-line repair, which was also being established as intermediate-level facilities in all the MiG-21 Bison operating squadrons, and full-fledged depot-level facilities had not been set up by HAL. In April 2010, IAF HQ stated that setting up of depot-level maintenance/repair/overhaul (MRO) facilities had not been considered economically viable since the present facilities were being used only for the MiG-21 Bisons, and the same would not be useful after withdrawal of these aircraft from service. The calendar life of the MiG-21 Bisons had been extended by March 2010 to up to 40 years. Due to non-availability of complete MRO facilities, 297 LRUs of the MiG-21 Bisons and 564 LRUs of the MiG-21bis were offloaded to the Russian OEMs for repair/overhaul during the period from April 2007 to November 2009, against a long=term repair agreement (LTRA) concluded in April 2007 by HAL with the Russian OEMs involving a total repair cost of US$976,593.52 (Rs.4.33 crore). The MoD stated in November 2012 that efforts made to set up MRO facilities for components of the Kopyo MMR had not been successful and instead of setting up full MRO facilities, only diagnostic and repair facilities were proposed for HAL. The MoD further stated (November 2012 and March 2014) that in the absence of MRO facilities, all LRUs and components had to be sent to various Russian OEMs for repairs.
In March 2008, IAF HQ inked a contract with Russia’s RAC-MiG for upgradation and life-extension of 63 MiG-29B-12 air superiority combat aircraft. The contract was to be carried out in two stages i.e. (a) design and development (D & D) work in two years (2008-2010) on six aircraft in Russia and (b) series-upgrade of the remaining 57 aircraft in India (2010-2014). All of these were to be fitted with the D-29 EW suite, each of which comprises a Unified Receiver Exciter Processor (UREP) that encompasses a digital radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) elements, along with the ELT-568 self-protection jammer transceivers imported from Italy-based Elettronica.
Based on ASORs prepared by IAF HQ in October 2006 for an integrated EW suite for fitment on the IAF’s fleet of MiG-29B-12s, the DRDO’s Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) proposed in October 2007 the joint development of a state-of-art EW suite (D-29) with Elisra of Israel. In March 2010 the MoD sanctioned this project to DARE under Mission Mode (MM) for design and development of the D-29 at a cost of Rs.168.85 crore with a PDC of 33 months (December 2012). Accordingly, DARE in April 2010 signed a tripartite agreement with Israel’s Ministry of Defence and Elisra at a cost of US$26 million (Rs.115.57 crore) with a PDC of 28 months (by August 2012).
Meanwhile, based on another MoD sanction in March 2009, DARE signed a contract with RAC-MiG for the structural modification of six MiG-29B-12s (which were already in RAC-MiG’s possession for upgradation) for fitment of the proposed D-29 suite at a total cost of US$14.25 million (Rs.74.10 crore) with a PDC of 20 months (November 2010). During structural modifications, RAC-MiG encountered issues related to positioning and installation of the D-29’s LRUs, for which DARE in June 2011 suggested certain additional structural modifications on the six MiG-29 airframes.
However, three MiG-29UPGs after upgradation were delivered in December 2012 to the IAF by RAC-MiG (without the DARE-specified additional modifications) for facilitating the training of IAF pilots on the upgraded aircraft. The D-29 was fully developed by DARE in March 2013 but it could not be evaluated on the first three MiG-29UPGs received in India without the additional modifications, which was necessary to carry out testing of the D-29 suite. The remaining three aircraft, after upgradation and structural modifications (including additional modification) for fitment of the D-29 suite were received in India only in December 2013 due to delays by RAC-MiG.
The evaluation of the D-29 was further held up till October 2014 since the IAF used the upgraded MiG-29UPGs for testing various other mission-specific systems that were fitted by RAC-MiG for upgrading the aircraft. Thus, there was lack of synchronisation of upgradation with structural modifications (including additional modification) of the IAF’s fleet of MiG-29B-12s and development of the D-29 suite. By March 2015, DARE had spent Rs.199.82 crore on the development of the D-29 suite and structural modifications of the MiG-29B-12s.
(to be concluded)