Out of the earmarked strike-package of six IAF Mirage 2000s, it can now be safely inferred (based on local eye-witness accounts from Jabba Village in Balakot) that in the pre-dawn hours of February 26, three Mirage 2000s sequentially made a 360-degree circle around the target, following which one after another they conducted the air-strike (as per local eye-witnesses) on Jabba Top (at an elevation of 4,000 feet above sea-level) at Kagan Gali along the Kunhar River inside the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.
Each of the three Mirage 2000s were armed with three OFB-built 1,000lb high-speed low-drag bombs, thereby accounting for a total of nine HSLD bombs being dropped.
In the IAF’s MRCA inventory, the most versatile platforms are the Dassault Aviation-built Mirage 2000s as they have highest number of weapons-to-target-matching combinations, a feat that will be equaled in future by the Dassault Aviation-built Rafale M-MRCAs.
The aerial confrontation on the morning of February 27 involved eight F-16s, four Mirage-IIIs and four JF-17s of the PAF, and two MiG-21 Bisons, two upgraded Mirage 2000INs and four Su-30MKIs. But there was only one aerial engagement, this being between two PAF F-16s and two IAF MiG-21 Bisons.
While one MiG-21 Bison successfully engaged and shot down a tandem-seat F-16 (B or D variant) with one R-73E IIR-guided missile, this very MiG-21 Bison was shot down by one AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM missile fired by another F-16. Another AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM was unsuccessfully fired toward the second MiG-21 Bison, and this missile eventually harmlessly landed inside Indian territory.
There are only two plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of SRAAMs for this aerial engagement: 1) The PAF was unsure whether or not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with IRST sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect); 2) The PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison and Su-30MKI.
The only plausible reason why all other IAF MRCAs airborne in that area were directed NOT TO engage the PAF strike force was because the latter was maintaining a 10km distance from the LoC (as per the 1989 bilateral agreement on confidence-building measures) between India and Pakistan) while at the same time dropping its LGBs from altitudes varying from 10,000 feet to 15,000 feet. So, all the four PAF MRCAs involved in the actual air-to-ground strike were inside the airspace of PoK. In retrospect, this appears to be a wrong interpretation of the 1989 bilateral agreement, which in turn led to a flawed rules of engagement put in motion by the IAF.
Another plausible reason that explains the IAF’s reticence to engage the PAF’s large-sized strike package is the lack of tactical data-links (TDL) on-board the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft and on the fleet of AEW & CS platforms, which prevents the latter from providing real-time airborne battle management cues to airborne IAF combat aircraft while operating inside contested/hostile airspace. TDLs come in two types: the L-band TDL for two-way line-of-sight communications; and a UHF-band SATCOM TDL, for which the IAF’s combat aircraft need to be equipped with SATCOM receivers.
(to be concluded)